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New Zealand Defence Force
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Wellington Mail Centre
Lower Hutt 5045
New Zealand

OIA-2026-5873
OIA-2026-5916

29th October 2026

[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

I refer to emails of 9 July 2026 and 3 August 2026 seeking, under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) *all briefings produced for, and all post activity reports arising from: New Zealand Defence Force participation in Exercise Black Prince 3* and *all briefings and post activity reports arising from NZDF participation in Project Convergence Capstone 6.*

I apologise for the considerable length of time it has taken to provide this response. The requested documents are enclosed. Where indicated: operational and/or capability information, including that for our military partners, is withheld under section 6(a) of the OIA; information provided by our partners on the basis of confidence is withheld under section 6(b)(i) of the OIA; personal information for some personnel is withheld to protect privacy under section 9(2)(a) of the OIA; particular observations, recommendations, and opinions are withheld under sections 9(2)(ba)(i) or 9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA as appropriate; and, signatures are withheld to avoid malicious or inappropriate use, such as phishing, scams or unsolicited advertising in accordance with section 9(2)(k) of the OIA.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

GA Motley
Brigadier
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

Enclosures:

1. Post Activity Report: Deputy Chief of Army Visit to United States, 18 August 2026
2. Post Activity Report (PAR): Exercise Project Convergence Capstone 6 (PC-C6): 09 May – 09 Aug 26, 24 August 2026
3. Post Activity Report: Project Convergence Capstone Six (PCC6), 27 August 2026

ARMY GENERAL STAFF

DCA MINUTE 086/2026

18 Aug 26 1775/1/1

DIRECTOR LAND DOMAIN

G5

G7

LAND C4

For information
CA
LCC

Post Activity Report: Deputy Chief of Army Visit to United States (Project Convergence Capstone 6) 24-27 Jul 26

This document was prepared with assistance from generative artificial intelligence (AI), Microsoft Copilot. All content has been reviewed, validated, and approved by the author.

Introduction

1. The purpose of this Post Activity Report (PAR) is to capture key observations, lessons, and implications identified during the Deputy Chief of Army's visit to the United States in support of Project Convergence Capstone 6 (PCC6) activities at Fort Irwin, California. The visit included engagement with United States Army experimentation activities, observation of emerging technologies and command-and-control systems, bilateral discussions with Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom counterparts, and engagement with New Zealand personnel participating in the activity.

Objectives

2. Key activity objectives.

   a. Observe emerging command-and-control, communications, autonomy, and data integration capabilities being trialled by the United States Army.

   b. Assess implications for New Zealand Army modernisation and interoperability.

   c. Engage with key Five Eyes partners regarding future capability development.

   d. Observe the contribution of New Zealand personnel participating in the activity.

   e. Identify opportunities, risks, and recommendations relevant to future capability and force development.

Summary of Activities

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3. The visit occurred within the context of rapid technological change being driven by advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, networking technology, software, communications, synthetic environments, and sensor fusion. PCC6 provided a valuable opportunity to observe how the United States Army is addressing these challenges and transforming command-and-control systems for future warfare.

4. The visit was conducted in four phases:

   a. **Arrival and Preparation:** Arrival in Los Angeles and preparation for engagement activities.

   b. **Project Convergence Engagement:** Attendance at PCC6 activities, including briefings by US Army experimentation staff, engagement with New Zealand personnel deployed in support of the activity, bilateral discussions with Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom senior representatives, and attendance at the Commander Experiment Update.

   c. **Distinguished Visitor Programme:** Participation in the PCC6 Distinguished Visitor programme, including observation of experimentation outcomes, command-post activities, emerging technology demonstrations, and future operating concepts.

   d. **Return and Consolidation:** Return travel and consolidation of observations and recommendations.

Personnel

Observations

5. New Zealand personnel participating in the activity demonstrated a high degree of professionalism, adaptability and commitment throughout the exercise. Both those operating within the exercise environment and those supporting from enabling locations represented the New Zealand Army exceptionally well. Their contribution was repeatedly acknowledged by Australian Defence Force counterparts, who commented favourably on the professionalism, engagement, and quality of the New Zealand contingent.

6. s. 6(a) [redacted]

Recommendations

7. Continue exposing New Zealand personnel to multinational experimentation and innovation activities.

8. s. 6(a) [redacted]

Research and development

Observations

9. Data interoperability was consistently identified as a critical enabler of coalition operations. Throughout PCC6, it was reinforced that common data standards are

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fundamental to achieving meaningful interoperability, regardless of the platforms or systems employed. Encouragingly, the NZ and Australian Armies appear closely aligned in both data standards and their approach to future interoperability.

