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TE TAUA MOANA O AOTEAROA

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COVER IMAGE

Royal New Zealand Navy officer's sword. Commissioned in 2025, it features His Majesty King Charles' cypher CRIII, the silver fern and the Southern Cross. The opposing side features Māori motifs.
Photo: LAC Jalesa Nomani

NAVY
TE TAUA MOANA O AOTEAROA

HEI MANA MŌ AOTEAROA
A FORCE FOR NEW ZEALAND

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The Royal New Zealand Navy
Te Taua Moana o Aotearoa
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FOREWORD

CAPTAIN QUENTIN RANDALL, RNZN

Assistant Chief of Navy (Strategy and Engagement)

It is a great pleasure to write the Foreword to this 2025 edition of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy*. This *Journal* serves as an important platform for professional discourse, providing an opportunity for critical analysis, innovative thinking, and informed debate on the issues that matter most to our Navy. Discussions in its pages help us refine our strategic vision, identify challenges and opportunities, and collectively shape the future of our service. In this Foreword I offer some perspectives on our Navy to put into context the essays that follow.

Our Navy has always stood as a vital component of Aotearoa New Zealand's national security regime. Yet we are navigating an era of unprecedented change, and the challenges facing our Navy - and indeed, all maritime forces - are becoming increasingly complex and multidimensional. The strategic environment is evolving at a pace unseen in recent history, shaped by geopolitical tensions, technological advancements, climate change, and shifting regional dynamics. Because our prosperity, security, and way of life are inextricably linked to the oceans that surround us, the need for a capable, agile, and future-ready Navy has never been more pressing. Our ability to project power, secure our sovereign interests, and contribute meaningfully to regional and international security remains paramount.

However, we must acknowledge that the challenges of tomorrow cannot be met with the tools of yesterday. Recognising this, the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) is embarking on an ambitious transformation journey - one that seeks to modernise our fleet, enhance our operational capabilities, and build a force that is adaptable to the strategic realities of the 21st century. Guided by the Defence Capability Plan 2025, https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/Defence-Capability-Plan-25.pdf, this modernisation programme is not

just about acquiring new platforms; it is about rethinking how we train, operate and maintain, leverage technology, and invest in our people - the heart of our Navy.

Part of this transformation must focus on integrating emerging technologies. The rapid developments of autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and space-based surveillance capabilities are redefining modern naval operations. For the RNZN to remain effective, we must harness these technologies, ensuring that our platforms and people are equipped with the tools necessary to operate in an increasingly complex and dynamic battlespace. This requires not only investment in new systems and fit-for-purpose infrastructure, but also a shift in mindset - one that embraces curiosity, innovation, agility, and continuous adaptation.

Modernisation extends beyond just our fleet. Even the most advanced technology and platforms are only as effective as the people who operate them. Investing in our officers and sailors will be central to a successful transformation journey. We must continue to attract, develop, and retain a diverse and skilled workforce that is prepared for the demands of modern naval warfare. Training, professional development, and leadership cultivation will need to remain at the centre of our efforts if we are to ensure that our people are equipped with the critical thinking and decision-making skills needed for this new era of complexity.

And we cannot make these changes alone. Partnerships and collaboration with the wider New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), other Government agencies, industry and international partners will be essential as we navigate this period of change. The RNZN does not operate in isolation; our strength is magnified through our alliance with Australia and cooperative engagements with our regional and international partners. Strengthening our relationships with likeminded security partners by participating in joint exercises, and contributing to multinational security efforts will continue to enhance our ability to address common challenges and uphold the stability in our region.

The path ahead is not without its challenges. The evolving security landscape demands that we remain proactive, adaptive, and forward-thinking in our approach. Budgetary constraints, resource limitations, and evolving threats will require us to prioritise effectively and make difficult but necessary decisions about the future force structure of the RNZN. Nonetheless, our core values and shared purpose as a Navy will guide us through this transformation with confidence and determination.

The RNZN has a proud history of service and sacrifice, and as we look to the future, we remain steadfast in our commitment to defending New Zealand’s maritime interests, contributing to regional stability, and upholding the international rules-based order and the values that define us as a force for good in the world.

In this spirit, I recommend to all interested readers the essays of this 2025 edition of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy*.

CAPTAIN QUENTIN RANDALL, RNZN

Captain Quentin Randall, RNZN is a graduate of the NZDF’s inaugural Advanced Command and Staff Course (2002), and a more recent graduate of the Defence Strategic Studies Centre at the Australian War College. Captain Randall holds Master degrees in Philosophy (Massey University, 2006) and National Security and Strategy (Deakin University, 2023). His early career postings included warfare and logistics appointments in both auxiliary and combat ships deployed across the Pacific and Asian regions. His senior appointments include Commanding Officer HMNZS *Philomel*, Chief Staff Officer – Support to the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand, and the Assistant Chief Defence Reserves, Youth and Sports. He has held the position of Assistant Chief of Navy (Strategy and Engagement) since January 2024, interspersed by a six month period as Deputy Chief of Navy in the acting rank of Commodore.

EDITORIAL



HONORARY CAPTAIN DR STEPHEN HOADLEY, RNZN

General Editor, Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy

New Zealand's security policies are being tested at a level not seen since the 1930s. The effects of wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, lethal conflicts in Africa and South Asia, China's military maneuvers in the South Pacific and Tasman Sea, and geopolitical realignments by Washington signal that distance will no longer protect us. Only partnerships with like-minded countries, coupled with our own robust self-help, can balance, and hopefully deflect, the security challenges that face us from autocratic powers.

These security issues come at us as information fragments via the traditional media, social media, and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)/Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) strategic plans, bulletins, directives and diverse comms… all useful but often intermittent and varied. A big-picture perspective is needed to integrate and assess the information bits necessary to guide rational action. To assist with the compilation of a big picture is the role of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy*.

With rising security challenges in mind, the aims of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy* are three. First, it aspires to provide a forum to simulate and inform debate on and discussion of New Zealand's naval and maritime security policies and strategies. Second, it provides all members of the security community - uniformed, government, academic, and media - a means to reach each other and the wider public with their career experiences, viewpoints, and recommendations. Third, it offers a vehicle for Navy and Defence personnel, and interested academic and media commentators, to sharpen their analytic and presentational skills to be better prepared for the debates over the security priorities sure to intensify in the coming year.

The overarching outcomes that we all seek are heightened public awareness and debate on how to meet the growing defence and security challenges facing New Zealand, and improved government and NZDF policies and performances to better manage those challenges.

These goals are ambitious but reachable. Readers may judge their achievement by reviewing the contributions to not only this 2025 edition but also the four prior editions back to the journal's inauguration in 2020, all available on line at www.nzdf.mil.nz/search/SearchForm/?Search=Professional+Journal+of+the+Royal+New+Zealand+Navy.

This 2025 edition of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy* presents analytical essays in three parts. **Part One - Partnerships** includes selected reviews of New Zealand's security relationships. In this edition the relationship with Australia is featured in an article by Royal Australian Air Force Wing Commander Sally Faulks with reference to the pros and cons of New Zealand joining the second pillar of Australia - United Kingdom - United States (AUKUS). This is followed by a timely update of trans-Tasman defence relations by Commander Mike Collinson, drawing on his experience as former Naval Adviser in Canberra. Japan's growing links with the NZDF and RNZN in the context of Tokyo's rapidly strengthening defence posture are set out in detail by Associate Professor Corey Wallace, a New Zealander pursuing a successful academic career in a Japanese university.

Part Two - Policies looks to the future of New Zealand's security policies. Commander Richard Greenwood-Bell offers his perspective on how New Zealand can mitigate challenges to its maritime security. Turning to cyberspace, Commodore Brendon Clark warns against the growing misinformation spread by social media and notes how the United Kingdom and New Zealand governments are defending their societies from this corrosive influence. With an eye on material basics, Major Cameron Wright perceptively identifies New Zealand's energy vulnerabilities and commends policies to mitigate them.

Part Three - Strategic Perspectives adopts a wider view and gives rein to out-of-the-square theoretical thinking. From a UK perspective, Professor Carl Hunter notes that grand strategy requires economic intelligence and industrial capacity to achieve effectiveness. Captain Quentin Randall offers the notion of Strategic Art as a paradigm to sharpen the thinking of security professionals. Colonel Grant Motley introduces Concordance Theory and applies it to New Zealand's civil-military relations in a fresh way. Commander Sam Greenhalgh in his perceptive review of the Waikato River War 1853-54 shows how today's RNZN officers can validate modern tactics with reference to the Royal Navy's successful campaigns of the past. Finally, senior NZDF official Kieran Burnett examines how information warfare and the promulgation of misinformation can border on treason, and casts a new light on an old crime.

This edition concludes with thoughtful book reviews curated by Captain Andrew Dowling from his perspective as our Defence Adviser in Canberra.

The next edition of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy* is already on the planning horizon. It aspires to present fresh essays to highlight security issues and policies emerging in 2026, and beyond. Potential contributors are invited to check the final page of this edition for guidelines, or to consult directly with me or the Editorial Board with ideas at rnznjournal@gmail.com.

HONORARY CAPTAIN DR STEPHEN HOADLEY, RNZN

Dr Stephen Hoadley, Honorary Captain RNZN, recently retired as Associate Professor of International Relations at The University of Auckland. He is the author of seven books, including The *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook* and *New Zealand United States Relations*. He was general editor of a five-volume series on International Human Rights and three other books, including *Asian Security Reassessed*. He is an Honorary Professor of the NZDF Command and Staff College and a media commentator and public speaker.

PART 1:
PARTNERSHIPS

AUKUS and the Trans-Tasman Relationship[1]

Wing Commander Sally Faulks, RAAF

The 2021 Australia - United Kingdom - United States (AUKUS) agreement promises opportunities for New Zealand, but also poses risks, warns Wing Commander Sally Faulks, RAAF. The trans-Tasman security implications - pro and con - of New Zealand hypothetically joining Pillar II are the focus of Wing Commander Faulks' essay. She notes also the partisan political controversy that the project has precipitated in Wellington. She concludes that relations with Australia will remain close whether or not New Zealand joins AUKUS-II, but that careful management of the issue will be required to minimise misunderstanding and irritation in Canberra.

Introduction

In 2021, prior to the AUKUS announcement, the Australia and New Zealand partnership was close and deep. The *Canberra Pact* and Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) Treaty obligations, the *Closer Defence Relations 1991* commitments, and the *Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations 1998*, and many other declarations and documents, underpin the security relationship. Despite the United States (US) withdrawal of ANZUS Treaty obligations to New Zealand, and Australian frustrations about asymmetry in the defence relationship, the trans-Tasman partners remained 'truly closer than teeth and lip'.[2] This essay traces the consequences of the initiation of the AUKUS project in 2021 on the trans-Tasman relationship, noting both opportunities and stresses.

The AUKUS Agreement 2021

On 16 September 2021, Australia agreed to an enhanced trilateral security partnership with the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, termed *AUKUS*.[3] See Figure 1. The Agreement aims to 'enable the partners to significantly deepen cooperation on a range of emerging security and defence capabilities, which will enhance joint capability and interoperability'.[4] This was the first significant defence arrangement that Australia had undertaken without New Zealand.

1 This is an abridged version of Wing Commander Faulks' Major Essay for the NZDF Command and Staff College in 2024 - ed.
2 Justin Bassi and David Capie, "Building an Australia-New Zealand Alliance Fit for the 21st Century," *The Strategist* (2024).
3 Scott Morrison, Peter Dutton, and Marise Payne, "Australia to pursue nuclear-powered submarines through new trilateral enhanced security partnership," news release, 16 September, 2021, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2021-09-16/joint-media-statement-australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security-partnership.
4 Morrison et al, 2021.

Figure 1 - New Zealand is considering participation in Pillar II (advanced military technology) of the AUKUS nuclear propelled submarine program | UK MoD

The first AUKUS Pillar (AUKUS-I) involves the UK and US supporting Australia in 'acquiring nuclear-powered submarines and the necessary infrastructure to keep them'.[5] The rationale for nuclear-powered submarines is that they are 'quieter, faster, more survivable and have longer endurance', and would bolster Australia's deterrence capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.[6] Until the new submarines are acquired, Australia will purchase US Virginia class nuclear-powered submarines from the US, and the US and UK will rotate submarines to Stirling Naval Base on Australia's west coast.[7] Australia aims to purchase three US Virginia class submarines from the early 2030s (with a possible further two to follow). Then in the early 2040s, there will be a 'trilateral joint delivery program building *SSN-AUKUS* based on a next-generation UK design integrating technologies from all three countries'.[8]

AUKUS Pillar II (AUKUS-II) involves trilateral cooperation on advanced military technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies, cyber warfare, hypersonic and anti-hypersonic weaponry, and underseas capabilities.[9] Further details on AUKUS-II have not been publicly released to date. There is much speculation about opening the AUKUS-II partnership to like-minded countries such as New Zealand. New Zealand's Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters' position is that New Zealand has not yet been invited to participate in AUKUS and that if they were, leaders would "weigh up the economic and security benefits and costs of any decision about whether participating in Pillar II is in the national interest."[10] At the Australia-New Zealand Leaders' Meeting on 16 August 2024, the prime ministers discussed AUKUS as 'an initiative that would enhance regional security and stability' and New Zealand's 'interest in exploring potential collaboration on advanced capability projects under AUKUS

5 Tom Corben, Ashley Townshend, and Susannah Patton, "What is the AUKUS partnership?" 16 September 2021. https://www.ussc.edu.au/explainer-what-is-the-aukus-partnership.
6 Corben et al, 2021.
7 Derek McDougall, "Aukus: A Commonwealth Perspective," *The Round Table* 112, no. 6 (2023), 572.
8 Australian Government, *National Defence Strategy* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2024), 42.
9 United States Studies Centre, 2024, 'AUKUS'. https://www.ussc.edu.au/topics/aukus.
10 Winston Peters, "Speech to New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Parliament - Annual Lecture: Challenges and Opportunities," news release, 1 May, 2024. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-new-zealand-institute-international-affairs-parliament-%E2%80%93-annual-lecture-challenges.

Pillar II'.[11] The most recent formal update was in September 2024, when the AUKUS partners stated that they were in discussions with New Zealand, Canada and Japan about potential collaboration under AUKUS-II.[12]

AUKUS and trans-Tasman differences on nuclear non-proliferation

A fundamental difference between Australia and New Zealand is their respective approaches to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and therefore their perceptions of AUKUS. New Zealand's strong support of the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 (NPT)* 'alongside ongoing advocacy for disarmament and a safe and secure, nuclear-free Pacific'[13] is a cornerstone of its independent foreign policy stance. See Figure 2. New Zealand won an injunction in the International Court of Justice against French nuclear testing in 1972 and sponsored a United Nations Resolution in 1973 for a nuclear-free South Pacific.[14]

Figure 2 - New Zealand differs from Australia on nuclear weapons and propulsion policy | NZ MFAT

Australia's position on nuclear non-proliferation is more muted than New Zealand's. Australia ratified the *NPT* in 1973, but also promoted policies that supported US extended nuclear deterrence.[15] New Zealand and Australia are both signatories to the Treaty of Rarotonga 1985, which establishes a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.[16] However, Australia initially opposed the Treaty of Rarotonga due to the problems it would create for ANZUS and its

11 Anthony Albanese and Christopher Luxon, "Australia-New Zealand Leaders' Meeting 2024," news release, 16 Aug, 2024, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-new-zealand-leaders-meeting-2024.
12 Reuters, "Aukus in Talks with Canada, Japan, NZ, Say Leaders" *Reuters* (2024).
13 Nanaia Mahuta, "Why the Pacific way matters for regional security," news release, 3 May, 2023, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/why-pacific-way-matters-regional-security.
14 Amy L. Catalinac, "Why New Zealand Took Itself out of Anzus: Observing 'Opposition for Autonomy' in Asymmetric Alliances," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010), 333
15 Christine M. Leah, "Deterrence Beyond Downunder: Australia and US Security Guarantees since 1955," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 4 (2016), 530.
16 Hamish McDougall, *The Round Table* 112, no. 6 (2023), 567-81. Also see Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," in *Australian Treaty Series No. 32* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1986). The other signatories were the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa.

impact on US deployment in the South Pacific. Australia was also clear in its opposition to the New Zealand policy on US nuclear-armed and -propelled warships, concerned it would 'undermine Western extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific'.[17]

Australia's approach of prioritising deterrence over nuclear non-proliferation remains in its current defence policy. Australia's *2023 Defence Strategic Review* stated 'in our current strategic circumstances, the risk of nuclear escalation must be regarded as real. Our best protection against the risk of nuclear escalation is the United States' extended nuclear deterrence, and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control'.[18] Australia has also shown ongoing opposition to the United Nations (UN) resolution on the *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)*, of which New Zealand is a strong advocate, as it prohibits signatories from participating in any nuclear weapon activities. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's government abstained from voting on the resolution in 2022, and the US warned that any decision by Australia to join the *TPNW* would jeopardise US extended deterrence.[19] These differing policy approaches on nuclear non-proliferation have not significantly challenged the trans-Tasman alliance to date, but might in future if US military presence intensifies.

Purchasing nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS-I is critical to Australia's deterrence strategy. Since the AUKUS announcement, New Zealand has reaffirmed its stance of not allowing nuclear-propelled vessels in New Zealand waters.[20] If New Zealand does not allow Australian submarines within its territorial waters, this could hamper alliance operations in a conflict. In addition, although AUKUS-II has been conceived as separate from the provision of AUKUS-I, it could be argued that any association with AUKUS would undermine the credibility of New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance. Should New Zealand join AUKUS-II, it would also have to accept the possibility of the technology being used as part of integrated systems involving nuclear weaponry.[21]

Technically, as New Zealand's prime minister affirmed in 2024, AUKUS does not violate commitments to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or to a nuclear-free Pacific.[22] The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have professed concerns about Australia as a non-nuclear power acquiring nuclear technology for military use. However, they were somewhat reassured by Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong's commitment to 'work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure adherence to Australia's non-proliferation commitments'.[23]

AUKUS and Australian views of New Zealand

Australia's decision not to consult with New Zealand prior to unveiling AUKUS may reflect a negative shift in Australia's attitudes towards operating with New Zealand forces. As defence analyst Brendan Taylor put it, "Australia's broadening and deepening engagement with a range of new security groupings has diminished the relative importance of trans-Tasman ties from Canberra's perspective".[24] AUKUS-I is already consuming 'substantial human and financial bandwidth' in the Australian Defence Force (ADF), with concerns that 'the demands

17 Christine M. Leah, "Deterrence Beyond Downunder" (2016), 521-34.
18 Australian Department of Defence, *National Defence: Defence Strategic Review* (Canberra: Australian Government, 2023), 38.
19 Peter J. Dean, Stephan Fruehling, and Andrew O'Neil, "Australia and the US Nuclear Umbrella: From Deterrence Taker to Deterrence Maker," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78, no. 1 (2024), 34.
20 Christopher Luxon, "Foreign Policy Speech to the Lowy Institute," news release, 19 October, 2024, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/foreign-policy-speech-lowy-institute.
21 Marco de Jong and Emma Shortis, "NZ Started Discussing Aukus Involvement in 2021, Newly Released Details Reveal," *The Conversation* (2024). Published electronically 30 April 2024.
22 Guy Charlton and Gao Xiang, "Canada and New Zealand Need to Consider Joining Pillar 2 of AUKUS". *The Diplomat*, 21, September 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/canada-and-new-zealand-need-to-consider-joining-pillar-2-of-aukus/; Judith Collins and Winston Peters. "Joint Statement on Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN) 2024." news release, 1 February, 2024, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-australia-new-zealand-ministerial-consultations-anzmin-2024, 4.
23 Susannah Patton, "How South-East Asia Views Aukus," *The Interpreter*. Published electronically 24 February 2024.
24 Brendan Taylor, "Same Bed, Different Nightmares: Strategic Divergence in the Australia-New Zealand Alliance," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. Published electronically 23 August 2024.).

that AUKUS places on Australia could also shrink the bureaucratic bandwidth that Canberra can grant to Wellington'.[25] In the *2023 Australian Defence Strategic Review*, New Zealand is only referenced once, as a 'key partner for Australia in the Pacific'.[26] Instead, the US is emphasised as Australia's primary ally. In contrast, New Zealand views Australia as its only formal military ally, and Australian defence policy disproportionately impacts New Zealand.[27] The disproportionate views on the importance of the trans-Tasman alliance between Australia and New Zealand, heightened by AUKUS, may continue to present challenges.

Another challenge to the trans-Tasman alliance heighted by AUKUS is the expectation for New Zealand to contribute more to collective security in the Indo-Pacific. Although these challenges have existed since as early as 1998, AUKUS has brought them to the fore. Australia's deterrence efforts are centred on AUKUS with or without New Zealand. However, the ADF has emphasised the need for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to be reliable and capable of defending Australia's eastern flank.[28] In addition, the US is critical of its allies' alleged 'free-riding' and asserts that if allies want protection, they need to accept some of the risks of extended nuclear deterrence. This view has only hardened since the 1980's, even before heightened by President Trump. A commentary by *The Strategist* noted that as the US 'develops a more conspicuous forward presence for its nuclear forces in the Indo-Pacific and expects more burden-sharing from allies to support this', pressure may intensify for Australia to contribute more militarily, implying corresponding increased contributions by New Zealand.[29]

AUKUS and differences on autonomous weapons systems

New Zealand is an international leader in the governance of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). In 2021, New Zealand's Minister for Disarmament released a Cabinet paper with a 'push for new international law to ban and regulate AWS, which once activated can select and engage targets without further human intervention'.[30] The Cabinet paper outlines concerns about the legal compliance and ethical acceptability of advanced AWS and the imperative for New Zealand to ensure the primacy of these principles over presumed military benefits.[31] The paper also suggests that New Zealand play a leadership role in achieving constraints on AWS. Another concern raised is the potential for AWS to be 'a destabilising factor in future conflicts and the maintenance of peace'.[32]

New Zealand's position on AWS was reiterated in New Zealand's *Disarmament and Arms Control Strategy 2024-2026*, but with a subtle shift. Priority Three is to 'shape norms and rules on outer space and autonomous weapon systems'.[33] *The Disarmament and Arms Control Strategy* focuses on working with partners and developing multilateral agreements, with less emphasis on the dangers of AWS.

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25 Taylor, ibid. Also see Soli Middleby, Anna Powles, and Joanne Wallis. "Aukus Adds Ambiguity to the Australia-New Zealand Alliance." *The Strategist*. Published electronically 11 October 2021.

26 Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles. "Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific Islands: Ambiguous Allies?" In *The Centre of Gravity Series*, edited by Andrew Carr. Canberra: Australian National University, 2018.

27 Robert Ayson, "New Zealand and Aukus: Affected without Being Included." *PacNet* 48. Published electronically 19 October 2021.

28 Katie Scotcher, "Australia Pressuring New Zealand to Upgrade Defence Force - NZDF Chief," *RadioNZ*. Published electronically 15 February 2024.

29 Australian Strategic Policy Institute staff, "Putting the NZ Back into Anzus: Why a Fleeting Reference Means a Lot," *The Strategist* (2024).

30 Phil Twyford, "Government commits to international effort to ban and regulate killer robots," news release, 30 November 2021. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-commits-international-effort-ban-and-regulate-killer-robots.

31 New Zealand Office of the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, *Autonomous Weapons Systems: New Zealand Policy Position and Approach for International Engagement* (2021), 1.

32 Office of the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control 2021, 2, 4.

33 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, *New Zealand Disarmament and Arms Control Strategy 2024-2026* (Wellington; 2024), 12.

New Zealand co-sponsored a UN resolution on AWS in 2023, and the 2021 Cabinet paper was reconfirmed in January 2024.[34] New Zealand also endorsed the *2023 US Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy*.[35] In its May 2024 submission to the UN Secretary-General, New Zealand stated that it seeks binding international prohibitions and regulation of AWS, with a 'comprehensive and specific prohibition on AWS that cannot comply with international humanitarian law'.[36] The submission also acknowledges the potential legitimate military benefits of AWS and, while advocating caution, did not support a blanket ban.[37]

In contrast, Australia has been developing autonomous military technology since 2016, with trusted autonomous systems listed as a priority area in defence policy documents.[38] Australian investment in robotics and autonomous systems has steadily increased since 2016.[39] The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has developed *Ghost Bat* (also known as *Loyal Wingman*), an uncrewed aircraft that acts as 'a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams.[40] The Royal Australian Navy is developing uncrewed undersea vehicle capabilities, and the Australian Army is developing autonomous vehicles.[41] See Figure 3.

Figure 3 - Australian Army drone RQ-7B Shadow 200 | Australian Army

The Australian policy position on AWS is that it does not oppose lethal AWS, provided they comply with international law.[42] This position was re-iterated in Australia's 2024 submission to the UN. It stated that it 'recognises the potential of AWS to enhance defence capabilities, reduce risk to defence personnel, and increase precision and efficiency in military operations - while minimising civilian casualties. All military capability must be used in compliance with

34 "Autonomous Weapon Systems," 2024, accessed 8 September 2024. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/disarmament/autonomous-weapons-systems.
35 United States Department of State, "Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy," news release, 1 Nov, 2023. https://www.state.gov/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy/.
36 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Autonomous Weapon Systems: New Zealand Submission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations* (2024), 3.
37 Ibid, 3.
38 Sian Troath, "The Development of Robotics and Autonomous Systems in Australia: Key Issues, Actors and Discourses," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 77, no. 1 (2022), 69.
39 Troath, "The Development of Robotics…" 2022, 70-71.
40 "Ghost Bat," 2024, accessed 8 September, 2024. https://www.airforce.gov.au/our-work/projects-and-programs/ghost-bat.
41 Nigel Pittaway, "Navy's Uncrewed Undersea Plans," *Australian Defence Magazine* (2022); Melissa Price, "Autonomous truck project passes major milestone," news release, 28 October 2021, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2021-10-28/autonomous-truck-project-passes-major-milestone.
42 Troath, "The Development of Robotics…" 2022, 75.

international law'.[43] Australia co-sponsored a joint proposal regarding AWS with Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Poland, the UK and the US (but not New Zealand), which suggests a two-tier approach with some AWS being prohibited and others limited but not prohibited.[44] Australia states that it does not agree with 'creating a new international law mandating a single standard of human control over or human involvement in the use of lethal AWS'.[45] This position diverges from New Zealand's advocacy of more robust international legal limits on AWS.

Although the technology included in AUKUS-II is not clearly outlined, in 2023, the AUKUS partners conducted a trial of 'AI-enabled assets' for detecting and tracking military targets.[46] Publicly available information about AUKUS-II states that 'trilateral cooperation on artificial intelligence and autonomy will provide critical enablers for future force capabilities, improving the speed and precision of decision-making processes to maintain a capability edge and defence against AI-enabled threats'.[47] These AUKUS-II technologies may conflict with New Zealand's position on AWS and present an ethical barrier to joining, with subsequent potential challenges to interoperability. Another risk is that when operating in a coalition, the uncertainty and ambiguity around AWS may lead to misperceptions and poor communication, damaging the trust critical to the trans-Tasman alliance.[48]

However, AUKUS may also present opportunities for the trans-Tasman alliance regarding AWS governance. Commentary within Australia has highlighted the need for Australia to 'develop a dedicated framework guiding the development of ethical AI in a defence context'.[49] Given New Zealand's experience and credibility on this issue, there is an opportunity for Australia to leverage this experience in refining a defence framework for the ethical use of AWS.

AUKUS and trans-Tasman interoperability

Interoperability is one of the central tenets of the trans-Tasman alliance and 'key to military relationships'.[50] Outcome 2.3 of the 2018 Closer Defence Relations (CDR) proposes that Australian and New Zealand 'command, control and communications arrangements deliver combined operational effectiveness, and facilitate timely coordination between our Defence agencies' and that 'interoperability is enhanced through opportunities for our personnel to undertake bilateral training, education, exchanges and attachments'.[51] Interoperability between Australia and New Zealand does not necessarily require the same equipment, but the equipment should be able to 'share common facilities and is able to interact, connect and communicate, exchange data and services with other equipment'.[52]

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43 Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Australia's Submission to the United Nations Secretary-General's Report on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems* (Australian Government, 2024), 1.
44 Australia DFAT 2024, 2.
45 Australia DFAT 2024, 4.
46 Tim Martin, "The AI Side of Aukus: UK Reveals Ground-Breaking, Allied Tech Demo," *Breaking Defense - Indo-Pacific*. Published electronically 25 May 2023.
47 GOV.UK, "Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia - United Kingdom - United States Partnership (AUKUS)," news release, 5 April 2022. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus-fact-sheet.
48 Sian Troath, "Australia's Pursuit of 'Killer Robots' Could Put the Trans-Tasman Alliance with New Zealand on Shaky Ground," *The Conversation*. Published electronically 22 August 2022.
49 Samara Paradine and Marcus Schultz, "I, Killer Robot: The Ethics of Autonomous Weapons Systems Governance," *The Strategist*. Published electronically 15 February 2024.
50 Jennifer Parker, "Interoperability: The Missing Link in Indo-Pacific Security," *The Interpreter*. Published electronically 16 August 2024.
51 Marise Payne, "Australia - New Zealand Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations." news release, 9 March 2018. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2018-03-09/australia-new-zealand-joint-statement-closer-defence-relations.
52 NATO "Interoperability: connecting forces." Updated 11 April 2023, accessed 20 October 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84112.htm.

Since 2018, NZDF procurements have aligned more closely with Australian capabilities, with the acquisition of C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles.[53] See Figure 4. In February 2024, New Zealand committed to 'increasing integration between [our] military forces, including through common capability, exchanges of senior military officers and increased participation in warfighting exercises'.[54] However, defence expenditure is yet to match the ambitious rhetoric.[55] In fact, New Zealand proposed a smaller defence budget in 2024, comprising only 0.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (pending the release of the Defence Capability Plan).[56] As journalists Craymer and Jackson noted, there is also an expectation that countries joining AUKUS will need to bring 'money, technology, or industrial capacity' to justify the added complexity of additional partners.[57] Therefore, even if New Zealand has ambitions to join AUKUS-II, financial and capability pressures may present barriers to participating.

Figure 4 - Royal New Zealand Air Force Poseidon and Hercules aircraft are interoperable with Australian counterparts | RNZAF

According to Singapore's Professor Khoo, if New Zealand does not join AUKUS-II, then 'it is hard to see how non-involvement will not weaken [that] alliance.'[58] New Zealand 'already struggles to maintain interoperability with Australia's defence capabilities', and AUKUS may 'widen the gap… even further'.[59] Interoperability will increase between Australia, the US and the UK, and it is 'unlikely that New Zealand will be able to 'plug-and-play' into these systems using technologies 'off-the-shelf' from the consumer market'.[60] Defence is not the only agency impacted, as 'diplomats and intelligence agencies engagement with Five Eyes intelligence sharing mechanisms will also not be able to access and share intelligence. Ultimately, New Zealand may be pushed out, leading to gaps in the network'.[61]

The elements of information exchange and communication critical for interoperability are 'predicated on a commonality of communications networks along with high level agreements regarding the sharing of secrets'.[62] Dr Reuben Steff is of the view that the NZDF may 'literally not be able to keep up in the field and/or communicate using allied communication channels. It will be unable to contribute in meaningful ways and its forces will become a liability'.[63]

53 David M. Andrews, "Interoperability, South Pacific Burden-Sharing, and Trans-Tasman Relations," *Australian Naval Review*, no. 1 (2021), 23.
54 Collins and Peters, 2024.
55 Taylor, 2024.
56 Lucy Craymer and Lewis Jackson, "New Zealand Proposes 6.6% Smaller Defence Budget Amid Personnel and Equipment Woes," *Reuters*. Published electronically 22 May 2024.
57 Craymer and Jackson, 2024.
58 Christopher Khoo, "New Zealand Is Reviving the Anzac Alliance - Joining Aukus Is a Logical Next Step," *The Conversation*. Published electronically 13 February 2024.
59 Middleby et al, 2021.
60 Reuben Steff, "For New Zealand, the Benefits of Joining Aukus Pillar II Outweigh the Costs," *The Diplomat* (2023).
61 Reuben Steff, "Aukus + NZ = Win-Win," *The Interpreter* (1 May 2023).
62 Parker, 2024.
63 Reuben Steff, "The Strategic Case for New Zealand to Join Aukus," *The Diplomat*. Published electronically 4 April 2023.

