



Reassessment of the
Recommendations
of
The Medallic Recognition Joint
Working Group
on
New Zealand Military Service in
South East Asia 1955 to 1989

March 2021

**REASSESSMENT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP ON
NEW ZEALAND MILITARY SERVICE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 1955 TO 1989**

CONTENTS

SECTION 1	Executive Summary	5
SECTION 2	Introduction	7
SECTION 3	The 2013 Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group Report and the approach taken to the Reassessment	8
SECTION 4	New Zealand Armed Forces service in South East Asia	12
SECTION 5	Current Medallic Recognition for service in South East Asia	16
SECTION 6	The New Zealand Operational Service Criteria for Medallic Recognition	19
SECTION 7	Reassessment of the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group report and its recommendations	21
SECTION 8	Conclusions	36
SECTION 9	Peer Review Comments	39
SECTION 10	Recommendations	42
MAPS		44
ANNEXES		46
BIBLIOGRAPHY		56

SECTION 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In 2011 the independent Medallic Review Joint Working Group (MRJWG) was tasked by the then Minister of Defence, Hon Dr Wayne Mapp, QSO to review the medallic grievances relating to service in South East Asia¹. The MRJWG reported in late 2013 and recommended that there should be no additional medallic recognition. The Hon Dr Jonathan Coleman, the then Minister of Defence agreed with the MRJWG's recommendations. In late 2017 the then Chief of Defence Force agreed in late 2017 to the NZDF undertaking a reassessment of the MRJWG recommendations after requests from veterans groups and the Royal New Zealand Returned and Services' Association (RNZRSA).
2. Veterans' groups have highlighted differences in New Zealand and Australian medallic recognition for South East Asia, with the latter providing medallic recognition for the entire 1955 to 1989 period. Much of this Australian service was originally classified as peacetime but has been subsequently recategorised as non-warlike operational service after the implementation of a 1995 Coalition election promise and the subsequent reviews to address anomalies and inconsistencies resulting from this decision.
3. The reassessment conducted by the NZDF was based on the Cabinet-approved New Zealand medallic principles and used the NZDF operational threat matrix as a guide to determining operational threat levels.
4. The reassessment found that the MRJWG final report was missing some potentially critical information which may have reshaped some of its conclusions.
5. The threat from communist insurgents on the Malay Peninsula was higher than that believed by the MRJWG. Material that has subsequently become available has shown an ongoing insurgency that increased in tempo from the late 1960s into the early 1980s. That threat did not significantly increase risk, as New Zealand forces did not train in areas vulnerable to insurgent activity or that had not been previously cleared by Malaysian forces. If there were any signs of insurgent forces New Zealand personnel were withdrawn from the area.
6. The reassessment concluded that threat levels during the month-long 1RNZIR company deployments to protect the Butterworth Air Base near Penang in northern Malaysia between 1971 and 1973 were higher than had been previously thought. Declassified material has shown that the deployment was clearly for operational reasons rather than for the stated training purposes. Intelligence assessments and operational visits identified a clear threat to the Base and the Australian Mirage fighters stationed there that required an additional layer of protection through the deployment of a rifle company initially from Singapore (shared between Australia and New Zealand) and subsequently directly from Australia. It is recommended that the 1RNZIR deployments to Butterworth Air Base between 1971 and 1973 be considered operational service.

¹ Throughout the report, the current convention of writing "South East Asia" without a hyphen between "South" and "East" is used except where it was in a contemporary title. While the reassessment focuses on Malaya, Malaysia and Singapore, the term South East Asia is used generically and covers a wider area north to the Taiwan Strait and east to Indonesia and the Philippines.

7. The 2020 reassessment did not identify any additional specific periods of naval service that clearly meet the operational service criteria. It does, however, conclude that naval service over the full period (1959-1974) has not received appropriate medallic recognition. Throughout the period the RNZN deployments were part of a formal Commonwealth commitment as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) and the Australia New Zealand United Kingdom (ANZUK) Force. These both had operational roles and which were also actively preparing for operations. The naval commitment primarily had a deterrent role maintaining a presence throughout the region and being available to provide assistance to merchant shipping if required. Given the extended duration of this service, it is challenging to separate out specific often short periods where the military threat increased to above the threshold required for award of a campaign medal.
8. The reassessment suggests that there is a need for a wider approach to medallic recognition for South East Asia. Rather than taking a pepper pot approach to separating out periods of service there is a need to take a more inclusive approach such as has been taken more recently for the extended deployments in Timor-Leste (13 years) and Afghanistan (19 years) where the nature of the threat has varied between High and Low (and Very Low for a brief period in Timor-Leste). In addition, there is a need to carefully balance service in South East Asia with other similar service which has received medallic recognition.
9. South East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s was generally, but not always, above the threshold of contemporary peacetime service which is one of the key principles of operational service. It is considered that if the government judges that *“a particular area is vulnerable to attack and dispatch armed forces there, they are sending forces [potentially] into harm’s way, or danger.”*²
10. While the threat may vary from time to time, or not be realised, it still needs to receive recognition. Such an approach is also consistent with the Government’s medallic principles, particularly Principle 1 – “medals are awarded to recognise service that is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand”. While there is a need to take a more inclusive approach to medallic recognition for service in South East Asia it is equally important that more anomalies and grievances are not created. It is recommended that the Minister of Defence approve the award of the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (NZOSM) to all New Zealand Armed Forces personnel posted or attached to the FESR and the ANZUK Force and associated units between 31 January 1959 and 31 January 1974. Personnel who already qualify for the NZOSM through operational service in the Malayan Emergency, Thai-Malay border, Indonesian Confrontation, Thailand and Vietnam will not receive any additional recognition.
11. No other changes to medallic entitlements are recommended. New Zealand Force South East Asia (NZFORSEA) which was established on 1 February 1974 did not have an operational role nor were personnel exposed to operational threats apart from in fleeting ways. NZFORSEA was based in Singapore until its withdrawal to New Zealand in 1989.

² “The Report on the Review of Veterans’ Entitlements”, Hon John Clarke, QC, January 2003 (Australian Government)

SECTION 2

INTRODUCTION

12. Between 1949 and 1989 New Zealand Armed Forces personnel served continuously in South East Asia, initially as part of Commonwealth forces in various guises and then subsequently as NZFORSEA. Issues around medallic recognition for the period after the end of the Malayan Emergency in 1960 continue to be an ongoing source of contention despite various efforts to resolve them in the last three decades.
13. In 2011, the then Minister of Defence, the Hon Dr Wayne Mapp, tasked the MRJWG to review all medallic grievances relating to service in South East Asia. The intention was that once this work was complete there would be no further official consideration of medallic recognition for that service. The MRJWG was independently chaired by Neil Walter, a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
14. The MRJWG reported in late 2013 (at Enclosure 1).³ It recommended that there should be no additional medallic recognition for service in South East Asia. After Ministerial consideration, the Hon Dr Jonathan Coleman, the then Minister of Defence, issued a statement saying that:

the Government agrees with the Joint Working Group's finding that the New Zealand Defence Service Medal is the appropriate medallic recognition for personnel who served throughout the world in a range of deployments that do not meet the criteria for operational service. Nearly all military personnel who served in South-East Asia from 1950 are eligible for this medal.⁴

15. The Government's decision disappointed veterans' groups. In October 2016, the RNZRSA National Council requested further work be undertaken based on additional information that had now become available. Given the 2014 decision was considered the final reassessment of the issues, there was a reluctance to again revisit the issues. Additionally, it was not practical to reconvene the MRJWG.
16. In late 2017 the previous Chief of Defence Force (CDF) agreed (after consultation with the new Minister of Defence, Hon Ron Mark) that the NZDF would undertake a further analysis based on the additional information and the availability of declassified Australian documents. The CDF's view was that it was important that the final decision on whether there was medallic recognition for a large group of military personnel who served New Zealand should be as thorough as possible.

³ This report was publicly accessible online from 2014 to 2020 on the NZDF Medals website. It is not currently available on the internet, but is on the NZDF intranet at: http://medals.nzdf.dixs.mil.nz/seasia/documents/MRJWGReport_000.pdf

⁴ Hon Dr Jonathan Coleman, Press Release 14 March 2014, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/medallic-recognition-joint-working-group-service-south-east-asia-1950-2011>

SECTION 3

THE 2013 MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP REPORT AND APPROACH TAKEN FOR THE REASSESSMENT

17. The MRJWG had been formed in 2009 at the direction of the then Minister of Defence, Dr Wayne Mapp QSO, to consider options, undertake consultation, prepare recommendations and draft eligibility criteria for the proposed New Zealand Defence Service Medal (covering all service in the Armed Forces since 1945 and introduced in 2011). Dr Mapp subsequently tasked the MRJWG to undertake consultation and then finalise a review of military service in South East Asia from 1950 to 1975 (subsequently extended to 1989). The consultation document was based on a research report prepared by an independent historian, Peter Cooke.
18. This was the first substantial New Zealand operational medallic review undertaken outside the auspices of the NZDF. The independent chair, Neil Walter CNZM, had been a senior New Zealand diplomat, including serving as Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade between 1999 and 2002. Other prominent members of the MRJWG included: the late Lieutenant General (Rtd) Don McIver, CMG, OBE; Air Vice-Marshal (Rtd) Robin Klitscher, CBE, DFC, AFC; Rear Admiral (Rtd) Ian Hunter, CB; and the then General Manager Veterans' Affairs, the late Brigadier (Rtd) Rick Ottaway, MBE⁵. They were supported by medal advisors from the NZDF and NZ Police as well as having access to advice from the Cabinet Office's Honours Secretariat.
19. The direction by Dr Mapp for the MRJWG to review South East Asia medallic entitlements inevitably created an expectation among many ex-Service persons of additional medallic recognition similar to Australia's approach. The institution of the Defence Service Medal had addressed one long-standing grievance and there was a view that Dr Mapp was sympathetic to their case. Veterans' groups have subsequently quoted handwritten comments by Dr Mapp on 29 October 2010 (released under the OIA) stating that "I actually consider we should provide a SE Asia Medal 1950-1975. It is quite different from all other service during that period."⁶
20. The review provided veterans individually and collectively the opportunity to make submissions arguing their cases and also comment on the report of the historian. The MRJWG released a public consultation document in 2011, and 68 submissions were received. In an interim report dated 2 November 2011, the Chair of the MRJWG noted that submissions from veterans fell into three groups: those who wanted all service in South East Asia to be given additional recognition; those claiming that a particular type of service should be classified as "operational service"; and those who considered one or more specific incidents warranted special medallic recognition.
21. After considering the historian's report and the submissions and testing them against the medallic principles provided to the MRJWG by the Minister, the working group reported that its initial view was that there was no service that warranted additional medallic recognition. The MRJWG did, however, caveat this with the need to undertake more research on transits of the Straits of Indonesia and the Taiwan Strait.

⁵ Lieutenant General McIver was then President of the Royal New Zealand Returned and Services' Association (RNZRSA), was a former Chief of General Staff and a veteran of service in the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation in Borneo, and Vietnam as well as being the Director of the Security Intelligence Service 1991-1999. Air Vice-Marshal Klitscher was a former Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, a veteran of Vietnam (where he was decorated for gallantry), and former President of the RNZRSA. Rear Admiral Hunter was a former Chief of Navy, twice a frigate commanding officer, and served with FESR. Brigadier Ottaway was a Vietnam veteran and served twice in Singapore.

⁶ See for example an article by Frank Rands "The history of medallic recognition – FESR & ANZUK" dated 10 January 2020 <https://rnzncomms.org/the-history-medallic-recognition-fesr-anzuk/>

22. In its final report dated 2 December 2013 the MRJWG advised the Minister that after further detailed historical research there was minimal or no threat to RNZN vessels during these transits and no additional medallic recognition was justified. It also confirmed its recommendation that no further medallic recognition be instituted for service in South East Asia between 1950 and 1989.

Reassessment of MRJWG Recommendations

23. Veterans' groups' complaints around the decision not to provide additional medallic recognition for South East Asia centre around three particular issues which are the focus of this reassessment:

- The threat to both Army and RNZAF personnel from the ebb and flow of the ongoing insurgency in Malaysia.
- The deployment of New Zealand infantry rifle companies to protect the Butterworth airbase near Penang in northern Malaysia 1971-73.
- RNZN deployments both as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve and ANZUK Force, as well as passage through disputed international waterways.

24. The current reassessment of the MRJWG's recommendations has been undertaken under the oversight of the Director Heritage Commemorations and Protocol within Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force. He had no involvement at all with the work undertaken by the MRJWG.⁷ In addition to material provided by veterans and the Australian Department of Defence, there has also been an exhaustive archival search for information relating to threat assessments, directives issued to commanders and other official documents (classified and declassified). For completeness, a bibliography of documents and other material used in the reassessment is included. This includes a number of British and Australian reports and reviews relating to medallic recognition in South East Asia.⁸

25. Public submissions to the MRJWG have also been reassessed to ensure that appropriate weighting has been given to views or recollections that cannot be otherwise substantiated through official sources.

⁷ The Director Heritage Commemorations and Protocol is John McLeod, ONZM. He is a former Army officer, who led the medallic review work 1994-1998 and 2000-2003 which resulted in service on the Thai/Malay border between 1960 and 1964, Suez 1956, naval service in Malaya and Confrontation and a range of other service being recognised as well as the institution of the New Zealand Operational Service Medal, the New Zealand Special Service Medal and the New Zealand General Service Medal 2002.

⁸ These include: the UK report "Military Medals Review" undertaken by Sir John Holmes in 2012; the Australian 1994 "Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Defence Awards"; the Australian "Review of Service Entitlement Anomalies in respect of South-East Asian Service 1945-75" prepared by Major General Judge PF Mohr in February 2000; "The Report on the Review of Veterans' Entitlements", Hon John Clarke, QC, January 2003; and various reports by the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal including their 2020 report on service at Butterworth Air Force Base in Malaysia.

26. Historian Peter Cooke was not available to be involved as he felt he was now too far removed in time from his initial work. The Defence Historian, John Crawford, provided advice on additional sources that may need to be considered and has reviewed the draft final report. His comments are included below. This information has then been assessed against the New Zealand Government principles and as best as possible against the NZDF criteria for operational recognition for medallic purposes.⁹
27. Service between 1955 and January 1959 in Malaya was not considered by the MRJWG as all operational service until 31 July 1960 (with the exception of Singapore from 1 February 1959) was covered by either the (British) General Service Medal or the (British) Naval General Service Medal. The re-consideration did not include service in Vietnam or Thailand which had already received medallic recognition.

General Comment on Reassessment of Historic Medallic Grievances

28. There continues to be ongoing pressure from individuals and veterans' groups within Commonwealth countries to revisit past medallic decisions, many made more than 50 years ago. They are convinced that the wrong decisions have been taken, and that substantial injustices have been done. Some of the issues had been looked at by the authorities several times in the past, with varying results, but the campaigners have been determined not to give up, convinced that their cases have not been properly considered.
29. One of the key questions to be asked is how far is it right and reasonable to reopen past medallic decisions decades after they were taken and to keep seeking reviews of the reviews until a particular authority (or politician) is convinced to support their standpoint? It is a general honours' principle that we should not try to substitute our contemporary judgment for that of those responsible at the time. We bring a different set of attitudes and sensitivities to those prevalent when the decisions were taken. We cannot know or understand the context in which they were operating at the time, or all the considerations and knowledge they had in their minds. We should not therefore second-guess them, armed with hindsight.