10. s. 6(b)(i) NZ should be cautious in drawing conclusions from a single formation s. 6(a)

11. s. 9(2)(g)(i)

12. The concept of forward production using additive manufacturing and commercial technologies is becoming increasingly viable for small UAS production.

Recommendations

13. Continue prioritising interoperability through common data standards.

14. s. 6(a)

15.

16. Continue monitoring additive manufacturing opportunities.

Infrastructure

Observations

17. Power generation and energy resilience have become increasingly significant operational considerations. Power should be considered a finite resource requiring deliberate planning and management by commanders. Decisions regarding energy consumption, battery replacement, charging cycles, and sustainment planning are becoming increasingly important across all tactical echelons.

18. s. 6(a) . While carrying a higher acquisition cost, these systems appear capable of delivering sustainment efficiencies over time.

19. s. 6(a) demonstrated utility as long-endurance sensing and communications platforms. While deployment timelines are relatively lengthy, they offer extended persistence and can be difficult to detect.

Recommendations

20. Investigate s. 6(a) future operational energy programmes.

21. Incorporate energy management planning s. 6(a) .

22. Continue assessment of s. 6(a) communications and surveillance applications.

Concepts

Observations

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23. s. 6(a) [redacted]

24. s. 6(a) [redacted]

Recommendations

25. Continue monitoring s. 6(a) development and experimentation.

26. s. 6(a) [redacted]

27.

Information Management

Observations

28. s. 6(a) [redacted]

29. s. 6(a) [redacted]

30. Increasing volumes of s. 6(a) [redacted] data will require improved integration into future Common Operational Pictures and command-and-control systems.

Recommendations

31. Continue developing s. 6(a) [redacted] doctrine and procedures.

32. s. 6(a) [redacted]

33.

34.

Equipment

Observations

35. s. 6(a) [redacted]

36. s. 6(a) [redacted]

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s. 6(a)

37. s. 6(a)

38. s. 6(a)

Recommendations

39. Include s. 6(a) within future vehicle requirements.

40. Investigate Defence-wide s. 6(a) standardisation.

41. s. 6(a)

42. Continue assessment of s. 6(a) technologies.

43. s. 6(a)

Conclusion

44. The activity reinforced that future interoperability will be enabled through common standards s. 6(a) energy resilience, and s. 6(a) are emerging as key requirements s. 6(a) . For the NZ Army, priority should be given to maintaining standards-based interoperability, simplifying sustainment s. 6(a) , improving integration of emerging technologies, and continuing to monitor allied experimentation and modernisation activities.

Recommendations

45. It is requested that **G5**:

a. s. 6(a)

b.

46. It is requested that **G7**:

a. **Examine** s. 6(a) requirements for future coalition interoperability.

b. s. 6(a)

c.

47. It is requested that **LANDC4**:

a. s. 6(a)

b.

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48. It is requested that **Director Land Capability**:

a. s. 6(a)

b. **Investigate** opportunities for s. 6(a) commonality and standardisation within future capability acquisitions.

c. **Consider** s. 6(a) as a preferred system design principle.

d. **Assess** the applicability of s. 6(a) concepts to future deployable Army infrastructure.

Hamish Gibbons

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Date: 2026.08.17 21:24:53 -04'00'

H. GIBBONS
BRIG
DCA

s. 9(2)(a)

Distribution:

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AGS
CAPBR: LAND DOMAIN

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2nd/1st RNZIR, NEW ZEALAND ARMY, 1 (NZ) BRIGADE

BN HQ MINUTE 277/2026

24 Aug 26

D0-0636/33
4500/1

CO 2/1 RNZIR

For information
2/1 RNZIR List C
1 (NZ) Bde HQ
OLCC
Army International Engagements Program (AIEP)

POST ACTIVITY REPORT (PAR): EXERCISE PROJECT CONVERGENCE CAPSTONE 6 (PC-C6): 09 MAY – 09 AUG 26

Reference

A. 2/1 RNZIR WNGO 028/26: EXERCISE BLACK PRINCE 3 AND PROJECT CONVERGENCE CAPSTONE 6.

Executive Summary

1. Project Convergence Capstone 6 (PC-C6) is the latest iteration of the United States Army Futures Command's premier experimentation event, conducted at Fort Irwin, California. New Zealand Army (NZ Army) participation reflected a strategic commitment to strengthening coalition partnerships and enhancing interoperability within multinational partners. As part of this commitment, 2/1 RNZIR deployed a Force Element to integrate with an Australian Army Human Machine Teaming (1 ARMD) Battle Group in support of experimentation activities.