Without access to AUKUS-II technologies, New Zealand's ability to operate in a joint force with Australia may be impacted, which would have a flow-on impact on the alliance relationship.

Conversely, says Khoo, if New Zealand does join AUKUS-II, it will 'invariably strengthen the ANZAC alliance'.[64] It would provide 'welcome support for keeping New Zealand defence capabilities up to date and interoperable with our allies,' believes Sakura Gregory.[65] New Zealand joining AUKUS-II would produce bilateral benefits regarding the sharing and development of technology, with the potential for a collaborative New Zealand-Australia framework on advanced technologies.[66] There are opportunities for partnership between Australian and New Zealand defence industries for niche manufacturing and testing.

The need for collaboration in emergent military domains such as cyber security is becoming increasingly important. In the Joint Statement released following the Australia-New Zealand Leaders' meeting on 16 August 2024, the Prime Ministers stated that 'in the event of a cyber-attack that threatened the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of our nations, Australia and New Zealand would consult together under the ANZUS Treaty to determine appropriate options to address the threat'.[67] The statement also confirmed that a cyber-attack constituted an armed attack under the Treaty.[68] The increased emphasis on cyber-attacks presents an opportunity for Australia and New Zealand to work more closely in the cyber and space domains, which AUKUS can facilitate. New Zealand's space industry may be of particular interest for AUKUS, being 'more developed than Australia's, and New Zealand-US company RocketLab already launches from both countries for clients including the US Department of Defense'.[69]

If New Zealand joins AUKUS-II, this will present opportunities for the trans-Tasman alliance to achieve greater interoperability, particularly in the space and cyber domains. To date, AUKUS has not inhibited interoperability during major defence exercises, and Australia and New Zealand are already collaborating in the space domain outside of AUKUS. Therefore, although AUKUS has the potential to improve collaboration within the alliance, it is not essential for interoperability 'across the Ditch'.

Impact of AUKUS on relations with China

Commentators in New Zealand have expressed concerns that joining AUKUS-II would impact negatively on relations with China. Indeed, China has explicitly decried AUKUS as 'a stark manifestation of Cold War mentality as it seeks to establish a nuclear-related exclusive military alliance that targets third parties'[70] Otago University professor Robert Patman is among those who have expressed 'grave concerns' about the prospect of New Zealand joining AUKUS, raising fears of economic coercion similar to Australia's recent experience should New Zealand join AUKUS-II.[71] Media defence commentator Thomas Manch asserted that if New Zealand signed up for AUKUS-II, this would risk drawing 'closer to the United States, and closer to conflict with China'.[72] Labour Party spokespeople have expressed similar reservations.

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64 Khoo, 2024.
65 Sakura Gregory, "Why NZ Should Join Aukus Pillar II" *Newsroom*. Published electronically 3 May 2023.
66 Steff, "Aukus + Nz = Win-Win."
67 Anthony Albanese and Christopher Luxon. "Australia-New Zealand Leaders' Meeting 2024." news release, 16 August 2024, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-new-zealand-leaders-meeting-2024.
68 Ibid.
69 Thomas Manch "The Aukus Question: What Could New Zealand Really Sign up For?," *The Post*. Published electronically 28 April 2024.
70 Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in New Zealand, "Remarks by the Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in New Zealand on the Joint Statement on Anzmin 2024," news release, 2 February 2024, http://nz.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrbt/sgfyr/202403/t20240326_11270723.htm.
71 Robert G. Patman, "New Zealand Eyes Joining Aukus Despite China's Warnings," *East Asia Forum*. Published electronically 7 June 2024.
72 Thomas Manch, 2024.

While Australia and New Zealand appear to have differing approaches towards China as regards AUKUS, historically they have been fundamentally in alignment.[73] Australia proposes to 'cooperate with China where we can, disagree where we must and engage in our national interest'.[74] New Zealand proposes three principles for working with China: 'engage and cooperate in areas of common interest; act to secure New Zealand's interests; and work with partners'.[75]

The details of Australia's and New Zealand's official policy documents suggest more divergence. Australia's *National Defence Strategy (NDS)* states that 'China has employed coercive tactics in pursuit of its strategic objectives' and that some of its initiatives in the Indo-Pacific 'lack transparency about their purpose and scope'.[76] The *NDS* also highlights China's grey-zone activities in the South China Sea, and while 'committed to pursuing a defence dialogue with China', Australia is aligned with the US on the issue of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.[77] In contrast, the *New Zealand 2023 Defence Strategy and Policy Statement's* description of China's actions is milder, stating that it 'poses challenges to existing international rules and norms'.[78]

However, in recent years, New Zealand has hardened its language and actions against China, thus moving closer to Australia's views. In 2022, former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern characterised China's security partnership with the Solomon Islands as 'gravely concerning'.[79] In March 2023, New Zealand Defence Minister Andrew Little was more explicit about the China threat, saying, 'when you look at what China is doing and their hugely significant additional spend on their military capability… we can't stand aside and say 'Nothing to see here and we'll kind of just carry on what we're doing''.[80] Following the ANZMIN2+2 meetings in February 2024, New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins and Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters discussed 'serious concern over developments in the South China Sea and an intensification of destabilising activities' and the will to 'continue deepening relations with Taiwan'.[81] More recently, on 25 September 2024, HMNZS *Aotearoa* sailed through the Taiwan Strait alongside an Australian ship for the first time since 2017.[82]

To date, none of these declarations and actions has significantly impacted New Zealand's relations with China or weakened the trans-Tasman alliance. Recent statements by leaders in New Zealand and China have downplayed the likelihood of AUKUS negatively impacting New Zealand. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon and Trade Minister Todd McClay 'publicly indicated that they would not expect a hostile backlash from Beijing if the National-led coalition government eventually joined Pillar II of AUKUS'.[83] The Chinese Ambassador to New Zealand, Wang Xiaolong, also conceded that 'China is not a threat to New Zealand, rather… an opportunity and a mutually beneficial partner'.[84] See Figure 5. Thus one could argue that should New Zealand join AUKUS-II, it would not signal a significant change in Wellington's security posture towards either China or Australia.

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73 Jason Young, "China and the Australia-New Zealand Alliance: The Importance of Loyal Opposition," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 1-8. Published electronically 23 August 2024.
74 Anthony Albanese and Penny Wong, "Press conference, Beijing, People's Republic of China," news release, 6 November 2023. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/transcript/press-conference-beijing-peoples-republic-china.
75 Young, 2024.
76 Australian Government 2024, 12.
77 Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Australia's Submission to the United Nations Secretary-General's Report on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems* 2024, 14, 49.
78 NZDF, *Defence Policy and Strategy Statement* (Wellington: 2023), 14.
79 Kirsty Needham and Lucy Craymer, "New Zealand's Ardern Says Solomon Islands-China Deal 'Gravely Concerning," *Reuters*. Published electronically 28 March 2022.
80 Sam Sachdeva, "Defence Minister: 'Independence Is Not Isolationism'," *Newsroom* (2023).
81 Judith Collins and Winston Peters, "Joint Statement on Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN) 2024," news release, 1 February 2024. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-australia-new-zealand-ministerial-consultations-anzmin-2024. 2024
82 The Economist, "New Zealand's Biggest Pivot since the 1980s," *The Economist*. Published electronically 28 March 2024.
83 Patman, 2024.
84 Patman, 2024.

Figure 5 - China Ambassador Wang Xailong and New Zealand Minister of Defence Judith Collins, May 2024 | China Ministry of Foreign Affairs

AUKUS and Indo-Pacific regional stability

Outcome 1.1 of 2018 CDR requires that Australia's and New Zealand's approaches to operations should 'contribute to stability in the region'.[85] A central rationale for AUKUS is its members' ability to mitigate the effects of China's militarisation of the South China Sea. However, some ASEAN countries have argued that AUKUS itself is contributing to militarisation in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia's foreign minister expressed concern about 'the continuing arms race and power projection in the region', calling on Australia to 'maintain its commitment towards regional peace, stability and security'.[86] Malaysia's leaders have also 'voiced unease that AUKUS could precipitate a regional arms race and raise the risk of conflict'.[87] Although the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific is driven by countries such as China and Japan of which AUKUS would be a minor element, some ASEAN nations see that additional element as unwelcome.[88] On the other hand, nations such as Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines have welcomed AUKUS as balancing against China's influence. But the ASEAN grouping has produced no formal position on AUKUS.[89]

85 Payne, 2018.
86 Patton, 2024.
87 Ibid.
88 Shoumik Malhotra, "Is a Militarisation of the Indo-Pacific Occurring?," *Australian Outlook*. Published electronically 16 June 2023.
89 Mingjiang Li, "Asean's Responses To aukus: Implications For strategic Realignments In the indo-Pacific," *China International Strategy Review* 4 (2022), 271.

There is also concern about how AUKUS fits into broader regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN is 'the convening platform for major powers to engage regionally', and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a platform for open dialogue on regional security.[90] However, AUKUS was arranged without prior notice to the ARF or ASEAN partners, which was perceived as a slight.[91] In key policy documents, Australia and New Zealand both emphasise the importance of ASEAN centrality for regional stability.[92] However, many Southeast Asians perceive AUKUS as an 'Anglophone' initiative, not inclusive of countries in the Indo-Pacific despite the common aim to resist China's assertiveness.[93]

One mechanism for assessing the impact of AUKUS on regional security is to compare the 2024 iteration of the *Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment* to the 2020 report. The 2020 Assessment identified the following challenges to security in the region: growing great power competition, implications of the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the trajectory of US alliances and partnerships.[94] The report identified the potential for flashpoints in the South China Sea and Taiwan and the threat of North Korean nuclear and missile programs.[95]

The 2024 report foregrounds China, asserting that 'China has been more willing to throw its weight around. Its economic, diplomatic and security coercion has been uneasily felt by countries across the region'.[96] Threats and flashpoints identified in 2020 have worsened, and 'incidents involving coercive acts by China's military and maritime security assets in these waters have grown more frequent and dangerous'.[97] The report references Australia's 'stronger and more nuanced approach' to regional engagement and the importance of military development of advanced technologies, but did not cite AUKUS as a significant issue for regional stability.[98] Therefore, Australian policy-makers seem unconcerned that AUKUS would impact negatively impact on Indo-Pacific regional stability or on the trans-Tasman alliance.

AUKUS and the Pacific islands

Australia and New Zealand agree that neighbouring Pacific island nations are essential stakeholders essential to regional stability. See Figure 6. As the largest states in the Pacific region, the Australia-New Zealand relationship is important in terms of contributions to regional stability and support for the strategic interests of Pacific island nations.[99] The southwest Pacific is where Australia and New Zealand's regional identities and strategic interests intersect most directly.[100] This convergence is reflected in Australia's *Pacific Step-Up* and New Zealand's *Pacific Reset*, both announced in 2018. Australia and New Zealand supported the *2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent*, proclaimed by the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022.

90 Prashanth Parameswaran, "Aukus, Southeast Asia, and the Indo-Pacific: Beyond Cyclical Perception Management," *The Diplomat*. Published electronically 6 June 2023.
91 Li 2022, 275.
92 Australian Government 2024, 48; NZ Government, *New Zealand National Security Strategy* (Wellington: Crown Copyright, 2023), 6.
93 Parameswaran, 2023.
94 Tim Huxley and Lynn Kuok, "Asia-Pacific Security Assessment 2020." International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2020.
95 Huxley and Kuok, 2020.
96 Evan A. Laksmana, "Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024.
97 Laksmana, 2024.
98 Ibid.
99 Jennifer Curtin and Dominic O'Sullivan. "Legacies of a Trans-Tasman Relationship: The Evolution of Asymmetry between New Zealand and Australia." Chapter 5 In Ian Roberge, editor. *Asymmetric Neighbours and International Relations: Living in the Shadow of Elephants*, Taylor & Francis Group, 2023, 54-69.
100 Rob Laurs, "In the Same Boat - a Case for Trans-Tasman Strategic Integration," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. Published electronically 20 September 2024.



Figure 6 - New Zealand, Australia and their Pacific island partners | Crown Copyright 2021: NZDF

However the announcement of AUKUS triggered concern that the Pacific could become 'an arena for Great Power competition, destabilising an area that faces the intersection of critical security issues such as climate change'.[101] Former leaders of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Palau spoke up against AUKUS, claiming that it 'goes against the Blue Pacific narrative'.[102] Leaders from Tonga, the Cook Islands and Samoa have said that 'keeping the Pacific nuclear-free and in line with the Rarotonga treaty' was crucial and that if New Zealand joins AUKUS-II, it could be perceived as 'rubber-stamping Australia acquiring the nuclear-powered subs'.[103] New Zealand's involvement in AUKUS-II could 'undermine a previous commitment to an independent, nuclear-free, and Pacific-led foreign policy'.[104] There is also a perception that money spent on AUKUS could have been spent on the Pacific's most pressing security concern – climate change.[105] If New Zealand does join AUKUS-II, both ANZAC nations risk friction with their Pacific island partners. Some Pacific states may even align with China instead, posing a threat to previous decades of stability. Solomon Islands' security agreement with Beijing is the most prominent example.

However, AUKUS also presents potential opportunities for New Zealand to advocate on Australia's behalf with Pacific island nations, emphasising Wellington's non-nuclear credentials.[106] In addition, the advanced technology developed through AUKUS-II may present opportunities to improve how Australia and New Zealand respond to natural disasters and other emergencies in the Pacific.[107] Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) has long been an area of collaboration for Australia and New Zealand, enhancing the reputations of both in the Pacific island region.

101 Gregory, 2023.
102 Christine Rovoi, "Does Aukus Undermine New Zealand's Position in the Pacific?," *PMN*. Published electronically 18 April 2024.
103 Rovoi, 2024.
104 Marco de Jong, "Losing the Pacific to the Anglosphere: Aukus and New Zealand's Regional Engagement," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. 1-8. Published electronically 25 September 2024.
105 Rovoi, 2024.
106 Middleby et al, 2021.
107 Steff, "The Strategic Case for New Zealand to Joining Aukus."

Summary of opportunities and challenges

Opportunities

AUKUS presents a number of opportunities for the trans-Tasman alliance. Since the AUKUS announcement in 2021, Australia and New Zealand's diplomatic approaches to China have become more closely aligned. The alliance also appears to be strengthened by clarifying obligations in the event of an attack on either country, including a cyber-attack. If New Zealand does join AUKUS-II, this would present opportunities to enhance interoperability and collaboration between the ANZAC nations. In particular, AUKUS-II could boost trans-Tasman capabilities in the space and cyber domains and HADR.

While the alliance's asymmetric nature limits New Zealand's military contribution, there are many opportunities for New Zealand to make valuable non-military contributions. New Zealand may be able to exert influence through soft power, responding to non-traditional security challenges, and advancing diplomatic positions that may be more difficult for Australia to take.[108] For example, New Zealand could provide expertise in the governance of AWS and utilise its 'soft power' diplomatic influence with Pacific island leaders.

Challenges

AUKUS also presents challenges for the trans-Tasman alliance. In an already asymmetrical relationship, AUKUS consumes significant Australian diplomatic bandwidth and emphasises the relative importance of the alliance to each country. Australia views the US as its primary ally, whereas Australia is New Zealand's only formal ally. AUKUS has also induced New Zealand to contribute more to collective security.

Australia and New Zealand have long held different policy positions on nuclear non-proliferation and AWS, and AUKUS may have exacerbated these differences. The AUKUS arrangements have also heightened challenges to trans-Tasman interoperability. However, these challenges existed prior to 2021 and have not significantly worsened due to AUKUS. The trans-Tasman alliance is still interoperable and functional.

AUKUS also challenges the trans-Tasman alliance regarding its impact on regional security. Regional stability is one of the three focus areas outlined in the 2018 CDR, and the key stakeholders of ASEAN and the Pacific islands are yet to be convinced that AUKUS has a positive impact.

Conclusion

While its benefits are yet to be realised, there is little evidence that AUKUS has significantly undermined Indo-Pacific stability or the trans-Tasman relationship in the nearly four years since its inception, and in some respects may have enhanced it.

108 Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles, "Burden-Sharing: The US, Australia and New Zealand Alliances in the Pacific Islands," *International Affairs* 97, no. 4 (2021), 1054.

WING COMMANDER SALLY FAULKS, RAAF

Wing Commander Sally Faulks joined the RAAF in 2009 as a medical officer. She holds qualifications in general practice and medical administration. Among her academic achievements are Bachelor of Science (Honours), Bachelor of Medicine and Surgery, Masters in Health Leadership and Management, Masters in Public Health and Masters in Strategic Studies (the latter awarded in May 2025). Wing Commander Faulks completed the NZDF Advanced Command and Staff Course in 2024. She is currently posted to RAAF Base Edinburgh as the Commanding Officer of the Institute of Aviation Medicine.

ANZMIN 2024 and the Tasman Navy Framework

Commander Michael Collinson, RNZN

In an increasingly complex geostrategic environment, New Zealand-Australia defence cooperation is more important than ever, affirms Commander Michael Collinson, RNZN. Supplementing Wing Commander Sally Faulks' essay on AUKUS, Commander Collinson highlights two initiatives in 2024 of especial significance for the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN): 1) the Joint Statement by defence ministers and 2) the announcement by Navy chiefs of the Tasman Navy Framework. Further cooperation initiatives are expected in 2025 and beyond as both governments address growing security challenges in the Pacific region.

Introduction

The New Zealand-Australia bilateral defence relationship is conducted in an increasingly complex geostrategic environment. It requires constant maintenance and enhancement to ensure both militaries can achieve a mutually effective level of cooperation, coordination and interoperability. Australia is New Zealand's only ally and closest defence partner, with which a profound degree of working and senior level key leader engagements occur every year. The year 2024 was no exception as it ushered in a number of key developments in the bilateral defence relationship. Below I highlight two trans-Tasman cooperation initiatives of great significance for our Navy.

ANZMIN meetings

First was the inaugural Australia New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministers Meeting (ANZMIN 2+2) that was held in Victoria on 1 February 2024, with the second such meeting occurring in Wellington on 6 December 2024. See Figure 1. Building on a commitment by ministers in 2022 to a refreshed *Australia-New Zealand Defence Dialogue Architecture* and in 2023 to a *Trans-Tasman Roadmap to 2035*, the two ministerial-level dialogues of 2024 brought greater integration of the two militaries closer to fruition. They heralded shared plans and practical arrangements between the services such as *Plan ANZAC*, a framework for work streams between the two armies that included 'sustained cooperation across strategic engagement, capability, training, readiness and common personnel issues'.[1] Of particular interest to the RNZN was the emergence of a *Tasman Navy Framework*, first mooted in 2023 and announced in 2024 (of which more below).

1 New Zealand Defence Force Media Release "New Zealand and Australian Army Chiefs sign Plan ANZAC", https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/new-zealand-and-australian-army-chiefs-sign-plan-anzac/.



Figure 1 - From left, Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong, Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters, Minister for Defence Richard Marles and Minister of Defence Judith Collins at Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN) on 6 December 2024 | ADF

The inaugural ANZMIN 2+2 meeting held in February 2024 was significant in that it laid the foundation for rising levels of bilateral defence engagement between Australia and New Zealand for the coming years. Ministers discussed strengthening the New Zealand and Australia alliance relationship in the face of evolving geostrategic challenges. Key themes from these meetings included—

1. a commitment to improving integration between military forces, including through common capability;
2. exchanges of senior military officers; and
3. increased bilateral engagements in exercises and operations.

This top-level leadership focus on the bilateral relationship and affirmation of trust between military leaders meant that tangible enhancements could be achieved in short order. A notable example was the reciprocal exchange and appointment of deputy commanders at the Australian Headquarters Joint Operations Command in Bungendore and the New Zealand Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand in Trentham.[2]

A key theme of these meetings was the reaffirmation of commitment to the bilateral relationship through the development of an increasingly integrated ANZAC Force. See Figure 2. This contributed to a focused effort to identify opportunities to collaborate in capability development and on operations, and resulted in increased coordination and the identification of deployments and other activities that could be undertaken bilaterally.[3]

2 New Zealand Defence Force Media Release. "Key operational leadership roles reciprocated between New Zealand and Australian Defence Forces", https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/key-operational-leadership-roles-reciprocated-between-new-zealand-and-australian-defence-forces.

3 See Briefing Document 6 December 2024. https://defence.govt.nz/publications/australia-new-zealand-joint-statement-on-closer-defence-relations/

Figure 2 - Australian Chief of Army LTGEN Simon Stuart and NZ Chief of Army MAJGEN John Boswell sign Plan ANZAC on 17 March 2023 | NZDF

ANZMIN Joint Statement

The 6 December 2024 ANZMIN 2+2 meeting provided the two ministers of defence the opportunity to reflect on progress made and set the direction for out years through the signing of the updated *Closer Defence Relations Joint Statement*. That two ministerial-level meetings were convened in the same calendar year was no mean feat by supporting officials. It was a testament to the importance placed by political leaders on the relationship by both nations, and furthermore signaled publicly both governments' awareness of the rising security challenges facing their countries in their region of concern.

In particular, the December 2024 *Joint Statement* reiterated the five paramount defence objectives shared by the two governments.[4]

1. Contribute to collective security and maintenance of the global rules-based order.
2. Effectiveness in combined operations.
3. Enhance interoperability.
4. Supporting Pacific sovereign security.
5. Effective defence industry collaboration.

4 *Australia - New Zealand Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations*, 6 December 2024. https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/CDR-FINAL-Dec-2024.pdf.

Tasman Navy Framework

Second, regarding our Navy, Rear Admiral Garin Golding, Chief of Navy, and Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, Chief of Navy Australia, signed off on the *Tasman Navy Framework* in November 2024.[5] See Figure 3. The *Tasman Navy Framework* is a strategic dialogue framework for engagement that seeks to foster good relations and ensure a coherent and focused bilateral dialogue that advances specific combat capabilities, personnel initiatives and interoperability. It is a positive answer to those skeptical of the relevance of Closer Defence Relations.[6]

Figure 3 - Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, AO, (right) and Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy, Rear Admiral Garin Golding, RNZN sign the RAN/RNZN Strategic Dialogue Framework Agreement 17 November 2024 | ADF

New Zealand and Australia have a long history of engagement, with close Navy ties built through regular exercises, operations in the region and the operation of similar capabilities. There exists such great mateship and people-to-people contacts that one might wonder why such an additional framework is even necessary. A key observation of mine after four years as Naval Adviser Canberra is that even though the RNZN has a robust and complex relationship with the Royal Australian Navy, it would still benefit from greater coordination through key work streams. Thus, the *Tasman Navy Framework* adopts five key work streams for collaboration and, importantly coordination. These are—

1. Strategy and Engagement;
2. Warfare;
3. Engineering and Regulation;

5 https://www.facebook.com/NZNavy/posts/hands-across-the-tasman-australia-is-new-zealands-closest-neighbour-and-only-all/976904057811874/.

6 Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles. “Has the Australia-New Zealand Alliance Become Irrelevant?” Australian Outlook, 3 December 2024. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/has-the-australia-new-zealand-alliance-become-irrelevant/.

4. Personnel and Training; and
5. Maritime Capability.

Conclusion

Within the context of long-standing and resilient Closer Economic Relations and Closer Political Relations, New Zealand-Australia Closer Defence Relations, already one of the most effective in the world, are on course to grow and deepen in 2025 and thereafter. That benign process can only intensify as each government commits to raising its defence budget to meet looming security challenges. Guiding this evolution are the overarching geopolitical goals shared by the two governments, articulated in the defence ministers' December 2024 *Joint Statement*.

> *In a more uncertain world, Australia and New Zealand must work together to maintain a region where sovereignty is protected, international law is paramount, and states have agency to make decisions free from coercion.*[7]

7 *Australia - New Zealand Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations*, 6 December 2024. https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/CDR-FINAL-Dec-2024.pdf.

COMMANDER MICHAEL COLLINSON, RNZN

Commander Michael Collinson is a Maritime Logistics Officer who has undertaken key logistics positions ashore and sea service in HMNZS *Resolution*, *Canterbury*, *Endeavour*, *Te Kaha*, *Wellington*, and *Te Mana*. Commander Collinson was the Maritime Logistics Officer in HMNZS *Te Mana* from January 2013 to March 2014 for Operation Crucible and counter piracy operations off the coast of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden for Operation Tiki VI.

Commander Collinson filled headquarters positions as Personal Staff Officer to Vice Chief of Defence Force and Chief of Staff of Capability Branch, before undertaking Advanced Command and Staff College study in 2019. Commander Collinson has recently returned from Canberra where he served as the Naval Adviser from December 2020 to December 2024. He is now posted to HQNZDF Strategic Commitments and Engagement Branch as Deputy Director Strategic Commitments – Global.

New Zealand - Japan Defence Engagement

Associate Professor Corey Wallace, Kanagawa University

New Zealand's post-war military engagement with Japan began during the Korean War, writes Associate Professor Corey Wallace, Kanagawa University. The defence relationship quickened in the late 1990s, leading in 2013 to the Strategic Cooperative Partnership and subsequent specialised agreements. Japan's decision in 2022 to accelerate defence readiness, and New Zealand's growing awareness of security challenges posed by great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, alongside strong diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Wellington and Tokyo, have accelerated New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) contacts and cooperation with their Japanese counterparts. These links are likely to strengthen, making Japan a significant security partner.

Introduction

While overshadowed by a rising China, Japan has once again emerged as a major East Asian geopolitical player. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific was embraced by the United States and backed in 2022 by a significant Japanese defence enhancement initiative.[1] Japan's new policy entails a doubling of the defence budget, deployment of long-range strike weapons, greater investment in logistics and defence research and development and closer defence cooperation with the United States and like-minded security partners in the region. See Figure 1. New Zealand is increasingly one of those security partners.

Type of Agreement	Countries (Year First Signed)
Defence Partnership (Memorandum or Statement of Intent)	Australia (2003), UK (2004), Singapore (2009), South Korea (2009), Vietnam (2011), Philippines (2012), Mongolia (2012), Italy (2012), Sweden (2013), **New Zealand (2013)**, NATO (2014), France (2014), India (2014), Indonesia (2015), Ukraine (2018), Malaysia (2018), UAE (2018), Sri Lanka (2019), Laos (2019), Pakistan (2019), Thailand (2019), Brazil (2020), Kenya (2024)
Regular 2+2 Dialogue	Australia (2007), France (2014), Indonesia (2015), UK (2015), India (2019), Germany (2021), Philippines (2023)
Information Security	NATO (2010), France (2011), Australia (2012), UK (2013), India (2015), Italy (2016), South Korea (2016), Germany (2021)
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement	Australia (2010), UK (2017), Canada (2018), France (2018), India (2020), Germany (2024), Italy (2024)
Defence Equipment Transfer	UK (2013), Australia (2014, 2017), India (2015), France (2015), Philippines (2016), Germany (2017), Malaysia (2018), Italy (2019), Indonesia (2021), Vietnam (2021), Thailand (2022), Sweden (2022), Singapore (2023), UAE (2023), Mongolia (2024)
Reciprocal Access	Australia (2022), UK (2023), Philippines (2024), France (Expected)

Figure 1 - Japan's Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements and Security Dialogues | Compiled by the author from online, archival, and interview sources.

1 Japan's enhanced security policies announced in 2022 were formalised in three documents: *National Security Strategy of Japan*; *National Defense Strategy*; and *Defense Buildup Program*. For details see https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/index.html.

While acknowledging the deep diplomatic, economic, and cultural links that have bound New Zealand and Japan since the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1952,[2] this essay focusses on the growing military cooperation, and in particular naval cooperation, as the two governments attempt to manage security challenges arising from China, North Korea, and Russia.

Early military relations

Although there were sporadic military-military interactions during the Cold War, neither Tokyo nor Wellington thought about their relationship primarily in terms of defence.[3] Following the Korean War, during which RNZN vessels operated out of the Japanese ports of Kure and Sasebo, the RNZN made occasional visits to Japan, mostly with a goodwill and rest-and-recreation emphasis rather than for military operations. These visits often followed deployments to New Zealand's commitments to the Far Eastern Strategic Reserve and the United Nations Command in South Korea.[4] In 1962, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's (JMSDF's) training squadron made its first visit to New Zealand. See Figure 2. This was the first Japanese naval ship to approach New Zealand waters in peace since the 1935 visit of the Japanese Imperial Navy's training squadron. Over the next 15 years, the training squadron made regular visits to Oceania, with five stopovers in Wellington and three in Auckland. In total, the JMSDF training squadron has made 15 visits to New Zealand, but only two visits since 2010 (2014 and 2019) as Japan has added more defence partners to its rotation.

Figure 2 - JMSDF Training Squadron visited New Zealand in 2014 | Consulate General of Japan, Auckland

2 *Japan and New Zealand, 150 Years*. Palmerston North: New Zealand Centre for Japanese Studies, Massey University, 1999. See especially Roger Peren's chapter "Towards Greater Understanding: Popular Interests and Attitudes".

3 Corey Wallace, "Dealing with a Proactive Japan: Reconsidering Japan's Regional Role and Its Value for New Zealand's Foreign Policy". In Anne-Marie Brady (ed), *Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019, 193-212.

4 *Japan and New Zealand* (1999): 186.

Visits were only one manifestation of the importance of the New Zealand-Japan defence relationship. Since the end of the Cold War the RNZN and the JMSDF have steadily ramped up defence diplomacy and engagement during operations and exercises.[5] The overall defence relationship was boosted in the late-1990s as both capitals began to pay more attention to the political relationship. This was signalled publicly by the visit of Prime Minister Jenny Shipley in 1998, the first top-level visit since Prime Minister Robert Muldoon's official visit to Japan in 1976.[6] A visit by HMNZS *Wellington* also in 1998 - the first RNZN visit to Japan in nine years - marked a commitment by the two governments to increased regularity in defence interactions.

Regular engagements

From the late-1990s, then, military-to-military engagements became more regular. This was due in part to Japan's own increased willingness to dispatch its Self-defence Forces farther overseas.[7] The commitment of defence resources by both Japan and New Zealand to the various Combined Task Force (CTF) operations in the Indian Ocean facilitated ad hoc but more frequent military interactions between the RNZN and JMSDF. See Figure 3.

Figure 3 - JMSDF ship JS *Yūgiri*, supporting CTF 151, with Spanish frigate SPS *Victoria*, in the Gulf of Aden | Combined Task Force 151

Following a port visit to Japan in 2002, HMNZS *Te Kaha* was immediately dispatched to take part in Operation Enduring Freedom's Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) alongside JMSDF ships. A Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) P-3K2 and counterpart Japanese aircraft were also dispatched.[8] When HMNZS *Te Mana* was sent on a follow-up deployment in 2004, it joined 11 ships, including three JMSDF vessels for a photo exercise (PHOTEX).[9] Between 2005 and 2007, HMNZS *Te Kaha* (twice), HMNZS *Endeavour* (twice) and HMNZS

5 Ibid, 188.
6 Although informal visits were made by prime ministers from both countries, and there were multiple visits by members of the Japanese Imperial Household to New Zealand.
7 Corey Wallace, "Japan's strategic pivot south: diversifying the dual hedge." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 13, no. 3 (2013): 479-517. Wallace, Corey. "Leaving (north-east) Asia? Japan's southern strategy." *International Affairs* 94, no. 4 (2018), 883-904.
8 John Martin, "Operation Enduring Freedom". *New Zealand Defence Force website*. March 27, 2023. Access at: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/operation-enduring-freedom/.
9 NZDF. "NZ Frigate Joins Multi-Nation Naval Force". *Scoop*. May 7, 2004. Access at: https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0405/S00069/images-nz-frigate-joins-multi-nation-naval-force.htm.