⁹ An early draft of this report was shown to Neil Walter, the Chair of the MRJWG, to seek his view on some of the additional information. It was subsequently decided by NZDF that the reassessment needed to be entirely separate from the MRJWG, noting that two members had subsequently died and that the MRJWG had made their good faith decisions based on the available material and they had subsequently been disbanded. Donald Anderson and Jack Hayes who provided policy advice and acted as the Secretariat for the MRJWG (as members of the Heritage Commemorations and Protocol Group) have undertaken much of the additional research for this reassessment. Their extremely thorough research efforts have uncovered much of the new information, as well as followed the trail of others to confirm that they actually had been destroyed.

30. This issue was eloquently addressed by Sir John Holmes in his 2012 “Military Medal Review” in the United Kingdom.

The fact that there is pressure to reopen a past decision is not by itself sufficient grounds to do so.... The fact that campaigners feel strongly about a specific issue does not mean they are right. Nor does the existence of significant public, press and political support for any particular campaign. However they do suggest that cases of this kind need to be considered particularly carefully, with some degree of transparency. Otherwise the feeling of injustice will be reinforced by frustration at an apparent brick wall of bureaucratic obstruction, however unfair this may be to those trying to implement a sensible and balanced policy....

In other areas of life, including decisions of the courts, we are from time to time ready to revisit decisions which seem to have been badly made and if appropriate to try to right wrongs. It is not necessarily the case that agreeing to one “concession” will inevitably lead to many more. Fear of precedent is not always a good guide to policy, however bureaucratically convenient.

Moreover, over past years, a number of decisions have been taken which have gone against the system's own rules. Previous medal decisions have been overturned years later, wearing of “double medals” has been permitted in some cases.... These have undermined the credibility of the principles and rules, and reinforced a feeling on the part of the campaigners that double standards are at work....

It is impossible to lay down hard and fast rules in advance about what would justify recommending a change to a past decision, but there would need to be at a minimum evidence of a significant injustice or inconsistency affecting a substantial group of individuals, a sufficient degree of assurance that the requirements of risk and rigour were genuinely met, and satisfaction that new inconsistencies were not being created.¹⁰

31. The challenge when addressing veterans' concerns or redressing past injustices is to avoid solutions which in turn create other inconsistencies or anomalies and to develop solutions which are seen by other veterans' groups as fair and not devaluing the status of their own awards. This is particularly pertinent for South East Asia where there is an interrelated array of RNZN, Army and RNZAF service which is difficult to further separate into discreet components. Australia found this when the implementation of a Coalition election promise in 1995 to provide medallic recognition for the naval element of the FESR led to an unfair situation and new anomalies. It had a cascading effect requiring further reviews and further awards to create consistency and fairness.

¹⁰ Sir John Holmes, “Military Medal Review”, 2012, United Kingdom Cabinet Office. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61398/Medals-Interim-Report-July-12.pdf

SECTION 4

NEW ZEALAND ARMED FORCES SERVICE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

Strategic Environment

32. “Forward Defence” in Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was part of a major shift in New Zealand’s defence strategy in order to keep communism as far away from our shores as possible. As part of this strategy New Zealand was a signatory to the 1954 South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, or Manila Pact, which included, among other countries, the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. The implementation of this Treaty was effected through the 1955 South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).¹¹ It covered each of the parties from armed attack, whether direct or insurgent. The main focus was on the threat of limited war with China in which Chinese forces would drive south into South East Asia. From New Zealand’s perspective it appeared to “provide a flexible back-up against conventional attacks and insurgency in South-East Asia”.¹²
33. As part of a wider national strategy New Zealand sought to help combat the spread of communism by contributing to the improvement of living standards in Asian countries through membership of the Colombo Plan. This was an extensive programme particularly over the period of New Zealand’s military involvement in South East Asia and which continues today in a different guise.
34. In line with the “Forward Defence” policy, New Zealand military forces were deployed to what is modern-day Malaysia and Singapore in 1955 as part of the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR). This deployment was initially under British colonial arrangements, but subsequently it fell under the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) which provided a security umbrella for the newly independent Federation of Malaya.
35. New Zealand was not willing, however, to accept the formal treaty obligations adopted by Britain for the external defence of Malaya through AMDA. Australia and New Zealand determined that their best course would be to associate themselves with the agreement by means of an exchange of letters between the governments. The letters would set out the rights and obligations held by each country, and limit the obligations to those incurred by the presence of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in the country.¹³ This agreement was used as a basis for Australian and New Zealand involvement in the Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation.¹⁴
36. AMDA was replaced with the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in 1971 with the termination of the United Kingdom’s defence guarantees of Malaysia. Under FPDA the five ‘powers’ (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the UK) agreed to consult each other “immediately” in the event or threat of an armed attack on any of the five countries for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in response. There is no specific commitment to intervene militarily.

¹¹ Membership included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom. A protocol extended application of the treaty to Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam.

¹² Ian McGibbon (ed), *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.481

¹³ Rolfe, Jim, “New Zealand’s Security: Alliances and Other Military Relationships”, Working Paper 10/97, <https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/strategic-studies/documents/working-papers/wp-10.pdf>

¹⁴ When Malaysia was created in 1963, AMDA was re-named the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement and continued to provide some measure of security to the new federation.

37. The operational command of New Zealand forces attached to the FESR was the Commander-in-Chief, Far East through the Anglo-New Zealand-Australia-Malaya (ANZAM) Defence Committee. The operations of the New Zealand components of the FESR were defined by directives issued by the New Zealand Chiefs-of-Staff Committee (after clearance by the New Zealand Government) to the ANZAM Defence Committee. Each of the New Zealand naval, land and air components had their own directive under that overarching directive. These clearly laid down the limitations on the employment of New Zealand forces and the requirements to seek national approval for employment outside that.
38. An example of this is the deployment of 1RNZIR to react to Indonesian landings on the Malay Peninsula in September 1964. This was delayed because the New Zealand Government wanted to ensure that it was not seen to be connected to the riots in Singapore. The Directive to the New Zealand forces in the Commonwealth FESR prohibited their involvement in policing civil unrest. Permission was given once it was seen that this was a “clear-cut military action”.¹⁵
39. In 1959, the British Commonwealth FESR forces including those of New Zealand were designated as part of the military contingency planning for responses under specific SEATO plans. This became an issue as Malaya was not a member of SEATO, and would not allow what was described in the Malayan media as a “fire brigade” of the Commonwealth to deploy directly from its bases into Asian “hot spots”. It insisted that this occurred via a third country such as Singapore. Chris Pugsley in his official history noted that these events highlighted “the fundamental fact that the whole position of [the] Strategic Reserve in Federation depends ultimately on Malayan goodwill, regardless of provisions of [the] 1957 Defence Agreement”.¹⁶
40. The FESR was never formally used in active operations under SEATO auspices. New Zealand forces came close to being part of active operations in 1961 when the SEATO Plan No. 5 involving military intervention in Laos was activated. New Zealand was prepared to deploy a New Zealand rifle company (from Malaya) with a British battalion. Preparations were made for operations including preparatory moves and concentration, but, in the end, a deployment was not required.¹⁷ In 1962, New Zealand deployed special forces supported by three RNZAF transport aircraft from Singapore to northern Thailand as part of a SEATO show of commitment to Thailand to defend its borders from an incursion from Laos (this deployment belatedly received medallic recognition in 2003 after a case was made to Government by the NZDF).¹⁸
41. It is estimated that in all 17,500 to 18,500 New Zealand Armed Forces personnel of all three Services served in the South East Asia area (Malaya/Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam) between 1959 and 1989. Many of these individuals served on two or more deployments in South East Asia while thousands of other personnel were deployed into the region for training exercises.

¹⁵ Note by Chris Pugsley on draft 18 February 2021

¹⁶ Pugsley, p.174

¹⁷ Pugsley, pp. 175-76

¹⁸ This was part of a wider NZDF submission to Government addressing retrospective medallic issues for service in north-east Thailand between 1962 and 1971. In the 1960s Thailand was threatened by a communist invasion along its lengthy north-eastern border with Laos. As well, communist insurgency in the north-east of Thailand in the 1960s and the early 1970s was a considerable problem for the Thai government.

FESR/ANZUK

42. The FESR was the combined military forces of the British, Australian and New Zealand armed forces based in Malaya and Singapore from 1955 to 1971. It was “equipped and trained to a level at least sufficient to participate in operations at short notice against the forces of a first class Asian power”.¹⁹ The New Zealand component, from 1959, was one infantry battalion, one or two RNZAF squadrons and one or more RNZN frigates or cruisers. Army and RNZAF personnel usually served for two years in Malaya/Malaysia or Singapore and the postings were married accompanied. RNZN ships spent about six to nine months in a wide range of locations in South East Asia while serving as part of FESR, with Singapore Naval Base being their home port while on deployment.
43. FESR was replaced by the smaller ANZUK force from 1 November 1971 to 31 January 1974. The ANZUK commitment consisted of one infantry battalion, support units, the force headquarters and RNZAF aircraft permanently based in Singapore, with a RNZN frigate also deployed to South East Asia for periods of usually three to six months.
44. The primary role of the FESR was to provide “a deterrent to further Communist aggression in South East Asia”, with the military units ready to be used in defensive operations in the event of an attack on Malaya, Singapore or the sea lines of communication around it. As originally conceived, the FESR was intended to provide forces that could move quickly forward in southern Thailand and occupy positions on the Kra Isthmus, the best defensive positions in the event of Chinese forces approaching Malaya. The secondary role was to assist when required in the maintenance of the security of Malaya and Singapore. RNZN vessels attached to the FESR were authorised by New Zealand for service outside the Malayan theatre. This included the patrols in the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait and protecting British merchant vessels against intervention from Chinese communist or Chinese nationalist warships or aircraft.²⁰
45. FESR ended because of Britain’s decision to significantly reduce the number of its military personnel who were based in locations east of the Suez Canal, especially those in South East Asia. ANZUK had a very different role to that envisaged for the FESR and was in practice an integrated command and control force of the three countries rather than a military arm of the FPDA.
46. New Zealand ground forces were attached to the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade and were based in Ipoh and Taiping in northern Malaya until November 1961. Subsequently, these ground forces were based in Terendak in Malacca further south until 1970, and then relocated to Singapore. 14 and 41 Squadrons operated out of Singapore.

¹⁹ Secretary for War Pensions Directive 2/2007, RNZN Service in the Malayan Conflict, 8 August 2007

²⁰ *ibid*

NZFORSEA

47. ANZUK was replaced by NZFORSEA from 31 January 1974, which was based in Singapore until its withdrawal to New Zealand in 1989. The New Zealand Government made the strategic decision in about 1973 that they would continue to base military personnel in South East Asia but in a different role which was non-operational. From early 1975, there was no longer a continuous RNZN warship presence in South East Asia.
48. As it considered there was no operational need for New Zealand to maintain standing forces in South East Asia, the 1972-75 Labour Government decided to follow the lead of the British and Australian Governments and also withdraw their forces. This decision was reversed in 1976 by the incoming National Government because of the infrastructure cost of relocating 1RNZIR and supporting units to a camp within New Zealand.
49. The role of NZFORSEA was to:
 - a. Promote stability in the area;
 - b. Enhance New Zealand's political and diplomatic influence in the region;
 - c. Implement the New Zealand Government Mutual Assistance Programme, where the New Zealand Armed Forces provided assistance and conducted exercises with the armed forces of countries in the area; and
 - d. Assist the development of the Armed Forces of countries in the area.²¹

²¹ ABFK 7494, W5563, Box 41, Part 1, Record 107/8/3/1
Establishments Overseas Units-AUZUK Forces
Singapore (R17293669)

SECTION 5

CURRENT MEDALLIC RECOGNITION FOR SERVICE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

New Zealand Medallic Entitlements for South East Asia

50. In the 1950s and 1960s the United Kingdom instituted medallic recognition for British Commonwealth forces posted to FESR who served on operations during the Malayan Emergency (1948-60) and the Indonesian Confrontation (1962-66). Eligible New Zealand Armed Forces personnel received a British General Service Medal or a British Naval General Service Medal for this service. There was no specifically New Zealand medallic recognition.
51. In the 1990s New Zealand began its divergence from the British system of medallic recognition for overseas military deployments. Previously New Zealand governments had permitted British-centric warrants and regulations as well as British medallic policy to be the determinant of New Zealand medallic entitlements. The policy changes in the 1990s and 2000s resulted in more than 40,000 personnel becoming entitled to either British awards or newly instituted New Zealand operational awards (including the New Zealand Operational Service Medal) for service across the world.
52. There is now a comprehensive set of medallic recognition for all periods of service in South East Asia where there was an explicit decision by the New Zealand Government to commit personnel to operations. In some cases, the interpretations of regulations for the British Commonwealth medals have been clarified or provided a more New Zealand-centric focus. Where this has not been possible, a New Zealand medal has been used to provide medallic coverage. Full details of the awards and changes in eligibility and interpretation as well as foreign awards are detailed at Annex B.
53. About 6,000 personnel who served in South East Asia between February 1959 and May 1975 qualify for one or more of the nine British or New Zealand campaign medals for specific theatre conflicts (Malayan Emergency, Thai-Malay border counter-insurgency patrols, Indonesian Confrontation, Vietnam). Approximately another 1,000 personnel are eligible for the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (NZOSM) only, as the Government recognises the period of service in Singapore between 1 February 1959 and 31 July 1960 as qualifying service or the individual completed between 7 and 29 days toward one of the campaign medals which required 30 days service. The British General Service Medal had been closed off for Singapore on 31 January 1959.
54. An estimated 4,500 NZ Armed Forces personnel who served in South East Asia from February 1959 to January 1974 do not qualify for any operational medals. About half of these personnel are still living. The main groups without medallic recognition in this period are RNZN and RNZAF personnel across the entire period and about 1,000 Army personnel who served in South East Asia from 1967 to 1974 but did not serve in Vietnam or have previous service in the Malayan Emergency, on the Thai-Malay border or in Indonesian Confrontation. Approximately another 7,000 to 8,000 personnel only served in South East Asia between February 1974 and 1989 for which there is no operational medallic recognition.

Australian Medallion Recognition for South East Asia

55. Veterans regularly cite the differences between Australian and New Zealand medallion recognition as justification for an award. Australia uses the Australian Service Medal (1945-75) and the Australian Service Medal (1975-2012) to recognise all non-warlike service in South East Asia. The two Australian Service Medals contain components of the New Zealand General Service Medal, the New Zealand Operational Service Medal and the New Zealand Special Service Medal, but also include service that is unlikely to be recognised by New Zealand such as nation building in Papua New Guinea 1945-75.²² Only warlike service is considered qualifying service for an Australian service pension, Australian Veterans' Gold Card and Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Scheme (similar to NZ's Veterans' SuperGold card and accompanying Community Services Card) or the Australian Active Service Medal 1945-75.
56. The 1992 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Defence Awards chaired by General Peter Gratton, a former Australian Chief of Defence Force, proposed the establishment of the Australia Service Medal 1945-75 and the addressing of grievances relating to occupation service in Japan, post-Korean War service, and service on the Thai-Malay border 1960-64 (all recognised by New Zealand between 1995 and 1998). It did not support veterans requests to establish a separate award for the FESR and for service in Singapore and in Butterworth post-Confrontation. The Committee considered that it was not markedly more demanding or hazardous than normal peacetime service.
57. As a consequence of lobbying by veterans' groups this decision became an Australian election issue. In 1996, the new Coalition Government carried through an election promise introducing the clasp "FESR" for the Australian Service Medal 1945-75.²³ This then created what became a cascading series of anomalies where Army and Air Force personnel and those serving post 1971 did not receive any similar medallion recognition.
58. This contravened an Australian service recognition principle which states, inter alia, "*care must be taken that in recognising the service by some, the comparable service of others is not overlooked or degraded*".²⁴ Rectifying each anomaly resulted in more clasps and wider entitlements. Service classified as "peacetime" by previous reviews²⁵ was reclassified as non-warlike for the purposes of medallion recognition to the extent that all service in South East Asia between 1950 and 1989 now receives a form of Australian medallion recognition.