2. During PC-C6, personnel from 2/1 RNZIR operated within the Australian Human Machine teaming (HMT) Battle Group across a series of staff and field training activities designed to assess emerging technologies, concepts, and operating methods. Through integration with Australian and United States Army elements, the Force Element contributed to NZ Army experimentation objectives while enhancing individual and collective interoperability within a coalition environment. The activity provided exposure to emerging capabilities, concepts, and coalition experimentation processes. s. 6(b)(i) , personnel gained valuable insights into future operating concepts, UAS employment, Human Machine Teaming, and coalition interoperability.

3. Observations reinforced the requirement for a range of UAS capability comprising long-range reconnaissance platforms, rapidly deployable short-range systems, close-target reconnaissance assets, and strike UAS. Autonomous sensor fusion, machine-assisted decision-making, and integrated communications networks as identified as critical enablers for future combat effectiveness. Specialist technical skills will be required to support increasingly complex autonomous systems.

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Army General Staff

G5 – Army Plans

SNO PCC6 MINUTE 099/2026

27 Aug 26 4800/30/1

DCA through G5

For information
See distro

POST ACTIVITY REPORT: PROJECT CONVERGENCE CAPSTONE SIX (PCC6)

Reference

A. DCA PLANNING DIRECTIVE: Army Experimentation Project Convergence Capstone 6 dated Mar 26.

Purpose

1. IAW Ref A, the purpose of this Minute is to record observations from Project Convergence Capstone 6 (PCC6), conducted from 22 Jun to 1 Aug 2026 at the National Training Centre (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. Project Convergence is a Five Eyes (FVEY) experimentation activity sponsored by U.S. Army Joint Modernization Command (JMC) on behalf of Futures and Concepts Command (FCC). The NZ Army has been an active participant since 2024. NZ Army's PCC6 experimentation objectives focused on the employment of Unmanned and Autonomous Systems (UxS)[1], Human Machine Teaming (HMT), and communications networks to enhance FVEY interoperability. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

2. **Linkage to NZDF Military Strategy.** The observations and recommendations identified in this PAR have applicability beyond the NZ Army and highlight both current and future opportunities for capability enhancement across the Integrated Force. These opportunities will strengthen the NZDF's ability to support Military Strategic Objectives within the South-West Pacific, the broader Indo-Pacific region, and globally, enabling the achievement of Government-directed defence policy objectives.

Executive Summary

[1] 2. Unmanned and Autonomous Systems a generic term which encompasses UAS-Unmanned Aerial Systems, UGVS-Unmanned Ground Vehicles, USVS-Unmanned Surface Vessels, UUVS-Unmanned Underwater Vessels.

s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

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3. PCC6 provided the NZ Army with a valuable opportunity to evaluate emerging UxS, HMT, tactical communications architectures, and FVEY interoperability within a force on force, 24/7, realistic, peer on peer combat environment. NZ patrols successfully integrated tactical sensors s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

4.

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8. **Institutional Implications.** PCC6 reinforced that the proliferation of low-cost s. 6(a) systems has fundamentally changed the economics and character of warfare. s. 6(a)

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s. 6(a)

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9. **PCC7**. On 29 Jul 2026, JMC confirmed PCC7 as a planned activity on FCC. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) . While detailed planning remains in its early stages, s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) . PCC7s. 6(a) has the potential to provide a valuable opportunity to support NZ Army s. 6(a) . s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

10. Although no decision on how NZ Army will participate on PCC7 has occurred, both options present an opportunity to reduce NZ numbers attending Project Convergence. It is recommended that AGS sends a representative to PCC7 IPC OTP 14- 18 Sep 26 at Fort Bliss, El Paso, Tx to enable AGS to make informed recommendations on NZ participation on PCC7.

11. Detailed observations for PCC6 are found within Annexes A-E.

PCC6 Key observations

12. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

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17. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

18. **Avoid Duplication**. PCC6 reinforced that the NZ Army can accelerate capability delivery, reduce risk, and reduce cost s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i) rather than duplicating experimentation and development efforts.