Te Mana all visited Japan. Then in 2008, during HMNZS *Te Mana's* third deployment (and the RNZN's fourth overall) to the Gulf region to join CTF152, it received 312 cubic metres of fuel from JMSDF JS *Ōsumi*.[10]

Figure 4 - HMNZS *Te Mana* (shown here with post-Frigate Systems Upgrade superstructure)| NZDF

Annual Japan-New Zealand defence talks began in 2007, alternating between Tokyo and Wellington. This led the two governments to sign a Memorandum of Intent on Defence Co-operation in 2013 which upgraded the overall relationship to a 'strategic cooperative part-nership' based on 'shared values and vision'. In 2014, on the occasion of the first visit by a Japanese prime minister in 12 years, the two sides agreed to begin discussions on an Ac-quisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) agreement. While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's national security reforms courted controversy at home, the New Zealand government welcomed them.[11]

New Zealand's readmission to United States-led multinational exercises following the Wellington Declaration in 2011 also 'provided more opportunity for service level interaction' between Japan and New Zealand militaries.[12] When New Zealand rejoined the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in an official capacity in 2012 for first time since 1984, the RNZN's Mine Counter Measures Team embarked on the JMSDF ship JS *Bungo* (MST-464). A 'natural extension' of the partnership fostered between the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), RNZN, and JMSDF during the RIMPAC exercise was an opportunity to conduct a short trilateral naval activity called Pacific Bridge north of Australia.[13] The RNZN sent HMNZS *Te Kaha* and HMNZS *Endeavour*, and the signing of a short-term agreement allowed the RNZN to refuel a JMSDF vessel JS *Shimakaze*, at sea for the first time. The two navies would meet again the following year at the RAN-hosted Triton Centenary exercises in 2013. Exercises with Australian and American militaries such as Kakadu, Talisman Sabre, and Cope North now facilitate regular NZDF and Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) service-level engagements.

10 NZDF. "HMNZS Te Mana On Patrol In Arabian Gulf". *Scoop*. May 12, 2008. Access at: https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0805/S00174/hmnzs-te-mana-on-patrol-in-arabian-gulf.htm.
11 Wallace (2019), 200.
12 Wallace (2019), 201.
13 NZDF. "Kiwi, Australian and Japanese Navies Work Together". *Scoop*. August 28, 2012. Access at: https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1208/S00449/kiwi-australian-and-japanese-navies-work-together.htm.

Defence relations rose to a higher level following the South China Sea Arbitration decision in July 2016. When the decision went against China as expected, Japan and New Zealand were part of a small group of seven countries that officially announced their support for the decision and called for full compliance. The year that followed was a busy one for the defence relationship. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) dispatched a K-767 in-air refuelling tanker, and a C-2 transport plane for overseas flight training and exchange. When a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Kaikoura, a Japanese P-1 surveillance flight provided valuable imagery of the damage to SH 1 and the Main Trunk railway line.[14] The JMSDF and RNZAF also both participated in Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) exercises during GUAMEX 2017.[15] HMNZS *Te Kaha* joined JS *Inazuma* in Exercise Pacific Guardian in Japanese waters south of Shikoku in June of 2017. Along with Canada and the United States, the four navies combined ASW exercises, surface gunnery and helicopter landings on each other's vessels. HMNZS T*e Kaha* embedded with the United States Seventh Fleet to provide protection for the USS *Nimitz*, a carrier that operates out of Yokosuka.[16] The importance of New Zealand's contribution was communicated to the author by Japanese interlocutors during Track 1.5 discussions held in Tokyo during 2019.

Another notable New Zealand contribution to East Asian security connected to Japan was Operation Whio. In 2018, New Zealand and Australian Prime Ministers Jacinda Ardern and Malcolm Turnbull 'agreed on the importance of rigorously enforcing sanctions against the [North Korean] regime'[17], and later that year Australia and New Zealand joined Japan in the newly established Pacific Security Maritime Exchange (PSMX). Created to detect and deter sanctions evasion such as illicit ship-ship transfers of restricted goods such as oil, coal, and iron ore, PSMX members contribute maritime patrol aircraft, naval vessels, and staff to the Enforcement Coordination Cell established by the United States in 2017 and hosted by the Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka.[18] Soon after, in September 2018, the RNZAF dispatched the first P-3K2 Orion flight to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, to enforce sanctions against North Korea. Between 2018 and 2021, Wellington dispatched Orions to Kadena five times, where the aircraft spent periods of up to 30-days operating under the United Nations (UN) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Japan. The Japanese government is forthright in recognising the importance of each one of these deployments to Kadena[19], as they contribute indirectly to Japan's national security.

During this period, the defence relationship has continued to develop beyond the 'medium-level priority' of past years.[20] This is in part due to the enhancement of the overall strategic relationship. For example, Japan was one of five countries singled out between 2018 and 2023 as being worthy of a 'deliberate programme of investing discretionary effort' alongside Singapore, Germany, Indonesia and India in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) documentation.[21] Japan sent a defence attaché to Wellington in 2021, matching the fact that New Zealand has had a defence attaché in Tokyo since at least 2015. Further, Tokyo and Wellington agreed in 2022 to a further enhancement of the strategic cooperative

14 In November 2016, the JMSDF sent two P-1s to RNZN's 75th anniversary. When the Kaikoura earthquake occurred during exercises surrounding the anniversary, the P-1 conducted damage assessment in areas that were now inaccessible.

15 Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs. "Exercise GUAMEX Kicks Off for Regional Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Partners". *PACOM Website*. July 31, 2017. Access at: https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1262998/exercise-guamex-kicks-off-for-regional-maritime-patrol-and-reconnaissance-partn/.

16 Hlavac, Tyler. "New Zealand navy frigate subs for damaged Fitzgerald during drills". *Stars and Stripes*. July 7, 2017. Access at: https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/new-zealand-navy-frigate-subs-for-damaged-fitzgerald-during-drills-1.477102.

17 "Joint statement by the Hon Malcolm Turnbull and Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern". *The Beehive*. March 2, 2018. Access at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-hon-malcolm-turnbull-and-rt-hon-jacinda-ardern.

18 "Pacific Security Maritime Exchange". *US Department of State website*. Access at: https://www.state.gov/pacific-security-maritime-exchange/.

19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Monitoring and surveillance activities by Royal New Zealand Air Force aircraft against illicit maritime activities including ship-to-ship transfers". *MOFA website*. April 9, 2024. Access at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00272.html.

20 Wallace (2019), 202.

21 MFAT's 2018-2019 annual report was the first.

relationship in a joint statement focused on 'common peace, security, and prosperity.'[22] In 2016 the JMSDF contributed to the RNZN's 75th anniversary celebrations in Auckland by sending JS *Takanami* and two P-1 Marine Patrol Aircraft to the international fleet review.

This enhanced political relationship has facilitated a rising tempo of service-level engagements. The NZDF and JSDF cooperated during Operation Christmas Drop (2019, 2022-2023), conducted fixed wing exercises around Guam as part of Sea Dragon 2020, and led by HMNZS *Manawanui* engaged with JS *Ashigara* and JS *Ise* off Hawaii (2020). In 2021, HMNZS *Te Kaha* joined navies from Japan, the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands and Canada in two exercises. See Figure 5. The first, in October 2021, was southwest of Okinawa and featured 17 vessels (including JS *Ise*, JS *Kirishima*, JS *Yamagiri* and HMNZS *Te Kaha*), multiple aircraft and three aircraft carriers. The fleet conducted 'large scale exercises' including counter-attack exercises, air defence exercises, anti-submarine exercises, and tactical manoeuvring. The demonstration of multinational interoperability was described by Japan's annual White Paper as constituting a contribution to 'Remote Island Defence'. The second exercise took place soon thereafter in the South China Sea. In the following year, the HMNZS *Aotearoa* joined the JS *Takanami*, JS *Izumo*, and HMCS *Winnipeg* for a Japan-New Zealand-Canada Trilateral Exercise (during Pacific Dragon missile defence exercise). HMNZS *Aotearoa* also visited the JMSDF naval base in Kure and then Yokosuka for the Fleet Review celebrating the JMSDF's 70th Anniversary. In 2023, JS *Akebono*, HMNZS *Te Mana* both joined Exercise Noble Caribou with vessels from Australian, American, and Canadian navies. In addition to sailing in formation and performing close manoeuvres, the five navies 'coordinated the flying operations of their embarked helicopters and conducted a high-seas weapons firing'[23].

Figure 5 - HMNZS Te Kaha deployed with her Japanese counterparts in a US-led multinational exercise in 2021 | Japan Ministry of Defense

An exemplary demonstration of the importance for New Zealand of Indo-Pacific security and the defence relationship with Japan can be seen through the various defence developments of 2024. When the Operation Whio mandate was extended in 2022, it did not include a

22 "Joint Statement: Japan and Aotearoa New Zealand: a Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Common Peace, Security and Prosperity". April 22, 2022. Access at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-japan-and-aotearoa-new%C2%A0zealand-strategic-cooperative-partnership-common.

23 Andrew Herring, "Friendships flourish on deployment". *Australian Defence Department website*. November 6, 2023. Access at: https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2023-11-06/friendships-flourish-deployment.

commitment of aircraft due to the phase out of the RNZAF's P-3K2. However, thanks to the accelerated introduction of the P-8A Poseidon aircraft, New Zealand was able to make its sixth contribution to PSMX activities in April 2024 by dispatching the P-8A to Kadena Air Base on its first overseas mission. Following the completion of its Operation Whio activities, the P-8A then participated in LINKEX and anti-surface warfare exercises during the 2024 Noble Raven exercises alongside the JS *Akizuki* (DD115) and USS *Miguel Keith* (ESB-5) - the latter vessel providing support for Seventh Fleet operations.[24] The next Poseidon dispatch as part of Operation Whio was expected in the first half of 2025.

Then in June 2024, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, while leading a large business delegation to Japan, reached an agreement in principle for an Information Security Agreement with Japan. This came with an announcement of increased defence cooperation with Japan as well as more regular commitments of aircraft to Operation Whio. For the New Zealand government, this 'reflects the importance New Zealand places on collective security efforts'.[25] Of particular significance was the commitment to supplying a surface vessel to support Operation Whio. This came soon after during the 2024 iteration of the RNZN's 'Operation Crucible' focused on the deployment of HMNZS *Aotearoa*.[26] Operation Whio was the second phase of Operation Crucible, demonstrating *Aotearoa's* value to regional security by conducting many replenishment-at-sea (RAS) activities with a wide variety of partners.

After RIMPAC 2024, HMNZS *Aotearoa* transited from Hawaii to Yokosuka, headquarters of the United States Seventh Fleet. The strategic objectives of the various RAS and other activities were to 'support and enhance New Zealand's reputation as a reliable partner in maintaining Indo-Pacific security' and 'adding credibility to our relationship with our traditional likeminded partners'.[27] At Yokosuka, tactical control (TACON) shifted to United States Navy Commander Task Force 73 (CTF 73), and during this period HMNZS *Aotearoa* engaged in various activities directly related to Operation Whio surveillance as well as various RAS activities and exercises with partner countries. HMNZS *Aotearoa* engaged in two 10-11-day long patrols, followed by logistics stops in Busan in South Korea and Sasebo in Japan. HMNZS *Aotearoa* conducted RAS, passage exercise (PASSEX), and joint patrols with navies from South Korea, Germany, Australia and the United States. Before its Sasebo logistics stop, HMNZS *Aotearoa* conducted a PASSEX with JS *Sendai* including a dry RAS 'to prove and demonstrate interoperability between the JMSDF and RNZN'.[28] Even after the Operation Whio phase came to an end, HMNZS *Aotearoa* continued reporting to Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC), including during transit through Taiwan Strait,[29] even if this was no longer its primary task. According to the NZDF, on six occasions HMNZS *Aotearoa* was in vicinity of Chinese warships that appeared to be shadowing her, including through the dispatch of helicopters. There were no overflights and interactions conformed to expectations under Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). During Operation Crucible, HMNZS *Aotearoa* also engaged in a search and rescue (SAR) exercise with the JMSDF and American, Australian, and Philippines ships in the Philippines' South China Sea exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

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24 Dzirhan Mahadzir, "ESB Miguel Keith Drills with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Royal New Zealand Air Force in East China Sea". *USNI News*. May 15, 2024. Access at: https://news.usni.org/2024/05/15/esb-miguel-keith-drills-with-japan-maritime-self-defense-force-royal-new-zealand-air-force-in-east-china-sea.

25 Lucy Cramer, "New Zealand will increase its military contribution to N. Korea sanctions monitoring". *Reuters*. June 18, 2024. Access at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/new-zealand-will-increase-its-military-contribution-n-korea-sanctions-monitoring-2024-06-18/.

26 NZDF. "Aotearoa completes Indo-Pacific mission". *NZDF* website, October 29, 2024. Access at: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/aotearoa-completes-indo-pacific-mission/.

27 HMNZS AOTEAROA MINUTE 83/2024. Released under the Official Information Act. Access at *NZDF website*: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/OIA-2024-5186-Operation-Whio.pdf.

28 Ibid.

29 The last time a RNZN naval vessel transited the Taiwan Strait (HMNZS *Te Kaha* in 2017), it was en route to Qingdao, China. There was no visit to China planned on this occasion.

Japan-New Zealand cooperation in the Pacific islands

The Japan-New Zealand defence relationship has developed rapidly over the last decade, but there are many areas of potential growth. As we look to the future of Japan-New Zealand defence relations, two areas of potential or likely growth stand out: cooperation in the Pacific island region, and increasing interoperability.

While New Zealand has increasingly demonstrated willingness to contribute to maritime security in Northeast Asia, Japan is correspondingly demonstrating an increased interest in strategic and defence cooperation in the southwest Pacific island region with both New Zealand and Australia. Alignment on and commitment to security capacity building in the Pacific are beginning to pick up pace. Japan has extended its Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self Defense Force (SDF) capacity building programmes to Fiji (two projects on military medicine in 2022 and 2024) and Tonga (naval maintenance in 2024). Furthermore, Fiji was one of the targets of Japan's 2023 Overseas Security Assistance programmes (a defence version of Official Development Assistance (ODA)) with ¥400 million being dedicated the provision of patrol boats and related equipment and training to the Fiji Navy to 'strengthen Fiji's capabilities for monitoring and surveillance, and disaster relief'.[30]

The 2022 eruption of a volcano in Tonga induced a substantial Japanese Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Recovery (HADR) response. The SDF sent C-130H transport planes, and later, its most capable transport aircraft, the C-2, to transport relief supplies and coordinate with partners such as Australia. The JMSDF then dispatched the JS *Ōsumi* loaded with two landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vessels, two CH-47 helicopters, another 60 high-pressure cleaning devices and 10 tonnes of drinking water.[31] In total, the SDF sent 300 personnel. At a parliamentary meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio made clear that Japan was working 'together with countries such as Australia and New Zealand' in providing this aid to Tonga.[32] Wellington has welcomed Japan's Pacific defence contributions,[33] leading to the 2023 Statement of Intent on Defence Cooperation in the Pacific. Focused on maritime security but also HADR and climate change, this statement acknowledged the importance of the Pacific islands region for the wider Indo-Pacific region and paves the way for further Japanese Pacific contributions through collaborations with New Zealand in addition to Australia.

Independently, since 2021 we have seen the inclusion of Pacific island nations in the JMSDF's Indo-Pacific deployment schedules. JMSDF port visits and the conduct of goodwill exercises have included New Caledonia (4 times), Palau (4), Vanuatu (2), Fiji (3), Papua New Guinea (3), Solomon Islands (2), Tonga (3) and Kiribati (2). The Japan-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation agreement of 2023 notably contained four pillars, one of which was 'To support defense cooperation between ASEAN, Japan, and the Pacific island countries'.[34] One outcome of this has been the expansion in 2023 of Japan's shiprider programme for ASEAN to include a Pacific island phase that embarks maritime law enforcement and naval officers from up to 10 Pacific island countries. Japan also initiated an annual defence dialogue with Pacific island countries.[35] The three countries with military forces in the Pacific - Tonga, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea - were invited, as were law enforcement representatives from 11 island countries without militaries.

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30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. "Official Security Assistance (OSA) Programme in implementation FY2023". *MOFA website*. October 10, 2024. Access at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/page22e_001067.html.

31 Yamagami Shingo, "News from Under the Southern Cross (Edition 54): Assistance for Tonga". *Embassy of Japan in Australia*. 2022. Access at: https://www.au.emb-japan.go.jp/files/100295885.pdf.

32 "Japan to Send SDF Aircraft, Vessel to Aid Tonga". *Jiji Press*. January 20, 2022. Access at: https://sp.m.jiji.com/english/show/17449.

33 Andrew Little, "Closer defence cooperation between New Zealand and Japan". *The Beehive*. June 4, 2023. Access at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/closer-defence-cooperation-between-new-zealand-and-japan.

34 Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation: JASMINE Overview. Access at: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/images/13th_annex.pdf.

35 Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue Joint Statement", 2023. Access at: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/images/e4b4d8b1ad510d146cab838b7f0a65ebbef9c99f.pdf. English language summaries of on the deliberations of the 2nd JPIDD can be accessed at: https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2024/04/133b72b88bef1421b1f5394f6ae75693291492db.html.

Eight partner countries were also invited: Australia, Canada, Chile, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States. The focus of these dialogues echoes the Pacific island nations' premier concern with illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, climate change, and HADR. Japan is looking to develop connections between the Japan Pacific islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) and the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting, in which Japan is an observer. Based on its approach to ASEAN over the last twenty years, Japan's regional defence contributions will likely be focussed on enhancing maritime domain awareness in the southern Pacific.

Looking ahead: Japanese options?

Interoperability and engagement between Japanese and New Zealand defence forces would not only be enhanced by a more regular schedule of exercises between the services but also made more seamless with the finalisation of the Information Security Agreement (ISA) and a New Zealand-Japan ACSA. A defence technology transfer agreement may also be of value. The Japanese government in the past did offer to sell the C-2 transport and P-1 surveillance aircraft to the New Zealand government, but this offer proved to be beyond New Zealand's modest financial and personnel means.

However, as the need to replace the ANZAC frigates looms, New Zealand is studying Australia's approach. Australia's SEA3000 programme to replace the RAN's eight ANZAC frigates with 11 new frigates recently down-selected an upgraded version of the JMSDF's *Mogami* multipurpose frigate (built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)) and the German MEKO A-200 (ThyssenKrupp) for final consideration. See Figure 6. Also being offered to Indonesia, the *Mogami* is a modular frigate that can be configured for a variety of mission types, especially ASW and AAW roles.[36] Larger, stealthier and faster than its German competitor, the *Mogami* only requires 90 crew members instead of an expected complement of 180 due to clever design features, improvements in power settings, and automation. Taking advantage of extra hull space, the 'new' *Mogami* promises substantial combat capabilities enhancements due to its 32-cell MK41 Vertical Launch System and a dedicated surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launcher. The advantages that the German rival offers, on the other hand, are familiarity and cost. The current ANZAC class frigates are based on the German MEKO 200 design for which residual manufacturing, maintenance and logistics facilities already exist in Australia. The MEKO A-200 is likely to be considerably cheaper up front, and the vessels will pose a less steep learning curve for integration into service. Canberra may, therefore, be tempted to take the safer option. New Zealand would normally do the same.

36 Alex Luck, "Japan's MHI Shows 'New FFM' Frigate at Indopacific 2023". *Naval News*. November 10, 2023. Access at: https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/indo-pacific-2023/2023/11/mitsubishi-shows-air-warfare-frigate-for-jmsdf/.

Figure 6 - New Japanese frigate JS *Mogami* | Japan Ministry of Defense

There is, however, Australian interest in the strategic, commercial, and industrial opportunities offered by the Japanese option.[37] The Japanese government has encouraged this interest. Learning from its failure to sell submarines to Australia a decade prior, Tokyo announced an 'all-Japan' approach to exporting the upgraded *Mogami*. It established a public-private promotion committee for the platform, made a pre-emptive exception to Japan's defence equipment transfer rules, and even promised to 'prioritise' the delivery of an enhanced *Mogami* to the RAN over delivery to its own navy. An experienced systems integrator, MHI has already started furnishing other Japanese shipyards with production technologies in anticipation of dialling up production. To counter the perception of high cost, Tokyo has also noted that the enhanced *Mogami* has a longer life cycle of forty years compared to thirty for its German competitor.[38] With the potential to realise greater economies of scale due to Tokyo's commitment to a 24-ship long production line, foreign procurement may make the *Mogami* cheaper still in the long-run.

Doubtless Australia's decision will have major implications for New Zealand given the shrinking time frame for making decisions about the renewal of the RNZN's maritime fleet. While it may be financially difficult for Wellington to follow Australia if it elects the *Mogami*, senior officials and politicians appear to be willing to consider other aspects of a closer relationship with Japan and Australia in the defence equipment area on their merits.[39] Acquisition of this warship by Australia and New Zealand would not only add substantial capacity to the RAN and RNZN fleets but also offer advantages of interoperability between Australia, New Zealand, and Japan who are increasingly finding each other to be valuable Indo-Pacific defence partners.

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37 Nishank Motwani, "Strategic and industrial factors favour Japan for Australia's frigate project". *The Strategist*. February 27, 2025. Access at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/strategic-and-industrial-factors-favour-japan-for-australias-frigate-project/; Eric Lies, "Mogami class offers strong technical advantages in Australia's frigate competition". *The Strategist*. February 28, 2025. Access at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mogami-class-offers-strong-technical-advantages-in-australias-frigate-competition/.

38 Andrew Greene, "Japan pitches 'superior' warships in bid to clinch $10 billion Australian contract". *ABC News*. December 17, 2024. Access at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-17/japans-pitch-to-clinch-10-billion-australian-warship-prize/104737686.

39 Interestingly, the Japanese government chose the JS *Kumano*, a *Mogami*-class frigate, as the venue for a ship tour for the New Zealand prime minister in 2024 rather than one of the JMSDF's much larger surface combatants. During an interview with the author, a senior naval official noted New Zealand's interest in the Mogami and other industrial opportunities that the Australian decision could precipitate. See also, Gabriel Dominguez, "New Zealand paving way for deeper security ties with Tokyo, envoy says". *Japan Times*. February 13, 2025. Access at: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/02/13/japan/politics/new-zealand-ambassador-japan-interview/.

Conclusion

Given the growing importance of the Quad[40] and the Indo-Pacific Four[41] in the face of China's assertiveness, and Japan's defence strengthening initiatives, Japan's security role in the Asia-Pacific region is set to expand. It follows that defence cooperation with partners such as Australia and New Zealand will expand correspondingly. Whether in diplomacy, economic exchange, and cultural interaction, or in security and defence engagement, Japan's importance to New Zealand has grown steadily over the decades, and relations will intensify at a tempo that serves the interests of both countries.

40 A security consultative arrangement between Japan, Australia, India and the United States.
41 The non-member association of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea with NATO.

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PART 2:
POLICIES



Mitigating Challenges to New Zealand's Maritime Security[1]

Commander Richard Greenwood-Bell, Royal Navy

Commander Richard Greenwood-Bell, RN, warns that disconnects have widened between New Zealand's maritime aspirations and capacity, and between its strategy and capability. Hampered by resource limitations, New Zealand, while aspiring to be a regional leader and global player, can barely secure its own sea borders. An assessment of New Zealand's *Maritime Security Strategy 2024* led Commander Greenwood-Bell to conclude that New Zealand is poorly configured to unilaterally assure its own maritime security. Nevertheless, he notes, New Zealand has the potential to mitigate maritime security shortfalls, and to remain a credible and relevant partner, ally, and leader in the Pacific, if the Government grasps the opportunities presented by RNZN fleet renewal and potential participation in Australia - United Kingdom - United States (AUKUS) Pillar II.

Introduction

New Zealand is inextricably linked to the sea, which simultaneously confers both the security of distance from conflicts and the avenues of non-conventional threats. The unique maritime geography enhances New Zealand's identity and standing in the international community, transforming a medium-sized country of 265,000 square kilometres with a low population density into a nation with rights to 5.7 million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)[2] and responsibilities for a search and rescue zone of 30 million square kilometres.[3] Approximately 99.7 per cent of the country's trade by volume (81 per cent by value)[4] is carried by ships, and the wider maritime economy was valued at $7 billion in 2022.[5] Yet, paradoxically, the successive governments of New Zealand did not publish a comprehensive Maritime Security Strategy until 2020.

Maritime Security: Nature and threats

The term 'maritime security' can be interpreted in many ways 'depending on who is using the term or in what context it is being used.'[6] The *New Zealand Maritime Security Strategy* (revised 2024) (*MSS 24*) definition is very broad, stating that 'Maritime security involves preventing, detecting, mitigating and responding to risks introduced by malicious, unregulated, negligent or harmful (or potentially harmful) activities at sea.'[7]

1 This is an abridged version of an Extended Essay Commander Greenwood-Bell composed while enrolled at the NZDF Command and Staff College, Trentham, in 2024.
2 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Our maritime zones and boundaries*. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/environment/oceans-and-fisheries/our-maritime-zones-and-boundaries.
3 Encyclopedia of New Zealand, New Zealand's search and rescue region https://teara.govt.nz/en/map/13199/new-zealands-search-and-rescue-region.
4 New Zealand Government, *Maritime Security Strategy 2024* (MSS 24). Wellington, June 2024, 8. https://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Report/MSS_V6_U.pdf.
5 Stats NZ, "Environmental-economic accounts: Data to 2022" https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/environmental-economic-accounts-data-to-2022/
6 Natalie Klein et. al., "Australia, New Zealand and Maritime Security," in *Maritime Security : International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand*, ed. Natalie Klein et. al. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2009, 5.
7 New Zealand Government, *Maritime Security Strategy 2024* (MSS 24). Wellington, June 2024, 11. https://www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Report/MSS_V6_U.pdf.

Importantly, 'maritime' must not be conflated with 'navy'. Whilst the naval force, in association with air and ground forces, are essential enablers of maritime security, the military is not the only actor, and its capabilities are the only means to the goal of security. Professor Christian Buerger in Figure 1 offers a matrix to show how maritime security is embedded in economic, human and environmental security.[8]



Figure 1 - Bueger's Maritime Security Matrix | Christian Buerger, "What is Maritime Security?" Marine Policy, Vol 53 (2015)

The United Nations Secretary-General also has acknowledged the definitional difficulties and instead has approached maritime security by its threats, summarised as follows.

- piracy;
- terrorism;
- arms trafficking;
- narcotic trafficking;
- people smuggling;
- illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing;
- damage to the marine environment.[9]

To this list I would add new challenges presented by climate change and emerging technologies deployed in intensifying great power competition such as information warfare[10], drone weapons, space rivalry and artificial intelligence.

8 Christian Buerger, "What is Maritime Security?", Marine Policy, Vol 53, 2015, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X14003327#bib15 and Christian Bueger, Timothy Edwards and Barry J. Ryan. "Maritime security: the uncharted politics of the global sea." International Affairs, 1 September 2019, https://research.ebsco.com/c/udfvrv/search/details/lehwoccikn?db=mth&limiters=None&q=maritime%20security%20uncharted%20politics%20global%20sea.

9 Secretary-General of the United Nations, "Oceans and the law of the sea: report of the Secretary-General", 10 March 2008, UN Doc. A/63/63, para. 39. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/628433?ln=en&v=pdf.

10 On information warfare see Brendon Clark's essay in this volume.

New Zealand’s maritime security framework

These traditional and emerging threats now all threaten New Zealand to some degree, and whilst the government of the day has responded[11], the route to a holistic maritime security strategy was long and convoluted. As early as 1862, it established the Marine Board[12] which has evolved into Maritime New Zealand. Diverse policies were incorporated into the *Maritime Security Act 2004*.[13] While maritime security was addressed indirectly by periodic Defence white papers, and focussed by doctrinal publications by the Navy, maritime policies were fragmented among a half-dozen departments and agencies. It was to forge coherence and focus scarce resources that the inter-agency project to produce a comprehensive Maritime Security Strategy was initiated.

The *Maritime Security Strategy* was inaugurated in 2020. It was drafted as an interagency iteration of the *2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement*.[14] It was intended to support the New Zealand’s policy initiative announced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Winston Peters as ‘The Pacific Reset’. The 2024 refresh (hereafter *MSS 24* or the Strategy) builds on the 2020 strategy and aligns with the *2023 Defence Policy and Strategy Statement (DPSS)* and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (MFAT’s) *2023 Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment*.[15] *MSS 24* adopts a ‘comprehensive multi-agency approach’ and integrates a variety of policies including border security, technology, transnational organised crime, strategic competition and economic security. See Figure 2.



Figure 2 - Maritime Security System enablers and governance | NZ Ministry of Transport, *Maritime Security Strategy 2024*

11 Stephen Hoadley has summarised New Zealand’s policies in “Maritime Trade Security Threats” in Wil Hoverd and Deidre McDonald, eds., *State of Threat: The Challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s National Security*. Palmerston North: Massey University Press, 2023, pp. 70-83.

12 Maritime New Zealand, “History of MNZ”. https://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/about-us/what-we-do/history-of-mnz/

13 New Zealand Government, *Maritime Security Act 2004*, No. 16 (as at 28 Oct 2021). https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2004/0016/latest/whole.html#DLM241605.

14 A summary of the genesis of the Strategy may be found in Peter Mersi with Gavin Birrell and Wayne Andrew, “Introducing the Maritime Security Oversight Committee and the New Maritime Security Strategy” in *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy*, Volume 2 July 2021, 118-133. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/RNZN-Journal_Vol-2_No.-One_online.pdf

15 MFAT’s, *2023 Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment - Navigating a shifting world*, June 2023 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/About-us-Corporate/MFAT-strategies-and-frameworks/MFATs-2023-Strategic-Foreign-Policy-Assessment-Navigating-a-shifting-world-June-2023.pdf.

Evaluating the Strategy

To assess the Strategy, I propose a framework of analysis set out by American academics Jeffrey Meiser and Sitara Nath in 2018.[16] Considered against these criteria, *MSS 24* is found wanting in several key areas. Whilst the Strategy correctly identifies the numerous threats emanating from the maritime security environment (as detailed above), it fails to present these as an 'addressable strategic challenge'.[17] It does not frame the problems in terms of value and solvability. It does not sufficiently address New Zealand's lack of resources (both in terms of capability and capacity) or the enormity and transnational nature of some of the challenges (such as climate change). The strategy also fails to provide any prioritisation. While it defines eight areas of concern,[18] it offers no guidance as to which is the most pressing, and therefore is silent on where scarce resources should be directed.

Furthermore, a strategy should have concrete objectives to allow assessment of its progress. Here I adopt management specialist George Doran's S.M.A.R.T. criteria of objective goal achievement.[19] Doran's Strategy Measurement Framework posed five criteria of goal-setting: specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, and time-bound.[20] Applied to *New Zealand's Maritime Security Strategy*, the four pillars - Understand, Engage, Prevent and Respond – may be considered to be the means through which the aim of maritime security is achieved. See Figure 3. However, their definitions in the Strategy document fail to meet the criteria of being specific and measurable, and therefore they are not objectively achievable. For example, the Respond objective states that 'New Zealand is prepared to take action to mitigate threats, incidents and emerging issues efficiently, effectively, and flexibly with the right tools across diverse maritime zones with sufficient authority to act.'[21] This language is so broad that it is impossible to measure success with any degree of accuracy.



Figure 3 - Four pillars of New Zealand's Maritime Security Strategy | NZ Ministry of Transport, *Maritime Security Strategy 2024*

16 Jeffrey W. Meiser and Sitara Nath, "The Strategy Delusion," The Strategy Bridge, 9 August 2018. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/9/the-strategy-delusion. Internal validity refers to the conceptual coherence of the strategy: its goals and objectives; proximate objectives; coordination of actions; proportionality of means and ends; and its causal wager. External validity refers to the likelihood of the strategy's success: the realism of its diagnosis; the distance between its vision and concrete objectives; and the proportionality of risks to goals.

17 Richard Rumelt, "Strategic coherence for tumultuous times," strategy + business, 23 September 2022, 4. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/transformation/strategic-coherence-for-tumultous-times.html

18 The eight areas of concern are: Challenges to the maritime rules-based international order; Growing maritime economy; Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; Pressure on the marine environment; The impact of climate change; Technological change; Maritime criminal activity; More challenging strategic environment. *Maritime Security Strategy 2024*, 10.