²² The definition of non-warlike service used for the Australian Service Medal is at Annex C.

²³ "Coalition makes its own Australia Remembers Commitment by Widening Service Medal Entitlement", Press Release 27 September 1995. Vice Chief of Defence Force Submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, VCDF/OUT/2010/492, 23 June 2010

²⁴ Minute to Chief of Defence Force from Director-General Defence Personnel Executive, dated 28 March 2001. Vice Chief of Defence Force Submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, VCDF/OUT/2010/492, 23 June 2010

²⁵ Gratton (1994), Mohr (1999) and Clarke (2003)

Form of Medallic Recognition sought in submissions to the MRJWG

59. There were requests for a range of medallic recognition from veterans making submissions to the MRJWG. As would be expected, many sought recognition in the same manner as Australia through the award of the New Zealand General Service Medal 1992 (Non-Warlike). This has the benefit of automatically qualifying for a second medal – the New Zealand Operational Service Medal – and coming with clasps which described the location or type of service. This is particularly important to naval veterans who want a FESR clasp on a medal in the same way their Australian counterparts do. While both New Zealand and Australia have moved away from clasps on operational medals, this was the form of recognition at the time of service in South East Asia and service already recognised has clasps for “Malaya” (the Malayan Emergency) and “Borneo” and “Malay Peninsula” (Confrontation).
60. There were mixed views on the New Zealand Operational Service Medal. Some submitters disparaged it as it comes without clasps and is widely issued (in the same way the New Zealand War Service Medal for the Second World War was). Others with service post 1966 were more supportive, seeing it as a more likely option for medallic recognition than a campaign medal.
61. A number of submissions also pointed out the parallels between service in the FESR and J-Force in 1946-49 and suggested a similar stand alone medal could be awarded to them. The New Zealand Service Medal 1946-49 was instituted in 1995 for the New Zealand element of the Japanese occupation force. This had the status of a campaign medal. This was a long fight for veterans. They felt aggrieved that their service was not recognised both because there was no British award and because it was not seen as war service as the Japanese military and civilian population did not resist the occupation. It took a generational change for a political decision to be made to both recognise this service and acknowledge the potential long-term health consequences of J-Force service.

SECTION 6

THE NEW ZEALAND OPERATIONAL SERVICE CRITERIA FOR MEDALLIC RECOGNITION

62. Since 2000, the assessment of service for medallic recognition has also been guided by the Government's principles for recognising operational service (at Annex C). Under Principle 1 "medals are awarded to recognise service that is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand". Peacetime service overseas may be demanding and of strategic value, but it is generally similar to that completed in New Zealand. The Government's practice has been that no service is recognised by the award of a medal for operational service unless there has been operational activity involving a risk of casualties and the possibility that the use of force may be required.
63. In the late 1990s, the NZDF put in place an operational threat (rather than risk)²⁶ matrix which is used to determine operational allowances and medallic recognition. This matrix is supported by intelligence assessments as well as other related tools. Threat is classified as Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High. The lowest classification leading to medallic recognition is **Low**. The **Very Low** classification attracts no medallic recognition with the operational threat to NZDF personnel being similar to that associated with peacetime activities in New Zealand.
64. The criteria for a **Low** assessment is at Annex D. In summary the operational threat posed to NZDF personnel is marginal but noticeably greater than that associated with normal peacetime activities. NZDF casualties are unlikely.
65. An operational threat assessment of **Low** and above does not necessarily result in a campaign medal. The duration of threat and the number of personnel involved in the operation also plays a part. An assessment of warlike service (**High or Very High**) would normally result in a medal that has a qualifying period of one day. **Medium** and **Low** are considered non-warlike and at a minimum would require a qualifying period of 30 days at that operational threat level.
66. While this operational threat matrix provides a sound basis for objective assessment for current and future operations, it can only be used as a guidance for retrospective consideration, particularly those at the margins. It can only be viewed through the lens of those making assessments around contemporary operations. It is also designed to be as prospective as possible, rather than used in hindsight. In general, there is sufficient intelligence and assessment information available to provide Ministers with a clear threat assessment, proposed risk mitigations, an indication of likely casualties and recommendations for Rules of Engagement. As a result, those deploying into an operational environment are cognisant of the mission status, whether it is qualifying service under the Veterans Support Act 2014, the level of allowances and medallic recognition.

²⁶ Threat and risk assessments are distinctly different, yet related. Threat reflects an intent and capability to cause harm, and risk assessments consider the likelihood and consequences of a harmful event occurring. Actions are normally taken to mitigate threat and reduce levels of risk on operations themselves.

67. Intelligence and threat material is usually at best fragmentary for historic operations and often missing or not prepared in a form that is useful today. In this case there is an even greater challenge because of the duration of the service in South East Asia when threat assessments and perceptions may have changed on numerous occasions. There is also the hindsight challenge as we know what actually happened and, indeed, whether threats were real or otherwise. Hindsight is more useful for defining start and end-date for combat operations and often involves a clear political decision to commit forces to combat operations. In the case of service in South East Asia, NZDF analysts were very reluctant to overlay the matrix to provide a retrospective detailed threat assessment, given the lack of some of the key information points.
68. One of the key aspects of any consideration is to take into account what the perceived threat was at the time. Official documents, particularly when looked at with hindsight to events, do not always match up with perceptions of the threat on the ground at the time from commanders at all levels and their personnel. They made their own objective assessments on what they saw and were told as well as learnt from the experiences of their predecessors. This is one of the arguments put forward that after a certain period of time official reassessment should be closed for campaign medals in the same way it is for gallantry awards.
69. As well, the concept of what was peacetime service needs to be considered in the context of the time rather than from a 2020 perspective. While peacetime service threats levels are Very Low, there always remains a level of risk and hazard in peacetime activities, particularly training. Considerable effort is put into reducing the risks of these activities. Despite that, NZDF personnel have been killed and injured by wild animals overseas, there are numerous and sometimes fatal training accidents and a multitude of environmental hazards, particularly overseas. As well, New Zealand naval vessels still transit disputed waters as part of normal peacetime activities.
70. Various Australian medallic reviews have struggled with the same retrospective issues. One of the principal lenses they now regularly apply is that which underpinned Major General Mohr's consideration in his 2000 review:
- If ADF personnel are placed in circumstances where they may be used to react to an assessed threat made by Australian Government intelligence agencies, it has to be considered operational service. This is regardless of whether the threat is realised or not.²⁷*
71. This very important consideration is one that is the heart of the New Zealand Cabinet-approved principles for medallic recognition and marks the difference between peacetime and operational service. No New Zealand operational deployment is ever made without it being a response to a threat determined by the New Zealand Government. Threat remains the key determinant of what defines operational service; the challenge is identifying its level retrospectively in an environment where personnel are deployed forward over an extended period of time. The NZDF operational threat matrix has been used as guidance.

²⁷ Minute ADF Director-General Personnel Executive to CDF, 28 March 2001.

SECTION 7

REASSESSMENT OF THE MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS

Additional Information and Research since 2014

72. In his 2000 report on specific Australian medallic anomalies for South East Asia Major General Mohr said he “found it difficult to comment in ... specific terms as [the] service ranged over almost all the period [1955-75] covered by the review and in particular two major conflicts, the Malayan Emergency and the Indonesian Confrontation”.²⁸ The MRJWG report covered an even longer period highlighting just how much effort was needed to be undertaken in research, public consultation and then consideration. The appointment of an independent chair, the participation of representatives of veterans with a significant professional understanding of service during the period being considered and public consultation undoubtedly meant there was a fresh and independent look at medallic recognition for South East Asia. From what has been seen in the reassessment work the MRJWG undertook their work in a highly professional and principled way and came to their own independent conclusions despite a range of challenging external perspectives and pressures.
73. In hindsight during the research phase and MRJWG work there were a number of gaps in the archival research as well as a lack of face to face engagement with veterans’ groups. This meant that its final report was missing some potentially critical information which may have reshaped some of its conclusions. This, however, did encourage veterans’ groups to undertake their own research and provide more material. It has also left a feeling of frustration for some veterans.
74. One of the gaps was that a search of the historical records to locate the classified intelligence and threat assessments was not undertaken. This was out of scope for the initial work of the independent historian because he lacked the appropriate clearances and it was determined by NZDF staff that this was not needed. The MRJWG subsequently decided that research in the classified historical records was unlikely to add any significant new information, and chose not to delay their report by undertaking this research.
75. New Zealand was actively engaged with the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) and its successor intelligence organisations over the entire period of the deployment to South East Asia. Threat assessments and intelligence updates were regularly provided to New Zealand commanders in theatre and distributed back to New Zealand agencies through the New Zealand High Commission in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.

²⁸ Mohr, p. 3-23

76. From 2017 to 2019, NZDF staff with the appropriate security clearances undertook an extensive search through classified and other historical records to try to locate the intelligence and threat assessments written by New Zealand or other countries at the time of the service in South East Asia. Some relevant information provided by our intelligence partners back to New Zealand has been located, primarily from the records of other New Zealand government agencies. We do not know how many threat or intelligence assessments were actually made, and so it is difficult to ascertain what proportion of New Zealand records of these assessments are missing. Many of the assessments located have either been New Zealand copies of the Australian material already provided to the RNZRSA and NZDF by a number of ex-Service personnel in 2016 and 2018, or relate to periods and locations for which there is already medallic recognition.
77. Our research has shown that, unfortunately, and unbeknown to the MRJWG, the NZDF Medals Policy staff and the Defence Historian, there was an ongoing systematic declassification and destruction of long-closed classified intelligence-related files covering South East Asia and other locations underway within HQ NZDF between 2005 and 2012.²⁹ We have been able to identify 633 potentially relevant files that were destroyed. Fortunately, quite a number of duplicate copies of the documents destroyed are still held on the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Cabinet Office. They are also available to us from Australian sources.
78. The research work undertaken by independent historian, Peter Cooke, was in delivered in a professional way and in accordance with the guidance provided to him. In hindsight it would have been helpful if the MRJWG had sought additional perspectives from the two New Zealand official historians of the period – Dr Christopher Pugsley, ONZM (Malayan Emergency and Confrontation) and Dr Ian McGibbon ONZM (Vietnam). Additionally, the Defence Historian, John Crawford, is one of the most knowledgeable New Zealand historians on matters relating to the New Zealand Armed Forces.
79. The MRJWG decided not to provide veterans the opportunity to make oral submissions despite a request from several groups to do so. This was a matter for the MRJWG to determine, but it has contributed to a lack of confidence in the MRJWG outcomes from several veterans groups.
80. The MRJWG chose to present its report to the Minister as an unreferenced short report summarising its conclusions and providing a recommendation to the Minister. A more detailed reference report certainly would have been helpful in demonstrating how the MRJWG came to the conclusions it did.
81. The former military members of the MRJWG brought with them detailed knowledge around service in South East Asia across the full period. This was important as it brought contemporary perspective as they tested information provided to them through research and submissions. On the other hand, they all had been senior officers with different perspectives to the former junior ranks who were the main proponents of medallic recognition.

²⁹ The destruction of these files is the subject of a separate internal follow-up.

82. As quoted earlier in this report Sir John Holmes noted transparency from officialdom is key to addressing historic medallic grievances. Unfair as it may seem to those who have seen the comprehensive work undertaken by the MRJWG and the quality and genuine sincerity of those involved, there was a perception of lack of transparency around their work. It left them open to perceptions (justified or otherwise) that their recommendations were: deficient in the absence of any consideration of classified material; reliant on ex-senior officers balancing their own judgements and experiences against those of the submitters without giving the latter the opportunity to be heard; and lacking a fully referenced report to support their recommendations.

Analysis – Service 1959 to 1989

83. In reviewing the material available to the MRJWG at the time it made its recommendations it is understandable how it came to the conclusion that no more medallic recognition for service in South East Asia was warranted. It could be argued that it probably did have sufficient information, at the very least, to suggest Army service in Butterworth between 1971 and 1973 needed further consideration.

84. This does not mean, however, there is not a case for additional medallic recognition to be considered; it is just not clear-cut. There is now, however, much more information available than in 2013 on three grey areas where veterans argue, that on balance, this is a case for medallic recognition. These are: the threat, both potential and real, from communist terrorist activities throughout the entire period to 1989; the specific threat from communist insurgent to Army deployments from Singapore to the Butterworth Air Force Base 1971-73; and naval service as part of the FESR and ANZUK.

Communist Terrorist Threat

85. From the further research undertaken, including the classified sources, it is apparent that the threat from communist terrorists covering the entire post-1960 period was greater than the MRJWG was aware of in its considerations. While the Malayan Emergency formally ended on 31 July 1960, in reality it was more a political statement rather than one signifying military success. A victory parade was held in Kuala Lumpur on 4 August 1960 marking the end of the Emergency. “Emergency operations” were now redesignated as “border operations” and 28th Commonwealth Brigade operations recommenced the week after the parade.³⁰ The threat (albeit reduced) from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) under the leadership of Chin Peng did not cease until 1989. Recent Malaysian research has shown that 53 Police and Malaysian Armed Forces members were killed between the end of the Emergency in 1960 and 1969, and a further 216 personnel wounded. Over the same period four Singapore Police members were killed in clashes with Communist Terrorists (CTs).

³⁰ Christopher Pugsley, *From Emergency to Confrontation*, 2003, p.169

86. From 1969, there was an escalation of clashes between Malaysian security personnel and CTs. A State of Emergency was declared in May 1969, although it appears to have its direct origins in the race riots that occurred in Kuala Lumpur that month, rather than the communist insurgency itself. In response to questions relating to the nature of service, Malaysian authorities told the Australian Government in 2004 that it considered there was an armed conflict between Malaysia and the communist insurgents between 1968 and 1989. This meant that the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel were on “active service” when involved in the operations against the CTs. The Malaysian Armed Forces suffered continuing casualties as a result of insurgent operations.³¹
87. At Annex E is a table drawn from Malaysian and Australian sources which detail Malaysian Armed Forces casualties in operations against CTs each year between 1969 and 1989, together with reported communist terrorist casualties over the same period. This information became available when Malaysian academic researchers published their research in English in October 2013.³² During this period, 155 Malaysian Armed Forces personnel were killed and another 854 wounded. Communist terrorist losses were 212 reported killed, 150 captured and another 117 who surrendered themselves. There was a spike in operations and casualties between 1974 and the early 1980s.
88. Australian classified reporting provided to the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal in the Butterworth case notes there was ‘increased concern’ about security in the early 1970s and in particular in 1975 when there were concerns about an increased threat associated with events in Vietnam and the possibility acquisition of improved weaponry, such as rockets and mortars, by the insurgents.³³
89. While Butterworth will be discussed separately, the information regarding an active communist terrorist presence in parts of Malaysia in the 1970s and early 1980s is consistent with the submissions made to the MRJWG by Army and Air Force personnel. While they do not identify a direct threat to the New Zealand personnel, they highlight an ongoing presence and awareness. That said, there is no evidence to suggest that either Malaysian or New Zealand authorities allowed New Zealand Armed Forces personnel to operate in areas where it was known that communist terrorists were operating. There was, however, always the possibility that there would be an incident on land or with New Zealand helicopters transferring New Zealand or Malaysian Armed Forces personnel.