19. **Align RAS Procurement with AS**. PCC6 demonstrated that aligning s. 6(a) acquisitions and HMT initiatives will maximise interoperability, improve supportability, and reduce capability risk through greater access to established systems and support networks.

20. s. 6(a)

21.

22.

23.

s. 6(a)

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24. **Logistic lift UAS**. PCC6 demonstrated that logistic lift UAS capabilities are now sufficiently mature to support military resupply tasks. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)

25. s. 6(a)

26.

27.

28.

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29. **Building the Army's Human Advantage.** PCC6 reinforced that future combat effectiveness will depend as much on technical expertise as traditional soldiering skills. s. 6(a) [redacted]

30. **Logistics. The right to repair**. PCC6 reinforced the importance of the 'right to repair' in expeditionary operations. Soldiers must be empowered and equipped to repair equipment at the point of need, with access to technical manuals, diagnostic software, spare parts, and appropriate tools. Consistent with observations from contemporary conflicts, forces operating in contested logistics environments increasingly favour low-cost, field-repairable systems over complex platforms that cannot be sustained or replaced at wartime tempo. s. 6(a) [redacted] . Future capability development should prioritise sovereign, adaptable, and user-maintainable systems that can be repaired and sustained by soldiers in the field.

31. s. 6(a) [redacted]

32.

33.

34.

[8] CAPBR Dep Dir Info Sub Portfolio.

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35. s. 6(a)

36.

Conclusion

37. PCC6 demonstrated that the fastest and most cost-effective path to increased combat effectiveness is s. 6(a) enhancing interoperability.

38. s. 6(a)

39.

Recommendations – it is recommended that DCA:

40. **Direct G5** to send a suitable representative to PCC7 IPC OTP 14- 18 Sep 26 at Fort Bliss, El Paso, Tx to enable AGS to inform recommendations on NZ participation on PCC7.

41. s. 6(a)

42.

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44.

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45. s. 6(a)

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51.

s. 9(2)(g)(i), s. 9(2)(k)

LTCOL
SNO PCC6

Annexes

B. s. 6(a)
C.
D.
E.
F.

Comment G5

s. 6(a)

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s. 9(2)(g)(i), s. 9(2)(k)

G5
COL

Comment DCA

G5 - Please take para 40-43 for consideration/action, and report back to me. G7 - Please take para 44-45 and 50 for consideration/action, and report back to me. DLD - please take para 47-49 for consideration/action, and report back to me. LC(L) - please take 46 and 51 for consideration/action, and report back to me. All - This is a useful PAR. Some of the tasks could be included in the next CA Directive or are not suitable. I will leave you to determine and advise.

Hamish Gibbons

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H GIBBONS
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Dep Director Information Sub Portfolio, Info Domain, (Attn:
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4. The purpose of this Post Activity Report (PAR) is to summarise the lessons identified by 2/1 RNZIR personnel during the planning, integration, and execution of PC-C6. It aims to capture observations and recommendations that will improve future participation in multinational experimentation activities, enhance s. 6(a) with coalition partners, and contribute to the ongoing development of NZ Army's future warfighting capabilities.

Summary of Activities

5. Ex Project Convergence Capstone 6, inclusive of Exercise Black Prince 3 (BP3), occurred IAW ref A, OTP 09 May – 09 Aug 26. The outline of the activity was as follows:

a. **Phase 1 (Exercise Black Prince 3).** 09 May – 03 Jun 26

b. **Phase 2 (PC-C6 Mobilisation and Skill Gap Closure).** 04 – 29 Jun 26

c. **Phase 3 (Ex PC-C6).** 30 Jun – 09 Aug 26


Conclusion

6. Exercise Project Convergence Capstone 6 provided a valuable opportunity for New Zealand personnel to operate alongside Australian and coalition partners within a large-scale multinational experimentation exercise. The activity exposed personnel to emerging technologies, coalition command and control arrangements, Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS), and contemporary operating procedures, while demonstrating that New Zealand personnel can effectively integrate with and operate under allied headquarters during complex activities. s. 6(a)

7. Key lessons identified throughout the deployment centred on command and support arrangements, leadership engagement, personnel welfare, logistics, communications, s. 6(a) and experimentation. The activity reinforced the growing importance of power generation, s. 6(a) , and the integration of UAS, s. 6(a) and sensor-to-shooter capabilities as critical enablers of future combat effectiveness. While the contingent successfully completed its assigned tasks, opportunities exist to improve s. 6(a) through s. 6(a) , earlier integration with coalition partners, s. 6(a) , improved communications interoperability, greater delegation of logistical and financial authorities, and better preparation and support s. 6(a)