19 The criteria are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound. See George T. Doran, "There's a S.M.A.R.T way to write management's goals and objectives," *Management Review* 70, 1981, 35-36. https://community.mis.temple.edu/mis0855002fall2015/files/2015/10/S.M.A.R.T-Way-Management-Review.pdf.

20 *MSS 24*, op cit, 38.

21 *Ibid*, 38.

Conversely, the Strategy *does* acknowledge that there is a disconnect in what Meiser and Nath refer to as 'Ends-means Proportionality.' By acknowledging the nation's limited resources[22] it recognises that New Zealand's maritime security means are insufficient to meet the ambitious goals, or ends, of the strategy, and that that New Zealand's security ultimately 'is reliant on strong domestic and international partnerships.'[23] However, in other areas the Strategy clouds the issue by referring to employing 'surface patrol and interdiction capability'[24] or 'maritime security assets'[25] to respond to threats, rather than speaking about specific platforms. This obfuscation weakens the validity of a Strategy, which on the one hand accepts responsibility for up to 30 million square kilometres of ocean[26] but on the other neglects to explicitly address the fact that the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) has only two frigates and the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) only four maritime patrol aircraft.

In addition to the above examples falling short of Meiser and Nath's and Doran's criteria, it is clear that the *MSS 24* has numerous other shortcomings as an effective strategy.[27] It attempts to address an international issue from a national perspective, fails to set achievable objectives, and defines a problem set which it cannot hope to address with its current resource: folding every current and emerging trans-Pacific maritime security threat in to one document has resulted in an unwieldy and ambiguous strategy that lacks both coherence and any metric by which it can be successful.[28]

Opportunity for mitigation No. 1: Fleet renewal

New Zealand officials and analysts are aware of the above shortfalls and omissions. Those less pessimistic, including this author, point out that incremental corrections are being instituted by officials with the support of their ministers, within the limits set by current budget constraints. Two mitigation measures are especially significant. All of the RNZN's major vessels save HMNZS *Aotearoa* (which entered service in 2020) will reach the end of their service lives in the mid-2030s. This provides an opportunity for innovative thinking when it comes to replacing these platforms and refocus the naval force.[29] The Maritime Fleet Market Research report for the upcoming *Defence Capability Plan (DCP)* stated that 'Rather than taking a 'like for like' approach to replacement, there is a unique opportunity to consider alternative fleet configurations [and] alternative ways to operate.'[30] It is evident that fielding a force of eight vessels in five classes is inefficient: operating unique platforms ensures there are no economies of scale; the technical workforce becomes siloed into whichever platform they initially specialise in (or are subject to costly re-training and subsequent loss of experience in the platform they depart from); and in a small organisation of fewer than 3000 regulars and reserves,[31] there is little to no resilience. From a purely economical and workforce skill maximisation standpoint, the procurement of 'newer and fewer' classes would be preferable.

When considering replacement options for the frigates, Navy planners would naturally turn toward Australia. The *National Security Strategy* and *Defence Policy and Strategy Statement*

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22 *Ibid*, 13.
23 *Ibid*, 25.
24 *Ibid*, 29.
25 *Ibid*, 30.
26 *Ibid*, 12.
27 A more detailed critique of *MSS 24* can be found in Richard Greenwood-Bell, "Briefing Paper - Evaluation of New Zealand's Maritime Security Strategy 2024", presented at the NZDF Command and Staff College, Trentham, 4 August 2024.
28 Despite criticisms, the Strategy represents a genuine inter-departmental effort by the New Zealand government to articulate the maritime risks the nation faces, and provides a strategic *framework* for how these problems may be addressed in the future. It is a promising work in progress.
29 New Zealand Government,"Future Force Design Principles" (Wellington, August 2023) p8. https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/23-0195-Future-Force-Design-Principles-WEB.pdf.
30 MFMR Industry Engagement documents quoted in Tim Fish, "The future of the RNZN - how can it recover lost capabilities?" *APDR* Dec-Jan 24. https://venturaapdr.partica.online/apdr/apdr-dec-jan-2024/features/the-future-of-the-rnzn-how-can-it-recover-lost-capabilities.
31 NZDF, *Our People, structure and leadership*, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/who-we-are/our-people-structure-and-leadership/.

both speak of the desire to 'maximise interoperability with security partners'[32] as a key tenet of the 'Understand, Partner, Act' approach. Purchasing the United Kingdom (UK) Type 26 (Hunter class in Australian parlance) would be a step-change appealing to Navy personnel. But a look at the cost compared to New Zealand's straitened budget circumstances rules out this option.

For those willing to think outside the 'replace like with like' box, the boldest option for the RNZN is to step away from naval combat capability in favour of an enhanced fleet of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), inshore patrol vessels (IPVs) and uncrewed systems. This would allow the RNZN to adopt a constabulary stance, monitoring and defending home waters and the extended EEZ whilst simultaneously maintaining its vital humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capability. As retired RNZN Captain Andy Watts speculated, the Navy 'used to be concerned with deployable capability, but does it need to pivot to detect deviancy?'[33] Akin to the Labour Government's controversial decision to disband the RNZAF's air combat force in 2000, this would no doubt meet with stiff opposition from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), and the RNZN in particular. But the concept merits examination. Indeed, over 20 years ago Project Protector – which procured HMNZS *Canterbury* plus the OPVs and IPVs – included a review that 'recommended that the NZDF move away from high-end warfighting and instead focus on peacekeeping and constabulary operations.'[34] One may suggest that the 2025 DCP could go even further by acknowledging that frigates are expensive to purchase and maintain and costly to upgrade. The recent Frigate Systems Upgrade Programme budget ballooned to $638.9 million[35] and eventually cost $700 million.[36] Considering that the minimum number of hulls to maintain a persistent at-sea presence is three (allowing for one vessel in maintenance and one in pre-deployment work-up), a suitable replacement would demand a significant proportion of the NZDF budget: a Hunter class frigate, for example, is in the region of $4.4 billion per hull – excluding weapons.[37]

Furthermore, the frigate upgrade took a worrying length of time. HMNZS *Te Kaha* was out of operation for nine months, and HMNZS *Te Mana* was in Canada for three years in total. During a large proportion of that period the RNZN was toothless, without a combat capability. This gap was tacitly acceptable to the government at that point; there would have been a trade-off between loss of capability for a length of time and increased cost of the overall programme should the frigates have been be refitted consecutively rather than concurrently. This gap is evidence that the maintenance of a naval combat capability at all times is not essential for the defence of the nation. Put bluntly, who is going to attack New Zealand, and even if someone *does*, what use are two frigates against a robust enemy flotilla? They are not required for HADR tasking – HMNZS *Canterbury* and HMNZS *Aotearoa* are better suited. They present the wrong message for capacity building amongst Pacific partner nations. Critics query whether the RNZN has the workforce and logistics resilience to deploy the frigates globally for any length of time. All of this raises the question, what are the frigates *for*?

The answer lies, once again, in the New Zealand government's search for relevancy. The *idea* of the frigates is worth more than their physical manifestation. It is almost irrelevant that

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32 New Zealand Government, *Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023*, 9. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-09/Defence%20Policy%20Strategy%20Statement%202023.PDF.

33 Andy Watts, "Opportunities for the future of New Zealand's Navy", Maritime Security Symposium, Wellington, 13 June 2024. Also see Watts' thoughtful discussion of new technology and modularity "Designing the Next Fleet" in this Journal, Volume 1, December 2020, 22-47.

34 Timothy Portland, "A Maritime Security Reset for the Royal New Zealand Navy," *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy*, Vol. 1 No. 1 December 2020. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Professional-Journal-of-the-Royal-New-Zealand-Navy-December-2020_online.pdf.

35 New Zealand Ministry of Defence, "Anzac Frigate Systems Upgrade," December 2017. https://www.defence.govt.nz/our-work/equip/capability-projects/anzac-frigate-systems-upgrade/.

36 Ben Felton, "New Zealand Frigate Sails Home Following Upgrade," Navalnews.com, 6 June 2022. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/new-zealand-frigate-sails-home-following-upgrade/.

37 Andrew Tillet, "The 'criminal price tag' for the navy's new warships is $4b a pop," The Australian Financial Review, 31 July 2024. Hunter-class frigates to cost Australians $4 billion each, excluding weapons (afr.com).

the Anzac class ships are beset with mechanical issues and suffer from workforce resilience problems; the fact that New Zealand has – on paper at least - a visible naval combat capability is what matters on the international stage. Certainly, there are points at which this fleet in being must put to sea and make its presence known, but none of these instances are in direct defence of the nation. Taking part in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), exercising interoperability with Australian forces or even deploying to the Arabian Gulf and Horn of Africa are all primarily activities designed to maintain New Zealand's seat at the table with her Western partners. As such, the frigates have more of a presentational than a pragmatic role.

For New Zealand's Pacific island partners, a renewed focus on OPV operations would surely be seen as beneficial. Those Pacific island countries (PICs) that do have vessels are focused on law enforcement and national security operations; none has blue-water capability, whereas an increased RNZN OPV fleet would enhance interoperability, relevancy and understanding. There is a reason that the Royal Navy (RN), in pursuit of the UK's Indo-Pacific tilt, forward deployed two River-class OPVs instead of a frigate or destroyer to the Pacific for five years.[38] See Figure 4. OPVs are the vessels best suited to operating in the region, with the flexibility to conduct law-enforcement, patrol and HADR operations in archipelagos unsuitable for larger vessels. Furthermore, as New Zealand seeks to expand its influence in the Blue Pacific, the prospect of a patrol vessel visiting the port of a partner is politically more acceptable than the presence of a larger, heavily-armed frigate with its overtones of great power rivalry.

Figure 4 - Royal Navy River-class Offshore Patrol Vessel HMS *Tamar* | UK Ministry of Defence

With regard to relations with Australia, one may suggest that the reaction in Canberra may be limited to a raised eyebrow rather than serious disquiet. Australia looms larger in New Zealand's consciousness than New Zealand in Australia's, and with the latter's focus toward the north to China and the east to the United States and AUKUS, any move by New Zealand toward greater island security may be welcomed by the Australian security community. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) are re-equipping with long-range missiles and strategic weapon assets. New Zealand could still fulfil her duties as a good neighbour and regional

38 United Kingdom Royal Navy, "Patrol Ships Begin Indo-Pacific Deployment," 7 September 2021. Patrol ships bid farewell to Portsmouth as they begin Indo-Pacific deployment (mod.uk).

partner without frigates. For example, New Zealand sent a support ship, HMNZS *Aotearoa*, instead of a frigate to RIMPAC 24, and suffered no criticism. Australian naval leaders imply that although the door is always open for New Zealand involvement in exercises or contingency planning, an NZDF presence is a welcome bonus rather than an integral cog in ADF naval operations.

Domestically, it is likely that a New Zealand pivot toward equipping for constabulary operations would be well received. It offers the perception of greater value for money as seen in more hulls for the same outlay – the cost of a River-class OPV is approximately only $232 million. It suggests that New Zealand's borders will be secured to a greater extent against the threats of trans-national organised crime, with an enhanced visible presence of RNZN vessels in ports around the country. To provide an integrated solution, procurement of a supplementary fleet of relatively cost-effective uncrewed vessels and aircraft could also be considered, mirroring Australia's combination of P-8A and MQ-4C Triton for maritime surveillance.[39] Combined with a system such as Anduril's Maritime Sentry Tower[40] which is able to autonomously detect, classify and monitor vessels up to 20 kilometres offshore, and has been used to support Operation Isotrope, the UK's counter-people smuggling campaign in the English Channel, New Zealand could exponentially increase its detection capability and border security. A final domestic consideration of stripping the RNZN of combat power would be the effect on the personnel of the Navy: would losing its fighting arm depress the morale of the force, its retention, and indeed its ability to recruit in the future? Or has the widely-held assumption amongst the populace that HADR is the NZDF's main role pervaded the armed force to such an extent that the loss of the frigates would have little bearing on the personnel issues, as was the case when the RNZAF grounded the Skyhawk combat wing?

Opportunity for mitigation No. 2: Join AUKUS Pillar II

AUKUS was heralded as a 'historic opportunity for the three nations, with like-minded allies and partners, to protect shared values and promote security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.'[41] Pillar II 'focuses on expediting cooperation in critical technologies, including cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, additional undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic.'[42] All of these development areas have applicability to maritime security, and with the United States indicating that other nations with Pacific interests may be welcome to join the triad, New Zealand must consider this interesting proposition.

To the casual observer, joining Pillar II may seem like an obvious choice: New Zealand already has strong ties and commonalities with all three constituent partners via both alliance (in the case of Australia), or Five Eyes membership (with all). As a junior partner, it would stand to reason that New Zealand may gain more from the relationship that it gives. This is an attractive notion especially as 'each area of Pillar II has game-winning potential in the strategic competition with China.'[43] With Beijing drawing ahead in almost all areas of military technology, New Zealand may wish to grasp this opportunity, certainly not to win, maybe not even to challenge China, but at least to be in the chasing pack to maintain relevance and credibility.

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39 Valenti *op. cit*.

40 Ian Johnston, "UK Home Office works with US defence start-up to identify small-boat crossings," Financial Times, 25 March 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/4e01883a-2d54-4bd0-93e7-5a9f087443f3.

41 Australian Government, "Joint media statement: Australia to pursue nuclear-powered submarines through new trilateral enhanced security partnership," 16 September 2021. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2021-09-16/joint-media-statement-australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security-partnership.

42 CSIS, "The US, Britain and Australia Announce the Path Forward for AUKUS," 16 March 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-britain-and-australia-announce-path-forward-aukus.

43 John Christianson, Sean Monaghan and Di Cooke "AUKUS Pillar Two: Advancing the Capabilities of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia," CSIS, July 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/aukus-pillar-two-advancing-capabilities-united-states-united-kingdom-and-australia.

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) could prove especially useful in the search for comprehensive maritime domain awareness in the Pacific, and New Zealand could leverage its relationships in the region for the good of the coalition. It could well be that Pacific island nations would look more favourably on an approach from New Zealand than the United States, especially given China's growing network in the region. Even though New Zealand would be an obvious proxy for the more influential powers at the heart of AUKUS, that one remove may be valuable in terms of the Blue Pacific nations carefully hedging their own foreign policies. The convening power of New Zealand and Australia, teamed with the technological capability of the UK and deeper pockets of the US, could be the winning combination that finally achieves *MSS 24's* aspiration of a comprehensive Common Operating Picture across the Pacific.

From a platform standpoint, the development of uncrewed and autonomous systems should be of great interest to New Zealand, especially when combined with a pivot to a constabulary force, as previously discussed. Low risk but effective force multipliers that also offer value for money and reduced workforce burden are inherently attractive. Among the 30-plus systems trialled at the recent AUKUS Exercise Autonomous Warrior were the USV *Bluebottle* (already being trialled by the RNZN), the extra-large autonomous UUV *Ghost Shark*, and the large UUV *Speartooth*, all promising utility in reconnaissance, surveillance and strike roles.[44] Such platforms could not only offer solutions to New Zealand's extensive ocean monitoring problems but also provide protection of undersea infrastructure. See Figure 5.



Figure 5 - Australian-made Bluebottle naval drone is being trialled by the RNZN | RNZN

Beyond enhancing maritime security narrowly defined, the greatest benefit to joining Pillar II must be that it buys *relevancy*. With the limited resources of the NZDF unable to contribute capabilities at any level above the bare minimum (infantry, surface vessels), New Zealand is in danger of becoming irrelevant despite its being a benevolent sibling 'across the Ditch'. Only one passing mention of New Zealand appears in the 116-page *Australian Defence Strategic Review*,[45] whereas New Zealand's *DPSS* makes multiple references to interoperability with partners – primarily Australia.

44 Australian Government, "AUKUS Pillar II in action at Exercise Autonomous Warrior 2024," 25 October 2024. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-10-25/aukus-pillar-ii-action-exercise-autonomous-warrior-2024.
45 Australian Government, *Defence Strategic Review 2023*, (Canberra: 2023), 46. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.

From the maritime security perspective, the case for abstaining is weak. It is difficult to conceive any way that inclusion in Pillar II could materially weaken New Zealand's maritime security. Pacific island leaders with whom New Zealand currently enjoys good relations may wonder if technological intimacy with outside powers compromises New Zealand's vaunted independent foreign policy. But on reflection they will realise that the region is likely to benefit, and that New Zealand would not take sides in the 'new cold war' and abandon its Blue Pacific neighbours.

There are several factors that may incline New Zealand political leaders to pause on Pillar II membership. These include public criticism of alleged compromise of the nuclear-free policy, and worry that closer ties with the West may signal 'a bit of a retreat from our independent foreign policy to one that's more closely in lockstep with… the Anglosphere.'[46] Of concern also is that tacit alignment with the United States would challenge China's bid for hegemony in the Pacific and thus provoke trade retaliation, damaging New Zealand's vital relationship with its largest trade partner. However, these concerns are hypothetical and speculative at present. Viewed through a purely maritime security lens, Pillar II could offer significant advantage in closing the technical capacity ends-means gap that New Zealand currently labours under whilst conferring intangible but politically significant benefits such as approbation by Western partners.

Conclusion

Maintaining a navy that represents a scaled-down version of larger partners' forces and tries to offer combat, replenishment, patrol, interdiction, amphibious (and, until recently, hydrographic) capabilities in a fleet of New Zealand's modest size is organisationally taxing, costly, inefficient, and sub-optimally effective. New Zealand's leaders need to decide which aspects of maritime security they want to prioritise and – within budget constraints – do one or two things well, rather than spread resources too thinly across multiple sectors.

I suggest that fleet renewal augmented by AUKUS Pillar II cutting-edge technology presents a once-in-a-generation opportunity for New Zealand. A crewed, patrol-focused, constabulary, HADR-capable Navy combined with a world-leading autonomous and uncrewed force units networked with partners could put New Zealand at the forefront of global AI and unmanned surface vehicle (USV)/unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) development. The combination would cement its status as a regional leader and global player. And it would leverage the nation's technical expertise for economic gain. These initiatives are within New Zealand's grasp and their implementation would be a positive message to Pacific and global partners alike. New Zealand would once again bring capabilities to the table that would not only earn credibility and relevance but also enhance maritime security in an increasingly contested Pacific region.

46 Robert Patman, quoted in "Foreign policy shift to AUKUS may be seen as a retreat," 1 News, 2 February 2024. https://www.1news.co.nz/2024/02/02/foreign-policy-shift-to-aukus-may-be-seen-as-a-retreat-expert/.

COMMANDER RICHARD GREENWOOD-BELL, ROYAL NAVY

Commander Richard Greenwood-Bell studied Strategic Studies at Lancaster University and joined the Royal Navy in 2005. A Maritime Attack observer, he flew the Lynx Mk8 on deployments to the South Atlantic, Baltic, Gulf and Caribbean seas, and performed Maritime Counter-terrorism duties in support of United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF). A J35 staff appointment in the Ministry of Defence followed, prior to converting to the Wildcat HMA2 and being appointed Executive Officer of 815 Naval Air Squadron. An operational deployment to a multinational headquarters in support of Ukraine on Op ORBITAL in 2023 was conducted prior to attending the New Zealand's Command and Staff College Advanced Course in 2024. He is currently the Naval liaison to Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Command.

Counter-terrorism in Social Media: United Kingdom and New Zealand Initiatives[1]

Commodore Brendon Clark, DSD, RNZN

Globalisation facilitates not only trade but also terrorism, warns Commodore Brendon Clark, DSD, RNZN. Commodore Clark's essay spotlights how unscrupulous disruptors exploit social media platforms to spread their contrarian messages and undermine social order. The British and New Zealand governments are taking counter measures but must remain agile to keep up with terrorists' adaptation of evolving digital technology. Public engagement, tech industry cooperation, utilisation of artificial intelligence (AI), and international collaboration are recommended.

Introduction

Terrorists increasingly promulgate their destructive ideologies through social media, taking advantage of globalisation. International agencies and governments are now obliged to take counter measures to maintain public trust and social order in the face of an avalanche of nihilistic messages. A state's conventional counter-terrorism strategy typically comprises a mixture of policies that may be summarised as prevention, deterrence, counter-attack, and resilience. But due to the fluidity of globalisation and the ease with which terrorism can physically and virtually transcend borders, it is important for states to consider and incorporate new international and domestic security tactics into their counter-terrorism strategies, typically through collaboration with allies and partners. This essay identifies the threats that arise through social media and explores British and New Zealand institutional initiatives to counter them.

Globalisation, social media and countering terrorism

Social media platforms provide terrorists with the ability to anonymously promulgate their corrosive messages with very few impediments or risks to themselves. Human-machine interface improvements, together with continual technological advances, have enabled terrorists to easily disseminate their ideologies and opinions using multiple mediums such as websites, blogs, forums, social networking, and video-sharing websites[2]. The prolific use of social media, providing access to all aspects of society over the past two decades has presented several new challenges to counter-terrorism operations. Authorities are finding that counter measures are either inadequate or not sufficiently agile and fast to remain up-to-date with rapidly changing technology and social appeal.

1 This is an abridged version of Commodore Clark's 2024 Master of Arts dissertation for King's College London - ed.
2 Gabriel Weimann, *Terrorism in Cyberspace: the next generation*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Columbia University Press, 2015, 175.

As John Amble observes, from a security perspective, countering terrorism has arguably been the highest security priority for governments since September 2001. Despite the best of intentions from security agencies to adopt new technology to combat the threat of terrorism, Amble concludes that their success has proved limited.[3] Specifically, terrorist groups have demonstrated their ability to be agile and adaptive by embracing technology and the Internet's capabilities to enable them to conduct a broad range of activities online. In contrast, official intelligence organisations have been slower and more restricted in their approach to adopting the capabilities provided by the Internet, which in turn has limited the effectiveness of their actions. As an example, in the first decade of this century, states tended to use connectivity-related technology to prioritise improvement of internal communication capabilities, whilst relegating the external element, including the monitoring of terrorists, to a secondary priority. The warnings of security experts that the Internet was a force multiplier and a means to counter-terrorist activity were slow to be taken up by authorities.[3] United States (US) Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld summed up the lag two decades ago: 'Our enemies have skilfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but for the most part we have not'.[4]

The United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy

In 2003, the United Kingdom (UK) launched the inaugural version of *Contest*, the nation's strategy for countering terrorism. See Figure 1. Recognising terrorism's evolving nature, largely due to technological advances and changes in the modus operandi of terrorists, there have been several iterations of the strategy, with the latest version being released in July 2023.[5] *Contest* provides a framework for relevant security agencies to analyse the threat, coordinate the response and communicate across government, international partners, citizens and the private sector.[6] At 71 pages long, its guiding document is not only comprehensive but also policy-relevant inasmuch as it provides tangible and practical policy prescriptions, explains policy rationales, and offers statistical facts for the public. The importance of domestic and international communication and collaboration is emphasised throughout the strategy.

Figure 1 - Summary of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy | UK Home Department

3 John Amble. "Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35*, no 5 (2012), 344. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.666819

4 Donald Rumsfeld. "War in the Information Age," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 February 2006. http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/23/ opinion/oe-rumsfeld23

5 The first publicly available version was dated 2006 with updates in 2009, 2011 and 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest#contents

6 United Kingdom, "Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", 2. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2023

The aim of *Contest* is 'to reduce the risk from terrorism to the UK, its citizens and interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence'.[7] At the heart of *Contest*, much like the United Nations (UN) counter-terrorism strategy, stand four key pillars:[8]

- Prevent - 'to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism… including supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism.'
- Pursue - 'to stop terrorist attacks happening in this country or against UK interests overseas.'
- Protect - 'to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack.'
- Prepare - 'to minimise the impact of an attack and reduce the likelihood of further attacks.'

Fundamental to the *Contest* strategy as it has evolved is a growing transparency and engagement with the public. This contrasts to the traditional closed and secretive mode of intelligence agencies, in which they shared very little national security information with the public. This shift is a positive move in the UK Government's attempt to enlist the public's assistance to condemn and report terrorism, and an inspiration to partner countries. As examples of the essential role of the public can play in strategy execution, His Majesty's Government (HMG) reports that in 2022/23, the UK Counter-Terrorism Police received over 13,000 tips from the public, of which nearly 2,000 provided meaningful intelligence to the authorities.[9]

Aotearoa New Zealand's counter-terrorism strategy

New Zealand's counter-terrorism strategy is embedded in the inaugural *Secure Together: National Security Strategy 2023–2028*. See Figure 2. "Terrorism and Violent Extremism" is one of the twelve security issues presented within the strategy.[10] *Secure Together* leverages lessons from the Royal Commission into the Christchurch mosque massacre and 'sets a vision for our national security that promotes a focused and integrated approach – one that positions us to act early to prevent threats whenever possible'.[11] Throughout the document, all headings and a significant number of words and phrases are written in both te reo Māori and English, recognising New Zealand's commitment to biculturalism and the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi. Furthermore, the style of language throughout is very much focused on people and ownership; for example, one finds frequent use of 'us', 'our' and 'together'. The strategy's first two sentences capture these bicultural and people-centred elements: 'It is a cloak of protection that uplifts the mana[12] of us all. The harakeke[13] fibre threads that weave together our korowai[14] represent a desire for us all to work together to protect and offer shelter to each other now and into the future'.[15]

7 Ibid, 4.
8 Ibid, 42.
9 Ibid, 26. Incidentally, the UK public makes over 120,000 complaints per year as part of the National Railway's "See it, Say it, Sorted" campaign.
10 Including for example Foreign Interference and Espionage, Disinformation, Transnational Organized Crime, Space and Cyber Security.
11 New Zealand Government. "New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023-2028", i.
12 *Mana* - authority or status of a person.
13 *Haraheke* - a flax frond from a shrub.
14 *Korowai* - A traditional Māori cloak normally woven from feathers.
15 New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023-2028", inside cover. https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2023-11/national-security-strategy-aug2023.pdf

Figure 2 - New Zealand's blueprint for security policy | NZ DPMC

Key initiatives under the umbrella of preventing and reducing the threat include—[16]

- coordinated research;
- public education to recognise the signs;
- early intervention;
- annual forums to discuss challenges, opportunities, sharing of knowledge and creating solutions; and
- domestic and international collaboration.

16 ibid, 1-14.

The Christchurch mosque massacre of 2019 was the catalyst of the creation and promulgation of an open-source counter-terrorism strategy. This was elaborated by the recommendations of the Royal Commission that encouraged the Government to discuss national security challenges with New Zealanders whilst simultaneously calling for 'stronger leadership, clear direction and better accountability to the public on national security'.[17]

Arguably, this distinct shift from the relative confidentiality of security agencies to public engagement and open discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism is innovative. *Contest* is deemed to be a 'world-leading counter-terrorism capability'[18] and it has been highly influential in the development of several European countries' strategies.[19]

The UK and New Zealand strategies compared

It is useful to consider four areas of commonality between New Zealand and the UK, as follows—

- **Transparency:** Like the UK, New Zealand's strategy represents a significant shift to transparency. Each openly discusses national security challenges and the associated activities of the security agencies wherever feasible. For example, the UK's Counter Terrorism Policing organisation seeks to protect the public by bringing the UK's police forces and intelligence agencies together, where they collaborate to prevent, deter and investigate terrorist activity.[20]

- **Collaboration:** Both strategies acknowledge that the threat of terrorism is a global challenge. Both acknowledge the importance of working closely with state partners and international agencies such as the UN. For instance, through strong bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, such as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance,[21] New Zealand, Britain, Canada, Australia and the US can share information, tools and capabilities, each of which leads to enhanced security.[22] In addition, member states of the UN share and coordinate terrorism intelligence through the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), including, for example, the UK sharing its strategy, *Contest*, with member states.[23]

  Role of the people: This is highlighted in New Zealand statements such as '…all New Zealanders can play a role in preventing and countering violent extremism', parallel to UK statements such as 'the public is a key partner in the successful delivery of *Contest*, and plays an essential role in preventing attacks and reducing loss of life in the event of an attack'.[24]

- **Online and social media environment:** Both strategies recognise the power of the online environment, rapidly evolving technological advances, and emerging technologies such as AI, robotics and quantum computing.[25] The strategies also accept that these technological advances introduce risk and opportunity for both terrorists and security agencies alike. For instance, whilst counter-terrorism actions are supported by technology through capabilities such as surveillance, communication systems and analysis, the

17 "New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023-2028", Foreword.
18 "Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", Home Secretary's Foreword, 2.
19 Diego Muro and Tim Wilson, *Contemporary Terrorism Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, 395.
20 United Kingdom, "Counter Terrorism Policing." https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk
21 The Five Eyes members are Australia, Canada, NZ, UK and USA. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligencealliance-of-the-anglosphere/
22 United Kingdom, "Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: International Partnerships", 54. https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2023/12/ISC-International-Partnerships.pdf
23 United Nations, "Sharing Electronic Resources on Law and Crime", UNODC.
24 "Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", 26. https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/treaties/strategies/united_kingdom/gbr0003s.html
25 "New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023-2028", 7. Also see "Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", 22.

> same technology can also be misused by terrorists to communicate using social media applications with end-to-end encryption and/or to livestream attacks and glorify their actions, thereby radicalising people with their ideologies.

Counter-terrorism role of the tech industry

In response to the exploitation of social media platforms by terrorists, many governments' security agencies have begun to collaborate with the technology industry to control online content. Work in the control of media content began almost two decades ago and accelerated after 2015 in response to 211 terrorist attacks[26] across Europe that year. For instance, from August 2015 through December 2017, Twitter suspended 1,210,357 accounts that had promoted terrorism, and in the second half of 2017, YouTube removed over 150,000 videos depicting violent extremism.[27] Several other social media platforms implemented similar actions. At the same time, new organisations emerged, including the European Union Internet Forum. At this juncture, actions to control content and suspend or shut down accounts were still being conducted piecemeal, without coordination across the technology industry. In response, terrorists simply shifted from one social media platform to another to exploit gaps and to continue operating.

To counter-terrorists shifting between platforms and thus to constrain the exploitation of social media, in 2017 several major Internet companies including Microsoft, Google and Facebook established the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). One of their early actions was to create a "digital fingerprint" (hashes) database. This enabled GIFCT members to use AI to identify, remove and in some instances block identical content before it was posted. The GIFCT's digital fingerprint database interceptions grew from 88,000 in 2018 to 390,000 in 2023, including a variety of terrorist and violent extremist content items in images, videos and text.[28] However, despite the success of the digital fingerprint database's growth, the *Global Terrorism Threat Assessment 2024* reports that there are still dozens of recordings of the Christchurch mosque massacre and the perpetrator's manifesto, translated into at least 15 languages, circulating online.[29] The Facebook livestream of the Christchurch mosque massacre further emphasised the requirement for global and technology company leaders to collaborate and eliminate terrorist content. This outrage ultimately led to the "Christchurch Call to Action" initiative by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, later joined by President of France Emmanuel Macron. It was summed up by Hoverd et al as follows:[30]

> The Christchurch Call is an action plan that commits government and tech companies to a range of measures, including developing tools to prevent the upload of terrorist and violent extremist content, countering the roots of violent extremism, increasing transparency around the removal and detection of content, and reviewing how companies' algorithms direct users to violent extremist content.

In summary, the importance of collaboration remains relevant today, with GIFCT's Executive Director Naureen Fink stating '…it is clear that no single sector or state can tackle the scourge of terrorist and violent extremist content alone'.[31] In bringing technology and counter-terrorism experts together, and working in collaboration with technology companies, governments,

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26 BBC, "Record number of EU terror attacks recorded in 2015", 20 July 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36845647

27 Stuart Macdonald, Sara Giro Correia and Amy-Louise Watkin, "Regulating Terrorist Content on Social Media: Automation and the Rule of Law." *International Journal of Law in Context* 15, no. 2, 2019, 184. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552319000119

28 Global Internet Forum Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). "2023 GIFCT Annual and Transparency Report", 3. https://gifct.org//wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GIFCT-Annual-Report-2023.pdf

29 Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Global Terrorism Threat Assessment 2024", 59. https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-terrorism-threat-assessment-2024

30 William Hoverd, Leon Salter and Kevin Veale, "The Christchurch Call: insecurity, democracy and digital media - can it really counter online hate and extremism? *Springer Nature Social Sciences* 1, no. 2 (2021), 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-020-00008-2

31 "2023 GIFCT Annual and Transparency Report", 6. https://gifct.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/GIFCT-Annual-Report-2023.pdf

industry, academia and businesses, GIFCT members seek to disrupt the misuse of digital platforms by terrorists and violent extremists.