31 This information is drawn from Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal “Fulcher and the Department of Defence [2020] DHAAT 08 (14 May 2020). This report includes references relating to the above information. <https://recognitionofrcbservice.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/RCB-Update-2-2020-tribunal-decisions-in-review.pdf>

32 National Security Council, “Statistics of Operational Achievement in Peninsular Malaysia 1969-85” (published in English in 2013); Malaysian Armed Forces Annual Report, 2001

33 This information is drawn from Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal “Fulcher and the Department of Defence [2020] DHAAT 08 (14 May 2020). This report includes references relating to the above information. <https://recognitionofrcbservice.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/RCB-Update-2-2020-tribunal-decisions-in-review.pdf>

90. There were a number of additional security measures taken by Commonwealth personnel primarily in Malaysia through the 1960s. While they were generally the norm for garrison duties overseas by British forces, the internal security situation was clearly a contributor. They included:

- Armed sentries at the entry points for military bases. This was the norm for much of the deployment period in Malaysia (1960-1969) and Singapore (1959-1974). In the late 1960s and early 1970s weapons and ammunition were available in the gatehouse rather than being carried by the sentry on duty.³⁴
- Military travel in Malaysia was always in convoy with a heightened awareness of the internal security risk, especially when carrying weapons and ammunition.³⁵
- There were travel restrictions for civilian travel by military personnel – especially in Malaysia where private car travel was actively discouraged in many areas until 1974.³⁶

- The carriage of live ammunition was the common practice in Malaysia for all exercises and road convoys. The actual practices varied between units and over time and there is inconsistency in documents and in recollections on who carried the live ammunition and how it was managed ie taped over magazines. It seems likely that the live ammunition was more to provide some protection from wild animals rather than as a security measure in case of unexpected contacts with potential communist terrorists. It is clear there is a difference between what was stated in official documents and practice on the ground where there was an emphasis on readiness should the situation change.³⁷
- For all of the period 1955-1974 instructions were that personnel on military and private road travel in Malaysia were not to stop at motor vehicle accidents. The instructions were to drive to the nearest Police Station and report the incident.³⁸

³⁴ Archives NZ, AAYS, W2325, Box 1, Record Sing-API, ANZUK Force Standing Orders for duty personnel, 1971 (R3941804)

³⁵ Archives NZ, Ministry of Defence, AALJ – Series Part 1 to 8 inclusive, Army General Staff – Jungle Training 1949-59; AASY W2325, Box 61 and 67, 21/01/2023

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ Archives NZ, MFAT ABHS (R17727175) 20358, W5400, Box 99, Part 1 Record KL 102/7/2. British Commonwealth presence in Far East, Current Intelligence Guide, June 1959 to September 1971

91. Veterans have pointed out that post the Emergency, Army personnel arriving in Malaya continued to be posted to Active Service. As a result of this, Active Service status personnel were subject to operational discipline standards and punishments and there has been an argument that this indicates an operational state. Generally personnel were posted to Active Service at the same time as they were formally warned out for operational deployment. This reflected the higher discipline standards required on operations and the greater consequences of poor behaviour or absence from duty.
92. Additional research has shown the Army saw no operational requirement for its personnel to be posted to Active Service at the end of the Emergency, and intended to cease the practice. That decision was reversed after British advice that its own personnel would continue to be posted to Active Service in preparation for operations on the Thai-Malay border.³⁹ It appears, from reviewing a small number of military personal files, that subsequent to November 1963 only personnel operating on the Thai/Malay border were posted to Active Service. This resumed more widely in September 1964 with border incursions by Indonesian forces. Active Service postings then ceased by October 1966 and subsequently only personnel deploying to Vietnam were posted to Active Service just prior to departure from Malaysia. It is likely there were, however, a number of administrative inconsistencies over this period.⁴⁰
93. While the Active Service decision might be seen as purely administrative, it does reinforce the perception that personnel were on operations and likely to be deployed to counter insurgents. A number of submitters to the MRJWG made this point, noting their proximity to the operational area, that they were supporting those on active operations on the border and their expectation they could be deployed at any time.
94. The RNZN did not use an equivalent posting status; instead Navy personnel were legally subject to operational discipline standards once their ship had left Devonport Naval Base, as naval ships are considered ready for operations whenever at sea.
95. Throughout the period under reassessment Service personnel posted to land-based service in Malaysia and Singapore were accompanied by their families. Personnel were provided with housing at no cost, schools were provided for children, tax-free allowances and concessions were provided and personnel were eligible for rehabilitation assistance on return to New Zealand – including low-interest housing loans.
96. It is very rare that personnel likely to be deployed on operational service have their families accompanying them to the theatre. It suggests that the military authorities considered it safe for families to be in theatre and that they would not be exposed to military threat. While this may be true, families accompanied ground forces on garrison deployments (rather than warlike ones) where the forces were likely to be used in some operational activities. It reflects a very different period in time, one where there was a transition to greater availability of air travel, postings were much longer and where those killed or died overseas were routinely not returned home for burial.

39 Archives NZ, HQ NZ Defence Force Classified File Registry Files (R23567117), ABFK, 7281, W5807, Box 168, Record 226/7/113, NZ Government – Commonwealth Defence – Defence of Malaya – Use of Commonwealth Forces after independence (included cessation of “Active Service” status following the Malayan Emergency)

40 This summary is based on personal file posting information associated with the repatriation of the remains of New Zealand personnel from Malaysia and Singapore in 2018 (Operation Te Auraki).

97. Official historian Christopher Pugsley notes that during the period at Taiping and Ipoh (during the Emergency and its aftermath), New Zealand families actually lived as part of a wider community with the local people. It was not until after the move to Terendak in 1963 that families became less involved with the local community and more isolated, relying on British and Australian families for social contact.⁴¹
98. Personnel deployed to South East Asia not unreasonably had the expectation that their role was preparing for combat operations on land, at sea and in the air, and that they could be committed to these operations at relatively short notice. These preparations were first against any resurgence by insurgents in Malaysia, followed by combat operations resulting from the highly volatile period of the Indonesian Confrontation from 1962 to 1966 and its immediate aftermath, then combat operations in South Vietnam from 1966 to 1971.
99. Balancing this is the perception that, despite this heightened state of readiness, apart from operations on the Thai-Malay border between 1960 and 1964 and Confrontation, the role of the ground forces increasingly became one of normal garrison duties. For example, Pugsley notes a change in early 1960s from “jungle counter-insurgency role to garrison duties and training for a SEATO contingency role”⁴². As well, the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal in a decision regarding a case for 4 Royal Australian Regiment (based with 1 RNZIR in Terendak) for Active Service medallic recognition in the period after Confrontation highlighted that its history stated “1967 provided peacetime soldiering at its best”⁴³.
100. Apart from the 1971 to 1973 Butterworth deployment, there is no information to suggest that threat levels for New Zealand activities could be considered anything other than Very Low, despite the ongoing insurgency. There may be short periods that they were higher but never for a sufficient period to be considered operational service.
101. The only other period of ground service that might be considered is the period covered by New Zealand General Service Medal (Warlike) “Malaya 1960-64”. One New Zealand rifle company was deployed into the operational area near the Thai/Malay while the remainder of the New Zealand battalion supported it from Ipoh. Prior to 31 July 1960 this was covered by the British General Service Medal, but post-Emergency, despite being in northern Malaysia just outside the operational area, there was no medallic recognition. As a number of submitters to the MRJWG pointed out, we have taken a more inclusive approach in medallic recognition in the Middle East to those directly supporting operations. This will be considered further below.

Butterworth Air Force Base

102. Between 1 March 1971 and 27 July 1973, there were 14 deployments of 1 RNZIR rifle companies from Singapore to assist Australia with the security of the Butterworth Air Force Base (near Penang and approximately 60 km from the Thai/Malay border). These deployments varied in duration from three to five weeks. Based on the research and recommendation of the independent historian, the MRJWG considered these deployments were not operational and therefore did not qualify for medallic recognition.

41 Pugsley, p.182

42 Pugsley, p.176

43 Review of Veterans' Entitlements para 14.130

103. The nature of these New Zealand and British deployments from 28 (ANZUK Brigade) in 1971 to 1973 and that of Australian units over a much longer period remains a source of contention on both sides of the Tasman, albeit for different reasons. It was initially considered peacetime service by Australia, upgraded to non-warlike service in 2001 (with recognition by the Australian Service Medal) and there has been an ongoing effort by veterans since then to have it upgraded to warlike service (which would result in the award of the Australian Active Service Medal).
104. There have been two significant reviews of Butterworth service by the independent Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, in 2011 and 2020. Neither has resulted in an upgrading of Australian Army service at Butterworth to warlike, but they have provided significant additional information that is relevant to the consideration of the 1 RNZIR deployments 1971-1973.⁴⁴
105. In 1969 the Australian Government announced a major shift to its commitment to Malaysia. Two squadrons of Mirage aircraft (34 aircraft) were to be located at Butterworth Air Force Base (then under Australian control but handed over to Malaysia in March 1971) and the Australian infantry battalion then stationed in Terendak, in Malaysia, would be relocated to Singapore (as would the New Zealand battalion). No Australian ground forces would continue to be stationed in Malaysia. One company would be detached from the Australian battalion in Singapore on rotation to Butterworth except on occasions when the whole force was training. "They ... will not be used for the maintenance of internal civil law and order ..." Rotation of Australian companies to Butterworth Air Base began in 1970 and continued until 1973 when the Australian battalion in Singapore was withdrawn. A rifle company was then sent direct from Australia to maintain an ongoing security and training presence.
106. In its 2011 report, the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal noted that between 1971 and 1973 the rifle company deployed from Singapore was not an integral part of the defence of the base. The initial purpose of the deployment (and that of the Mirages) was to provide an Australia military presence in Malaysia after the British withdrawal from the region and the Australian and New Zealand redeployment from Terendak to Singapore. Assistance with local defence would only be provided in an emergency and would not be a primary role for the company. There would be no change in command status except in an emergency; no such emergency happened.
107. In 2020, the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal recognised that the deployment of the infantry company from Australia after 1973 became fundamentally an operational one, in order that the unit could be "available if needs be, to assist in the protection of Australian assets, property and personnel, at Air Base Butterworth". Operational command shifted to the Officer Commanding RAAF Butterworth. The Tribunal notes that service with the Australian Rifle Company Butterworth and by other ADF personnel at Air Base Butterworth between 1970 and 1989 is recognised as "hazardous" and was therefore not rendered under ordinary peacetime conditions.

44 "Inquiry into recognition for members of Rifle Company Butterworth for service in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989", February 2011, <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Rifle-Company-Butterworth-Inquiry-Report.pdf>; "Fulcher and the Department of Defence [2020] DHAAT 08 (14 May 2020). This report includes references relating to the above information. <https://recognitionofrcbservice.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/RCB-Update-2-2020-tribunal-decisions-in-review.pdf>

108. There continues to be a stream of declassified material which has been accessed by veterans and researchers and which is painting a different picture than that considered by the MRJWG. Some of this has been detailed in a September 2020 article by Ken Marsh, "Military and Political Risk in South-East Asia 1971-1989 Australia's Commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Integrated Air Defence System", which admittedly is sympathetic to the case of Australian veterans seeking greater recognition for this deployment.⁴⁵
109. Marsh notes that in the March/April 1971 period there were a number of reports highlighting the vulnerability of Butterworth, particularly with the discovery of a communist terrorist camp some 20 km from Butterworth. The Australian High Commissioner considered Butterworth could become an attractive future target, while several Australian newspapers highlighted the vulnerability of Butterworth to attack. An official report on Butterworth security in April 1971 stated that while considering the likelihood of Butterworth being targeted was low, they noted "the possibility of attacks cannot be ignored". The potential consequences of any attack were viewed as being severe, both in direct effects (civilian and military personnel casualties, damage to aircraft or facilities) and in the wider strategic consequences for Australia. It proposed the deployment of a rifle company from Singapore.
110. The Australian Secretary of the Department of Defence commented in March 1972:
- In addition, Malaysian reluctance having been overcome, the ANZUK force will now provide one infantry company on rotation through Butterworth on a full-time basis, ostensibly for training, flag-showing and a change of scene. The presence of this company will provide the Commander with a ready- reaction force which he can use inter alia to supplement elements available to him under the joint Malaysian-RAAF Plan, but short of an actual overt breach of security the Commander cannot use these troops for guard or other security duties.*
111. The sensitivity of the situation was again made clear in October 1973 when an Australian senior officer reported on his return from Butterworth that:
- The deployment of this company to Butterworth has in recent years assumed a real importance because of security. Although the Malaysians may be expected to have assumed that this is the case, publicly and privately the position is maintained on both sides that the deployment is for exercise purposes.*
112. New Zealand initially agreed to provide companies on a one-in-four basis because of its training value, but Army Headquarters in Wellington agreed to a more flexible approach to deployments. As with Australian companies, operational command remained with the Commanding Officer of 1 RNZIR except in an emergency situation. The role was to provide an Australian and New Zealand presence in the area, enhance diplomatic and political presence and to assist in developing the Malaysian Armed Forces which remained responsible for security matters outside the perimeter of the Base. Assistance could be provided in a civil disturbance or natural disaster with the approval of the RAAF Base Commander.

⁴⁵ Ken Marsh, "Military and Political Risk in South-East Asia 1971-1989 Australia's Commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Integrated Air Defence System", Sabretache vol. LXI, no. 3 – September 2020 . <https://recognitionofrcbsevice.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Military-and-Political-Risk-in-South-East-Asia-1971-1989.pdf>

113. The Rules of Engagement were covered by Standing Orders of 28 ANZUK Brigade which permitted use of live ammunition (when issued) only in self-defence. The General Instructions for the Butterworth Company stated that companies were to provide their own training ammunition, while 1st line ammunition was held by RAAF Butterworth. The company commander was permitted to authorise the issuing of one box of live ammunition to standing patrols (which happened on an inconsistent basis).⁴⁶
114. The first company deployed encountered signs of an insurgent activity (in the jungle 70 km from the air base), although it did not make any contact with them. It was quickly extracted from the area.⁴⁷ One female insurgent was reportedly captured after the extraction by the Malaysian forces.
115. This did not appear to impact on any training exercises in the jungle. Indeed training continued to be the priority for the deployed New Zealand companies, to the extent that the 1 RNZIR administrative instruction for the deployment to Butterworth was called a training directive. It included tasks such as “teaching and practising Protective Security duties for the defence of Air Base Butterworth”. Butterworth was also used in 1972 and early 1973 for the 1 RNZIR shooting team practising for the Freyberg Cup. The last two deployments were openly called Exercises (Summer Place and Living Doll).⁴⁸
116. The New Zealand historical report seems at odds with the findings of Australian reviews of the same activities. The Australian material supports at a minimum a strong Low threat assessment while the New Zealand material is more in keeping with a Very Low assessment. The Australian information does suggest that the rifle company deployment from 1971 to 1973 had a much greater security focus that has been publicly stated and reflected concerns with the capability of the Malaysians to provide security for the air base, a deteriorating security situation and the capability of insurgents to undertake such an attack. Admittedly, much of the concern came from a RAAF perspective with their understandable concern over the security of their high-value aircraft and an intrinsic distrust of the Malaysian security arrangements.
117. A 1971 declassified threat assessment provided by a veteran and also accessed in New Zealand records suggest that New Zealand officials were well aware of the evolving threat. Indeed, it would be surprising if New Zealand was not aware given the close relationship and the collaborative approach taken in theatre to deal with the withdrawal of UK forces.
118. In the case of Butterworth deployments it is suggested that considerable weighting be applied to the Australian declassified material and various reviews and that there should be some form of medallic recognition because of the political intent and the threat levels. Only five of the 14 deployments would meet a 30-day qualifying period if the two deployments under the guise of exercises are included. In addition, the activities undertaken by some of the deployments, including training for the battalion shooting team and minor construction and maintenance tasks by the battalion pioneer platoon over the New Year leave period at Butterworth, are not consistent with those associated with the award of a campaign medal.

