




Headquarters  
New Zealand Defence Force  
Defence House  
Private Bag 39997  
Wellington Mail Centre  
Lower Hutt 5045  
New Zealand

OIA-2025-5572

December 2025



Dear

Further to the decision you received on 26 November 2025, enclosed are the copies of New Zealand Defence Force information within the scope of the request. Enclosure four contains a 18 July July note to the Prime Minister's Department, the Chief of Defence Force Operational Directive, and Chapter One from the 1997 Operational Support Package: Bougainville prepared by the Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security. A classified 25 July 1990 signal is withheld in full in accordance with section 6(a) of the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA). The content of this signal is available in the other declassified documents provided at enclosure four, particularly the rules of engagement.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at [www.ombudsman.parliament.nz](http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz) or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

**GA Motley**  
Brigadier  
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

**Enclosures:**

1. Determining Which Deployments are Declared Operational Service, 15 November 2015
2. Review of Deployments with emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954, 22 October 2009
3. Threat Assessment – The Threat to the RNZN in Bougainville Waters, 27 June 1990
4. Declassified collection of Operation Big Talk documents
5. Historical Risk Assessments: Bougainville, 21 August 2002

**Submission to the Minister of Veterans' Affairs**

**DETERMINING WHICH DEPLOYMENTS ARE DECLARED OPERATIONAL SERVICE**

VA tracking: 096 15-16 NZDF tracking: 494/15

**Type of submission:** For consultation

**For action by:** Urgent

**Purpose:** To set out the criteria used to assess whether deployments should be declared to be operational service under the Veterans' Support Act 2014, and to seek your agreement to declare certain deployments to be operational service under the Act

**Cost:** Nil

**Current status:** For decision

**Key risks / Limitations:** Nil

**Recommended actions:**

- a. **Endorse** the criteria I intend to use to determine which deployments I recommend be declared operational service;
- b. **Endorse** how I intend to inform you about the risks associated with deployments;
- c. **Note** that further consideration of which deployments should be covered by the Veterans' Support Act 2014 is a matter which should be examined during the upcoming review of the legislation, which is scheduled to occur as soon as practicable after 7 December 2016;
- d. **Endorse** using geographical areas, rather than operations, as the basis for declarations of operational service where appropriate;
- e. **Agree** that New Zealand Defence Force involvement in the relief effort for Tropical Cyclone Pam not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;
- f. **Agree** that Operation Haku not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;
- g. **Agree** that Operation Takapu not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;
- h. **Agree** that service s.6(a) [redacted] as part of Operation Troy not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;
- i. **Agree** that service in the State of Kuwait as part of Operation Mohua not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

- j. **Agree** that service in the Republic of Korea as part of Operation Monitor not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;
- k. **Agree** to declare that the declaration of emergency status for service with United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon, made under the War Pensions' Act 1954, has been superseded by the declaration of operational service for service with United Nations in South Lebanon, which you made on 6 August 2015;
- l. **Agree** to declare that the declaration of emergency status for service with United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, made under the War Pensions' Act 1954, has been superseded by the declaration of operational service for service with United Nations in the Syrian Arab Republic, which you made on 6 August 2015;
- m. **Note** the review of deployments from and after 15 August 1945 to 6 December 2015 is being staggered to make it manageable and that the most recent deployments will be reviewed first; and
- n. **Agree** that I will report on the conclusions of the reviews of deployments from and after 15 August 1945 to 6 December 2015 only when I am recommending that you issue a new declaration of operational service or that you modify an existing declaration of operational service.



**K.R. SHORT**  
Air Vice-Marshal  
Vice Chief of Defence Force  
Date: 15 NOV 15

MINISTER'S OFFICE COMMENTS:

**VANZ contact:** VA name

**Ph:** #

**A/H:** #

**Agencies involved:**

Reference VA 096 14-15

15 November 2015

Minister of Veterans' Affairs

## **DETERMINING WHICH DEPLOYMENTS ARE DECLARED OPERATIONAL SERVICE**

### **Purpose**

1. This brief:
  - a. seeks your endorsement of how I intend to determine which deployments be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014 (the Act);
  - b. seeks your endorsement for how I intend to inform you about the risks associated with deployments;
  - c. recommends that six deployments *not* be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act;
  - d. recommends that you declare that two declarations of operational service have been superseded;
  - e. informs you about the progress of Veterans' Affairs review of deployments from and after 15 August 1945 to 6 December 2015; and
  - f. notes that further consideration of which deployments should be covered by the Veterans' Support Act 2014 is a matter which should be examined during the upcoming review of the legislation, which is scheduled to occur as soon as practicable after 7 December 2016.

### **Background**

2. The Act requires that I provide you with a report that assesses the operational and environmental threats to the health and well-being of members of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) as soon as practicable after a decision is made to deploy them.
3. If you are satisfied that a deployment poses a significant risk of harm to the members of the NZDF deployed, you are required to declare the deployment operational service by placing a notice in the New Zealand Gazette (the Gazette).
4. The Act also requires that I inform you when a deployment ends or if the threats posed to the members of the deployed force escalate, abate or cease.