Recommended next steps

1. Reviewing and adapting strategies

Reviewing, adapting and where required, transforming the strategy to counter the evolving threat of terrorism is of critical importance. Each of the strategies reviewed incorporate this important thinking, including New Zealand's *Secure Together*: 'Strategy is not an end, it is simply the beginning and our approach to national security and the specific issues of greatest concern will continue to evolve and adapt'.[32] The agility and the ability to pivot in response to the contemporary environment is critical as failure to adapt simply renders the strategy ineffective.

Likewise, the UK's *Contest* provides an enduring example of adaptation and transformation over a period of 20 years. Specifically, the strategy recognises the requirement to respond to a less predictable terrorist threat that is not only more challenging to detect and investigate but is also ever present and evolving, operating in an environment where advances in technology create both opportunity and risk to international counter-terrorism actions.[33] The evolutionary approach, with six iterations over the last two decades in response to each of these elements, demonstrates the UK's commitment to regularly reviewing and updating their counter-terrorism strategy to ensure it remains relevant. For instance, following the 2018 edition, Home Secretary Braverman directed an overhaul of the Prevent pillar, based on recommendations from an independent review of the Prevent pillar and the Manchester Arena Inquiry, recognising the pivotal role that ideology had in encouraging extremism.[34]

2. Increasing the public's contribution to counter-terrorism operations

Although security agencies and their collective capabilities are very much at the forefront of counter-terrorism actions, one must not overlook the increasing value add the public brings to the capability set. Whilst extant tools and next generation technology such as foundation AI models are some of the key enablers in the counter-terrorism space, it is vitally important to leverage and utilise the power of the people. The public could be considered a nation's largest informal security organisation. Although both the New Zealand and UK strategies emphasise the vital role the public has with the detection and disruption of terrorist activities, it is an area of the capability set that warrants further attention to determine whether this critical enabler is being optimised. Using the Prevent pillar from the UK's strategy, for instance, it would be useful to study what percentage of the population would recognise the signs of radicalisation, know how to report it and, thence, actually follow through and report it.[35]

3. Harnessing artificial intelligence

As suggested by Lakomy, AI is perceived to be one of the most significant technological advances in history, with its popularity becoming even more evident with the launch of ChatGPT in December 2022.[36] As reported by Krystal Hu, by the end of January 2023 there were just over 100 million ChatGPT users with an average of 13 million interactions per day, making it the fastest growing consumer application in history.[37] The speed of innovation and roll-out of foundation and generation AI models such as ChatGPT have provided the global community

32 New Zealand Government. "New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023-2028", 34.
33 Suella Braverman, "Contest, the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2023 Statement made on 18 July 2023," https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2023-07-18/hcws967, 39 Ibid, 1.
34 Ibid.
35 "Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism", 26.
36 Miron Lakomy, "Artificial Intelligence as a Terrorism Enabler? Understanding the Potential Impact of Chatbots and Image Generators on Online Terrorist Activities," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, (2023), 1. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2259195
37 Krystal Hu, "ChatGPT sets record for fastest-growing user base - analyst note," Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/technology/chatgpt-sets-record-fastest-growing-user-base-analyst-note-2023-02-01/

with powerful new tools that perform a wide variety of functions, including conducting research, explaining a topic and having a conversation. From a business perspective, AI is capable of processing and analysing data at far greater speed and capacity than a human.

Leveraging the potential of AI, these same means can also be utilised by security agencies to enhance the effectiveness of extant capabilities such as automating recurring tasks, reducing workload, diverting human resources to other tasks, forecasting future scenarios, identifying suspicious financial transactions and monitoring Internet content.[38] In turn, through the use of AI, detection, prevention and intervention capabilities are enhanced, thereby improving the state's control of online terrorist and extremist content.[39] For example, the 2023 Christchurch Call document, *Snapshot*, reports that Microsoft and Tech Against Terrorism are continuing to work up a solution to incorporate AI into existing detection tools. In parallel, the technology industry must also consider other opportunities that AI offers, including improving responses to content detection and moderation, supporting behavioural analysis, and better responses to crises.[40]

Whilst there are considerable moral benefits of AI, without robust and appropriate safeguards in place, it is assessed that these same models could be weaponised by terrorists and used, for example as a medium for producing tailored propaganda, targeted recruitment and execution of attacks. As Lakomy reports, in the first half of 2023, ChatGPT and Bing Chat provided information about how to avoid content and website removal, how to remove tracking features to prevent censorship, instructions to create a website on the dark web, and a list of websites that do not share data with governments. Whilst simple questions about explosives and bombs generated an appropriate security warning, when refined questions were entered, ChatGPT provided a lengthy and detailed response, allowing the user to make an explosive device with an array of different recipes.[41] Although Lakomy stresses the content was not verified, in March 2023, a response of anything other than a security warning should serve as an alarm for the global community.

The admonition of Mr Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism, on 26 September 2019 is an appropriate summary of the theme of this section: 'We must come together now, and we must do it fast, to mitigate this [terrorist] threat and ensure that new technologies remain a force for good rather than a force for evil'.[42]

4. Balancing civil liberties and counter-terrorism actions

Countering terrorists' use of AI and end-to-end encryption has posed dilemmas to politicians, legal and technical communities and policy makers as they attempt to strike a balance between protecting the public and complying with rule of law and maintaining privacy and respect for human rights. This is particularly relevant with the decision(s) made by AI, such as decisions to stop the posting of an item or to remove an item from the Internet. Action must be carefully calibrated and, as sought by both the UN and the Christchurch Call to Action, be guided by the principles of a free, open and secure Internet without compromising human rights, freedom of thought and expression. Likewise, as reported by the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), a number of studies have concluded that despite ongoing effort, most algorithms either contain or are subject to prejudice and bias, thus leading to distorting decisions. This is no less true when AI is tasked with forecasting future terrorism scenarios, prescribing counter-terrorism actions or identifying potential perpetrators. The same applies

38 United Nations, "Countering Terrorism Online with Artificial Intelligence", 13. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/countering-terrorism-online-with-ai-uncct-unicri-report-web.pdf

39 Tech against Terrorism. "Joint Statement: Christchurch Call Leaders' Summit 2023", 1. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2023/11/11/joint-statement-christchurch-call-leaders-summit-2023 45 ibid, 2.

40 Christchurch Call, "Snapshot Report 2023", 12. https://www.christchurchcall.com/assets/Summit-23/Christchurch-Call-SnapshotReport-2023.pdf.

41 Ibid, 12-13.

42 https://www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/unoct-usg-voronkov-biography.pdf

with end-to-end encryption, in which AI may be less sensitive to human nuances, whereas human Internet providers are obliged to strike a nuanced balance between the privacy of individuals and the security of the wider public. This is an area that warrants further debate.

Conclusion

The counter-terrorism strategies of New Zealand's *Secure Together* and the UK's *Contest* embody key themes that may be recommended abroad. These include first, the need for greater transparency and engagement with the public and second, the improved coordination and collaboration with domestic and international actors. The strategies also highlight the need for wide-ranging engagement and collaboration with academia, think tanks, the technical industry and organisations such as the GIFCT and Tech against Terrorism, and initiatives such as the Christchurch Call to Action. The common aim of all these initiatives is to curb the exploitation of digital platforms by terrorists and violent extremists.

To achieve this aim, governments and international security agencies need to be constantly informed about rapidly evolving technological advances and emerging technologies such as end-to-end encryption and AI. These technological advances create new opportunities for terrorists, but if adapted purposefully, they can give authorities useful tools to challenge and suppress social media incitement to terrorism and violence. Countering the constantly evolving threat requires adaptive thinking and action by legitimate institutions, and their adequate resourcing by governments. New Zealand's Security Intelligence Service (SIS), Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), Police, and intelligence and security units of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) all have vital roles to play in curbing online terrorists' incitements to violence.

COMMODORE BRENDON CLARK, DSD, RNZN, CO-DIRECTOR MARITIME FLEET RENEWAL

Commodore Brendon Clark, DSD, was commissioned into the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1992. He has served in HMNZS *Canterbury*, *Waikato*, *Manawanui*, *Charles Upham*, *Wellington* and *Endeavour*, including two operational deployments to East Timor in late 1999 and early 2000.

After training in Canada and Australia, Commodore Clark deployed as Ship's Flight Commander on HMNZS *Canterbury* and *Te Kaha* to the South Pacific, Australia, North and South East Asia. He was subsequently appointed Commanding Officer of RNZAF No. 6 Squadron.

Commodore Clark was then posted as Chief of Staff to the Captain Fleet Operational Readiness and Commander Maritime Operational Evaluation Team (MOET), and from 2019 served as the Captain Fleet Operational Readiness (CFOR).

In 2021 he commanded the Combined Task Force 150 out of Bahrain, then returned in 2022 to serve as Assistant Chief of Navy Personnel and Training. In August 2024 he was appointed Transformation Lead Maritime Fleet Renewal. Commodore Clark was promoted in April 2025 and appointed as Co-Director Maritime Fleet Renewal.

At the 2023 New Years Honours Commodore Clark was awarded the New Zealand Distinguished Service Decoration.

Enhancing Energy Security for New Zealand and the New Zealand Defence Force

Major Cameron Wright, NZ Army

New Zealand is vulnerable to imported energy disruptions, warns Major Cameron Wright, NZ Army. Economic reliance on land transportation, fossil-fuel powered, presents critical risks, as do geopolitical conflicts beyond New Zealand's control. Electrification of the civilian and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) vehicle fleets, and development of renewable energy sources, can mitigate the risks, but will require time, cost, and political will. Major Wright recommends nine interim measures, including raising on-shore fuel reserves to the International Energy Agency standard of 90 days, and closer NZDF collaboration with the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Introduction

New Zealand is a world leader in renewable energy generation. However, it still depends on imported oil to run its economy and essential services.[1] This dependence makes New Zealand susceptible to fluctuations in fuel supply and pricing due to external disruptions outside its control, fostering economic uncertainty among businesses and citizens. With a significant portion of its economy reliant on fuel oil for transportation and industry, New Zealand risks financial instability unless swift mitigation measures are implemented. This will also limit the response of the NZDF to domestic and international crises, as their capabilities will rely on fossil fuels for the foreseeable future.[2] Although New Zealand has actively developed long-term strategies to lessen its exposure to these risks, there has been an apparent lack of urgency in the short term, which risks New Zealand being 'all hui and no do-ey.'[3]

Rapid transport-sector electrification will improve New Zealand's domestic energy resilience by increasing the proportion of national reserve stocks in the country, reducing import fuel dependence, strengthening transport reliability, and reducing national carbon emissions. By accelerating the electrification and enhancement of the transport sector, New Zealand can strengthen its ability to withstand external disruptions, prioritise energy availability to essential services, and reduce its carbon footprint while better fulfilling the global agreements to which New Zealand has committed.[4] [5] This essay identifies areas New Zealand is already addressing and where it can make short-term advances. It then provides an assessment of the New Zealand energy context and the multiple global disruptions to which it is vulnerable. Finally, it assesses strategies for accelerating renewables and how this may affect New Zealand and the NZDF. It is vital to recognise that as global fuel availability and costs continue to fluctuate, New Zealand's pursuit of greater energy independence and resilience becomes not only a

1 International Energy Agency, *New Zealand 2023 Energy Policy Review*, IEA Energy Policy Reviews (OECD, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1787/d99c3085-en, 155. Also see World Energy Council, "World Energy Trilemma Index" (World Energy Council, 2022).

2 Antonia V. Herzog et al., "Renewable Energy: A Viable Choice," *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 43, no. 10 (December 1, 2001), 8-20, https://doi.org/10.1080/00139150109605150.

3 NZDF, "NZDF Emissions Reduction Plan ERP," 2022, 11. 'All Hui and No Do-Ey' is a colloquial term derived from the common saying of 'All talk and no action'. 'Hui' is the New Zealand Māori word for meeting.

4 New Zealand Government, "Submission under the Paris Agreement New Zealand's First Nationally Determined Contribution," November 4, 2021.

5 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Global Agreements," https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/environment/climate-change/working-with-the-world/building-international -collaboration/.

strategic necessity but also an economic imperative. It is hoped that the recommendations that conclude this essay will add to the ongoing public discussion around energy security and resilience, provide practical guidance to policymakers, and set the conditions for a more resilient and sustainable energy future for New Zealand.

New Zealand's energy context

New Zealand uses renewable energy for most of its electrical generation needs. It is fortunate to have harnessed abundant natural resources to achieve over 80 per cent renewable energy generation for the nation.[6] [7] However, lagging investment has increased the country's reliance on fossil-fuel power plants to cover the short-term deficiencies, which negates the positive impacts of electrified transport and undermines achievement of New Zealand's climate goals. There has been only limited investment in large-scale renewable hydroelectric energy projects since 1993, and the current plans to meet 100 per cent renewable generation by 2035 are experiencing extensive delays and overspends, resulting in the continued use of fossil fuels to avoid energy instability.[8] Renewable energy projects, primarily hydroelectric and geothermal, require extensive capital expenditure and detailed environmental and safety assessments before construction begins. New Zealand needs to identify the necessary energy mix that will allow immediate energy needs to be met by smaller-scale renewable projects, like solar and wind, while large-scale renewable solutions are delivered in the long term. New Zealand's energy demands will continue to increase as the population and appetite for technology grow. If these projects are not completed as the world transitions to more electric equipment and vehicles to combat climate change, the dependence on imported fuels will increase as the reliance on non-renewable energy generation plants increases.

Although New Zealand generates most of its power from renewable energy, the transport sector relies heavily on importing fossil fuels to keep the economy running. New Zealand's transport sector contributes 20 per cent of national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions; however, this presents an opportunity to make the most positive impact on reaching climate goals in the short term.[9] New Zealand imports 100 per cent of its fuel to support transport. This reliance on other countries' ability to supply fuel presents a significant risk to New Zealand's economy and its ability to respond to the impacts of external disruptions. However, renewable energy presents an excellent opportunity for its vehicle fleet to be 100 per cent electrified if the required investment is made. See Figure 1. New Zealand's national vehicle fleet has only been electrified ~1 per cent and can be 'refuelled' by organic national energy, leaving the remaining ~99 per cent internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles vulnerable to any level of disruption to fuel supply.[10] This level of exposure will result in wide-ranging upheaval in New Zealand's traditional way of life and may see the economy grind to a halt. Disruptions to people's commutes, delayed food distribution, and slowed industry operations will heavily impact economic stability.

6 International Energy Agency, *New Zealand 2023 Energy Policy Review*, IEA Energy Policy Reviews (OECD), 29.
7 IRENA, "Renewable Energy Statistics 2023," 2023, 107.
8 Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE), "Hydroelectric Power NZ," June 20, 2023, https://www.ice.org.uk/what-is-civil-engineering/what-do-civil-engineers-do/hydroelectric-power-new-zealand/. Also see Jill Herron, "Lake Onslow Battery Losing Its Charge," Newsroom, April 1, 2023, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/page/lake-onslow-battery-losing-its-charge.
9 Transporting New Zealand, "New Zealand's Truck Fleet," Ia Ara Aotearoa Transporting New Zealand Inc. https://www.transporting.nz/new-zealands-truck-fleet. Also see Interim Climate Change Committee, "Accelerated Electrification Report," April 30, 2019, 87.
10 International Energy Agency, *NZ 2023 Energy Policy Review*, IEA Energy Policy Reviews (OECD, 2023), 58.



Figure 1 - Inaugural steps towards public transport electrification | Auckland Transport (AT)

Given the dispersed geography of New Zealand's primary industry economy, the transport sector is more difficult to reform than other sectors, due to the dependence on ICE vehicles to deliver goods and services. New Zealand's economy is primarily made up of agriculture, forestry, tourism, manufacturing, and dairy, with these areas using heavy trucking to distribute their products throughout their supply chain.[11] This dependence on high-emission, fossil fuel assets makes the country highly susceptible to fluctuations in the price and availability of imported fuels, with a cascading effect that amplifies operating costs and triggers inflationary pressures, fostering an atmosphere of economic uncertainty.[12] Although these systems appear to be working now with manageable levels of risk, the question remains, 'Is New Zealand resilient enough to respond to a severe disruption to imported fuel?'. Such a query demands close attention, especially in light of the global uncertainties of potential supply chain disruptions heightened by recent international events. New Zealanders must remain vigilant and attuned to the global risk landscape, acknowledging the possible repercussions of supply chain disruptions, which, if underestimated, could have far-reaching consequences.

As recommended by the International Energy Agency (IEA), New Zealand must maintain 90 days of fuel supply to meet IEA requirements to provide redundancy; however, only 44 days are held within New Zealand's physical stock-holding infrastructure, where the remaining is held offshore on a 'ticketing' basis.[13] Having only 44 days of fuel on hand creates a risk that rationing may be required until the offshore supply can be mobilised.[14] There are two ways to reduce this risk: 1) increasing the number of days' supply of fuel held onshore by building more storage capacity or 2) reducing the demand for fuel use. Although the construction of additional storage facilities will increase the amount of fuel available, it does not address the internal distribution and rising demand for fuel for the economy.

11 TradingEconomics, "NZ Exports By Category," https://tradingeconomics.com/new-zealand/exports-by-category.
12 Hasanul Banna et al., "Energy Security and Economic Stability: The Role of Inflation and War," *Energy Economics* 126 (October 1, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106949.
13 International Energy Agency, *2023 Energy Policy Review*, IEA Energy Policy Reviews (OECD, 2023), 143-156.
14 Mobilising offshore supplies assumes that they are not pre-empted by other markets, that tankers are available and their security is ensured enroute, and that their owners cannot get a better price by going somewhere else. Thanks to Lieutenant Commander Richard Davies RNZN for these cautionary remarks-ed.

Electrification of domestic transport will reduce the need for imported fuel while increasing the proportion of onshore reserve storage capacity.[15] See Figure 2. The more the domestic fleet is electrified, the more resilient the country will be, as fuel reserves can be prioritised for emergency services and military responses that primarily rely on fossil fuels to project influence. Although there have been moves to investigate alternate fuels and battery electric military vehicles, military hardware will be powered by fossil fuels for the foreseeable future.[16] This reliance will be exacerbated if a disruption to fuel imports requires a military response internationally. If New Zealand can achieve a more significant proportion of onshore energy storage, then fuel reserve capacity can be reallocated to support large sea and air military assets, achieving greater flexibility in any military response.

Figure 2 - Towards carbon zero in transportation | NZ Ministry for the Environment

Because New Zealand sits at the end of most global supply chains due to its geographical location, and has experienced recent disruptions, policy-makers are aware of the potential for future disruptions. New Zealand was impacted severely during the uncertainty around COVID-19 lockdowns, the Suez Canal blockage, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[17] As New Zealand relies on fuel imports, it must increase its resilience to lessen these impacts and maintain autonomy and domestic security. As the challenges of geopolitics and climate change continue to worsen, understanding these disruptions' impacts and the likelihood of them occurring will allow New Zealand policy-makers to prioritise its efforts and mobilise its workforce to respond.

Scenarios of supply chain disruption

New Zealand is highly susceptible to global supply chain disruptions as its economy experiences wide-ranging negative impacts when disruptions occur due to its isolation. During Ever Given's blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021, international shipping was severely impacted by increased lead times and fuel costs due to the requirement to transit around the

15 Febelyn Reguyal, Kun Wang, and Ajit K. Sarmah, "Electrification of New Zealand Transport: Environmental Impacts and Role of Renewable Energy," *Science of The Total Environment* 894 (October 10, 2023) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.164936.

16 Reed Blakemore and Tate Nurkin, "Power Projection: Accelerating the Electrification of US Military Ground Vehicles", Atlantic Council, 2022.

17 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), "Potential Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on the New Zealand Economy, 28 February 2022."

Cape of Good Hope or wait for the blockage to be cleared.[18] These costs were then passed on to consumers by distributors and cascaded through all other aspects of the supply chain. Given the frequency of use and the increasing size of commercial shipping vessels using the many narrow shipping corridors, the likelihood of a similar blockage or disruption cannot be discounted.[19] Although measures have been taken to prevent such events from repeating, many variables cannot be controlled, and the chance of a deliberate blockage cannot be ruled out. If it isn't the Suez Canal, it could be the Strait of Malacca or the interdiction of critical ports New Zealand suppliers rely on that can cause an indirect disruption to its supply.

Global political events instigated by state and non-state actors can disrupt New Zealand's security as a second or third-order effect rather than a direct attack. New Zealand enjoys relatively good relationships with most global nations and has no enemies; however, it is not immune to the broad sweeping consequences of international conflicts that create market volatility, resulting in a rise in commodity prices to reflect increased scarcity.[20] New Zealand saw a 100 per cent increase in the average diesel price between 2021 and 2022 from NZD$1.49 to NZD$3.03.[21] This can be directly attributed to the Russian war in Ukraine and the volatility introduced to the global fuel market. Although New Zealand had nothing to do with this conflict on the other side of the world, it is evident that it severely impacted the cost of living and the fuel-dependent industries the economy relies upon. Given that New Zealand receives most of its fuel from refineries in South Korea, Japan, and Singapore, what would be the impact on New Zealand if there was a significant conflict in the Indo-Pacific that disrupted the direct supply of New Zealand fuel?[22]

A potential conflict in the South China Sea, involving New Zealand's largest trading partner and its leading fuel exporters, would cause widespread disruptions whether New Zealand is directly involved or not. Although New Zealand is determined to remain non-committal to either side in a hypothetical United States-China conflict in the Indo-Pacific region due to trade dependence on China and security agreements with the United States, New Zealand would still feel the effects.[23] If China were to intervene militarily to annex Taiwan, there would be disruptions to the physical movement of fuel and the price due to uncertainty around its supply. Although the potential for this is difficult to determine, the probability is not zero. It could become more likely if the situation experiences a catalyst that plunges the Pacific into an uncertain future. If this were to occur, New Zealand would have more issues to worry about, the least of which would be fuel. If an event in the Indo-Pacific were to occur, be it in China-Taiwan or in North-South Korea, if the fuel supply from New Zealand's now-dependent exporters is disrupted, New Zealand would be vulnerable if its energy resilience is not addressed. Most disruptions mentioned thus far are man-made and can be tracked and anticipated to some degree. However, another less predictable area is Mother Nature and the increasing impacts of climate change.

Climate change and natural disasters present the potential for many disruptions that can impact New Zealand's energy sector. Being situated on the Pacific Plate or 'the ring of fire', New Zealand is highly susceptible to natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic

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18 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "The Importance of the Suez Canal to Global Trade - 18 April 2021," New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed July 31, 2023. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/mfat-market-reports/the-importance-of-the-suez-canal-to-global-trad e-18-april-2021/.

19 Abel Meza et al., "Disruption of Maritime Trade Chokepoints and the Global LNG Trade: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach," *Maritime Transport Research* 3 (January 1, 2022). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.martra.2022.100071.

20 Institute for Economics & Peace. "Global Peace Index 2023: Measuring Peace in a Complex World", Sydney, June 2023. http://visionofhumanity.org/resources.

21 Figure.nz, "Retail Fuel Prices in New Zealand." https://figure.nz/chart/lSYJzICrinllOY7p.

22 Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, "Oil Statistics," accessed July 31, 2023. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/building-and-energy/energy-and-natural-resources/energy-statistics-and-mo delling/energy-statistics/oil-statistics/.

23 Reuben Steff and Francesca Dodd-Parr, "Examining the Immanent Dilemma of Small States in the Asia-Pacific: The Strategic Triangle between New Zealand, the US and China," *The Pacific Review*, 32, no. 1 (2019): 90-112, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1417324.

eruptions that can impact energy security in the country, especially if a large energy generation infrastructure is affected.[24] If a large earthquake compromises any of the large hydroelectric dams or the many high power distribution lines, especially the High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) link between the two main islands, the implications for energy distribution for the country would be catastrophic.[25] As natural disasters are impossible to predict, a diverse energy mix and resilient system are crucial in ensuring energy needs are met until necessary remediation is completed. The reliance on one primary source of energy generation presents considerable risk. New Zealand should drive investment in other systems that can be decentralised to provide broader coverage to energy users.

Weather events are another concern for New Zealand, given its isolated geographical location and the effect climate change has on the frequency and intensity of events. Recent flooding in Hawkes Bay demonstrated the vulnerability of the roading system to landslides and swollen rivers, destroying crucial arterial routes that enable the distribution of essential services and commodities.[26] If New Zealand's fuel solely depends on these roads to allow distribution to all users, continued future dislocation will severely impact all aspects of the New Zealand supply chain.[27] Additionally, the increase in higher temperatures resulting in drought can cause dam levels to fall below the required levels to generate the energy necessary to sustain the country's needs. Any severe damage to critical energy infrastructure that supports New Zealand's reliance on imported fuel, such as ports and storage sites, can depress the economy and leave the country in a vulnerable state.

So what does this mean for the NZDF?

Given the constraints regarding the electrification of current military hardware and the economic challenges associated with converting the military to green fuels, New Zealand's military readiness and national security are set to remain reliant on imported fuels. This dependence creates a complex scenario where the NZDF competes for the same storage and access to import fuel that is crucial also to the country's overall functioning.[28] In the event of a significant disruption beyond the current 44-day onshore fuel reserve, New Zealand would be facing the prospect of fuel rationing, prioritising essential services, and potential hoarding by citizens.[29] This situation limits the NZDF's capacity to respond effectively to domestic and international emergencies, and places added strain on domestic operations. Additionally, disruptions impacting New Zealand would likely have more severe repercussions on surrounding Pacific island countries, necessitating humanitarian aid missions.[30] Furthermore, the limited fuel reserves, tapped by multiple users, would deplete rapidly, requiring government leaders to make difficult decisions regarding allocation. The ADF has identified fuel supply and storage as a critical vulnerability in its Defence Strategic Review, so the NZDF should work closer with Australia in addressing this common issue.[31] However, New Zealand should not rely on its closest ally and would be best advised to secure its own fuel solution so Australia can focus on mitigating regional disruptions.

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24 National Geographic, "Plate Tectonics and the Ring of Fire," accessed August 1, 2023. https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/plate-tectonics-ring-fire.

25 Electricity Authority, "HVDC Inter-Island Cable: Benmore to Haywards," Authority, March 2023. http://www.ea.govt.nz/news/eye-on-electricity/hvdc-inter-island-cable-benmore-to-haywards/.

26 Natasha Frost, "New Zealand, Battered by a Record Storm, Faces a Painful Cleanup," *The New York Times*, February 16, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/16/world/asia/new-zealand-cyclone.html.

27 Stephanie E. Chang, "Socioeconomic Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Natural Hazard Science*, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.013.66.

28 National Emergency Management Agency, "National Fuel Plan: Planning and Response Arrangements for Fuel Supply Disruptions and Emergencies Supporting Plan," March 2020.

29 Tom Pullar-Strecker, "NZ May Need to Beef-up Fuel Reserve Plan to Reduce Risk of 'car-less' days," Stuff, March 29, 2022, https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/128192700/nz-may-need-to-beefup-fuel-reserve-plan-to-reduce-riskof-carless-days.

30 Simron J. Singh et al., "Socio-Metabolic Risk and Tipping Points on Islands," *Environmental Research Letters* 17, no. 6 (May 2022). https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac6f6c.

31 Australian Government, "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, (DSR)" (Commonwealth of Australia, 2023), 77.

The key to enhancing the NZDF's resilience against severe disruptions in fuel supply lies in the electrification of the national transport system. As the proportion of electrified vehicles in the country's civilian and military fleets increases, the overall risk of internal uncertainty decreases, relieving pressure on law enforcement and emergency services to maintain civil order. Additionally, by reallocating more fuel to sectors like the military, where electrification is not immediately feasible,[32] the NZDF can gain greater flexibility in responding to crises at home and abroad. The faster New Zealand can achieve independence from imported fuels for its national fleet, the more resilient it becomes to a wide range of emergencies, whether natural or manmade.[33] This resilience benefits New Zealand and enables the country to support those nations reliant on its assistance better. By framing the issue of energy resilience through both security and environmental lenses, a sense of urgency is instilled in the short term while long-term solutions are pursued. If New Zealand can successfully implement rapid and enduring strategies, these models and policies can be extended to its neighbouring island nations, bolstering their own resilience, and reducing the risk of societal breakdowns in the face of global challenges beyond their control. This approach enhances New Zealand's security and reinforces its role as a regional leader in fostering stability and sustainability.

Conclusions

New Zealand is in a strong position to lead the world in self-sufficient renewable energy generation and in the total electrification of its transport fleet. Its abundant natural resources will allow it to generate excess electricity to supply cheap power and drive innovation in renewable energy. However, New Zealand remains reliant on imported fossil fuels to run the economy, especially in the transport sector.[34] This level of dependence puts an increased strain on the mitigation measures in place, which are commendable but inadequate. At the extreme, an unexpected cut-off of imported fuel would impose severe strains on core institutions so intense as to threaten civil order.

Rapid electrification of New Zealand's transport sector provides the best way to improve domestic resilience in the short term and will accelerate its transition to renewable energy. Reducing the demand for fuel imports will take the pressure off the now-dependent fuel import supply and limited fuel reserve stockpile required to run the country. The more independent the transport sector becomes through electrification, the more resilient the country becomes against unpredictable global disruptions to fuel supply. Freeing these reserves will provide better preparedness for emergency services and for the NZDF to respond to emergency situations domestically and abroad. New Zealand must continue not only to formulate plans and strategies to address energy resilience but also to take decisive action to lessen the impact of global supply disruptions. Rapid electrification of the transport sector is the best way to do this.

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32 Royal New Zealand Navy ships will not embark battery-powered vehicles or equipment because of the risk of lithium fire - ed.

33 How to achieve fuel economies in the Defence Force is explored by Lieutenant Isaac Wade, RNZN in his essay "Applications of Hydrogen Technology in the NZDF and RNZN" in the 2024 edition of this *Professional Journal*. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Professional-Journal-of-the-Royal-New-Zealand-Navy-2024-Vol-4.pdf - ed.

34 The closure of the Marsden Point Refinery appeared to be a retrograde step, but because it refined imported oil, its closure made no difference to New Zealand's overall imported fuel dependency. Thanks to Lieutenant Commander Richard Davies, RNZN for making this point - ed.

Recommendations

1. Revive the Clean Car Feebate: *Re-instate the suspended Clean Car Feebate program to target ICE alternatives to reduce consumers 'green premium' when choosing new vehicles.*[35] *This policy revival should ensure that utility vehicles required by farmers and workers are not unfairly penalised, with flexibility introduced as electric alternatives for utility vehicles become available.*

2. Implement Emission Standards for Older Vehicles: *Introduce emission standards to incentivise the transition to electric or more efficient ICE vehicles. Gradually increasing the stringency of these standards will contribute to a cleaner national vehicle fleet over time, preventing New Zealand from becoming a dumping ground for outdated ICE vehicles and mitigating adverse effects on lower socioeconomic groups.*

3. Support Large Transport Companies: *Empower large transport companies to lead the electrification transition in heavy transport through financial incentives and the establishment of electrification quotas for their fleets. This approach will enable smaller transport providers to be fast followers rather than being disadvantaged by significant capital investment, particularly when the necessary charging infrastructure is not widely available.*

4. Increase Onshore Fuel Reserves: *Develop a strategy to transition a greater portion of the national 90-day reserve holding to be onshore rather than offshore ticketing. This will acknowledge the importance of fuel availability in an emergency and ensure a clear allocation of reserves to specific sectors.*

5. Promote Rooftop Solar in Residential and Industrial Properties: *Collaborate with residential developers and large industrial property owners to install rooftop solar arrays to supplement local energy needs, offsetting the immediate demand from rapid electrification. This initiative can benefit from bulk purchases of solar panels and batteries to achieve cost-efficiency within a shorter timeframe.*

6. Engage with Electric Vehicle Manufacturers: *Collaborate with overseas electric vehicle manufacturers to identify and support products that best align with New Zealand's unique context. Given the country's heavy reliance on agriculture and farming, special attention should be given to the availability of electric tractors and utility vehicles to facilitate widespread electrification.*

7. Electrify the Government and NZDF Fleets: *Mandate the replacement of government department vehicle fleets to electric (where appropriate) to set an example and introduce more electric vehicles to the second-hand market over time. This demonstrates leadership and provides politicians firsthand experience implementing electric vehicles, potentially driving future policy decisions. This could be extended to the NZDF non-military vehicle fleet and military base security fleets not expected to board Navy ships.*

8. Investment in Future Technologies: *The Government should consider setting up an investment fund for emerging technologies that could enable New Zealand to remain competitive in the introduction of new solutions. Encourage and support New Zealand technology companies to drive innovations in fuel supply and efficient use.*

9. Collaborate Internationally: *Engage with regional and global partners to share information and technologies to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes to common issues. Attend Australia's whole-of-government and industry Fuel Council to identify common interests and areas of cooperation. Identify areas where the NZDF can best support ADF in preparedness and availability of fuel in response to regional and global challenges.*

35 'Green Premium' is the price difference paid for a more environmentally sustainable product above a similar conventional product.