46 “General Instructions for Butterworth Company”, HQ 28 ANZUK Brigade

47 The platoon was commanded by Lt Christopher Pugsley. He recently confirmed the details of this incident which happened on a patrol as part of an exercise. He said they took the tape off the one magazine of live ammunition they had and loaded it. (Chris Pugsley, discussion with John McLeod, 27 January 2021)

48 Peter Cooke, Historical Report, MRJWG

119. It is recommended that all of the 1 RNZIR deployments to Butterworth 1971-1973 be approved as qualifying time for the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (with seven days qualifying service required to be awarded this medal) but no campaign medal be instituted. The above recommendation is consistent with the New Zealand medallic principles because service at Butterworth was beyond normal peacetime service.

Naval Service

120. Medallic recognition for naval service in the FESR/ANZUK has remained a particularly contentious one and has been a source of ongoing frustration and anger from veterans, particularly in online material. Some veterans felt there has been a long-standing “indifference” from defence authorities. One veteran commented that the MRJWG report did not provide “any supporting military historical evidence to justify their making such a decision and knowing the Australian Government had previously issued ADF military personnel their FESR clasp/medal for doing literally, task for task exactly what the NZ Forces were called upon to do is considered not only churlish but deeply disrespectful.”⁴⁹ There appeared to be widespread anticipation from naval veterans’ groups that their historic grievances would be resolved and that this was thwarted by the MRJWG and a change of Minister of Defence.

121. The RNZN Naval Communicators Association have been strident advocates of the case for medallic recognition. They want a New Zealand (General) Service Medal, with the FESR clasp:

As an imperative, it should also be recognised as a veteran qualifying medal and with that acceptance comes that the wearers acknowledge that in every sense they are Bona Fide veterans who served their country[They] were or could be as vulnerable as a soldier on the front line, and should, therefore, be treated and recognised as true veterans and New Zealand’s best, with all the privileges in life and in death fully afforded and implemented.” They should also be entitled to medallic awards “for the period 1971 to 1975 which coincides with the cessation of the FESR and the winding up of the ANZUK Force which replaced it.”⁵⁰

122. A strong component of the naval veterans’ case is based on the approach taken by the Australian Government in awarding a “FESR” and “SE ASIA” clasp to the Australian Service Medal 1945-75. It seems incongruous to these veterans that Australian can award a medal for a particular form of service but that New Zealand is unwilling to provide a New Zealand medal for exactly the same type and period of service. (There is no British medal for the FESR or ANZUK).

123. As noted previously, just because veterans feel strongly about a medallic issue and persistently and forcibly make their case, it does not necessarily mean that it is justified or that a medal should be approved as a form of appeasement. Medals by their very nature create divisions and regulations tend to be restrictive in order to underpin an ethos that “medals are hard earned”.⁵¹

124. Contrary to the above comments about the review, the MRJWG had the benefit of additional historical research which it especially commissioned and was fully aware of the Australian medallic decision and reasons for it. The MRJWG also had the benefit of the involvement of Rear Admiral (Rtd) Ian Hunter, CB, Chief of Navy 1991-94 and a FESR veteran, who had previously produced a report for the RNZRSA on possible recognition of naval service in South East Asia. It was he who insisted that the MRJWG commission additional detailed work around transits through the Straits of Indonesia and the Taiwan Strait.
125. After that additional work, however, the MRJWG still determined that no additional medallic recognition was warranted. Ships deployed to the FESR/ANZUK were combat ready and available for operations, and where the Government agreed to them participating in operations they have now (finally) received appropriate recognition. Medals are not awarded simply because forces are in position and ready (whether in New Zealand or overseas) for operational tasking; they need to be committed and undertake specific operational tasks. They cannot also be awarded simply because service in the tropics was particularly demanding environmentally and potentially hazardous as some submitters claimed.
126. Transiting disputed international waterways, even in periods of tension, and "showing the flag" are all part of peacetime naval activities. Ships may be at "action stations" or a lower level of readiness for transits but the research undertaken for the MRJWG showed the threat was considered minimal and for limited periods. Commanding Officers were directed to maintain a non-threatening posture with armaments and to leave the area if necessary to avoid any incident. In addition, the Indonesians were generally advised through diplomatic channels of any transits 72 hours in advance.
127. There is, however, a wider issue regarding medallic recognition of operational naval service and there is a strong argument that the service of naval veterans has not been appropriately recognised. There has been a challenge to separate out peacetime naval operational service (ships are always considered operational except when undertaking training or work-up exercises and carry ammunition) and that which is operational for medallic recognition. In some cases, land medallic criteria have been applied to maritime service. This included both the Naval General Service Medal 1915 for Malaya and General Service Medal 1962 for Confrontation, the eligibility criteria for which were reinterpreted by the New Zealand Government in 2001 and 2002.
128. Apart from the Indonesian Confrontation, naval operational service since the end of the Korean War has not involved combat operations. Rather it is more about creating a presence and a deterrent from maritime (and in some cases air) elements which may otherwise be hostile or disrupt maritime shipping. It can also involve creating demarcation lines to ensure waterways are open.
129. All naval service on vessels posted as part of the FESR until the end of Confrontation in 1966 is deemed war or emergency service under the War Pensions Act 1954. This was as a result of a Social Security Appeal Authority decision in December 2005 and another made in the High Court in June 2007. The Social Security Appeal Authority's decision determined that greater emphasis should be placed on the intention to deploy vessels to the FESR rather than the conduct of the ship when deployed there. The High Court decision indicated "that the statutory test for war or emergency service should not require that an activity took place that had an air of urgency or heightened level of physical, psychological or environmental risk. The Court's view was that if a claimant was deployed to a declared war or emergency, then their service should be considered service in a war or emergency."⁵²

⁵² Secretary for War Pensions Directive 2/2007, RNZN Service in the Malayan Conflict, 8 August 2007

130. While the High Court separated out medallic and war pension coverage, noting that one cannot be used to support an argument for the other, there is a clearly a link here that highlights the different nature of the FESR compared with other service. New Zealand personnel deployed to the FESR were part of a force that acted as a deterrent and if necessary support against foreign aggression. In addition, the Government approved service patrolling the Taiwan Strait and the protection of British merchant shipping against intervention by Chinese communist (or Chinese nationalist) forces.
131. It can be argued that if the Government deployed New Zealand Armed Forces personnel to an environment where there was a potential for harm, the Government needs to recognise this service regardless of what eventuated. This “potential for harm” concept is consistent with the New Zealand medallic principles as service that has the “potential for harm” cannot be seen as normal peacetime service.
132. “Potential for harm” is the reason threat assessments are used in determining threat levels. Deterrent operations by their very nature anticipate threats, and if those threats do not eventuate, it may be because they are successful. There could have been any number of incidents involving RNZN vessels serving with the FESR/ANZUK. There always was considerable potential for incidents or harassment resolved peacefully to turn into a situation where any of the parties used force in a localised way. This created a situation where ships’ crews had to operate on the basis that there might be an incident requiring an armed response. This created a very real perception of danger and the associated stress that went with it.
133. Naval veterans provided many examples of “potential for harm” in their submissions to the MRJWG. These involved incidents with other forces such as threatening behaviour from Indonesian attack boats, transits of the Taiwan Strait, operating in close proximity to Chinese and Soviet military ships and submarines at a time when the Chinese government was actively supporting the North Vietnamese in their war against the South Vietnamese government. In the midst of this there was an incident during the 1962 Cuban crisis when ships on station were warned that hostilities were likely to commence in 12 hours and to take preparatory steps.
134. In reviewing these submissions, it is possible that the “potential for harm” was over-stated, but that is using hindsight. A ship on patrol does not go to the highest alert level of “action stations”, load live ammunition and move to a full damage control state unless the Commanding Officer perceives a threat and then that threat becomes “real” for the crew. It might be precautionary but it is a response to a perceived threat which needs actions to mitigate the risk. This was obviously not something that occurred with every RNZN vessel but by being part of the FESR/ANZUK naval force it had the potential to occur every time the ship was undertaking patrol activities.
135. Rear Admiral David Ledson, ONZM, in his peer review comments below makes the point regarding transiting sensitive straits that in the 1972 deployment his ship was closed up to Action Stations to transit Sunda Strait in Indonesia. As he was only a Midshipman at the time, he was unaware of whether the decision was based on intelligence. “My sense at the time was that the CO, who had served in Confrontation, made the call on the basis of his judgement.”

136. An example of the type of potential incident was one on 28 June 1966 involving HMNZS *Hickleton*. *Hickleton* returned fire on a sampan carrying armed infiltrators in the approaches to Singapore, killing two Indonesians and wounding one. Ironically two operational gallantry awards were made to members of *Hickleton's* crew for service that was treated as non-operational for medallic purposes (until 2002) as the ship was returning to Singapore for a formal inspection. Indeed, *Hickleton* was unprepared for anything warlike having already stowed below its ready to use gun ammunition and needed to break this out under machine gun fire.⁵³ This highlighted the need for ships to maintain a state of constant readiness.
139. In 2002 the parameters were widened with retrospective medallic recognition for the 1982 to 1983 Operation ARMILLA in the Indian Ocean where HMNZ Ships Canterbury and Waikato were attached to a Royal Navy Task Group. The significance of this was that it widened recognition to maritime deterrent operations generally rather than just deterrent and interdiction missions which involved boardings at sea. FESR veterans often use the recognition for Operation ARMILLA as a comparison point.
140. Operation ARMILLA took place within the context of the war between Iran and Iraq. Attacks and the confiscation of merchant ships in the Gulf region resulted in Britain sending Royal Navy ships to protect neutral, and particularly British, merchant shipping in the area. The objective was to maintain a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean, surveillance, sea patrols and escorts to allow safe passage through the Gulf of Oman, the Straits of Hormuz and subsequently the Persian Gulf.

Recognising Naval Service

137. One of the challenges with retrospective medallic recognition is that service at a particular time might not have fitted with the contemporary official view on operational service, but that similar service has subsequently been recognised as the nature of operational threats change. Prior to 1996, the only naval service designated as operational (for medallic purposes) was in a war, an emergency or as part of a United Nations mission. In 1996 the NZGSM 1992 (Arabian Gulf) was awarded to recognise the operational threat in boarding, searching and arresting at sea on a maritime interdiction and deterrence operation from 1995 to 1996 (ensuring sanctions against Iraq were upheld).
138. The introduction of the medallic principles in 2000 and the clarity that provided created an opportunity to relook at a range of historic medallic issues, many of them related to naval service. As a result of this, additional naval post Korean War service (1954-57), Suez 1956, Malayan Emergency and Confrontation was given medallic recognition either through new medals or redefinitions of existing warrants and regulations. This recognition remained within the existing parameters of "war and emergency" service.
141. The contemporary threat assessment for Operation ARMILLA highlighted the risk of irrational, sporadic and unpredictable actions to disrupt the movement of friendly and third party merchant ships with potential risks posed for RNZN vessels. The Rules of Engagement allowed for the use of force as a last resort to disable or destroy a hostile actor. The Royal Navy task force was authorised to intervene if force was used by belligerents on a merchant vessel complying with international rules of search.
142. During Operation ARMILLA, RNZN vessels and personnel were exposed to threat levels not encountered during normal peacetime duties. The ships were also required to maintain a higher than normal state of readiness while in the area of operations and were subject to Rules of Engagement that demonstrated the level of risk associated with service in the area of operations.

⁵³ Pugsley, p.248

143. While RNZN vessels attached to the FESR/ANZUK had a similar deterrent role to those deployed to Operation ARMILLA, the latter operated in an elevated threat environment with wider Rules of Engagement which went beyond self-defence. As such, the two activities are not strictly comparable for medallic purposes.
144. We have also reviewed post-2000 RNZN operations to identify possible comparisons with service in South East Asia. In general, these operations involve both deterrent and interdiction as well as boarding. All have clear operational tasks in an elevated threat levels with their own specific Rules of Engagement approved by the Government.
145. Options for recognition of all FESR/ANZUK service are discussed in Section 8.
147. There were admittedly more insurgent activities on the Malay Peninsula in the period from 1975 to 1989 than thought by the MRWJG. Submissions to the MRJWG highlighted a number of incidents including one as late as 1983, where there was potential for NZDF personnel to come in contact with insurgent groups. While this caused concern at the time, it does not affect the overall threat level for NZDF personnel during the period 1974 to 1989. There was never any intention that NZDF personnel enter an area where there was an operational risk and they were immediately withdrawn when there were any concerns. Several short-term potentially hazardous situations are not sufficient to raise the threat level for the entire period.
148. One of the main reasons that a New Zealand Army battalion continued to be based in Singapore from 1974 to 1989 was the high cost of building accommodation and facilities in New Zealand for the battalion personnel and their families. The third Labour Government announced in 1975 that the battalion should be relocated to New Zealand within the next two years or so, but this decision was reversed in 1976 by the incoming National Government, for financial reasons. The required funding and construction work in Linton Camp was only completed in early 1989.

Service from 31 January 1974 to 1989

146. The role of NZFORSEA was non-operational and therefore does not meet the most important criteria for medallic recognition as operational service. The surviving archival material held by the NZDF and Archives New Zealand strongly indicates that the threat level in training areas in Malaysia, in their base in Singapore, and at sea between 1974 and 1989 was Very Low.
149. While there were a number of RNZN ship deployments for exercise or passage north reasons and RNZAF aircraft from New Zealand participated in FPDA exercises they undertook no activities that could be considered operational for medallic purposes.

SECTION 8

CONCLUSION

150. Service in South East Asia which clearly crossed the obvious operational threat threshold has already received medallic recognition and the MRJWG did not consider any other service should receive medallic recognition. It did, at the request of then Defence Minister Coleman, consider whether service in the FESR/ANZUK could be recognised by a clasp to the New Zealand Defence Service Medal (NZDSM). The MRJWG did not support this proposal as it considered that it would change the intent of the NZDSM and clasps should only designate type of service rather than location of that service. The NZDSM should be seen as “appropriate medallic recognition for all service personnel ... whose service does not meet the criteria for “operational service”.”⁵⁴
151. Apart from five deployments to Butterworth from 1971 to 1973, this reassessment has not identified any service that is of sufficient duration (30 days or more) and which could be considered operational which should be recognised through the award of a campaign medal such as the New Zealand General Service Medal. There are short periods between 1959 and 1974 that might be argued at the margins such as specific sea transits and service supporting operations on the Thai-Malay border 1960 to 1964, but the arguments for these are not persuasive.
152. Service in NZFORSEA between 1974 and 1989 was a non-operational deployment. Its mission was solely focused on training and development. There was not an operational internal role within Malaysia or Singapore or regionally. While there may have been short-term hazardous incidents from time to time involving the possible presence of insurgents, there is no ongoing or cumulative threat that would justify medallic recognition.
153. This reassessment has clearly shown the lack of validity in the argument that the NZDSM is adequate recognition for South East Asia service between 1959 and 31 January 1974. It supports the view of the former Minister of Defence, Hon Dr Wayne Mapp, that service in South East Asia between 1950 and 1975 “is quite different from all other service during that period”. It is clearly different from peacetime service but yet does not meet the threshold for a campaign medal.
154. With respect to those involved in the MRJWG process, they were never going to be able to address the challenges of recognising service in South East Asia by applying a matrix threat over the extended period New Zealand forces were deployed as part of a “Forward Defence” to South East Asia. The service in South East Asia sits right in the middle of a transition in the way service was recognised by medals. In the 1950s and 1960s service effectively needed to be warlike in nature. This had ruled out J-Force 1946-49 as qualifying for a medal. Even as late as 1980, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force from 1979 to 1980 (a peacekeeping force in practice) received a British medal (the Rhodesia Medal) which was not considered a campaign medal because it was “not a military operation or campaign”⁵⁵. It was relegated to the status of not much more than an official commemorative medal in the order of precedence (this was finally remedied nearly 40 years later in 2018 when it was recognised as a campaign medal).