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s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)



Jeremy Mateparae

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JR MATEPARAE
LTCOL, NZ ARMY
CO, 2/1 RNZIR

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POST ACTIVITY REPORT (PAR) EXERCISE PROJECT CONVERGENCE CAPSTONE 6: 09 MAY – 09 AUG 26

Observations

8. Key observations of the training period are captured using the Fix, Improve, Sustain method and are categorised using the continental staff system.

S0 Command

9. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

10. **Observation.** Despite a request from the NZ force element, no formal New Zealand Contingent PAR or Senior National Officer (SNO) hour was conducted during the deployment. As a result, personnel were not provided a dedicated opportunity to raise concerns, provide feedback, or discuss lessons identified directly with senior leadership. This reduced the ability of the contingent leadership to gauge personnel welfare and communicate the contingent's experiences and concerns to higher headquarters.

s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

S1 Personnel

11. **Observation.** The NZDF medic was not integrated into the tactical phase of the exercise. Instead, the medic remained within the Rear Unit Base Area (RUBA) for the duration of the field activity and was therefore unable to integrate with patrols or gain exposure to the tactical and operational challenges experienced by forward elements. This limited opportunities to develop interoperability with ADF medical personnel at the combat team level, reduced the medic's understanding of patrols medical conditions, and restricted valuable training opportunities associated with providing medical support within a field environment.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Future deployments should embed the NZDF medic within tactical patrols alongside combat teams and ADF medical personnel during field activities. Employing the medic forward will improve integration with supported elements, enhance understanding of tactical operations, strengthen interoperability within the ANZAC construct, and provide valuable training

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s. 9(2)(g)(i), s. 9(2)(ba)

12. **Observation.** Personnel deployed to PC-C6 did not have a full day of stand-down throughout approximately six weeks of activity. Prior to entering the field environment, the contingent remained restricted to Fort Irwin despite having approximately two to three weeks of available to allocate some downtime. The prolonged operational tempo, combined with limited opportunities for rest and recovery, had a negative effect to morale, wellbeing, and long-term performance.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** For future deployments of a similar duration, incorporate scheduled stand-down periods or welfare leave opportunities prior to and following major field activities. Planned recovery periods should be considered as part of deployment planning to better manage operational tempo and maintain personnel morale.

13. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

14. **Observation**. Driver variations were initially only given to drivers and commanders (co-drivers). Once in country, approximately week two of the activity, the SNO and contingent S4 directed all personnel on the activity, regardless of whether personnel were designated drivers, to be placed on driver variation. This imposed unnecessary limitations on non-driving personnel without a direct operational requirement.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Review driver variation policies for future deployments and apply restrictions only to personnel required to operate military vehicles and designated vehicle commanders (co-drivers). This will reduce unnecessary administrative burdens while maintaining vehicle safety requirements.

15. **Observation.** The deployed 2/1 RNZIR force element did not include a role of a Rifle Platoon Sergeant. As a result, s. 6(a) to simultaneously manage tactical planning and administration throughout the exercise.

a. **Recommendation (Fix).** Deploy a SNCO in a role of a Rifle Platoon Sergeant to support the patrols. This appointment should provide oversight of battle procedure, welfare management, and administrative coordination including weapons and stores, improving support to the patrol.

S3 Operations

16. **Observation.** Accommodation allocation upon arrival was poorly coordinated. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

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s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Prior to future deployments, coordinate accommodation and facility allocations s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

17. **Observation.** Integration with Australian forces occurred relatively late in the preparation period. Earlier integration, such as Exercise Black Prince 3 in Australia, would have enabled greater familiarity with supported headquarters, their equipment, mounted TTPs, and key personnel prior to field deployment.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Conduct integration activities s. 6(a) at the earliest opportunity. Where possible, personnel and equipment should be attached during preparatory exercises to improve interoperability s. 6(a) .

18. **Observation.** No formal post-activity engagement or social function was conducted with Australian host units following completion of field operations despite close integration over an extended period.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Incorporate post-exercise engagement activities into activity planning to strengthen professional relationships, acknowledge host nation support, and reinforce coalition partnerships.

19. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

S4 Logistics

20. s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

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s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

21. s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

22. **Observation.** No cleaning stores, facilities, or coordinated support were provided for PXA upon return from the tactical field exercise. Personnel were required to purchase cleaning equipment privately and develop their own procedures for customs preparation. s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

a. **Recommendation (Fix).** The contingent S4 should develop a detailed PXA plan prior to the patrols return and ensure adequate cleaning facilities and stores are available upon return to the mounting area. s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

23. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

24. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

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s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

S5 Plans

25. **Observation.** No consultation occurred between the 2/1 RNZIR representative and NZ EXCON personnel regarding return travel arrangements. Personnel received no input into travel options regarding differences between commercial and military return flights.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Incorporate key personnel in consultation for the return travel planning where operationally feasible. This will improve transparency and support individual welfare considerations as this was not a consideration that was included.

S6 Communications

26. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

27. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

28. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

29. **Observation.** Welfare internet services were unable to support the contingent's requirements. Personnel frequently relied upon Australian-provided systems or privately owned equipment to maintain contact with family and conduct administrative tasks.

a. **Recommendation (Fix).** Provide an appropriately scaled welfare internet capability to support all NZ deployed personnel. Welfare communications

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systems should be capable of supporting the deployed contingent throughout the activity.

30. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

S7 Training

31. **Observation.** PC-C6 was intended to support experimentation and capability development, s. 6(a) New Zealand personnel were unable to fully participate in planned experimentation activities and instead largely conducted a conventional tactical field training exercise. This reduced the opportunity to collect meaningful trials and assess s. 6(a) use within a realistic coalition environment.

a. **Recommendation (Fix).** s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

Additionally, experimental capabilities should be validated at scale during pre-deployment activities in New Zealand and tested under conditions that replicate the expected operational environment. This approach will reduce technical risk prior to deployment and maximise experimentation when deployed overseas.

32. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

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33. **Observation.** Personnel received repetitive lessons and briefings across pre-deployment training in Burnham Military Camp (BMC) and Linton Military Camp (LMC), resulting in additional time away from home and reducing the time available for practical training and experimentation.

a. **Recommendation (Improve).** Coordinate training packages across home units and mobilising HQ to minimise unnecessary lesson duplication, minimise time away from home, and maximise time available for practical training and experimentation.

34. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

35. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

36. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

37. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

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s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

38. s. 6(a), s. 9(2)(ba)(i), s. 9(2)(g)(i)

S8 Doctrine

39. **Observation.** PC-C6 reinforced that persistent ISR coverage and top-attack UAS threats are now a defining feature of the contemporary battlefield. Forces unable to control and defend the Air-Ground Littoral (AGL) face significantly reduced survivability, freedom of manoeuvre, and combat effectiveness. s. 6(a)

S9 Finance

40. **Observation.** Limited delegated purchasing authority was provided to s. 6(a) procure stores and equipment in support of the tactical phase of the activity. As a result, personnel were unable to rapidly source and acquire equipment s. 6(a)

a. **Recommendation (Fix).** Increase delegated purchasing authority s. 6(a) to allow the timely procurement of low-cost stores and equipment in support of operational requirements. Providing greater financial flexibility would enable commanders to s. 6(a) improve sustainment, and better support personnel during future deployments.

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Conclusion

41. Exercise Project Convergence Capstone 6 provided a valuable opportunity for New Zealand personnel to operate alongside Australian and coalition partners within a large-scale multinational experimentation exercise. The activity exposed personnel to emerging technologies, coalition command and control arrangements, Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS), and contemporary operating procedures, while demonstrating that New Zealand personnel can effectively integrate with and operate under allied headquarters during complex activities.

42. Key lessons identified throughout the deployment centred on command and support arrangements, leadership engagement, personnel welfare, logistics, communications, s. 6(a) and experimentation. The activity reinforced the growing importance of power generation, s. 6(a) , and the integration of UAS, s. 6(a) and sensor-to-shooter capabilities as critical enablers of future combat effectiveness. While the contingent successfully completed its assigned tasks, opportunities exist to improve s. 6(a) through s. 6(a) , earlier integration with coalition partners, s. 6(a) , improved communications interoperability, greater delegation of logistical and financial authorities, and better preparation and support s. 6(a) .

s. 9(2)(g)(i)

2/1 RNZIR

Annexes:

A. s. 6(a), s. 6(b)(i)
B.
C. s. 6(a) .

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