MAJOR CAMERON WRIGHT, RNZALR, NZ ARMY

Since joining the New Zealand Army in 2008, Major Wright has been employed as a Logistics Officer and is a qualified Ammunition Technical Officer and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operator. He has worked in direct support of the RNZN as the Depot Manager at Kauri Point and SO2 Technical Assurance Explosive Ordnance Engineer in HQ Defence Munitions Management Group. He deployed to Iraq on OP MANAWA 7 as the Training Task Unit XO in 2018, and as the logistics planner for PACSPT in Papua New Guinea in 2021, in support of their COVID response. Major Wright holds a Master's degree in Systems Engineering, specialising in Weapons and Ordnance from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and is a graduate of the 2023 Australian Command and Staff Course, earning the degree of Master of Military and Defence Studies, specialising in Operational Art. Major Wright has extensive experience in the ammunition and EOD technical streams.

PART 3:
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

On Grand Strategy and Economic Intelligence[1]

Professor Carl Stephen Patrick Hunter, OBE

Grand strategy informed by economic intelligence is foundational to the United Kingdom's security and prosperity, asserts Professor Carl Hunter, OBE. In this "new-1945 moment" the Royal Navy (RN) is central to maintaining the rules-based international order and to achieving national and global prosperity for future generations. Professor Hunter identifies the 2021 Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) pact as an example of how to maintain Britain's defence-technological and industrial superiority over geopolitical rivals.

Introduction

The United Kingdom's (UK's) core strategic capabilities are the four public sector elements of defence, diplomacy, security, and development, and the four private sector elements of trade, finance, the scientific and intellectual, and the cultural. Grand Strategy is about coordinating all these eight elements. Basil Liddell Hart summed them up as follows (See Figure 1).

> '*The role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object… the goal defined by fundamental policy.*'[2]



Figure 1 - Liddell Hart's seminal writing on strategy | Praeger

1 This article was first published in Volume 113, No. 1 of The Naval Review. www.naval-review.com. The current version has been slightly edited - ed.
2 Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy*. London: Faber and Faber, 1967, 322.

For 500 years the Royal Navy (RN) has been at the helm of this endeavour, known today as the “Art of Admiralty”. Nevertheless, today’s complex and contested times require those in the economic and scientific spheres to play an active part to support those in the military sphere.

The Royal Navy

Developing Grand Strategy from the maritime perspective is of particular importance in our “near-war age”. The RN is the only service that references trade, freedom of navigation and the integrity of the maritime global commons as essential to its core aims. At a time when the last 80 years of the rules-based international order are under threat from adversarial contestation, the 2021 AUKUS agreement on new nuclear-propelled submarines draws a line against such threats, and will influence the next 75 years of the rules-based order. Today is the UK’s ‘new-1945 moment’ and AUKUS will secure its partners’ technological dominance and operational advantage in the oscillating geopolitical rivalry.

There are many brilliant senior RN officers who effect naval strategy within our Grand Strategy. But alongside naval strategy, a deep understanding of trade, finance and geostrategy is required. The generation of economic intelligence where economic opportunities and threats converge is essential to underpin the grand strategic application of UK global maritime power, on and under the oceans, so the UK can remain a global maritime and underwater power.[3] This economic intelligence can be defined as—

> *‘that part of the general body of knowledge called intelligence, which pertains to the earning, distributing, and using of wealth and income, public and private; as, the natural resources, human resources, agriculture, industry, commerce, [and] finance…’*[4]

Because of its central role in the UK’s Grand Strategy, the RN presides at the ‘Crown Jewels’ level of government. It is the fulcrum of the UK’s global maritime power, as the sixth largest economy in the world, a nuclear weapons power and a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The RN is a central enabler of each of these pillars of UK advantage and is uniquely positioned in our increasingly volatile and contested world to reinforce Grand Atrategy so as to secure our future economic, scientific, technological and maritime advantage in the decades to come at today’s “new-1945 moment”. See Figure 2.

Figure 2 - HMS *Prince of Wales* and HMS *Queen Elizabeth* | Royal Navy

3 During the Second World War an economic intelligence unit existed within the Ministry of Economic Warfare. As the UK redeemed the peace dividend, it gradually shrank the economic intelligence unit and subsumed it into the MoD’s Defence Intelligence unit in the 1990s. Peter Davies, *The Authorised History of British Defence Economic Intelligence*. London and New York: Routledge, 2019.

4 Central Intelligence Agency, “Proposed Definition of Economic Intelligence, Scientific Intelligence, and Technical Intelligence”, CREST, General CIA Records. CIA-RDP61S00527A000100150143-3. Released September 5, 2000. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp61s00527a000100150143-3.

Maritime deterrence

The Continuous-At-Sea-Deterrent (CASD) is provided by the four Vanguard Class Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclears (SSBNs) of the RN's submarine service. See Figure 3. The operation of CASD's strategic nuclear deterrent is a fundamentally maritime endeavour. But it is secured and enabled by the other four fighting arms of the RN. Its maintenance through scientific and engineering superiority, working with the United States of America (USA), is world-leading, is the key reason for AUKUS itself. UK Strike, the conventional deterrent comprised of the Carrier Strike and Littoral Strike capabilities, is also central to maintaining the rules-based international order. The six Ship Submersible Nuclears (SSNs) operated by the Submarine Service are the fundamental "glue" which coordinates the conventional and nuclear deterrent capabilities of the RN, creating a "triangular relationship" between CASD, UK Strike, and the SSN fleets as central pillars of the UK's national deterrence strategy.

Figure 3 - Britain's nuclear submarines are essential elements of deterrence | UK MoD

Therefore, funding the RN is a national investment in national and global economic security. Underfunding the RN would make the UK vulnerable to the drastic economic costs in the event of failure to secure the oceans. In the 12 months to May 2024, the UK's imports and exports of goods amounted to GBP 850.6 billion.[5] Given that 95 per cent of this physical trade travels on the oceans, this amounts to GBP 808.7 billion of trade each year which is enabled by the RN's defence of maritime security.[6] Each day, London trades USD 3.8 trillion in foreign currency exchange.[7] And 99 per cent of international financial transactions occur via undersea cables, so at a rate USD 3.76 trillion per day, financial exchanges worth USD 1,373.4 trillion annually are protected by the RN each year.[8]

5 Department for Business & Trade, "UK trade in numbers", Updated 04 April 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-trade-in-numbers/uk-trade-in-numbers-web-version.

6 Department for Transport, *UK Port Freight Statistics: 2020*, Statistical Release, 14 July 2021. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1014546/port-freight-annual-statistics-2020.pdf (publishing.service.gov.uk).

7 According to statistics published by The Global City, "The UK: the heart of the world's financial market" [Web Release]. https://www.theglobalcity.uk/global-financial-centre#:~:text=Forex%20for%20the%20world,%2C%20and%20Hong%20Kong%20%2D%20combine d.&text=Click%20to%20access%20available%20viewer%20actions.

8 European Subsea Cables Association, "Growth, Energy, Security, Economy" - Subsea Cables, 09 July 2024. https://www.escaeu.org/news/?newsid=118.

Furthermore, the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are indivisible, in both geostrategic and economic terms. They are increasingly co-joined by the Arctic Ocean, which is quickly becoming the new frontier of maritime adversarial activity, making the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific "Arctic-dependent". The RN must be fully equipped to pursue UK and United States strategic advantage in each of these regions in order to secure present and future national prosperity by maintaining the rules-based order. AUKUS will be the key initiative through which the RN will be able to secure this with a 75-year horizon. As AUKUS does to the Submarine Service, Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) represents a similar opportunity to secure strategic advantage for UK Strike - if a maritime-capable sixth-generation fighter is funded for the Royal Air Force (RAF). The "near-war" age in which we now reside can then be defined as a "near-war AUKUS-GCAP age", in which the triangular "CASD-UK Strike-SSN" relationship will be foundational if the national shared endeavour is to succeed. Neither AUKUS nor CASD can succeed if both remain locked within a diminishing RN budget.

Economic security and economic intelligence

As a reflection of its economic interests, the UK's defence interests are global, and are consequently dependent on the effective application of economic intelligence. The government's Securonomics model dictates that 'sustainable growth lies on a broad base and resilient foundations'.[9] If the broad base of the UK's economy, enabled by the core capabilities of trade and finance, is almost entirely maritime, then investment in the critical maritime capabilities which secure it should be the first priority.

As flagged by Dani Rodrik's 'productivist paradigm', the Biden Administration's 'modern supply side economics', and Rachel Reeves' 'Securonomics'[10] there is an increasing global economic movement towards harnessing the economic and scientific to the national defence means to secure long-term grand strategic goals. Enabling a constant flow of economic intelligence to forecast where the confluences of economic disruption are likely to occur enables the concentration of RN power to minimise them. Yemeni Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping is a recent case in point.

Economic implications of geopolitical shocks necessitate a constant interpretation and policy reconsideration. War in the Taiwan Strait would cost 10 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP).[11] European economies are currently feeling the costs of a relatively primitive but hostile actor - the Iranian-backed Houthis - strangling trade in the Red Sea, quadrupling the price of shipping from Western Europe to East Asia.[12] Further east, Iran looms over the Strait of Hormuz, through which 21 per cent of global petroleum products flows each year.[13] From its expansion into the South China Sea, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) reaches towards the Strait of Malacca, through which USD 3.5 trillion of global trade flows annually.[14] As the UK has fallen into a state of "sea blindness" in the post-1945 environment, leaders neglect grand strategic thinking, fail to fully value economic intelligence, and thus under-fund the RN.

By virtue of the 'Prosperity Continuum', the UK's domestic stability and domestic security are the pre-requisites of domestic prosperity, which finances our collective security, that enables global stability and global prosperity, which is a UK national interest. By securing the oceans

9 Rachel Reeves, "Mais Lecture 2024", 19 March 2024. https://labour.org.uk/updates/press-releases/rachel-reeves-mais-lecture/.
10 Ibid.
11 Malcom Scott, "A War Over Taiwan Is a $10 Trillion Risk", Bloomberg UK, 9 January 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-09/economy-risks-latest-taiwan-war-would-cost-world-10-trillion.
12 According to the Drewry World Container Index. https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry.
13 US Energy Information Administration, "The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil transit chokepoint", 21 November 2023. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002.
14 Thomas Dent, "The Strait of Malacca's Global Supply Chain Implications", Institute for Supply Management, 21 November 2023. https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/news-publications/inside-supply-management-magazine/blog/2023/2023-11/the-strait-of-malaccas-global-supply-chain-implications/.

with both UK Strike as a conventional deterrent on the oceans, and the Astute Class SSN's and future SSN-AUKUS, under them, and CASD as the strategic nuclear deterrent, the RN preserves and expands national and global security and prosperity. Moving to a state of 'sea sight', as a core aim of the Art of Admiralty, requires the UK to be conversant with the economic intelligence around its maritime dependencies on chokepoints and subsea cables. Funding the RN is therefore an investment in the UK's global economic foundation, which maintains and expands the rules-based order to allow future generations to prosper and perpetuate a national shared endeavour to succeed.

United Kingdom role in North Atlantic Treaty Organization

This investment also underpins the UK's position within North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), where the UK is 'contributing 25 per cent of Alliance strength at sea, and 10 per cent of land and air'.[15] See Figure 4. This speaks to the UK's maritime posture within the Alliance, which, if NATO is the UK's 'strategic anchor' in the Euro-Atlantic, also speaks to the RN's dominant position within the UK's defence posture.[16] Carrier Strike Group 25's (CSG25's) deployment to the Indo-Pacific will be a key moment for the RN to assert the UK's role as a 'global force for good'. Achieving this in both the economic and military contexts will be key considerations for the UK as a step towards re-affirming a maritime-led UK grand strategy.

Figure 4 - The Royal Navy-led exercise Joint Warrior 2024 enhanced NATO's deterrent posture | SHAPE-NATO

The core of NATO's strength is economic, projecting 'a collective GDP twenty times greater than Russia. And a total defence budget three-and-a-half times more than Russia and China

15 Ministry of Defence, "Chief of the Defence Chatham House Security and Defence Conference 2024 keynote speech", 27 February 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-of-the-defence-chatham-house-security-and-defence-conference-2024-keynote-speech.

16 Ministry of Defence, "Chief of the Defence Staff speech at RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2024", 23 July 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-of-the-defence-staff-speech-at-rusi-land-warfare-conference-2024.

combined'.[17] NATO overwhelmingly spends proportionally less of GDP on defence than China and Russia, and yet still dramatically outspends these adversaries in real terms. Leveraging this economic advantage, alongside defence capabilities, as two pillars of grand strategy to generate geostrategic dominance, will give effect to the UK's top military leader's statement that 'economies will probably do more than explosives to check those authoritarians and autocrats who seek to ruin our freedom and prosperity'.[18] A potent economic intelligence capability is required to enable the mobilisation of this economic advantage within our grand strategy, which can be deployed alongside conventional defence capabilities to secure the international order for the next 75 years.

Conclusion

The ability of the UK to develop its economic and scientific capabilities will be enhanced by AUKUS. And revitalising the government-science-industry synergism will stimulate a 'whole of nation' effort to secure strategic technological dominance over adversaries. To achieve that, those leading UK industry and science must work together to support the RN in a national and shared endeavour to make the next 75 years as secure and stable as the last 80 years have been. Failure to do this will result in weakening our naval strategy and thus our grand strategy. To forestall this, we need an enhanced economic intelligence capability in order to maintain our economic growth, scientific development, technological progress, and strategic adaptation.

17 Ministry of Defence, "Chief of the Defence Chatham House Security and Defence Conference 2024 keynote speech", 27 February 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-of-the-defence-chatham-house-security-and-defence-conference-2024-keynote-speech.

18 British Army, "Pulling the Future into the Present: RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2024.", 23 July 2024. https://www.army.mod.uk/news/pulling-the-future-into-the-present-rusi-land-warfare-conference-2024/ [Accessed 17 September 2024].

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Strategic Art and the Enhancement of New Zealand's National Security[1]

Captain Quentin Randall, RNZN

Drawing on critiques and proposals by United States and Australian generals, Captain Quentin Randall, RNZN introduces the concept and practice of Strategic Art. This paradigm promises better to integrate New Zealand's sometimes fragmented security architecture and to bring practical outcomes to the good intentions of the *National Security Strategy* and the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF's) *Capability Management System*.

Introduction

In response to an increasingly complex strategic environment, many nations, including Australia and New Zealand,[2] are adopting a more integrated approach to national security. This requires all public sector agencies to work together for the national interest. The New Zealand Government's *2023 National Security Strategy* identified no less than 12 agencies as comprising the national security community charged with serving the national interest, of which the NZDF is just one. This essay examines the role the NZDF can play in integrating the national security architecture through its leadership development model and leading public sector Capability Management System… and the obstacles that must be addressed if success is to be achieved. It recommends adoption of the concept of Strategic Art. See Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Minister of Defence Judith Collins with AVM Darryn Webb (Air Force) , MAJGEN Rose King (Army), and RADM Garin Golding (Navy) | NZDF

1 Captain Randall's essay is an abridgement of a longer work done during his Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Australian War College 2023 - ed.

2 Australia Department of Defence (2023) "National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023." https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review, 18, and New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (2023). Also see New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, "New Zealand's National Security Strategy", 35-36. https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/new-zealands-national-security-strategy and New Zealand Ministry of Defence (2023) "Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023." Wellington: August 2023. https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/defence-policy-review-defence-policy-and-strategy-statement-2023/.

Strategy and the national interest

Government officials frequently use the term national interest to convey the importance of an issue, yet statements often lack causal explanations between the issues and specific interests. Senior security analyst Professor Donald Nuechterlein defined national interest as '… the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other foreign states comprising the external environment.'[3] He argues four basic interests form the foundation of a state's foreign policy: security, economic well-being, the importance of maintaining international order in political and economic systems, and an ideological component reflecting the values of the state.[4] This argument applies well to New Zealand's case. In 2020 incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade asserted that her ministry's role was to '...protect enduring national interests…', summed up as support of the international rules-based order, a security environment that keeps New Zealanders safe, international connections that enables prosperity, and global action in sustainability issues.[5]

However, in her inaugural speech to the Wellington diplomatic corps she mentioned *security* only four times as a national interest and only as regards maintaining relationships with Australia and the United States. In contrast, partnerships and relationships were mentioned 48 times.[6] Prime Minister Chris Hipkins reiterated the partnerships theme, arguing they are '...key to our economic prosperity, [and] enhancing our national security…'.[7] This reflected New Zealand's long-held internationalist view that a country cannot become more secure by making others less secure.[8] The tone and emphasis of this discourse support the assertions made by academic theorists that policies of small-states strongly emphasises trade economic security and place a heavy reliance on institutions and multilateralism.[9] This relatively low priority assigned to military security is reflected in successive New Zealand defence white papers which have discounted the threat of direct military attack.[10] More recent strategic assessments have recognised intensifying geo-strategic competition as a destabilising feature, but have continued to be focussed on economic and non-traditional security challenges.[11] See Figure 2.

3 Donald E. Nuechterlein, "National interests and foreign policy: A conceptual framework for analysis and decision-Making." British Journal of International Studies 2, no. 3 (October 1976), 246-66. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500116729.
4 Nuechterlein, 248.
5 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Briefing for Incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs," Wellington, New Zealand, 2021, 33.
6 Nanaia Mahuta, "Inaugural Foreign Policy Speech to Diplomatic Corps." The Beehive, February 4, 2021. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/inaugural-foreign-policy-speech-diplomatic-corps.
7 Christopher Hipkins, "Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Speech to NZIIA." The Beehive, July 7, 2023. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/prime-ministers-foreign-policy-speech-nziia.
8 David McCraw. "New Zealand Foreign Policy under the Clark Government: High Tide of Liberal Internationalism?" Pacific Affairs 78, no. 2 (July 1, 2005), 217-35. https://doi.org/10.5509/2005782217.
9 McCraw, 7-8.
10 New Zealand Ministry of Defence. *Defence White Paper 2010*, 10 and *Defence White Paper*, 2016, 19.
11 *Defence Strategic Policy Statement*, 26 and "Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023," 10-11.

Figure 2 - New Zealand Government's focus on economic security | Beehive.govt.nz

The division of responsibility across government agencies for protecting these interests is defined in policies and departmental strategies. The NZDF's assigned objectives are broad, spanning community environmental well-being and resilience, securing the national lines of communication, maintaining the rules-based order and promoting strong international networks.[12] The scope of these expectations grows considerably when paired with ten all-encompassing roles of defending, protecting, contributing and supporting New Zealand, its allies and partners, geographically ranging from Antarctica across the Pacific to Asia and, more broadly, internationally. See Figure 3. Finally, there is an enduring need to be prepared to respond. This creates tension among Defence strategists whereby the Government's approach to security relies heavily on the country's geographic isolation paired with multilateralism rather than on military power. Yet, simultaneously, the Government has wide-ranging and ambiguous expectations of its Defence Force. When ill equipped with limited capabilities and ambiguous demands, friction over the allocation of resources and capability requirements can arise. This is further compounded when so little emphasis is placed on military capability as an instrument of national power.

12 *Defence Strategic Policy Statement*, 6.



Figure 3 - New Zealand's area of primary maritime responsibility | NZ MFAT

Uneven defence capabilities

One of the outcomes of this ambiguity is highlighted in defence commentator Pete McKenzie's exposé of the challenges facing the NZDF following the COVID-19 pandemic.[13] McKenzie noted that since 2017 the Government has undertaken a large investment in defence capability, amounting to $4.5 billion of additional funding. These funds were almost exclusively dedicated to new military hardware. Infrastructure investment and pay and conditions remained static, and the perceived military value of staff has eroded by deployment to menial domestic security tasks during the pandemic. This resulted in historically high attrition levels to the point that the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) has conceded that the NZDF would struggle to maintain peacekeeping operations in the South Pacific should the need arise.[14] See Figure 4. The CDF argued that a lack of consistent support from successive governments is the root cause of these problems, suggesting that a focus on short-term political wins dominates decision-making rather than adopting long-term strategies supported by consistent funding programmes.[15]

13 Pete McKenzie, "In Our Defence." North & South Magazine, March 2023 (February 11, 2023). https://northandsouth.co.nz/2023/02/11/new-zealand-defence-force/.
14 McKenzie, "In Our Defence."
15 McKenzie.

Figure 4 - New Zealand's Search and Rescue Region extends from Antarctic to Equator | Maritime NZ

Yet on paper, the NZDF is guided by an ambitious Capability Management System (CMS) described as '...the leading example of long-term capital planning in the public sector.'[16] The CMS is jointly operated by the Ministry of Defence (the civilian agency responsible for advising the Government) and the NZDF.[17] It provides the framework, guidance, standards and tools to ensure the NZDF has the right military capability. It comprises five distinct phases. In the first phase, Policy and Strategy, the Government sets the roles and expectations of the NZDF, based on formal strategic assessments, and this guides capability acquisition. This is followed by the Capability Definition phase, led by the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the NZDF, during which a range of innovative capability solutions are presented to the Government in the form of a series of business cases to inform investment decisions. The third phase, Capability Delivery, is again led by the Ministry and focuses on delivering projects agreed upon by the Government. The project output then transfers to the In-Service phase for the NZDF to implement operationally. The CMS cycle concludes with Disposal.[18]

16 "2023 Briefing to Incoming Minister of Defence," 62.
17 New Zealand Ministry of Defence. "About us" Ministry of Defence website. Accessed October 18, 2023. https://www.defence.govt.nz/who-we-are/ and "2023 Briefing to Incoming Minister of Defence," 61.
18 New Zealand Ministry of Defence "Major Projects Report 2022." Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Defence, July 2022, 7-8.

The first two phases are the most critical in this policy cycle. This is where Chilcoat's application of Strategic Art is most relevant to determining and delivering military capabilities, especially in a resource-constrained political environment. The acquisition of the NZDF's maritime replenishment ship, HMNZS *Aotearoa*, provides an interesting example. See Figure 5. The project was initiated in January 2011 to replace the Navy's replenishment ship HMNZS *Endeavour*, which retired from service in 2018.[19] In 2010, the Government indicated that acquisition of a more versatile sustainment platform with amphibious sealift capability would be explored to supplement the Navy's only amphibious capable ship, HMNZS *Canterbury*,[20] in response to increased risks in the South Pacific.[21] The business case for this project was presented to Cabinet in mid-2014 but the option to incorporate sealift into the solution was rejected, and funding was prioritised towards other projects. The Cabinet concluded additional sealift requirements could be commercially chartered when required.[22]

Figure 5 - HMNZS *Aotearoa* alongside at McMurdo Base, Antarctica (2025) | NZDF

By 2016, the Government shifted its security focus towards Antarctica, affirmed its interest in preserving the environment and stability in the region[23] and committed to replacing HMNZS *Endeavour* with an ice-strengthened replenishment ship.[24] The estimated cost difference of an amphibious sealift option compared with an Antarctic capability was marginal, being $495m or $493m, respectively.[25] While HMNZS *Aotearoa's* 2022 maiden voyage to Scott Base in Antarctica was a success,[26] and the project delivered a very specific operational need of 'supporting other government agencies with specific fitted capabilities', the 2019 Defence Capability Plan reconfirmed the need for two amphibious sealift ships to improve the responsiveness of the NZDF to needs in the island Pacific.[27] HMNZS *Aotearoa* is a useful addition to the NZDF's suite of capabilities; however, the decision to look south was political, not an outcome guided by military necessity, and the project's outcome has diluted the nation's military capabilities necessary for the Pacific island region. The resulting niche capability supports only one Government agency - Antarctica New Zealand - whose demands are already adequately met through commercial means. Support is planned well in advance based on seasonal access to Antarctica, and partner nations' long-standing collective

19 "Major Projects Report 2022," 71-72.
20 New Zealand Ministry of Defence. Defence White Paper 2010. Wellington, N.Z.: Ministry of Defence, 2010, 54.
21 Defence White Paper 2010, 29.
22 New Zealand: Ministry of Defence. Major Projects Report 2022." Wellington, July 2022.
23 New Zealand: Ministry of Defence. Defence White Paper, 2016. Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Defence, 2016, 11.
24 Defence White Paper, 2016, 47.
25 "Major Projects Report 2022," 74-75.
26 "Successful resupply mission to Antarctica proves capability of NZ Navy ship," February 16, 2022. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/successful-resupply-mission-to-antarctica-proves-capability-of-nz-navy-ship/.
27 New Zealand Ministry of Defence. Defence Capability Plan 2019, 13.

agreement on peaceful cooperation and non-militarisation, not a dedicated ship, ensures stability on the continent.[28] In contrast, the NZDF has been required to provide immediate and extensive humanitarian support across New Zealand and the Pacific, requiring considerable force projection capacity in the aftermath of tropical cyclones, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis, in all of which commercial options are unrealistic. Yet, the NZDF continues to be limited to having a sovereign amphibious capability available for only half a year.[29]

This example reinforces the CDF's argument that inconsistency in Government policy as an input to the CMS is a key challenge in sustaining military capability. In this case, the emphasis was placed on looking towards Antarctica for a short period. The CMS promoted innovative thinking during capability definition, such as considering other agency requirements. Yet once the decision was made, capability delivery suffered the dogma of process and myopia through which equipment acquisition was conflated with military capability. This narrow focus has led some to criticise the Navy's current force design for having such a diverse range of singular capabilities that it is now unsustainable.[30]

Strategic Art – How the NZDF can add value

American Lieutenant General (ret) Richard A. Chilcoat argues that the volatile post-Soviet geopolitical environment requires a new discipline among political and military leaders.[31] He calls this Strategic Art, which he defines as 'The skilful formulation, coordination and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.'[32] He stresses that Strategic Art is a human skill.[33] Similarly, Major General (ret) Mick Ryan's critical analysis of strategic thinking in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) notes a failure to apply Strategic Art, and advocates greater personal accountability, asserting that '...individuals think strategically, not institutions…'.[34] See Figure 6. Both note that institutions and their cultures shape the environment in which Strategic Art is applied. Thus, three interrelated variables emerge that influence the application of Strategic Art: individual capability, institutional culture, and organisational bureaucracy.

Figure 6 - Major General (ret) Mick Ryan, a proponent of Strategic Art | Australian Army Research Centre

28 *The Antarctic Treaty*, 2.
29 Quentin Randall, "The Royal New Zealand Navy: An Agile or Fragile Navy for a Large Maritime Nation," unpublished essay for Deaken University, 32.
30 Andrew Watts, "Designing the Next Fleet," The Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy 1, no. 1 (December 2020), 22-47.
31 Richard A Chilcoat, *Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1995, iii.
32 Chilcoat, 4.
33 Chilcoat, 16.
34 Mick Ryan, "Thinking About Strategic Thinking: Developing a More Effective Strategic Thinking Culture in Defence," Australian Defence Force Vanguard Occasional Paper Series, 2021, 12.

NZDF doctrine is silent on the specific term Strategic Art, but the underlying concepts described by Chilcoat and Ryan are familiar to military leaders. Military institutions place a premium on individual leadership. The NZDF is no exception, having emerged as a broad spectrum innovator offering development programmes spanning the foundational needs of self-leadership in recruits through to the complex undertakings of senior executives leading organisations.[35] Underpinning the framework is an acknowledgement that different leadership skills are required at different levels across the organisation, and what makes a particular leader successful at one level may not translate to success at another level.[36] Executive leaders, for example, who focus on creating conditions for operational and strategic success over the long term, are often faced with complexity and ambiguity. They rely on developing relationships and engaging with external agencies and political leaders, which requires different skills from commanding units and formations.[37] The individual nature of leadership development makes it a complex undertaking, especially when considered across the two planes of horizontal development (what you know) and vertical development (how you think).[38] NZDF doctrine subscribes to leadership development as a continuing process, suggesting 10 per cent is through formal education, 20 per cent arises from relationships and performance feedback, but the remaining 70 per cent occurs through challenging workplace experiences.[39]

Organisational culture and talent management systems are fundamental to supporting leadership development across the NZDF, and at the more senior levels, across the wider public service organisation.[40] Yet, for all the effort devoted to building a comprehensive model for leadership development, the NZDF's core value of *commitment* may also be its biggest flaw. With an organisational culture founded on service and branded to the public as 'A Force for New Zealand',[41] the emphasis on outputs results in leaders being motivated and rewarded for responding to the next issue, often at the expense of the reflection necessary for strategic thinking.[42] In a time-scarce environment there is a tendency to rely on previously evolved bureaucratic processes designed to minimise risk. Decision-makers may lack the curiosity or critique that a project may warrant, such as illustrated with the CMS and acquisition of HMNZS *Aotearoa*.

However, few institutions provide a talent identification and leadership development programme that spans a 30+ year career and is intended to grow senior executives with the skills required to be successful at each leadership level. Nor do they offer the range of challenging multi-national or inter-agency experiences as the NZDF. In a whole-of-government security framework, the people in the system are important, not the system itself. And inter-agency understanding, or empathy, is a critical component of Strategic Art,[43] a point recognised by the Public Service Commission and enabled through senior leader inter-departmental secondments. The national response to COVID-19 provided even greater opportunities for secondments of mid-ranked leaders across national logistics, health and leadership enterprises to work together and expand their relationships and knowledge of other agencies.

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35 Kevin Short and Andrew Bridgeman. "Advancing Pacific Partnerships 2019." Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Defence, "Leadership Development Centre: NZDF Programmes." October 2019, 15. https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publications/advancing-pacific-partnerships-2019/.

36 New Zealand Defence Force, "NZDF Leadership Doctrine. 0, 00.6". Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Defence Force, 2018, 45.

37 NZDF Leadership Doctrine, 16.

38 NZDF Leadership Doctrine, 49.

39 NZDF Leadership Doctrine, 48.

40 New Zealand Public Service Commission. "Developing your career across the Public Service." https://www.publicservice.govt.nz/working-in-public-service/developing-your-career-across-public-service/.

41 New Zealand Defence Force. "We're a force for New Zealand." https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/.

42 Ryan, "Thinking About Strategic ", 7-8.

43 Chilcoat, *Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders*, 6.

The *National Security Strategy* and subordinate plans codify the intent for an integrated approach across the national security community and create an environment where thoughtful formulation and skilful application of ends, ways, and means can be exercised to protect the national interests. Yet, for this to be translated from being only a political value statement to a tangible outcome, senior executives - individuals - need the capability to think and act strategically in cooperation with agencies across the national security community. Refining Chilcoat's earlier assessment, this environment demands a new discipline of all political, civil and military leaders across the national security enterprise. While the NZDF is not the lead agency for the nation's integrated security requirements, the premium it places on developing leaders is a valuable whole-of-government capability that should be more widely appreciated.