54 MRJWG Report dated 2 December 2013

55 Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal, “INQUIRY INTO RECOGNITION OF SERVICE WITH THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE – RHODESIA 1979-80”, 8 November 2010 <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Rhodesia-Inquiry-Report.pdf>

155. We now take a different perspective on non-warlike service and we might take a different approach to service in Malaya/Malaysia, in particular, if we were coming to it fresh. East Timor is a good example of that where medallic recognition has been inclusive over an extended period including two consecutive medals with a qualifying period adjusted to take account of the changing operational threat levels from warlike to non-warlike and briefly for something akin to a Mutual Assistance Programme⁵⁶. Similarly the different threat levels and tasks over an extended period in Afghanistan resulted in a range of inclusive awards with different qualifying thresholds including Afghanistan primary (one day in Afghanistan) and Afghanistan secondary (30 days) for supporting roles in other countries in the region.
156. It is suggested that the entire period between 1955 and 1974 in Malaya/Malaysia and associated service be treated as one period for medallic recognition rather than the current pepper-pot approach. The principle is that New Zealand deployed personnel and assets to FESR and ANZUK, both of which had an operational role and which were actively planning and preparing for operations.
157. The decisions made by the Social Security Appeal Authority in December 2005 and High Court in June 2007 show that greater emphasis should be placed both on the intention to deploy vessels to the FESR rather than the conduct of the ship when deployed there, and that if personnel were deployed to a declared war or emergency, then their service should be considered service in a war or emergency.

⁵⁶ Mutual assistance programme service is not considered as operational service by NZDF for any purposes, and therefore does not receive medallic recognition or the payment of operational allowances.

158. This is also consistent with how service had been recognised through the Second World War and Korea. The medals have geographic areas but do not try and distinguish between type of service within that area. This is the approach taken by the Honourable John Clarke, QC, who in the 2003 Australian “Review of Veterans’ Entitlements”, stated that if “the military authorities consider that a particular area is vulnerable to attack and dispatch armed forces there, they are sending forces into harm’s way, or danger.”⁵⁷

Award of the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (NZOSM)

159. It is proposed that all service in FESR and ANZUK up to 31 January 1974 be recognised through the award of the NZOSM which recognises operational service to New Zealand. It is rare for the NZOSM to be awarded separately from a campaign medal or to those who did not accumulate seven days qualifying service towards a campaign medal. The only current occurrences are for the 1948-49 Berlin airlift and service in Singapore between 1 February 1959 and 31 July 1960.
160. Clause 5(h) of the New Zealand Operational Service Medal Regulations (2002) states that qualifying service includes inter alia “any other operational service, irrespective of whether a war or campaign medal has been awarded for that service, that the Minister of Defence, on the advice of the Chief of Defence Force, may determine.” The intention of this clause was to cater for circumstances where the award of a campaign medal was not appropriate or feasible but that the Chief of Defence Force and the Minister of Defence considered that operational service to New Zealand should be recognised. This is consistent with the drafting intent when the NZOSM was instituted.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Clarke, “Review of Veterans’ Entitlements”.

⁵⁸ John McLeod was drafter of the Cabinet paper, Royal Warrant and Regulations for the NZOSM. It was considered there were other cases such as those in Singapore 1959-60 where the award of a campaign medal was not appropriate or feasible. Clause 5(h) was inserted to avoid having to amend the Regulations

161. All those who served in FESR and ANZUK who have already received New Zealand and/or British campaign medals have also qualified for the NZOSM. They would not receive another medal as the NZOSM can only be awarded once. This solution would avoid the significant problem of double-medalling of service by not providing additional recognition for personnel who already had recognition for their service. This would provide operational medallic recognition for service to New Zealand to approximately 4,500 former service personnel who have no award that recognises their unique operational form of service.
162. It is proposed that the NZOSM would be awarded to personnel posted or attached to the FESR, ANZUK and other in-theatre units with a qualifying period of seven days. The standard 30-day qualifying period for officials visitors would apply. In the case of RNZN vessels the qualification would be by ship and all crew would qualify.
163. This proposal would provide recognition for personnel whose service may not have reached the threshold of a campaign service medal but who were deployed to a force that can be considered operational and operated in an environment where they were potentially in harm's way from time to time. It will not provide the level of recognition that many may want, particularly as the NZOSM does not carry any location clasps. Rather, it is recognition of operational service to New Zealand which reflects exactly what this service is.
164. It is considered, that on balance, there is a reasonable case for service at Butterworth Air Force Base between 1971 and 1973 to be assessed as meeting the threshold for the award of the New Zealand General Service Medal (Non-Warlike) with a relevant clasp. The difficulty is that only a portion of those who deployed to the area would meet the 30-day qualifying period and the nature of some of this service would make it a very "soft" campaign medal. Rather than try and separate out this deployment from all the others over the full period of service in Malaya/Malaysia it is proposed to take a more inclusive approach through the award of the NZOSM.
165. It is suggested that the threshold laid down by Sir John Holmes for changing a past medallic decision has arguably been met.
- There is evidence of a significant injustice or inconsistency affecting a substantial group of individuals.
 - There is a sufficient degree of assurance that the requirements of risk and rigour were genuinely met.
 - The uniqueness of the situation means that new inconsistencies are not being created.
166. The proposal is consistent with the Government's medallic principles particularly Principle 1 – "medals are awarded to recognise service that is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand".
167. While the Minister of Defence can approve the award of the NZOSM in this situation, it is suggested that the decision should only be made after consultation with the Prime Minister. This is because it is a variation of a medallic decision made by a previous Government which will resolve a long-standing grievance and will affect a large number of people, half of whom will still be alive.

SECTION 9

PEER REVIEW COMMENTS

The NZDF Historian John Crawford

168. *John Crawford is one of New Zealand's distinguished military historians with a stellar international reputation. He has been Defence Historian since 1986. John's work covers the wide spectrum of New Zealand's military history included colonial period, the New Zealand Wars, the South African War, the two World Wars, service in South East Asia, peace-keeping operations, East Timor, territorial and volunteers forces in New Zealand and the Cold War.*
169. Mr Crawford considers the conclusions reached by the MRJWG about not recommending any further medallic recognition for service in South East Asia were reasonable given the evidence that was available to the working group. Since the working group submitted its report, however, significant new evidence has come to light that fully warrants a review of this matter.
170. The approach taken in this report to the question of granting further medallic recognition for service by New Zealand military personnel in South East Asia between 1955 and 1989 is sound. This is especially so as the unfortunate destruction of many relevant records means that the kind of operational threat assessment based analysis carried out in the past is not practicable. Mr Crawford's view is that the importance the report attaches to what policymakers and participants knew at the time, rather than what we know with the benefit of hindsight, is in these circumstances appropriate.
171. Based on his knowledge of documents and publications relating to NZFORSEA he fully endorses the conclusion of the report that no medallic recognition should be granted to personnel serving with this force between 1974 and 1989.

172. The evidence presented in the report clearly establishes that military service in South East Asia between 1955 and 1974 was, to use the words of the New Zealand Government's principles for recognising operational service, "beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand". The recommendation that service in South East Asia between 1955 and 1974, that is not already recognised, should now be recognised by the award of the NZOSM is, therefore, in his view reasonable. The nature of the service by New Zealand military personnel that would, if the report's recommendations are implemented, qualify them for the award of the NZOSM does not meet the criteria for instituting any other form of medallic recognition.

Military and Official Historian Dr Ian McGibbon, ONZM

173. *Dr Ian McGibbon is one of New Zealand's foremost and distinguished military historians. He is a former Defence Historian, New Zealand official historian for the Korean and Vietnam Wars and has published widely on military history and international affairs. He has worked extensively with official material covering the period covered by this report and has viewed many of the documents that have subsequently been destroyed.*
174. Dr McGibbon has reviewed the draft report and provided comments particularly relating to the strategic international and military environment. He said it is important to note that the primary purposes of the FESR deployment was to counter possible Chinese aggression south into South East Asia; the counter insurgency role in Malaya was very much a secondary one. That is the reason why naval elements of the FESR were authorised to operate beyond Malayan waters.

175. Dr McGibbon agrees with the recommendation that there be no medallic recognition for service beyond 31 January 1974 (NZFORSEA). His view is that the argument for the NZOSM for the period 1959-1974 is a “generous interpretation” of the nature of service during that period, but on balance provides a pragmatic solution to address long-standing medallic grievances covering a complex and unique period of overseas military service.

Military and Official Historian Lieutenant Colonel (Rtd) Dr Christopher Pugsley, ONZM

176. *Dr Christopher Pugsley is one of New Zealand’s foremost and distinguished military historians. He is the New Zealand official historian for the period covering Malaya and the Indonesian Confrontation. He is particularly well-known for ground breaking histories of New Zealand in the First and Second World Wars, but he has also written extensively on the New Zealand Wars and early New Zealand silent film. **He has caveated his comments with the disclaimer that he was a platoon commander in 1 RNZIR at Butterworth in 1971 and again in 1972 as 2IC Support Company and would be eligible for a NZOSM in relation to that service should the report recommendations be approved.***

177. Dr Pugsley agrees with the recommendation that there be no medallic recognition for service beyond 31 January 1974 (NZFORSEA). He agrees with Dr McGibbon that the argument for the NZOSM for the period 1959 to 1974 is a “generous interpretation” of the nature of service during that period, but on balance provides a pragmatic solution to address long-standing medallic grievances covering a complex and unique period of overseas military service. For Dr Pugsley, the overriding ambition during his posting to 1RNZIR, which was shared by the members of his platoon, was to see service in South Vietnam. All training deployments and exercise activities conducted by the battalion in Malaysia were focused to

that end. The frustration was in not achieving that goal but remaining on the fringe.

Rear Admiral (Rtd) David Ledson, ONZM

178. *Rear Admiral (Rtd) David Ledson, ONZM, is a former Chief of Navy with 42 years of service between 1967 and 2009. He served in South East Asia on HMNZS Taranaki in 1972 as part of a nine month deployment to ANZUK. He has operational service on the Armilla Patrol and Operation Big Talk in Bougainville; both operations being initiated part way through deployments to the United States and Asia respectively.*

179. Admiral Ledson considers the proposed approach to medallic recognition in South East Asia is consistent with the recognition principles and is fair. He acknowledges that Australia has provided medals for service that NZ has not, and so arguing that NZ should provide them has an emotional resonance that can be hard to rebut. However, as unpopular as it may be, Admiral Ledson considers, it is important NZ makes its own decision based on its principles.

180. Admiral Ledson also commented:

I regularly deployed to SE Asia between 1972 and 1979 and was never really aware of any significant risk; compared to the UK in 1977 for warfare training when I was very sensitive to the IRA threat. Where I do disagree with the recommendations, though, is that I believe OSMs should have clasps in cases where they are the only form of medallic recognition approved for particular service...

*In providing a response, I thought it might be helpful to provide some Navy context. I hold to the view that when Veterans gather together on Anzac Day they should be able to look at each other and, through the medals they are wearing, know the nature of their service. Most of those who served during the post 1966 Cold War years look at today's Veterans and are (a) embarrassed and (2) resentful. This is probably especially true of Naval Veterans who during those years at sea spent months away from their families and trained to be ready to go to war immediately against the Soviet Union; the DSM [New Zealand Defence Service Medal] doesn't recognise the unique nature of this service. What this highlights, is that more often than not, in the case of Navy, *(is that)* **'the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand'** are quite different when deployed overseas than they are for Navy personnel in New Zealand – and the men and women of the other two Services; for whom a four-six month deployment would invariably be on operations.*

181. In regard to the award of the NZOSM as proposed for service in South East Asia, Admiral Ledson observed:

I surprise myself by feeling quite strongly about this. If the recommendations are agreed, I will have been involved in operations which on two occasions are considered to merit the NZOSM – but for which I in actuality receive no recognition; the Anzac Day analogy. I believe that it is now time that clasps to the OSM be awarded so that the medal tells the full story of the nature of the wearer's service.

SECTION 10

RECOMMENDATIONS

182. It is recommended that you:

- a. **note** that in 2014, on the advice of an interdepartmental working group – the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (MRJWG) – the Minister of Defence decided that medallic recognition for previously unrecognised service in South East Asia between 1950 and 1989 was not justified as the risks to NZ Armed Forces personnel from enemy combatants and insurgents were assessed as Very Low (below the threshold to justify recognition);
- b. **note** that additional archival research, Australian and Malaysian documents considered by the NZDF together with the reports of subsequent specific Australian medallic reviews and applying a good faith principle to submissions by ex-Service persons since 2014 indicates that the operational threat from 1959 to early 1974 was at times higher than the MRJWG was aware of;
- c. **note** that while the service at Butterworth Air Force Base arguably meets the threshold for the award of a New Zealand General Service Medal, a significant portion of those who served there would not meet the standard 30-day qualifying period;
- d. **note** that service with the FESR and ANZUK between 1959 and 1974 should be seen as completely different to equivalent peacetime New Zealand Armed Forces' service in the same period and that it should be appropriately recognised;
- e. **note** that the NZOSM Regulations allow the Minister of Defence, on the advice of the Chief of Defence Force, to determine any period of operational service as qualifying service for this medal, irrespective of whether a war or campaign medal has been awarded for that service;
- f. **agree** to recommend to the Minister of Defence that, after consultation with the Prime Minister, he approves service with the FESR, ANZUK and associated units between 1 February 1959 and 31 January 1974 as qualifying service for the award of the NZOSM; and
- g. **agree** that there are no grounds to institute medallic recognition for the later military service in Singapore and Malaysia as part of NZFORSEA from its formation on 31 January 1974 until the return to New Zealand in 1989.

J.R. MCLEOD, ONZM

Director
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March 2021

MAPS

- A. Map of South East Asia
- B. Map of Malaysia

ANNEXES

- A. Campaign medals awarded for service in South East Asia 1959 to 1975
- B. The Australian Department of Defence's definition of non-warlike service for medallic recognition
- C. New Zealand Government's principles (2000) for the medallic recognition of operational service
- D. NZDF Operational Threat Matrix – Low Assessment
- E. Malaysian Armed Forces casualties against communist terrorists 1969 to 1989 and reported communist terrorist casualties over the same period.

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MAP A

MAP OF SOUTH EAST ASIA



MAP B

MAP OF MALAYSIA



ANNEX A

CAMPAIGN MEDALS AWARDED FOR SERVICE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 1959 TO 1975

The following campaign medals have awarded to New Zealand Armed Forces personnel for service in South East Asia from 1959 to 1975.

British campaign medals awarded to Commonwealth military forces, including the New Zealand Armed Forces, for service between 1959 and 1966

1. British General Service Medal 1918-1962 with clasp 'Malaya' (instituted 1950) – for Army and Air Force service.
2. British Naval General Service Medal 1915-1962 with clasp 'Malaya' (instituted 1950) – for Navy service. Eligibility extended by the New Zealand Government in 2001 to additional Royal New Zealand Navy deployments, including two deployments in 1959-1960.
3. British General Service Medal 1962-2007 with clasp 'Brunei' (instituted 1963).
4. British General Service Medal 1962-2007 with clasp 'Borneo' (instituted 1964).
5. British General Service Medal 1962-2007 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' (instituted 1967). Eligibility extended by the New Zealand Government in 2001 to two additional Royal New Zealand Navy deployments.