Conclusion

The increasing complexity of the geostrategic environment demands a more integrated, whole-of-government approach to national security. Yet, the rigid characteristics inherent in public service agencies have been criticised for failing to deliver the Government's policies. The national security community is becoming increasingly diverse so as to meet new security demands. However, the lack of a direct military threat to New Zealand has left the NZDF with wide-ranging, ambiguous, and un-prioritised policy objectives, with successive governments placing only a minor premium on military capability as a national resource. For all organisations forming the national security community to be strategically effective parts of the national security apparatus, and to avoid risk-averse stasis, senior executives across all agencies must be able to turn resources into influence. And they should be encouraged to adopt an integrated whole-of-government approach to deliver strategic outcomes.

Still, the NZDF is one of the few public sector organisations that has invested in a comprehensive and transparent approach to capital investment and developed leadership competencies organisation-wide. Developing the skills of Strategic Art is a personal endeavour framed by the contextual environment, and deploying this capability across the security community is a key value-add that the NZDF can offer to executive leaders across the government. Professional education comprises only a fraction of the leadership development continuum, but it offers the opportunity for a diverse group of peers with common interests to learn and build relationships across the community, relationships that will aid in delivering the desired effects of an integrated national security apparatus.

Ambiguous policy statements will continue to be a feature of the political landscape and will generate friction as limited resources are spread thinner to cover the breadth of capabilities required to meet growing security demands. The *National Security Strategy* has presented a useful integrating concept with potential to leverage the capabilities of each contributing agency. But without leaders who can think and act strategically, the document risks becoming just another government value statement that the public sector fails to turn into tangible outcomes. The Strategic Art approach offers a way to mitigate this risk.

CAPTAIN QUENTIN RANDALL, RNZN

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Civil-Military Relations in New Zealand: A Concordance Theory Perspective[1]

Brigadier Grant Motley, NZ Army

Brigadier Grant Motley notes that while the study of civil-military relations has been dominated by the theory of separation of militaries from political institutions, he recommends a promising alternative: *concordance theory*. Building on a theoretical foundation provided by Dr Rebecca Schiff of Harvard University and United States (US) Naval War College, Brigadier Motley adopts the original theory's focus on military intervention in civil affairs to an outcome that is more relevant to New Zealand's civil-military relations - military effectiveness.

New Zealand's unique civil-military relations

New Zealand's geographical and historical context has resulted in a unique civil-military relationship. As a geographically remote maritime nation, New Zealand has had considerable discretion in what sort of military it possesses and the manner and circumstances in which it is employed. Following internal conflicts between settlers and the indigenous Māori in the mid-19th century, New Zealand has maintained an externally focused military strategy based on relationships with great and powerful friends and the ideal of collective security, consequently doing its fighting overseas. Indeed, New Zealand has rarely faced a direct threat to its homeland. As a result, the military has never been configured to defend it.

Despite this, New Zealand has paid a high price to protect its freedom and defend its values by contributing generously to its partners' combat initiatives. The per capita war dead in the First and Second World Wars was amongst the highest in the British Commonwealth. New Zealand has suffered casualties also in conflicts in Korea, Malaya, Vietnam, and the Middle East. Despite these sacrifices, and because of the absence of immediate threat, the New Zealand military, whilst respected, commands only modest policy priority, subordinated as it is to other national functions and domestic concerns that attract greater political and public attention and budget allocations.

Furthermore, the relatively small size of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) limits its impact on the everyday lives of the citizenry. The steady decline of numbers serving in the reserves and a modest defence budget - a little over one per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) - means that most New Zealanders do not interact with military personnel or weigh up 'guns or butter' fiscal trade-offs. New Zealand's political elite, naturally concerned with gaining and maintaining public support, have little incentive to prioritise defence matters. Apart from general expressions of public support, the occasional operational deployment or a new capability acquisition, the Government and Parliament focus on domestic issues. The military's major channels into the political awareness and decision-making realms are the Cabinet's External Relations and Security committee and Parliament's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee. In both cases, the military shares schedule and agenda space with other agencies, and it is typical for defence matters to be delayed or deferred. Ministers of Defence typically divide their time amongst several other portfolios. See Figure 1. Consequently, achieving concordance can take time and remains at the mercy

1 This essay is an abridged edition of Brigadier Motley's Master of Strategy and Security thesis at Deakon University - ed.

of more pressing political and public priorities. New Zealand's small defence industry, a shortage of focused defence reporting in the media and very few civil-society lobby groups and 'think tanks' results in national defence issues disappearing from political and public view before energising the debate and awareness that defence issues deserve.

Figure 1 - Minister of Defence Judith Collins is also responsible for six other portfolios | Beehive, NZ Government

Concordance theory

As formulated by Dr Rebecca Shiff, a senior Harvard University and US Naval War College academic, concordance theory focuses on 'agreement, dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society [the three partners]' and performs two functions.[2] First, it explains which institutional and cultural conditions prevent or promote domestic military intervention. Second, it predicts that domestic military intervention is less likely to occur when there is agreement among the three partners on four specific indicators.

- composition of the officer corps;
- political decision-making process;
- recruitment method; and
- military style.

These indicators assist analysts in 'predicting the prevention or occurrence of military intervention in domestic politics'. See Figure 2.

2 Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. Routledge, 2009. Also see her 1996 essay "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance". https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502200101. Also see "Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism". *Armed Forces & Society* (0095327X) 23 (2) 2, 1996, 277-83. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9602300209.



Figure 2 - Concordance Theory Summarised | Diagrammed by the author[3]

However, given the low probability of military intervention in New Zealand, I propose to modify concordance theory by changing the dependent variable - the outcome - from explaining and predicting military intervention to those factors that influence *military effectiveness*. This is admittedly an experimental approach, but it is one that builds on contemporary scholarship on how civil-military relations influence outcomes such as national resilience, national strategy, combat effectiveness and whole-of-government integration.[4,5] Furthermore, the indicators can be modified to explain the degree of concordance in a mature, small-state democracy with little probability of military intervention, and to predict the relationships' implications for military effectiveness.

Military effectiveness as the dependent variable

New Zealand is a mature and stable liberal democracy with sufficient partner concordance across the indicators to ensure that military intervention in domestic politics is unlikely. The concordance theory explains and predicts what the reader has probably surmised, that New Zealand is at no risk of a coup d'état and little possibility of the military intervening in domestic politics. While concordance theory's causal objective, the nominated dependent variable, is domestic military intervention (where coup d'état is the most extreme example), other variations include military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, and military effectiveness.[6] Changing the hypothetical outcome to explain and predict military effectiveness requires first, a definition of military effectiveness and second, adaptation of the indicators to support the new objective. Definitions of military effectiveness range from tactical advances to achieving military strategic outcomes relative to the external security environment. It is, therefore, necessary to be specific whilst also limiting the concept of military effectiveness to the domestic realm. This is necessary to prevent the indicators of concordance from becoming externally focused and beyond the competence of the 'partners' to agree or even affect. Moreover, it avoids altering or expanding the fundamental partnership model that sees the citizenry delegate governance to the political elite, who in turn have entrusted security to the military.

3 Diagram constructed by the author based on Schiff's explication.
4 Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Effective Defence decision-making". *Policy & Management Review* 2, no. 2 (June 2002), 7.
5 Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long. "Democracy and Effective Defence decision-making: A Deeper Look". *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 4 (2004), 525-46.
6 Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness", 7.

Having avoided modifications to the indicators that introduce external factors and inflate the role of foreign partners in achieving concordance, the definition of military effectiveness also needs to be limited to areas of equally shared responsibility. One of the most significant studies of military effectiveness in recent times has proposed that military effectiveness is 'the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power'.[7] Building on this and other formulations, I suggest that military effectiveness is best conceived as *the capability of the military to achieve politically desired outcomes given a level investment the citizenry can accept*. This definition of military effectiveness includes explicit consideration of political and societal constraints, and it is a measure of cohesion rather than performance. This definition encompasses three components: investment, capabilities, and outcomes. Each element overlaps with and depends on the other two, ensuring that influence and responsibility are exercised by all three partners. It retains and reinforces the significance of concordance theory's emphasis on historical context.

Adapting the indicators

As discussed above, the proposed change of dependent variable to military effectiveness protects the integrity and value of the concordance theory's historical context and the 'three partner' construct and retains its domestic focus. However, changing the outcome from intervention to military effectiveness required some adaptation of the original indicators to refocus them appropriately.

Composition of the officer corps. The indicator of social composition of the officer corps remains relevant but less critical regarding military effectiveness. While the officer corps remains the military decision-making elite, other factors are more critical, such as the overall social composition of the military and the degree of institutional and cultural separation from society. Likewise, the military's adherence to traditions can impact on organisational innovation and may reinforce values incompatible with the other partners, widening the 'civilian-military gap'. Considering military effectiveness, this indicator needs to focus less on the officers and more broadly on the military professionals, the organisational support they require and their appropriate level of integration with and participation in society.

Political decision-making process. The case study revealed that whilst the Defence Force is well regarded by the public, it maintains a low profile and appears under-represented in the political decision-making process. The Defence Force's main channel for political consideration is via the Foreign Policy and Security Committee of Cabinet, which deals with foreign affairs, trade, and myriad other issues. The separation of the Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence in 1990 reduced the military's voice by splitting its responsibilities between the Chief of Defence Force and military staff on one side and the Secretary of Defence and civilian staff on the other.[8] See Figure 3. This separation remains in place despite recommendations as early as 2002 to reintegrate and more sensibly manage partner interactions. Despite these specific comments, this indicator remains substantially valid, but greater focus is required on how each partner communicates and engages with the others. The perceived benefits of an apolitical and silent Defence Force must be reviewed against the desirability of open debate and a public desire to hear from military professionals.

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7 Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness: Volume 1: The First World War*, 2nd ed., vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511778254. Also see Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness", 1-21.

8 Don K. Hunn, "Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force". Wellington: NZ Ministry of Defence, September 2002. https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/review-of-accountabilities-and-structural-arrangements-between-the-ministry-of-defence-and-the-new-zealand-defence-force/.



Figure 3 - New Zealand civil-military institutions | Office of the Auditor General New Zealand

Recruitment method. In considering New Zealand's recruitment method, concordance theory's coercive-persuasive dichotomy is largely irrelevant to New Zealand's case because the Defence Force has been an all-volunteer force since 1973. However, the recruitment method indicator remains helpful in evaluating how and from where the Defence Force is recruited and the level of public support enjoyed by the military services. Still, it should be expanded to consider the resourcing of the military. Whilst it is possible to devise financial and economic indicators for military expenditure and national budgets, the primary adaptation of the recruitment method indicator is to consider how the partners engage and decide upon the level of investment appropriate to achieve an effective military. Understanding how the partners can discuss these matters, and whether sub-groups such as industry, the media and academia contribute to the discussion, would provide evidence of firmly held and well-informed partner agreement. My case study shows that significant resourcing and capability issues attract little interest in public discourse. This in part is because New Zealand's current approach to civil-military relations is based on separation.

Military style. Military style 'manifests itself within, among, and throughout the substance of the other indicators'.[9] It relates to symbolism and ritual, the projection and perception of power and authority, and the military's differentiation from other elites and non-elite groups. To support the causal outcome of military effectiveness as defined above, military style should also focus on the prominence and the value associated with the military's function in society. This expansion of military style allows the original concept to be retained whilst discounting various factors that are irrelevant to 'domestic military intervention' but appear relevant to military effectiveness. These included the reduction of the reserve force and the subsequent reduction of camps and bases throughout New Zealand. Each has the effect of reducing the prominence of the military in society, including fewer military veterans in parliament and less public awareness of the military's role. Arguably, this has also widened the civil-military 'gap'[10] between the polity, the citizenry and the military. This gap is manifested in a lack of interest in military matters by the media and other civil society groups. Finally, is the military's apolitical silence still appropriate? While this issue might be more appropriately considered under political decision-making, the problem facing those committed to an effective military is how to revitalise military style so as to go beyond its current separate and apolitical status.

9 Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*, 47.
10 Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness", 11.

In summary, two of the indicators - social composition of the officer corps and the political decision-making process - are found to be relevant to assessing military effectiveness, with only minor alterations to Schiff's framework. More significant adaptations are required in the concepts of recruitment method and military style. These modifications reflect a requirement to consider partner agreement on how recruits and military personnel represent society, how the military is resourced and how the style and prominence of the NZDF impacts the strength of partner concordance and military effectiveness.

Conclusions

Concordance theory has been found to be a rewarding theoretical framework with which to analyse, explain and predict how the military, the polity and the citizenry (the three partners), conditioned by historical context, can concur on how the military functions (the indicators) and thereby prevent military intervention in domestic politics (Schiff's dependent outcome). Schiff's concordance theory provides a departure from the political-military dichotomy and institutional rivalry focus typical of earlier separation theories. See Figure 4. It allows flexibility in application and interpretation, noting that 'the structure and form of these four indicators… can differ depending upon each nation's particular political system and culture.'[11] This assertion by Schiff encouraged my employment of concordance theory to evaluate civil-military relations in New Zealand. Although Schiff did not apply her theory to cases where civil control of the military was secure, my case study was able to encompass how a military-strategic approach and citizen preferences can combine to influence the unique role of the military in New Zealand.



Figure 4 - Schiff's Concordance Theory explained | Routledge

11 Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*, 40.

It is evident that New Zealand enjoys a state of concordant civil-military relations. But the strength of that concordance is based on superficial partner relations. This is partly due to New Zealand's historical context and geographical isolation from conflict zones that has allowed considerable discretion over the form and function of the military and where and when it is employed. The case study showed that New Zealand has maintained an externally focused military supported by security partners and a commitment to collective security. Whilst rarely faced with a direct threat, New Zealand participated in all the major conflicts of the 20th century and sustained enormous losses. Despite this, New Zealanders have never embraced military values, and their citizen-soldier model tended to civilianise the military rather than the reverse. Indeed, the legacy of early and extensive civilian participation in the military has led to a Defence Force that is ready to align itself with society's expectations and norms. Incidents of civil-military discord have been mainly between the political elite and the military and reflect clashes of culture and personality, possibly made worse by the institutional separation of the political policy-making and military partners from the late 1980s onwards.

The relatively small size of the NZDF, along with base closures and personnel reductions, has diminished its profile in society, while a declining reserve force has further distanced the military from its citizenry. The political elite, reflecting public indifference, offers only occasional and constrained support, and defence issues remain a low priority in New Zealand. The Defence Force shares its Minister of Defence and significant political decision-making channels with other agencies and portfolios, often causing military requirements and concerns to be deferred due to busy schedules and higher political priorities. New Zealand's negligible defence industry, few 'think tanks' and limited depth of defence reporting in the mainstream media results in near disappearance of defence issues from the public discourse. But, despite this, the actual impact is not discordance between the partners. Rather, concordance prevails. But it lacks the depth of engagement and conviction needed in a time of various strategic challenges when partner commitment to military effectiveness is most needed.[12]

The modified theory of concordance leads to my conclusion that military effectiveness in New Zealand is less dependent on the officer corps' social composition but rather is dependent on the military's overall composition and depth of the 'civil-military gap'. While the Defence Force is respected and trusted by the public, it remains largely disconnected from everyday New Zealand life. Its military effectiveness is depressed to the extent that the public is indifferent to investing in the new recruits and resources that a competent military requires. Moreover, the Defence Force's access to and influence in the political decision-making- process appears restricted, and the institutional separation of the Ministry of Defence from Joint Force Headquarters raises further barriers. These factors contributed to a discordant political and military relationship in the late 1980s and again in the 1990s-2000s. The lack of agreement and partner trust each time led to reduced military effectiveness, specifically regarding capability and policy outcomes.

The modified theory of concordance thus highlights the desirability of policy reforms regarding how the military is adequately replenished by recruits, and resourced and imbued with a commitment to military effectiveness. Crucial also is whether consensus is informed and broadly supported across the three partners and also in influential groups like the media and industry. The need to arrest the trends of the reduction of combat personnel, reservists, and resources, and the consolidation of bases, is also implied.

12 Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness", 1-21.

Finally, this case study of New Zealand civil-military relations has potential application to counterpart militaries. It provides a starting point for further refinement and application to other democratic or benign non-democratic countries that enjoy a stable and uncontentious political environment but whose military effectiveness is less than optimal. The archetypal remedy of civil-military separation and an apolitical military may no longer suffice. The theory of concordance and its modified version proposed here suggests that further thinking to merge concordance theory and military effectiveness is warranted. By recalibrating Schiff's theory, one may achieve a broader perspective of civil-military relations than those centred on institutional separation and so begin the reforms of making militaries more concordantly effective rather than institutionally ostracised.

BRIGADIER GRANT MOTLEY, NZ ARMY

Brigadier Grant Motley has served in a variety of infantry and armoured command roles including Commanding Officer 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (RNZIR), and was the Commander of the New Zealand Defence College. He has served overseas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Timor Leste, Afghanistan and Iraq and on exchange postings with the armed forces of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. More recently Brigadier Motley was the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence, the Defence Adviser to Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia, and an instructor at the Australian War College. Brigadier Motley's research interests include civil-military relations and small state defence diplomacy. He is currently the Chief of Staff at Headquarters NZDF.

Naval Lessons from the Waikato River Campaign[1]

Commander Sam Greenhalgh, RNZN

The British River War Fleet was crucial to gaining control of the Waikato River and supporting British efforts to suppress the Kīngitanga (Māori King Movement), writes Commander Sam Greenhalgh, RNZN. His study of the campaign underpins lessons of contemporary utility to the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), highlighting multi-domain coordination, mission execution, and command and control aspects of naval operations that remain relevant today. Commander Greenhalgh points out the importance of integrating maritime with land operations, the advantages of decentralised command allowing junior officers to take initiatives, and the value of standardised and well-maintained equipment for logistical efficiency and operational sustainability. He recommends these and other lessons as relevant for smaller navies such as the RNZN required to manage limited resources in complex and sometimes distant conflict environments.

Introduction: Impact of the fleet on the war

The River Fleet empowered the British to assert control of the Waikato River, New Zealand's longest and a vital North Island artery. By dominating this waterway, the British could outmanoeuvre strategically skilled Māori forces with better propelled and armed vessels, deliver artillery and soldiers quickly and precisely and maintain a reliable supply line to the deployed troops. The suppression of the Kīngitanga movement was significantly advanced by the River Fleet's ability to penetrate deep into Māori territory, dislodging them from vital strategic locations and eroding their capacity to resist, compelling a retreat of Māori forces that led to the loss to the British of the bulk of the Waikato region. My study of the campaign has yielded at least eight lessons, as follows. Other researchers are welcome to add to this list.

Lesson One: Coordination of forces

The success of the British River Fleet was enhanced by its coordination with land forces in all its engagements, applying multi-domain pressure to an entrenched defensive force. Under the direction of Commodore Wiseman, the river flotilla operated in tandem with General Duncan Cameron's land forces, amplifying the effectiveness of both. This combined-arms strategy allowed the British to press their offensive from multiple directions, forcing Māori forces to contend with well-equipped infantry and the highly mobile and heavily armed River Fleet. The River Fleet's flexibility in mobility, firepower, and tactical positioning in supporting Cameron's infantry assaults allowed the British to secure strategic objectives with relative speed. Despite occasional British communications lapses, as seen at Rangiriri, the Māori forces were outmanoeuvred, as they lacked the same level of integration between their land-based forces and the river, which had previously been a significant part of their logistical and strategic framework.

1 This essay is an abridged version of an Extended Essay written by Commander Greenhalgh while enrolled in the NZDF Command and Staff College in 2024 - ed.

The collaboration between the River Fleet and land forces was particularly apparent in the Battles of Rangiriri and Meremere. At Rangiriri, for instance, the gunboats provided artillery support, bombarding Māori defensive positions from the river and softening them up for land-based assaults. The fleet's heavy armour and superior firepower rendered Māori cannon fire largely ineffective, giving the British a substantial tactical advantage. The ability of the River Fleet to remain on station – remaining in position to deliver continuous fire – severely limited Māori defensive capabilities and eroded morale. Furthermore, the fleet's ability to flank Māori fortifications from the water, opening a new dimension of attack, weakened the defence of these pā before the British infantry advanced. At Meremere, the fleet's role in providing transport, fire support, and a blocking force on the river allowed the British to besiege the Māori forces, cutting off accessible retreat and supply routes. Applying such multidomain techniques, effectively coordinated by alert and adaptive commanders, multiplied the British advantages.

Lesson Two: Denying the adversary's use of the river

The Waikato River was a vital lifeline to the centre of the North Island, and the British fleet's domination of the river denied Māori forces this route. The fleet functioned not only as a military force but also a blockade, preventing the Māori from using the river for their own transportation or supply lines. See Figure 1. This anti-access/area denial (AA/AD) outcome, as we could call it today, dealt a significant blow to the Waikato Māori, whose daily lives and operations had long depended on the river. Without the ability to move troops or supplies freely along the river, the Māori found their mobility restricted. They were forced to rely on less efficient land-based routes, further straining their defensive capacity. The British fleet thus functioned as a chokepoint, cutting the Māori off from one of their key advantages and further tilting the balance of power.



Figure 1 - An artist's impression of the *Rangiriri*, the sister gunboat to the *Koheroa*[2] | National Library of New Zealand[2]

2 Herbert Baillie, *The iron gun-boat Rangariri in 1863, built at Sydney for the New Zealand Government*, Illustration from National Library of New Zealand. http://natlib.govt.nz/records/22741376.

With freedom on the river, the River Fleet's effectiveness was further enhanced by the strong logistical and engineering support it received from British bases at Port Waikato and Onehunga, accessed by the river-mouth harbour. These bases were essential hubs for resupplying the fleet and maintaining its operational readiness. They provided fundamental services, such as repairs, fuel, and armament resupply, ensuring the fleet could maintain its presence on the river for extended periods. The ability to ferry troops, casualties, and supplies via the river allowed the British to keep their forces at the front well-supported and combat-ready while ensuring that the Māori could not regain their footing through sustained resistance. The presence of these bases reinforced the British stranglehold on the river and ensured their forces could advance steadily into the Waikato.

Lesson Three: Utilising technological advantage

The River Fleet exemplified the broader technological superiority the British brought against the Māori during the Waikato War. See Figure 2. While the Māori showed remarkable ingenuity in designing and defending their pā, using elaborate trench systems and earthen fortifications to blunt British attacks, they were outmatched by the British's technological edge. The gunboats represented a multi-domain force projection capability that the Māori had no equivalent to counter. The Māori defensive strategies, which had worked against previous British campaigns, were overwhelmed by the combination of land, riverine, and artillery attacks that the British fleet and infantry executed precisely. The steam self-defence systems fitted to the gunboats are an excellent example of the use of technology, making the gunboats almost impenetrable to a Māori force. Despite their bravery and strategic acumen, the Māori could not hold out against the overwhelming force and firepower of the British, especially when faced with the multi-domain effects that the River Fleet brought to the battlefield.

Figure 2 - "The paddle steamer Koheroa was on the Waikato River during the Waikato War. This watercolour shows troops disembarking at Pukerimu (Cambridge) in April 1864."[3] | Te Ara Encyclopedia of New Zealand[3]

3 Naval gunboat, Waikato, 1864 - Te Tiriti o Waitangi - the Treaty of Waitangi - Te Ara Encyclopedia of New Zealand, https://teara.govt.nz/en/artwork/36361/naval-gunboat-waikato-1864.

These aspects prove why the British River Fleet played a decisive role in the eventual British victory in the Waikato War. By controlling the river, coordinating closely with land forces, providing superior firepower and mobility, and denying the Māori access to a critical resource, the fleet ensured the success of British operations on land and the eventual suppression of the Kīngitanga movement. The fleet's presence also highlighted the technological and logistical advantages that the British brought to the war, advantages that ultimately proved too great for the Māori to overcome. While the British fleet's success in the Waikato War showcased impressive dominance and technological superiority, it is also evident that the British military did not execute their strategy flawlessly. The Waikato campaign revealed several challenges and shortcomings in their approach, which provided valuable lessons for future military operations. These experiences forced the British to adapt and refine their efforts, learning from their encounters on the river against an adversary whose resilience and ingenuity exposed weaknesses in British operations. The lessons learned during the Waikato campaign hold relevance for modern military operations, and their implications will now be explored.

Lesson Four: Command opportunities for junior officers

The river flotilla provided a unique environment where junior officers had increased opportunities to exercise command and make critical decisions. While not unusual for the time, this does provide further examples of mission command being employed across all levels. In conflict, smaller individual vessels required independent leadership at the lowest level possible to ensure that more senior, experienced officers were available for advanced tasks. Examples from the Waikato War, where the gunboat barges were under Midshipman charge, show how the British got this correct, whether it be through necessity or knowledge. Employment in these roles allowed junior officers to demonstrate initiative and leadership in a dynamic and unpredictable environment, gaining valuable experience by applying their trade in actual operations.

For modern military operations, this demonstrates the value of decentralised command structures and the employment of mission command. Giving junior officers command experience in smaller or isolated units can accelerate leadership development, foster adaptability, and prepare them for more significant roles. The concept of mission command is central to modern operations, emphasising trust, flexibility, and initiative at all levels and is building more momentum in today's forces as personnel resources become stretched. Allowing junior officers to command under such conditions prepares future leaders for more complex operational environments and breeds leadership experience that thrives on mission command ethos. This is an aspect that current militaries struggle to get right and need to continue to inspire within their hierarchies.

Lesson Five: Interchangeability of command and personnel

Aligned with mission command, the ability to rotate personnel and command teams across different vessels within the flotilla and the wider Royal Navy fleet in New Zealand provided the British forces with operational flexibility. This interchangeability and interoperability ensured that operations could continue even if key personnel became unavailable, which was particularly important when maritime incidents were commonplace. An example is the loss of HMS *Orpheus* on the Manukau bar, which claimed many experienced sailors' lives[4]. This interchangeability reduces dependence on a single person or team, thus maintaining operations' momentum by adding flexibility and reducing the planning burden.

Modern militaries can learn from this approach by ensuring the cross-training of personnel in operating a standard fleet while creating modular command teams that can adapt to various platforms and mission types. Interchangeability allows forces to maintain operational continuity and reduce vulnerability to personnel shortages or unexpected changes. The flexibility of personnel in modern joint and combined operations, especially in diverse environments, is essential for sustained effectiveness. It is also worth noting that the British were not troubled by a seaworthiness process that ensured people were adequately trained and experienced, which created issues, as will be discussed later.

Lesson Six: Commonality of equipment

The British flotilla benefited from commonality in equipment across all the rivercraft, including on the barges. Standardising equipment across multiple platforms reduced logistical complexity, enabling more efficient maintenance and resupply. This commonality also simplified crew training and allowed personnel to operate different vessels without requiring specialised training, enhancing the abovementioned interchangeability effect. The best example of this was the Armstrong 12-pounder gun. Regardless of whether commonality was by choice or lack of options, the lesson is that no matter which vessel a sailor served on in the River Fleet, it would have a 12-pounder. It was familiar kit and would not require training. For the current day military force, equipment standardisation remains critical. When different units use similar or interchangeable equipment, logistics become more manageable, reducing the risk of delays or shortages. This lesson supports the idea of procurement strategies that prioritise commonality across platforms where possible, ensuring that the force can respond quickly and flexibly to operational requirements without invoking worthiness processes and subsequent delays. Joint military operations, especially involving coalition forces, can benefit significantly from shared equipment standards.

4 James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: A History Of The Maori Campaigns And The Pioneering Period*, Wellington, N.Z: Government Printer, 1983.

Lesson Seven: Ignoring processes leads to failures

The example of the rushed introduction of *Koheroa* demonstrated the risks associated with expediting Introduction Into Service (IIS) processes. The vessel faced operational issues immediately, caused by operational and technical incidents that resulted in failures and delays. This highlights the importance of thorough testing, evaluation, and training before deploying new equipment in a combat environment. If this had been completed with more care, the overloading of *Koheroa*, resulting in groundings and structural failures, might have been avoided. This serves as a cautionary tale for modern forces, particularly forces like the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), facing the replacement of several capabilities, which comes with an expectation that they will enter service and be effective immediately. While the pressure to field new systems efficiently in conflict can be intense, skipping testing and evaluation stages can result in operational failures. Therefore, time must be taken to complete such activities in peacetime. A deliberate, well-structured IIS process is needed to ensure that new platforms are combat-ready and personnel are fully trained. A modern military must balance the need for rapid deployment with the importance of ensuring new equipment functions as intended in the operational environment.

Lesson Eight: Seaworthiness is important

The British flotilla faced frequent operational disruptions due to a weakness of processes to oversee the designs and operations of the deployed naval vessels. These issues led to frequent groundings, vessel damage, and significant delays, hindering the flotilla's ability to support the ground forces effectively. They also operated their vessels often in an overloaded state, reducing operating margins of safety, which was apparent in the groundings and damage experienced by the earlier vessels. This was exemplified by mishaps suffered by *Koheroa*. For modern military operations, the lesson is that persistence and reliability in challenging environments depend on equipment that is fit for purpose and capable of enduring extended operational use. Developing a maritime regulatory baseline that regulates and accounts for the specific operational environment, such as riverine or coastal operations, is critical. Equally important is the understanding that pushing equipment beyond its operational limits, whether through overloading or improper use, will likely result in avoidable failures. Regular maintenance and adherence to operational limitations are essential to maintaining force effectiveness and should not be seen as a burden but as an enabler to a fighting force. The NZDF maintains such a system with a mantra of "Safe to operate, operating safely" with authorities and regulators who manage compliance and certification.[5] See Figure 3.

5 NZDF, *NZBR 2000 - NZDF Seaworthiness Instructions* (2016), subsequently superseded by *DMR 8 Seaworthiness Rules* and *DFI 8.3M NZDF Seaworthiness Instructions* - ed.



Figure 3 - NZDF Seaworthiness System | RNZN *Navy Today*[6]

Further, the acquisition of the steamers *Avon* and *Pioneer* reflected the British need for affordable riverine vessels delivered expeditiously. However, over time, both vessels proved ill-suited for the riverine operations required in the Waikato campaign. After entering service and experiencing various river operations, they were found to be cumbersome. They lacked manoeuvrability to effectively navigate the tight and shallow waterways, contributing to operational delays and failures in supporting combat operations. This highlights the importance of aligning acquisition processes with operational requirements established against seaworthiness requirements. Modern militaries often face similar challenges regarding rapid acquisition in response to immediate needs. However, buying or developing equipment that does not meet the mission profile can lead to failure in worthiness. Thorough requirements analysis, careful planning, and long-term thinking should guide acquisition decisions to ensure the assets procured can perform as needed in the intended operational environment. Feedback loops between frontline operators and procurement agencies should be established to refine specifications and improve equipment alignment with operational and worthwhile practices.

6 RNZN, "NZDF Seaworthiness System," Navy Today, no. 197 (2016).

Conclusion

It is unfair to judge the British naval operations of 1863-64 by contemporary standards, given the harsh context of the distant campaign. However, the insights derived from a historical analysis remain relevant for modern military operations, highlighting the importance of studying the Fleet's engagements, not only its successes but also its shortcomings. For the Waikato campaign was fraught with challenges, compelling the Royal Navy to learn from their encounters with the Māori resistance, and to adapt quickly. These challenges - such as integrating maritime and land forces, ensuring robust logistical support, and navigating complex operational geography - remain highly relevant to modern militaries. Flexibility, preparedness, and a profound understanding of operational environments are essential for successful military operations. These elements must be coupled with alert command, control, and communications, and robust governance processes, to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of complex and costly military assets.

Modern militaries face increasingly intricate and multifaceted challenges, from diverse terrains to rapid technological advancements. Yet, these historical events can inform contemporary military strategies across various contexts. Above all, this study highlights that modern military forces can draw valuable lessons from New Zealand's history, capitalising on the ingenuity and strategic brilliance of the Māori forces while seamlessly integrating the technological advancements and organisational strengths of the British. By synthesising these elements, contemporary militaries can enhance their effectiveness and resilience, creating a uniquely informed approach to modern operations.

COMMANDER SAM GREENHALGH, RNZN

Commander Sam Greenhalgh joined the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1998 as a Warfare Officer before specialising in naval aviation. After completing Observer training in 2004, he held various operational and leadership roles, including Frigate Flight Commander and staff appointments within both Air and Navy as Staff Officer Naval Helicopters and Staff Officer Aviation Readiness. Notable achievements include developing aviation capabilities for the Otago Class Offshore Patrol Vessels, leading the acceptance of SH2G(I) Seasprite helicopters in the USA, and commanding No. 6 Squadron from 2019 to 2022. In 2023, he became Chief of Staff at RNZAF Base Auckland before attending the NZDF ACSC(J) in 2024. He is currently Executive Officer to the Maritime Component Commander.

Redefining Treason in the Age of Information Warfare[1]

Mr Kieran Burnett, New Zealand Defence Force

While the conception of treason has displayed varied faces throughout history, Kieran Burnett, Deputy Director of Strategy for Defence Security, New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), focusses here on ambiguities surrounding treason induced by the exploitation of information platforms by malign actors. Both state and non-state actors have begun using proliferating social media to generate disinformation and malinformation, and to conduct information warfare, raising the question of when their manipulation of information becomes a treasonous act. Burnett identifies two emergent challenges - disinformation-enabled treason and digital whistle-blower treason – and warns that their prosecution by democratic governments can conflict with protections of free speech.

Introduction

Globalisation, the internet of things, and proliferation of social media have vastly altered how information is received, processed, and distributed around the world. The influences of platforms that can promulgate information instantly in real time have displaced traditional media such as television, radio and print journalism.[2] Malign state and non-state actors have seized the opportunity to weaponise information to achieve their objectives, and their actions at the extremes may border on treason. However, as governments act to protect their security from the threat of information warfare, they risk blurring the moral and legal boundaries between free speech and treason.

Information warfare

The emergence of this new, highly interconnected information environment has intensified the threat of information warfare conducted by both state and non-state actors. The exact definition of what encompasses information warfare is still subject to debate amongst academics and government agencies alike. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, information warfare may be broadly defined as the capability to create, protect, use, and exploit information for a strategic advantage.[3] Information warfare can include traditional propaganda, complex strategies to alter people's political beliefs, and espionage using computer systems. It often entails using elements of disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation for different purposes. See Figure 1.

1 This is an abridgement of an extended essay Kieran Burnett wrote while enrolled in the NZDF Command and Staff College in 2024 - ed..

2 Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, "Information disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making," COE, 2017. https://edoc.coe.int/en/media/7495-information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research-and-policy-making.html.

3 Katharina Kiener-Manu, "Cybercrime Module 14 Key Issues: Information warfare, disinformation and electoral fraud," www.unodc.org, June 2019, https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/information-warfare--disinformation-and-electoral-fraud.html.



Figure 1 - Information Disorder Framework | Diagrammed by the author

Non-state actors such as extremist or terrorist networks have quickly seized on the proliferation of social media to increase the reach of their propaganda. These actors have learned to utilise artificial intelligence platforms to create 'deep fake'[4] images and videos which reinforce their violent political ideologies.[5] State actors such as Russia have undertaken social, political, economic, and military initiatives to develop formidable information warfare capabilities. Disinformation has been used effectively by state actors like Russia to legitimise military aggression, undermine the integrity of elections, and create social upheaval in western nations.[6] Whilst states like China, Iran, and North Korea have more embryonic information exploitation capabilities, they have the skills and anti-democratic motivation to eventually match Russia.[7] In a prescient observation made decades ago by Marshall McLuhan, "World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation".[8]

Disinformation in the United States

The capability to manipulate narratives and create false realities has provided powerful weapons for undermining democratic states. Malevolent state and non-state actors have used these capabilities strategically to spread misinformation and disinformation to harm democratic states around the world. The effects of disinformation were especially evident in the January 6, 2021, riots at the United States (US) Capitol. This incident was initially organised as a protest demonstration; however, domestic and foreign actors deployed disinformation to incite a violent insurrection under the pretence of patriotic protest against alleged electoral fraud. These actions were subsequently classified as serious crimes against the Federal Government, which convicted over 400 perpetrators.[9] Members of the

4 Deep fakes are artificially created videos and images that present false or misleading information for political purposes.
5 Ella Busch and Jacob Ware, "The Weaponisation of Deepfakes Digital Deception by the Far-Right," December 2023. https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-12/The%20Weaponisation%20of%20Deepfakes.pdf.
6 Cathy Downes, "Strategic Blind-Spots on Cyber Threats, Vectors and Campaigns," The Cyber Defense Review 3, no. 1 (2018), 79-104.
7 International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A Net Assessment," IISS, 2021. https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2021/06/cyber-capabilities-national-power/.
8 Marshall McLuhan, *Culture Is Our Business*. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2014.
9 Nik Popli and Julia Zorthian, "What Happened to the Jan. 6 Rioters Arrested Since the Capitol Attack," Time, January 6, 2022. https://time.com/6133336/jan-6-capitol-riot-arrests-sentences/. President Trump pardoned all of them on 20 January 2025.

Oath Keepers[10] were found to have used the disinformation-filled environment to justify their violent anti-government agenda. Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes was sentenced to 18 years in prison after being convicted of seditious conspiracy for his role in the attack.[11] Whilst seditious conspiracy and treason are treated as separate legal concepts within the US, they undoubtedly share many related characteristics of betrayal against the state. Only the restrictive framing of treason within the US Constitution saved Rhodes from conviction of treason and thus capital punishment.[12] See Figure 2.

Acts of treason are specifically identified in the United States Constitution as *levying war* against the U.S. or *providing aid and comfort* to its enemies. This clear, specific definition was a deliberate act by the framers of the U.S. Constitution to avoid the political and social manipulation seen within early-modern England, wherein British monarchs used charges of treason expansively as political weapons. Grounded in the First Amendment protections for freedom of speech, the authors of the Constitution believed there was a clear distinction between thought, intent, and actions. In their view, impassioned speech or debate regarding the government should not be conflated with a rebellion or insurrection.

Figure 2 - Contrasting US and British Approaches to Treason | Composed by the author

Political historian Timothy Snyder has found a clear link between the challenges to democracy in America and Russia's disinformation campaigns. He argues that the Kremlin's campaigns have deliberately and systematically targeted the societal, economic, and political institutions of the US to erode them from within.[13] This distorted information environment provides fertile ground for treason, as malicious actors use disinformation to turn different aspects of society against each other. Snyder's theory leads to the observation that disinformation-enabled treason has emerged as a new form of treason within the modern information environment. Snyder's perspectives on disinformation give meaning to new terms like 'alternative facts'[14] which signify a broader trend of deliberate distortions of reality for partisan ends. Truth is no longer objective; its subjectivity has left many people without a consensual understanding of the virtues and faults of governance.[15]

Of course, different viewpoints and ideologies have always been part of politics. However, the 2016, 2020 and 2024 presidential elections seem to be inflection points where social divisions have deepened due to disinformation. This is aptly described by scholar Rueben Brigety who said, 'the campaigns looked less like a contest of ideas and more like a battle between tribes, with voters racing to their partisan corners based on identity, not concerns about policy'.[16] As a result, individuals' political, social or ethnic identities have now become fundamental organising principles in their lives, creating renewed forms of tribalism. This fracturing is amplified by online social media and undermines the democratic consensus.

Social media platforms which are designed to amplify engagement have become breeding

10 The Oath Keepers are an extremist, anti-government group that uses political violence to advance their agenda within the US.
11 Nik Popli and Julia Zorthian, "What Happened to the Jan. 6 Rioters Arrested Since the Capitol Attack," Time, January 6, 2022. https://time.com/6133336/jan-6-capitol-riot-arrests-sentences/. Upon his re-election, President Trump in early 2025 pardoned the perpetrators of the January 6 riots, including Stewart Rhodes.
12 Charlies Savage, "How the Crime of Seditious Conspiracy Is Different From Insurrection and Treason" New York Times 25 May 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/25/us/what-is-seditious-conspiracy-insurrection-treason.html.
13 Timothy Snyder, *The Road to Unfreedom*. Random House, 2019.
14 Lochlan Morrissey "Alternative facts do exist: beliefs, lies and politics" The Conversation, October 5, 2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/conway-press-secretary-gave-alternative-facts-860142147643.
15 David V. Gioe et al, "Reconceptualizing Disinformation as the United States' Greatest National Security Challenge," National Defense University Press PRISM 9, no. 3 (November 18, 2021)), 140–57.
16 Reuben E. Brigety II, "The Fractured Power," Foreign Affairs, February 16, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-16/fractured-power.

grounds for hostile sentiment towards rival tribes and towards the Federal Government. The sophisticated algorithms used to tailor content to users have created ‘echo-chambers’ which systematically reinforce extreme ideologies and biases.

Further, malevolent social media influencers have become empowered to distort information to create pseudo-realities which support their contrarian political beliefs rather than providing objective truth.[17] Disinformation has facilitated a steady decline in loyalty to the state, as aspects of society now see the government as a direct source of opposition to their political position. Increasingly, people willingly tie their allegiance to a political figure, movement, or party as opposed to the government. This greatly skews norms of behaviour, heightening the risk that acts of political violence will occur, acts that may border on treason. Buoyed by an increasingly warped view of reality, those who commit such acts will not see themselves as traitors but more as defenders of their own unique version of the ‘truth’.

Disinformation in Brazil and beyond

Disinformation-enabled treason is not limited to the US, as similar disinformation campaigns have permeated Brazil, resulting in mass protests and violence. In 2022, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in a closely contested election. The defeat shocked Bolsonaro’s supporters who then perpetrated nationwide protests and triggered online conspiracy theories.[18] This disinformation ignited a mass protest which resulted in Bolsonaro’s supporters storming Brazilian government buildings in an attempted coup. Many of the perpetrators believed they were patriots overturning a wide-ranging conspiracy against the Brazilian people. Critics regarded the perpetrators as traitors.[19]

Generalising from this example, one may speculate that disinformation-enabled treason is not just localised to the US but is also a growing global trend. There have been violent incidents around the world which illustrate the power of disinformation in fostering attacks against the state from within.[20] [21] All these events involve the strategic use of disinformation to escalate online discourse to stimulate real-world violence against the state.

Disinformation-enabling leaders

Moreover, whilst the new information environment is undoubtedly facilitating disinformation-enabled treason, the role of influential political actors cannot be underestimated. Political actors such as President Donald Trump, Roger Stone[22], and Michael Flynn[23] all played key roles in the 2020 US election fraud narrative. Similarly, Jair Bolsonaro and his allies pushed election fraud narratives to support their objectives. Whilst all these political actors have an online presence, they also led public rallies to spread disinformation. This highlights that malign political actors pose two dangers. Firstly, they validate disinformation by publicising contrarian narratives among their followers via social media platforms. Secondly, they translate disinformation from the digital domain into ‘reality’ by inciting action through public engagement. To the extent that their incitement induces anti-state violence, its perpetrators risk prosecution as traitors.

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17 Gioe et al, “Reconceptualizing Disinformation…”

18 Carolina Taboada et al, “Disinformation Trends in Brazil,” DISINFORMATION PULSE (Igarape Institute, 2023), JSTOR, 5. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48865.

19 Association for Progressive Communications, “An Architecture for Destruction? What 8 January in Brazil Tells us about the use of social media platforms against democracy,” Association for Progressive Communications, March 28, 2023. https://www.apc.org/en/blog/architecture-destruction-what-8-january-brazil-tells-us-about-use-social-media-platforms.

20 Reuters, “UK examines foreign states’ role in sowing discord leading to riots,” August 6, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-examines-foreign-states-role-sowing-discord-leading-riots-2024-08-05/.

21 “NZ’s ‘disinformation dozen,’” Radio New Zealand, May 18, 2022. https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/audio/2018842409/nz-s-disinformation-dozen.

22 A Republican political operative who was convicted of obstructing a congressional investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

23 Donald Trump’s former National Security Advisor who plead guilty to inappropriate interactions with the Russian ambassador to the US. He was pardoned by Trump in 2020.

When does disinformation become treason?

As democratic societies have evolved, so has the conception of treason. Political, social, legal, historical, and technological dynamics have reshaped the perception and legal definition of treason from the time of Caesar through the Cold War WWII until today. See Figure 3.



Figure 3 - Varying characterisations of traitors throughout history | Provided by the author

Treason is commonly understood today as the act of betraying one's nation. However, as democratic societies have evolved, so has the conception of treason. As illustrated by Figure 3, the term 'traitor' has evolved to reflect personal, political, and ideological acts of betrayal. Each of the terms set out in Figure 3 reflects the diverse and complex ways that a traitor can be categorised based on different scenarios. Therefore, this piece will adopt the definition developed by author Peter Hoffer which broadly conceptualises treason as a violation of allegiance to the state, embodying acts intended to harm or destabilise the state's authority and functioning. This provides a holistic framework in which to consider how treason is continuing to evolve in conjunction with the information warfare domain.

As both a legal and moral instrument, the charge of treason has been used by government leaders to protect the security of the state. But over time the nature of treason has progressively become more complex in response to shifts in the geopolitical environment. Challenges to state authority are now more intangible, indirect, and increasingly difficult to address through existing legal frameworks. Existing concepts and legal framings of treason are now challenged by the evolution of the practices of disinformation and leaking in the modern information age. The advent of 'alternative facts' has made truth subjective, thereby eroding what loyalty and betrayal, and therefore treason, mean in modern society. Equally, the emergence of leaking has challenged the traditional legal and moral authority of the state. The actions of Edward Snowden illustrate that, to some individuals, commitments to ideals and principles will supersede allegiance to a particular government.

Digital whistle-blowing treason

The second significant trend emerging from the modern information environment is that of 'digital whistle-blowing'. The term whistle-blower refers to a person who is engaged by an organisation and exposes unethical or illegal activities through prescribed legal channels. Whistle-blowers have exposed wrongdoing around the world such as fraud, corruption, privacy breaches, safety issues, and abuses of power. In their comprehensive study of whistle-blowing, Dworkin and Baucus (1998) assert that whistle-blowers are a necessity for robust organisational and societal oversight. This viewpoint is supported by other scholars who suggest that scandals which arise from whistle-blowing ensures government entities remain aligned to the values and beliefs of the societies they serve.[24]

Recently whistle-blowing has undergone significant transformation due to the arrival of the modern information environment. The far-reaching impact of globalisation and interconnected technologies have provided whistle-blowers the capability to release information on a global scale. Historically, whistle-blowers would rely on traditional media to expose wrongdoing. Now, digital whistle-blowers can use tools like mass data leaks, anonymous disclosures, and social media platforms to instantly disseminate information worldwide. This has effectively 'democratised' access to sensitive information, thereby bypassing traditional gatekeepers and allowing a wider audience to rapidly engage and act upon the disclosed data.[25] Furthermore, the large amounts of data being made available online enables the public to quickly act upon systemic behaviours in relation to wrongdoing. The speed and reach of digital whistle-blowing has energised activists seeking greater transparency. However, when disclosures involve classified information, whistle-blowing can be perceived as an act of betrayal against the state, and therefore treason.[26]

Snowden, Manning, Assange: patriots or traitors?

Governments have historically viewed any release of classified information by digital whistle- blowers as a direct threat to national security. These incidents often blur the lines between acts of courage to expose wrongdoing and committing treason against the state. Undoubtedly, Edward Snowden's disclosures of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership in 2013 presents a strong example of this dichotomy. Snowden was a contractor for the US National Security Agency (NSA) who leaked over a million classified documents to journalists detailing the agency's global surveillance apparatus. See Figure 4. The documents contained detailed information on sophisticated intelligence methods, tools, and infrastructure used by the Five Eyes partners to monitor both allies and prospective threats alike. The disclosures by Snowden generated a furious debate about the scale, reach, and type of contemporary surveillance practices used by intelligence agencies.[27] The US and other western governments condemned Snowden's actions as treasonous, as he had potentially endangered the lives of intelligence operatives and military personnel around the world conducting sensitive activities.[28] Conversely, Snowden characterised himself as a champion of civil liberties, as he believed that the US government was acting outside of its legal mandate. His intent was not to betray his country, but to call out in accordance with moral and ethical imperatives to what he had seen at the NSA.[29] Accordingly, Snowden's loyalty to principles like transparency, legality, and the protection of individual rights superseded his allegiance to the state.

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24 Dia Jade Andrews, James Connor, and Ben Wadham, "The Military Scandal: Its Definition, Dynamics, and Significance," Armed Forces & Society 46, no. 4 (2020), 716-734. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609294.

25 Naomi Colvin, "Whistle-Blowing as a Form of Digital Resistance: State Crimes and Crimes Against the State," State Crime Journal 7, no. 1 (2018), 24. https://doi.org/10.13169/statecrime.7.1.0024.

26 Colvin, ibid.

27 Zygmunt Bauman et al., "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance," Int Polit Sociol 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2014), 121-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12048.

28 Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, "ISIS Leader Takes Steps to Ensure Group's Survival," The New York Times, July 20, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/middleeast/isis-strategies-include-lines-of-succession-and-deadly-ring-tones.html.

29 Associated Press, "Snowden tells life story and why he leaked in new memoir," AP NEWS, September 13, 2019. https://apnews.com/article/57af1e21c0c14309a3684fc7695605c6.

Figure 4 - Edward Snowden, October 2013 | The WikiLeaks Channel

A poll of American respondents taken at the end of 2013 reflected a mix of viewpoints regarding whether Snowden's actions were treasonable. Whilst 49 per cent believed he was a traitor for threatening western intelligence operations, 51 per cent of Americans regarded Snowden as a hero for exposing government surveillance programmes.[30] This polarisation of public sentiment raises several philosophical questions about how to define treason within the modern information environment. Should Snowden be regarded as a traitor if his intent was to protect the public from illegal transgressions by the state? In some ways Snowden's actions could be described as a benign initiative to inform the public about the improper actions of their government. This aligns with the theory of constructive civil disobedience developed by political philosopher John Rawls, in which a pre-meditated, public, and non-violent breach of law is intended to induce positive societal change. Therefore, Edward Snowden could be viewed as a 'moral agent' who acted in the public interest to ensure that personal privacy wasn't eroded without the public's informed consent.[31] His actions constituted a form of digital resistance, where the proactive release of classified information enabled the public to hold notoriously secretive institutions like the NSA accountable. The wide array of material released by Snowden stopped the US government from using secrecy or national security considerations to control the public narrative regarding his actions. For the first time, government leaders were forced to openly engage in public discourse around the relative merits of their claim to use intrusive surveillance systems to protect the interests of the US.[32]

However, many critics from the national security community rightly dispute the morality and legality of Snowden's actions, some claiming they verged on treason. They point out that Snowden never used the established whistle-blower processes to raise concerns regarding the activities of the NSA. Accordingly, under US law he could not be classified as a whistle-blower or enjoy the corresponding legal protections.[33] Because Snowden used journalists as interlocutors to disseminate classified information unlawfully, he has been classified by national security professionals as a 'leaker'. Unlike spies, leakers do not work on

30 Zygmunt Bauman et al., "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance," 2014.
31 Kimberley Brownlee, "The civil disobedience of Edward Snowden: A reply to William Scheuerman," Philosophy & Social Criticism 42, no. 10 (2016), 965-70. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453716631167.
32 Colvin, "Whistle-Blowing ..."
33 Ursula Wilder, "The Psychology of Leaking and Espionage in the Digital Age," Studies in Intelligence 61, no. 2 (June 2017). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-61-no-2/the-psychology-of-leaking-and-espionage-in-the-digital-age/.

behalf of a foreign intelligence service, apply trade-craft,[34] or receive financial compensation. Their motivations are ideological, and they often seek to make an immediate impact based on releasing sensitive information via the internet. Classified as a leaker, Snowden would be placed in the same category as Chelsea Manning[35] and Julian Assange[36], both of whom faced significant legal consequences for releasing classified information online.[37]

Their actions provide insights into different aspects of treason within the modern information environment. All three leakers were indicted under the *U.S. Espionage Act 1912*[38] in a deliberate, symbolic move by the government to separate them from other 'legitimate' whistle-blowers who exposed acts of wrongdoing. They would be publicly shamed by being indicted under the Espionage Act alongside convicted traitors such as Aldrich Ames, who spied for the Soviet Union. This legal strategy effectively blurred the distinction between those people who exposed wrongdoing by the state and those who betrayed their country for personal gain, that is, traitors. This deliberate juxtaposition served to reinforce the power of the state, maintain the need for secrecy, and deter other prospective leakers. By stopping short of charging Snowden with treason, a charge that might not have stood up in court, the government kept control of the narrative of national security, devalued Snowden's initiatives, and deterred future whistle-blowers.

Conclusion

Leaders must now grapple with how to reconcile moral and ethical obligations of individuals with the officially conceived requirements of national security. As a result, the nature of treason is now fluid, complex, and ambiguous. Whichever way treason may be defined, states must minimise it by not only countering information warfare and disinformation but also fostering loyalty among its citizens while also respecting higher-order moral, ethical, and ideological principles, notably those protecting free speech and legitimate dissent.

34 Tools and techniques utilised to undertake acts of espionage.
35 A member of the US Army who disclosed nearly 750,000 classified and sensitive documents via the WikiLeaks online platform. She was court-martialled and sentenced to 35 years in prison. Her sentence was commuted to eight years by President Barack Obama.
36 Founder and editor of the WikiLeaks online platform which has released over 10 million classified and sensitive government documents. Famously, he spent several years in the Ecuadorian Embassy in the UK to avoid extradition to the US. He accepted a plea bargain with the US in 2024 and now resides in Australia.
37 Wilder, "The Psychology of Leaking and Espionage in the Digital Age," 2017.
38 Practical considerations also would have played a role in utilising the *Espionage Act* as opposed to trying to meet the high thresholds and procedural requirements within the US Constitution.

MR KIERAN BURNETT, NZDF

Mr Kieran Burnett is the Deputy Director of Strategy for Defence Security in the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). He is responsible for security planning, policy, analytics, education and programmes across the NZDF. Mr Burnett joined the NZDF in 2016 and has held several roles in the national security sector. He graduated with a Bachelor of Business Studies from Massey University in 2008. In 2024 he attended the Advanced Course of the NZDF Command and Staff College and graduated with a Masters of Strategic Studies from Victoria University of Wellington.

BOOK REVIEWS

Book Review Editor Captain Andrew Dowling is currently Defence Advisor in the New Zealand High Commission, Canberra.



Atlas of the New Zealand Wars, Volume One, 1834-1864

Derek Leask
Published by Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2025.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Dr Richard Taylor, NZA, Director,
New Zealand Wars Study Centre.

April saw the publication of the first volume of *Atlas of the New Zealand Wars*, by Derek Leask. Volume one covers the period 1834-1864, from the Guard incident in South Taranaki in 1834 to the end of the Second Taranaki War in 1864. The Waikato War, which ran over the same period as the Second Taranaki War, will be covered in the second volume, which will cover the period 1864-1884.

As its name would suggest, the book features a large number of contemporary maps and diagrams drawn by participants, many of which have not previously been made publicly available here in New Zealand. Leask sourced the material from repositories in New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom and France. Where appropriate, the maps and diagrams are supported by contemporary paintings and sketches which help the reader interpret the information provided in the other illustrations. Leask clearly references the illustrations throughout the text, which helps them to tell their own story.

The supporting text is detailed but accessible, and pulls together a great deal of information that has not previously been covered in such depth in a single volume. This includes a lot of contextual material, such as the early development of settlements and infrastructure in future theatres of war; the Te Atiawa ‘civil war’ in the 1850s; and interesting developments that were the result of conflict elsewhere, such as the development of military defences in Akaroa in response to conflict at Wairau and in the Bay of Islands. Navy readers will appreciate references to the maritime and littoral movements undertaken in support of land operations during the series of conflicts covered in the book.

Leask's interpretation of events is moderate, balanced, and clearly supported by the available evidence – a reflection, perhaps, of his previous 44-year diplomatic career. This is perhaps best demonstrated by how he deals with the vexed question of which side 'won' the Northern War of 1845-1846. While not specifically addressing the question, he presents a strong case that it was Grey and Tāmati Wāka Nene - rather than Hone Heke and Te Ruki Kawiti - who achieved their strategic objectives, which of course is the whole point of going to war. In this regard, his approach and language stands in stark contrast to that used in some of the recent revisionist histories of the wars. The attentive reader will learn much by reading between the lines.

This beautiful book will be an invaluable addition to the library of anyone with an interest in the New Zealand Wars. I look forward to the second volume.



Command: How the Allies Learned to Win the Second World War

Al Murray
Published by Headline, London, 2022.

Reviewed by Captain Andrew Dowling, RNZN, Defence Advisor, New Zealand High Commission, Canberra.

I found this book to be a surprise, but a pleasant one. I'd imagined a roaming discourse around how the Allies shaped their various approaches as the war progressed and how they matured across all domains, civilian and military included. I was wrong. Instead, Al Murray gives the reader snapshots of different Allied commanders at different periods during the conflict, zooming in on their key episodes and how their initiatives contributed to the overall success of the Allied cause.

Murray, by his own admission, is an amateur historian, and at the risk of sounding snobbish I submit that it is his avoidance of a dry academic approach that makes this book accessible and easily read by anyone with an interest, not so much in war, but in how to shape and lead people.

Murray offers 10 chapters, each focusing on a different Allied commander. Beginning with Patton and Slim (my favourite as always) he proceeds alongside others to New Zealand's Freyberg (one of the few who had 'a good First World War' and earned himself a DSO with three bars and a VC). His final chapter covers an unknown second lieutenant, Peter White, who Murray argues had visceral and critical experiences of command and commanding that are as equally worthy of commendation as those of the starred officers.

Each chapter opens with a note on how and where we find our subject. It then paints a picture of initial Allied failure, be it in the jungle, in armoured warfare, in training or in the desert. Each of these chapter-vignettes frames the challenges and circumstances of the leadership successes that followed and how each commander played a key role in changing the narrative from defeat to victory.

Murray presents these arguments soundly and concisely. He argues that Allied victory was not ultimately achieved be all these piecemeal successes but rather by learning from the initial failures in command, leadership, and warfighting that preceded them. As he put it, if you haven't failed you can't get better (although that can be expensive, he concedes).

If I were to criticise the book, it would be in the selection of commanders solely from Allied armies. Omitted are the incredible developments, innovations, and applications of technology by the other services. Coningham of the Royal Air Force, Cunningham of the Royal Navy, and Zhukov or Rokossovsky of the Russian Army would have made equalling compelling subjects. Moreover, exceptional leadership by enlisted commanders - sergeants and petty officers - are not included. However, I fully acknowledge that the list of deserving commanders is a long one, and that you can't please everyone.

For anyone in any role that requires leadership, civilian or military, this book offers nuggets of insight and wisdom at all levels of command, because Murray's subjects range from a field marshal (Montgomery, a standout for me) down to a second lieutenant (White, equally meritorious in his unique circumstances).

On reflection, I enjoyed this book once I'd stopped trying to compare it to more academic works such as Richard Overy's *Why the Allies Won* (possibly still my favourite book on WW2). It delivered well on its promise of highlighting warrior personalities - known and relatively unknown - and how the approaches of each helped achieve eventual Allied victory.



The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Military-Civil Fusion: A New Paradigm for Military Innovation?

Yoram Evron and Richard A. Bitzinger
Published by Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Reviewed by Dr Anthony Smith, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
This is an abridged version of a longer review Dr Smith wrote for *New Zealand International Review*, March/April 2025, of which he is Book Review Editor.

This book looks at the military-civil fusion in the United States, China, India, and Israel, noting how the fourth industrial revolution has fundamentally altered military-industrial complexes. The fourth industrial revolution of the last decade has seen the development of artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons systems, big data, block chain, cloud and quantum computing, and the internet of things. The previous industrial eras were the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, the technological revolution of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the information revolution after World War II.

What ‘military-civil fusion’ means requires elaboration. It builds on earlier concepts. When President Dwight Eisenhower coined the term ‘military-industrial complex’, the military and commercial sectors in the United States still tended to be functionally separated. Evron and Bitzinger argue that US companies that relied on military contracts during this era often obtained exclusive contracts and were largely insulated from the free market. Defence industries during the Cold War might then ‘spin off’ commercially valuable technologies like the internet.

In contrast, the fruits of the fourth industrial revolution, in the US at least, are now developed within giant tech companies and principally for the private sector, and then grafted onto the defence sector, or ‘spin on’. The term ‘civil-military integration’ has been commonly used

to describe the combining of defence and civilian industrial bases. The authors argue that ‘military-civil fusion’ differs from ‘civil-military integration’ in that the former involves government-civilian fusion right from the earliest stages of technological development. They note that China is most advanced in this regard, given its centralised leadership’s command of the civilian economy.

Readers will be remined of the swings and roundabouts of US defence spending. Despite the stereotype of the military-industrial complex, US defence spending has oscillated quite a bit. The US drew down defence spending in the 1970s after the Vietnam War, then raised it dramatically in the 1980s, then reduced it again to take the ‘peace dividend’ in the 1990s. Now, in the post 9/11 world, defence spending is up again, compounded by the high costs of new technologies, rising faster than inflation. Billions have been poured into the National Science Foundation and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The authors note that although defence contracts are spread more or less evenly among aerospace competitors Lockheed, Boeing, and Northrop-Grumman, unnecessary upgrades raise costs, for example the upgrade of the M1 tank to M1A2. The US Navy has two construction sites for submarines when one site could readily handle the output (two per annum). Bitzinger and Evron note that this redundancy is seen as ’preserving the defense-industrial base’.

China’s military spending has remained high over the last couple of decades, and technology has improved apace. Despite Western bans on arms sales and technological transfer, China has made good use of dual-use technologies from Western private firms, such as computer chips.

India seeks to modernise its military but, despite having an advanced civilian IT sector, finds it difficult to achieve a military-civil fusion that might generate a more indigenous high-tech defence sector. Consequently, India remains the world’s largest importer of arms by dollar value, followed by China and Saudi Arabia.

The case study on Israel was written before the current conflict in Gaza and Lebanon. Then, Israel was in the top ten of global arms exporters, comprising a quarter of all Israeli exports by value, which helped sustain a domestic defence industry. Israel has invested heavily in research and development across a range of defence technologies, which has attracted diplomatic interest by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. The authors speculate presciently that Israel’s military technology prowess may achieve deterrence by shifting the regional balance of power in Israel’s favour, but caution that potential Israeli overreach risks undermining regional stability.

In summary, these case studies of military-civil fusion in the US, China, India, and Israel are informative and insightful. The authors – Evron from Haifa University and Bitzinger from Nanyang Technical University Singapore – are respected academics. It is a pity that they have not included Russia in their otherwise creditable book given that Russia’s military technology is significant in the global arms trade.

INVITATION AND GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Editorial Committee of the *Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand* Navy welcome submissions to the next issue, Volume 6, 2026.

Guidelines for submissions are as follows—

- Submissions should be broadly consistent with the aims of the Journal, which are to inform debate on New Zealand's maritime and naval policies and to encourage strategic and policy-relevant thinking about New Zealand's wider security context.
- Draft articles should normally not exceed 4,000 words in length. Shorter articles, commentaries, and book reviews are welcome. All lengths are negotiable in the interests of equity, consistency, relevance, and readability.
- Sources of quotations and specific information should be flagged as footnotes. These should be consistent with the *Chicago Manual of Style's* 'Shortened Notes' and 'Bibliography' styles, accessible at https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html. Online references should include a hyperlink. Potential contributors should consult earlier volumes of this *Journal* for examples. https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Professional-Journal-of-the-Royal-New-Zealand-Navy-2024-Vol-4.pdf.
- Illustrations should be high resolution (300 dpi minimum at full scale) and should be sent as separate files. Captions and sources should accompany the illustrations. The Editor may augment captions and insert additional illustrations as appropriate.
- An official biography and high resolution portrait photo of the author should be appended.
- Submissions to the 2026 issue of this *Journal* should be emailed to the following e-dress by the end of January 2026, and preferably earlier: rnznjournal@gmail.com.
- Once drafts are received, they may be edited for consistency with the *Journal's* format. Authors will be consulted for approval of significant editorial alterations.

Members of the Editorial Committee welcome communications with potential authors at any time. We stand ready to help authors shape their provisional topics into acceptable articles or reviews. Please feel free to consult us. rnznjournal@gmail.com.