New Zealand campaign medals for service between 1960 and 1975

6. Vietnam Medal (in 1968 New Zealand and Australian jointly instituted this campaign medal). Eligibility extended by the New Zealand Government in 2001 to Royal New Zealand Air Force air crew who flew one or more operational sorties.
7. New Zealand General Service Medal 1992 (Warlike) with clasp 'Malaya 1960-64' (instituted in 1997, eligibility extended in 2001 and 2002).
8. New Zealand General Service Medal 1992 (Warlike) with clasp 'Vietnam' (instituted in 2002 to recognise a variety of service by both military personnel and civilians, who served in Vietnam, but who cannot be awarded the Vietnam Medal). Eligibility extended in 2008 to include all New Zealand military and civilian recipients of the Vietnam Medal.
9. New Zealand General Service Medal 1992 (Non-warlike) with clasp 'Thailand' (instituted in 2003).

Foreign campaign medals for service between 1959 and 1973

10. South Vietnamese Government – South Vietnamese Campaign Medal (Her Majesty approved in 1966 the wear by New Zealand military personnel).
11. Malaysian Government – Pingat Jasa Malaysia (Her Majesty approved in 2005 the wear by New Zealand military personnel).

ANNEX B

OPERATIONAL THREAT MATRIX – LOW THREAT

The operational threat posed to NZDF personnel is marginal but noticeably greater than that associated with normal peacetime activities. NZDF casualties are unlikely. Definitions for each threat loose, allowing individuals or smaller elements to take unilateral action. Terrorist activity is infrequent and such activity is normally focused on gaining publicity rather than the infliction of casualties. NZDF personnel/units are unlikely to be targeted. No threat from electronic attack.

- **Maritime.** Maritime assets may be operating but not in an offensive manner.

- **Ground.** Ground forces may be deployed but are operating in a primarily defensive/security posture. Instances of offensive action are limited to sporadic harassment operations (either conventional or unconventional) against other factions/ stakeholders

- **Air.** A favourable air environment with no chance of encountering hostile aircraft. Hostile ground forces possess visually laid small arms and antiaircraft machine guns (AA MG) up to 12.7mm (.50 cal).

- **Internal Security Situation.** The operational situation is generally stable with the possibility of minor unrest and/or civil disobedience. Elements of the local population may not concede the legitimacy of government or local authorities. There may be an escalated level of violent and property crime, and such crime may be specifically targeted against foreigners.

- **Security Threats.** The NZDF are unlikely to be specifically targeted by threat groups, and these groups have only a limited capability to do so. Foreign threat groups may be active in the area.

- **Introduced Operational Dangers.** Introduced operational dangers may be prevalent but are not endemic or present in the areas into which NZDF personnel are likely to deploy. Mines/IEDs, if any, are contained within marked areas. There is no CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear] threat.

ANNEX C

DEFINITION OF NON-WARLIKE SERVICE – AUSTRALIA

The definition of non-warlike service used for the Australian Service Medal is operations which encompass:

- **Hazardous.** *Activities exposing individuals or units to a degree of hazard above and beyond that of normal peacetime duty such as mine avoidance and clearance, weapons inspections and destruction, Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority, Service protected or assisted evacuations and other operations requiring the application of minimum force to effect the protection of personnel or property, or other like activities.*
- **Peacekeeping.** *Peacekeeping is an operation involving military personnel, without powers of enforcement, to help restore and maintain peace in an area of conflict with the consent of all parties. These operations can encompass but are not limited to:*
 - (1) *activities short of Peace Enforcement where the authorisation of the application of force is normally limited to minimum force necessary for self-defence- activities,*
 - (2) *military observer activities with the tasks of monitoring ceasefires, re-directing and alleviating ceasefire tensions, providing 'good offices' for negotiations and the impartial verification of assistance or ceasefire agreements, and other like activities; or*
 - (3) *activities that would normally involve the provision of humanitarian relief.*

ANNEX D

NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT MEDALLIC PRINCIPLES (2000)

The assessment of service for medallic recognition is based on the Government's eight principles for recognising operational service. These principles were approved by Cabinet in 2000.

The following principles provide a framework for the recognition of service that exceeds the normal requirements of peacetime, principally in terms of the level of risk and the role of the military forces involved.

PRINCIPLE 1

Medals are awarded to recognise service that is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service. Medallic recognition will be provided only where New Zealand Defence Force units or personnel are engaged in operations, whether warlike or non-warlike. In this context, non-warlike operations include peacekeeping operations or other hazardous activities. The nature of the service performed will be the primary consideration for the medallic recognition of operational service. Additional considerations include details of the area of operations, enemy faced or parties dealt with, and time served in the location. Awards may be either a specific New Zealand campaign medal or the New Zealand General Service Medal in silver or bronze.

PRINCIPLE 2

Deserving service by New Zealand personnel should be recognised by a New Zealand award. Where New Zealand personnel are involved in an operation that meets the definitions described in Principle 1, that service is to be recognised by a New Zealand award.

PRINCIPLE 3

There must be a balance between maintaining the exclusivity of awards and recognising significant service. While service that meets the requirements of these principles will be recognised, the prestige of awards depends to a degree on their exclusiveness. Service associated with a particular operation or operational area will not necessarily qualify for the recognition extended to personnel serving in that operation or operational area. For example, recognition might not be appropriate for logistic support to a deployed force or planning activities in a headquarters outside the operational area.

PRINCIPLE 4

In all but exceptional circumstances, there should be only one New Zealand medal to recognise each period of operational service. Awards made under the Imperial system, prior to the establishment of the New Zealand General Service Medal, remain New Zealand medals that were awarded on the advice of the New Zealand Government. Specific New Zealand medals will not be awarded in respect of service already recognised by an existing New Zealand or Imperial award.

PRINCIPLE 5

Awards will be continued only where the service rendered continues to meet all other requirements for the award of a medal. One particular consideration must be the end date of a period of medallic recognition. This applies particularly to long-running operations or peace-support missions where the situation that originally merited the award of a medal, changes to the extent that such recognition is no longer appropriate, especially where the service no longer meets the definitions of warlike or non-warlike operations. A system of review is to be instituted to ensure that where the nature of service in a particular mission changes, consideration is given to reviewing and, if necessary, to changing any associated medallic recognition.

PRINCIPLE 6

Medals for operational service should be open for award to civilians in appropriate circumstances. These circumstances will include situations where the New Zealand Government deploys Police or other civilians to operations or where civilians are working with the NZDF or other New Zealand Government contribution as part of a deployed force.

PRINCIPLE 7

The fairness and integrity of any award must be transparent, and such awards should also be timely. The usual criterion for timeliness, as applied most particularly to gallantry awards, is that recognition should follow within five years of the event. Where it is necessary to exceed that limit, there should be evidence of a substantial grievance that requires redress, claims from individuals should be verifiable from official records, and a significant number of participants should be able to claim a medal personally.

PRINCIPLE 8

Approval will be sought to accept and wear medals awarded by foreign governments or international organisations, where the service performed by New Zealand personnel is consistent with the other principles for medallic recognition.

Operational service by New Zealand personnel may attract the award of medals from foreign governments or international organisations, such as the United Nations. Royal permission is required for such medals to be accepted and worn by New Zealand personnel. Normally, only one foreign or international medal will be considered for unrestricted wearing in addition to a New Zealand medal. The award of non-New Zealand medals will not affect the decision to issue a New Zealand medal.

ANNEX E

Malaysian Communist Terrorist Casualties Peninsula Malaysia – 1969 to 1989

Year	Killed	Captured	Surrendered	Total
1969	0	0	1	1
1970	9	2	5	16
1971	9	1	3	13
1972	1	1	2	4
1973	8	0	1	9
1974	41	8	10	59
1975	7	1	5	13
1976	16	10	19	45
1977	23	28	27	78
1978	15	5	8	28
1979	26	7	9	42
1980	17	0	1	18
1981	6	3	18	27
1982	4	0	1	5
1983	10	0	3	13
1984	5	0	1	6
1985	0	0	0	0
1986	6	0	2	8
1987	7	2	0	9
1988	2	82	1	85
1989	0	0	0	0
Totals	212	150	117	479

Source: Figure 4.2 Stats of Operational Achievement in Peninsular Malaysia 1969-1985 – National Security Council p.157.

**Malaysian Armed Forces Casualties
Peninsular Malaysia – 1969 to 1989**

Year	Killed	Wounded	Total
1969	6	22	28
1970	13	28	41
1971	9	35	44
1972	4	17	21
1973	4	19	23
1974	3	38	41
1975	33	150	183
1976	3	6	9
1977	13	85	98
1978	14	124	138
1979	15	80	95
1980	12	27	39
1981	9	34	43
1982	2	38	40
1983	5	23	28
1984	5	40	45
1985	3	23	26
1986	1	28	29
1987	1	28	29
1988	0	8	8
1989	0	1	0
Totals	155	854	1009

Sources:

1. *Figure 4.2 Stats of Operational Achievement in Peninsular Malaysia 1969-1985 – National Security Council p.157.*
2. *ADF 'The Malaysian Army's Battle against Communist Insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia 1968-1989. Published by Malaysian Armed Forces Annual report to Malaysian Government, Kuala Lumpur 2001.*

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1. Submissions from Individual Veterans and Veteran Organisations

- a. Submissions to the Medallic Review Joint Working Group (68 in total)
- b. Submissions and correspondence from the South East Asia Veterans Association
- c. Submissions and correspondence from the RNZN Communicators Association
- d. Correspondence from the Royal New Zealand RSA National Office
- e. Submissions and correspondence from Capt John Sturgess, RNZIR.
- f. Submissions, correspondence and Ministerial Enquiries (15 individual cases)

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2. Joint Service Organisation – JSO 1 (Defence Organisation in New Zealand), JSO 2 (New Zealand Defence Policy), JSO 4 (New Zealand Defence Forces), JSO 15 (Administration), JSO 17 (Defence Policy RNZN), JSO 18 (Defence Policy RNZAF), JSO 4 (SEATO), JSO 25 Defence of the Pacific), JSO 26 (Defence of the Commonwealth), JSO 31 (Plans), JSO 33 (SEATO Exercises), JSO 34 (Regional Defence), JSO 35 (Overseas Liaison), JSO 41 (ANZAM), JSO 42 (Regional Defence), JSO 43 (Commonwealth Defence), JSO 140 (South East Asia), and JSO 142 (Malaya).

Note: These files are not all readily available to the general public. Some are historic and have now been replaced and are available only as paper copies. Electronic records exist for some with many of them still classified.

Archives New Zealand hold the following records in **ARCHWAY**. They can be booked and viewed in person at the reading room of Archives New Zealand. Some are available as digital copies, more are coming on line all the time as part of an Archives NZ digitization programme.

3. Ministry of Defence – MOD 3 (Commonwealth Defence), MOD 5 (ANZAM), MOD 22 (Operations and Planning).

Note: These files are not all readily available to the general public. They are all historic and have now been replaced and are available only as paper copies.

Annual reports are available as below:

R23420748. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1964 (Publication). Open access.

R23420749. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1965 (Publication). Open access.

R23420750. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1966 (Publication). Open access.

R23420751. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1967 (Publication). Open access.

R23420751. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1967 (Publication). Open access.

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R23420757. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1973

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R23420758. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1974 (Publication). Open access.

R23420759. BADX, 10905, A525, Box 1. Report of the Ministry of Defence 1975 (Publication). Open access.

Subsequent and prior years are available.

4. Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR) New Zealand Parliament – 1959 to 1991.

The Appendices to the Journals of the New Zealand House of Representatives (AJHR) are a collection of government-related reports published every year from 1858 to now. The reports cover many subjects, documenting the work of all Government Departments and a wide range of other activities carried out by, or of interest to, the 'Government of the Day'.

They are important official records of New Zealand's social, economic and political history and are a crucial source for many researchers. The reports are often at a high level and not detailed down to individual events, but give clear policy direction and record new decisions made.

5. Royal New Zealand Navy Operations

Reports of (Ships) Proceedings (ROPS) and Operations; and Ships Logs:

The following RNZN Ships served in SE Asia between 1959 and 1989. Note the dates shown are the recorded "cross over dates" when they were posted under command of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, or FARELF, or NZFORSEA, or post Feb 1974-'Far East Station'. This was often soon after putting to sea off the coast of New Zealand and so these dates do include most ship visits to Hawaii, Guam, the Far East and Australia while voyaging to and from the Singapore base station. However, it is clear that a significant portion of all voyages was spent in Singapore and Malaysian waters. Those that already receive medallic recognition are shown, along with other voyages in the SE Asia area that currently do not have medallic coverage beyond the universal New Zealand Defence Service Medal (Instituted in 2011).

5. a. HMNZS Rotoiti – Based in Singapore 1 January 1959 to 3 August 1959; and 15 May 1958 to 31 March 1959 and 10 April 1960 to 9 March 1961 when some medallic recognition was awarded.

R12456068. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 19, Part 1. Record 62/1/5. Operations: Movements of HMNZS Ships – *HMNZS Rotoiti* – 1958 to 1962. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456069. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 19, Part 2. Record 62/1/5. Operations: Movements of HMNZS Ships – *HMNZS Rotoiti* – 1962 to 1965. Were classified files, now open access.

R1015651. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 124, Part 3. Record 62/1/39. Operations: Movements of HMNZS Ships – *HMNZS Rotoiti* – 1975 to 1986. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457635. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 163. Record 72/2/20. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Rotoiti* 1960 to 1965. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457652. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, Part 1. Record 72/3/5. *HMNZS Rotoiti* 1962 to 1963. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457653. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, Part 2. Record 72/3/5. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Rotoiti* 1963 to 1968. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017210. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 55, Part 1. Record 72/3/20. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Rotoiti* 1975 to 1979. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017177. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 54, Part 2. Record 72/3/19. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Rotoiti* 1976 to 1979. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017209. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 188, Part 2. Record 72/3/30. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Rotoiti* 1980 to 1986. Were classified files, now open access.

5. b. HMNZS Royalist. Based in Singapore 7 February 1959 to 26 June 1959; and 23 January 1961 to 22 August 1961; and 25 February 1963 to 9 July 1963; and May 1964 to July 1964; and 15 March 1965 to 17 November 1965 when some medallic recognition was awarded.

R12457643. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 164. Record 72/3/1. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Royalist* 1959 to 1966. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456049. ABFK 7395, W4010, Box 17, Part 1. Record 62/1/1. Operations. Movements of ships – *HMNZS Royalist* 1958-1959. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456050. ABFK 7395, W4010, Box 17, Part 2. Record 62/1/1. Operations. Movements of ships – *HMNZS Royalist* 1959-1961. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456051. ABFK 7395, W4010, Box 17, Part 3. Record 62/1/1. Operations. Movements of ships – *HMNZS Royalist* 1962-1963. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456052. ABFK 7395, W4010, Box 17, Part 4. Record 62/1/1. Operations. Movements of ships – *HMNZS Royalist* 1963-1965. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456053. ABFK 7395, W4010, Box 17, Part 5. Record 62/1/1. Operations. Movements of ships – *HMNZS Royalist* 1965-1966. Were classified files, now open access.

5. c. *HMNZS Otago* – Based in Singapore 10 February 1962 to 28 March 1962; and 1 April 1963 to 15 December 1963; and 18 July 1964 to 26 May 1965; and 7 February 1966 to 2 September 1966 when some medallic recognition was awarded.

HMNZS Otago was also posted to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 4 April 1968 to Dec 1968; and 21 April 1969 to 15 March 1969; and 12 June 1970 to 12 Dec 1971; and 15 January 1973 to 21 July 1973; and 12 November 1973 to 11 April 1974.

HMNZS Otago was also posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 21 May 1976 to 2 November 1976; and 20 April 1981 to 28 July 1981.

R12456124. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 26, Part 1. Record 62/1/28. Operations, Movements of ships – *HMNZS Otago* 1960 to 1961. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456125. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 26, Part 2. Record 62/1/28. Operations, Movements of ships – *HMNZS Otago* 1962 to 1965 (Note there are some records missing). Were classified files, now open access.

R12456126. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 26, Part 3. Record 62/1/28. Operations, Movements of ships – *HMNZS Otago* 1965 to 1968. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456127. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 26, Part 4. Record 62/1/28. Operations, Movements of ships – *HMNZS Otago* 1968 to 1970. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457679. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 168, Part 1. Record 72/3/19. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Otago*. 1961 to 1965. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457680. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 168, Part 2. Record 72/3/19. Reports of Proceedings *HMNZS Otago*. 1965 to 1968. (Note some records are missing). Were classified files, now open access.

R1017176. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 54, Part 1. Record 72/3/19. Reports of Proceedings – *HMNZS Otago* 1972-1976. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017175. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 54, Part 2. Record 72/3/19. Reports of Proceedings – *HMNZS Otago* 1976-1979. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017174. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 111, Part 3. Record 72/3/19. Reports of Proceedings – *HMNZS Otago* 1979-1983. Were classified files, now open access.

5. d. *HMNZS Taranaki* – Based in Singapore 12 March 1962 to 21 April 1963; and 11 September 1963 to 7 September 1964; and 13 August 1965 to 15 May 1966 when some medallic recognition was awarded.

HMNZS Taranaki was also posted to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 3 February 1967 to 16 December 1967; and 8 February 1970 to 21 August 1970; and 16 April 1972 to 10 Sep 1972.

HMNZS Taranaki was also posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 24 June 1974 to 5 December 1974; and 13 May 1975 to 10 October 1975;

R12457681. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 168, Part 1. Record 72/3/20. *HMNZS Taranaki* 1961 to 1966. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457682. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 168, Part 2. Record 72/3/20. Reports of Proceedings – *HMNZS Taranaki* 1966 to 1968. Were classified files, now open access.

R12456130. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 26, Part 3. Record 62/1/29. Operations – Movements of Ships – *HMNZS Taranaki* 1965 to 1967. Were classified files, now open access.

R124576131. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 26, Part 4. Record 62/1/29. Operations – Movements of Ships – *HMNZS Taranaki* 1967 to 1970. Were classified files, now open access.

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R12457178. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 111, Part 6. Record 72/3/20. Reports of Proceedings – *HMNZS Taranaki* 1976 to 1980. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457179. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 187, Part 7. Record 72/3/20. Reports of Proceedings – *HMNZS Taranaki* 1981 to 1986. Were classified files, now open access.

5. e. HMNZS Pukaki – Based in Singapore as part of Commonwealth Strategic Reserve – 4 May 1959 to 9 May 1960; and 6 June 1961 to 10 June 1962 when some medallic recognition was awarded.

R12457654. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, Part 1. Record 72/3/6. *HMNZS Pukaki* 1958 to 1964. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457655. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, Part 2. Record 72/3/6. *HMNZS Pukaki* 1964 to 1965. Were classified files, now open access.

5.f. HMNZS Hickleton – 10 April 1965 to 27 November 1965; and 28 November 1965 to 30 July 1966 when some medallic recognition was awarded. Laid off in UK on 5 Nov 1966. No ROPS have been found for this ship. Crew received medallic recognition for their service in Borneo.

5.g. HMNZS Santon – 10 April 1965 to 25 November 1965; and 26 November 1965 to 20 May 1965 when some medallic recognition was awarded. Laid off in UK 4 Dec 1966. No ROPS have been found for this ship. Crew received medallic recognition for service in Borneo.

5. h. HMNZS Waikato – was posted to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 24 October 1967 to 16 May 1968; and 14 October 1969 to 12 March 1970; and 6 October 1971 to 15 April 1972; and 20 Jun 1972 to 17 Jun 1973. (Note: under ANZUK command for some of this time).

HMNZS Waikato was also posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 25 March 1974 to 12 August 1974; and 5 March 1975 to 18 July 1975; and 6 April 1981 to 28 July 1981; and 17 May 1982 to 6 September 1982; and 16 May 1983 to 18 Oct 1983; and 31 May 1984 to 10 August 1984; and 18 March 1985 to 5 July 1985 and 7 Jun 1988 to 26 August 1988; and 1 May 1989 to 24 August 1989.

After the withdrawal of NZFORSEA in December 1989, HMNZS Waikato was posted to 'Far East Station' based on Singapore for the following dates: 8 April 1990 to 14 August 1990; and 20 July 1992 to 27 October 1992; and 21 August 1995 to 3 November 1995.

R12457691. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 170, Part 1. Record 72/3/25. *HMNZS Waikato* 1966 to 1968. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457692. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 170, Part 2. Record 72/3/25. *HMNZS Waikato* 1969 to 1970. Were classified files, now open access.

Note: ROPs for the period 1970 to 1972 have not been found.

R1017186. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 54, Part 1. Record 72/3/25. *HMNZS Waikato* 1972 to 1978. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017184. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 112, Part 2. Record 72/3/25. *HMNZS Waikato* 1978 to 1983. Were classified files, now open access.

R1017185. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 118, Part 3. Record 72/3/25. *HMNZS Waikato* 1983 to 1986. Were classified files, now open access.

R15981106. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 140, Part 1. Record 3370/5/8. *HMNZS Waikato* 1986 to 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

R9337882. AAQG (HQ NZFORSEA), W3789, Box 51, part 1. Record 5.074. *HMNZS Waikato* – General Matters 1982 to 1983. Were classified files, now open access.

Ships Logs are available for this ship from: January 1992 to June 1998 and are open access.

5. i. *HMNZS Lachlan* – Note: not based in Singapore during review period.

R12457647. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, Part 3. Record 72/3/3. *HMNZS Lachlan* 1966 to 1969. Were classified files, now open access.

5. j. *HMNZS Blackpool* – Posted in support of Commonwealth Strategic Reserve based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 6 November 1966 to 24 May 1967; and 23 October 1968 to 15 June 1969.

R12457687. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 169, Part 1. Record 72/3/24. *HMNZS Blackpool* 1966 to 1969. Were classified files, now open access.

R12457688. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 169, Part 2. Record 72/3/24. *HMNZS Blackpool* 1969 to 1970. Were classified files, now open access.

5. k. *HMNZS Wellington* – Posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 7 June 1988 to 26 August 1988; and 1 August 1989 to 24 August 1989 and to Far East Station 28 May 1990 to 14 August 1990; and March 1991 to 21 July 1991; and 5 July

1993 to 17 October 1993; and 27 June 1994 to 27 October 1994; and 3 September 1998 to 11 Dec 1998.

R15981115. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 141, Part 1. Record 3370/5/14. *HMNZS Wellington* 1986 to 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

R15981116. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 141, Part 2. Record 3370/5/14. *HMNZS Wellington* 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

R15981004, ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 127, Part 2. Record 3520/26. Plans, Operations and Readiness – *HMNZS Waikato* 1989 to 1995. This remains a restricted access file.

R15981005, ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 127, Part 3. Record 3520/26. Plans, Operations and Readiness – *HMNZS Waikato* 1989 to 1995. This remains a restricted access file.

Ships Logs are available for this ship from: January 1992 to June 1998 and are open access.

5. m. *HMNZS Endeavour* – Posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 1 May 1989 to 24 August 1989; and 28 May 1990 to 14 August 1990; and March 1991 to 22 July 1991; and 1 August 1992 to 27 October 1992; and 27 June 1994 to 27 October 1994; and 2 June 1995 to 3 December 1995; and 13 August 1998 to 11 December 1998.

R1017227. ABFK, 7395, W4831, Box 52, part 1. Record 72/3/4. Reports and Returns – Reports of Proceedings (ROPS) – *HMNZS Endeavour* 1958-1964. Was classified, now open access.

R12457650. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, part 2. Record 72/3/4. Reports and Returns – Reports of Proceedings (ROPS) – *HMNZS Endeavour* 1964 -1967. Was classified, now open access.

R12457651. ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 165, part 3. Record 72/3/4. Reports and Returns – Reports of Proceedings (ROPS) – *HMNZS Endeavour* 1968-1970. Was classified, now open access.

R15981118. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 142, part 1. Record 3370/5/6. Reports and Returns – Reports of Proceedings (ROPS) – *HMNZS Endeavour* 1988-1989. Was classified, now open access.

Ships Logs are available for this ship from January 1990 to December 1999 and are open access.

5. n. HMNZS Canterbury – Posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 6 September 1977 (ex UK) to 28 September 1977; and 9 August 1978 to 14 Dec 1978; and 15 February 1980 to 30 June 1980; and 16 February 1982 to 3 September 1982; and 28 May 1986 to 10 October 1986; and 28 April 1987 to 17 September 1987; and posted to Far East Station 30 March 1997 to 30 May 1997.

R15981108. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 140, Part 1. Record 3370/5/10. *HMNZS Canterbury* 1986 to 1988. Were classified files, now open access.

R15981109. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 141, Part 2. Record 3370/5/10. *HMNZS Canterbury* 1988 to 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

5. o. HMNZS Southland – Note: was posted in support of NZFORSEA based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 28 May 1986 to 10 October 1986; and 28 April 1987 to 17 September 1987; and 1 August 1988 to 4 November 1988.

R15981114. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 141, Part 1. Record 3370/5/13. **HMNZS Southland** 1986-1988. Were classified files, now open access.

R15981114. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 141, Part 2. Record 3370/5/13. **HMNZS Southland** 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

5.p. HMNZS Manawanui – Posted to Far East Station based in Singapore for the following dates with no medallic recognition awarded. 5 August 1996 to 20 November 1996; and 17 August 1998 to 3 December 1998.

R15981118. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 142, Part 1. Record 3370/5/16. *HMNZS Manawanui* 1988 to 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

R15981119. ABFK, 7712, W5564, Box 142, Part 1. Record 3370/5/17. *HMNZS Manawanui* 1988 to 1989. Were classified files, now open access.

R8681620, ABFK, 7592, W5259, Box 7. *HMNZS Manawanui* – Ships Logs – May 1996 to October 1997. Were classified files, now open access.

R8681637, ABFK, 7592, W5259, Box 7. *HMNZS Manawanui* – Ships Logs – October 1997 to December 1998. Were classified files, now open access.

R9337544, AAQG (HQ NZFORSEA), W3789, Box 24, Part 1. Record 3260/2/6. *HMNZS Manawanui* – Ship operations, 1988. Were classified files, now open access.

6. NZ High Commission files in Kuala Lumpur (Defence Attachè desk)

KL 102 series (Visits, liaison and exercises) including:

From ANZUK HQ to CO, 1RNZIR – Approval for 1RNZIR to provide troops for the Rifle Company at RAAF Air Base Butterworth dated 31 Jan 1972

Directive by Commander ANZUK HQ to Officer Commanding Rifle Company Butterworth dated 31 Jan 1972. Note the same directive was applied to the British Battalion (1RHF) also supporting the Australian Bn based in Singapore.

KL 103 series. (Assistance to Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore)

R17727090. ABHS, 20358, W5400, Box 80. Ministry of Foreign Affairs – General Matters, Part 1. 1 August 1970 to 16 Mar 1978. KL 82/4/1. Was a classified file – now open access.

R17727091. ABHS, 20358, W5400, Box 81, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – General Matters, Part 2. April 1978 to Jul 1982. KL 82/4/1. Was a classified file, now open access.

R17727092. ABHS, 20358, W5400, Box 81, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – General Matters, Part 4. August 1982 to Dec 1985 to Jul 1982. KL 82/4/1. Was a classified file, now open access.

R17727093, ABHS, 20358, W5400, Box 81, Part 1. Record KL 83/11/1. New Zealand: External Relations – Singapore – General. Jun 1959 to Jul 1981. Was a classified file, now open access.

R17727094, ABHS, 20358, W5400, Box 81, Part 2. Record KL 83/11/1. New Zealand: External Relations – Singapore – General. Aug 1981 to Dec 1985. Was a classified file, now open access.

Australian Military Records and Reports

7. Australian Department of Defence

CRS A1945 Dept of Defence

correspondence files, visits and classified registry files with the active support of the Australian Department of Defence's Directorate of Honours and Awards , Canberra. Not all of these files are available on line but can be read in Canberra. Researcher support is available at a cost for specific queries.

Australian Department of Defence Honours and Awards website – Medal Warrants and declarations for:

Australian Defence Medal

Australian Service Medal 1945-1975 with clasps 'SE Asia' and 'FESR'.

Australian Active Service Medal

Australian Operational Service Medal

Note: See ww1.defence.gov.au/adf-members-families/honours-awards for extensive details and images of their awards.

Australian Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) Reports on –

“Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Defence Awards” (dated 1994).

“Review of entitlement anomalies in respect of South East Asian Service 1945-1975” by General Judge PF Mohr (Feb 2000)

“Review of service by 4RAR Terendak Service 1966-1967” (dated 15 Feb 2009)

“Enquiry into eligibility criteria for Australian Defence Medal” (dated 11 Feb 2009).

ADF Submission (signed by Vice CDF) into recognition of members service in Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB) in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989. (dated 23 Jun 2010)

“Inquiry into recognition for members of the Rifle Company Butterworth for service in Malaysia between 1970 and 1989”. (dated 18 Feb 2011).

“Fulcher and the Dept of Defence (2020) DHAAT 08 dated 14 May 2020”. Decision NOT to award the Australian Active Service Medal to Mr Fulcher for his service in RAAF Base Butterworth between Feb and May 1979 with C Coy, 2/4 RAR.

Note: See the Australian Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT): <https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au> . Full details of reports both completed and underway are available for free download to the general public.

8. Malaysian and Singaporean Sources (In year of publication order)

FPDA, Communique issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial meeting in London 1971. Covers the External Defence Arrangements for Malaysia and Singapore.

Book – The 5 Power Defence Arrangements. Author Alan Crowe. Published by Percetakan Konta Sdn Bhd, KL, Malaysia 2001.

Article – The Five Power Defence Arrangements- A case study in Alliance Longevity. Author Gavin Keating. Published Australian Defence Journal V, 170 pp 48-59. 2006.

Article – The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia (1948-1990) – Contesting the Nation – State and Social Change. Author Cheah Boon Kheng, National University of Singapore (Based on part of a thesis). Published in NZ Journal of Asian Studies, June 2009 – Vol 11.1, pages 132-152.

Book – From Third World to First, The Singapore Story 1965-2000. Author Lee Kwan Yew. Published by The Straits Times Press 2012.

Article – The Second Emergency 1968-1989. RSIS Commentary – 191/2013 published in English 10 Oct 2013. Author Ong Weichong.

Report – The Malaysian Army's Battle against Communist Insurgency in Peninsular Malaysia 1968-1989. Published by Malaysian National Security Council in MAF report to Malaysian Government, Kuala Lumpur 2001. Translated into English for ADF in 2013.

Book – The Defeat of Armed Communism in Malaysia – The Second Emergency. Author Ong Weichong. Published by Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group London 2015.

Article – The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). Can lessons learned be drawn for present day situations? Maj Lim Yu Sing, SAF. Published in Pointer, Journal of SAF Vol 41, No 3.

Article – The Five Power Defence Arrangements, A contemporary assessment. Major Pek Wan Kian, SAF. Published based on a thesis – Pointer, Journal of the SAF Vol 42, No 4.

Article – “Military and Political risk in SE Asia 1971-1989 Australia's Commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Integrated Air Defence System. Sabretech Journal, Vol LXI, No 3. Published in September 2020.