5. In response you can (by placing a notice in the Gazette) end, shorten or extend the period of operational service.

### **Determining which Deployments are Declared Operational Service**

6. The Minister of Veterans' Affairs is the arbitrator of what significant risk of harm is and, consequently, if a deployment should be declared operational service. However, I intend to take into account the following, so I can provide you with consistent recommendations about whether deployments should be declared operational service. This will not fetter your powers under the Act.

#### *Deployments*

7. Under the Defence Act 1990, the Chief of Defence Force can issue Defence Force Orders (DFOs) that set the terms and conditions of service for members of the armed forces. DFO 3, the NZDF Human Resource Manual, contains a definition of operational service.

8. When determining if an operation is a deployment for the purposes of the Act, I will take into account two factors:

- a. has it been appropriately authorised; and
- b. does it fulfil the definition of operational service in DFO 3.

9. Consequently, I will consider an operation to be a deployment for the purposes of the Act if the operation:

- a. has been appropriately authorised by Parliament, Cabinet, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence or the Chief of Defence Force; and
- b. fits into one of the following three categories:
  - (1) **Warlike:** Military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives and there is a pre-determined acceptance of casualties. These operations encompass:
    - (a) a state of war;
    - (b) conventional combat operations against an armed adversary; and
    - (c) peace enforcement operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who have not consented to intervention and are engaged in combat activities. Normally, but not necessarily always, they will be conducted under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, where the application of force is authorised to restore peace and security or other like tasks.

- (2) **Hazardous:** Military activities where the application of force has been authorised to pursue military specific objectives and there is a pre-determined acceptance of casualties, but under conditions less than warlike. The conduct of these operations is considered to be hazardous and can encompass:
- (a) peace enforcement operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who have consented to intervention but may remain engaged in combat activities. Normally, but not necessarily always, they will be conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, where the application of force is authorised for self-defence, defence of designated persons and the mission accomplishment;
  - (b) peacekeeping operations in support of ongoing diplomatic efforts to secure a state of peace and where previous belligerents have requested assistance to secure the peace or enhance the diplomatic peace processes. Use of force may be authorised for self-defence or defence of designated persons; and
  - (c) missions where use of force by members of the NZDF may be limited due to the circumstances but casualties may be expected, whether combat related or environmental.
- (3) **Non-Warlike:** Military activities in support of a government direction that involve pre-determined risk associated with the tasks outside of normal peacetime service requirements. Casualties are not expected but could occur. These operations encompass:
- (a) peacekeeping operations in relatively benign situations in support of ongoing diplomatic efforts to confirm the state of peace already established and where the risk of a breakdown of the established peace is minimal. Use of force may be limited to self-defence and the defence of designated persons;
  - (b) activities such as the enforcement of sanctions in a relatively benign situation;
  - (c) the provision of humanitarian relief, in disaster conditions, that entails a higher level of risk or discomfort than that are normally encountered in relief flights of civil assistance;
  - (d) military observer activities with the task of monitoring cease-fire, redirecting and alleviating cease-fire tensions, providing 'good-offices' for negotiations and the impartial verification of assistance of cease-fire agreements, and other like activities; and
  - (e) hazardous activities, which expose members of the NZDF to a degree of hazard above and beyond that of normal peacetime duty e.g. mine avoidance and clearance, weapons inspections

and destruction and operations requiring the application of minimum force to provide protection for members of the NZDF or property.

*Significant Risk*

10. Service in the NZDF is unique because members of the NZDF can be ordered to put themselves in harm's way in the service of New Zealand.

11. Parliament recognised this by requiring you to declare a deployment operational service if it poses a significant risk of harm to the members of the NZDF deployed.

12. The Law Commission in its 2010 report '*A New Support Scheme for Veterans: A Report on the Review of the War Pensions Act 1954*' (which led to the Act) argued that a special government obligation arises "when service personnel are in situations far outside that which they would expect or choose to experience in standard employment and living circumstances in New Zealand", on page 56 of the report.

13. Given the existence of the Accident Compensation Scheme, the Law Commission argued that it "is only when a service person is placed outside of their usual circumstances and faces actual risk of harm from a conflict situation or extreme environment that there are grounds for a special entitlements regime to apply", on page 56 of the report.

14. Consequently, I intend to define 'significant risk of harm' as when the overall operational or health threat level is medium or above, as this is the point at which the threat posed to members of the NZDF is clearly beyond that associated with peacetime activities, according to the definition of threat levels used in Strategic Military Threat Assessments (SMTAs) undertaken by the NZDF.

15. Table 1 provides the definition of threat levels used in SMTAs:

Threat Level Definitions	Operational Threat	Health Threat
Very Low	s.6(a)	
Low		
Medium		

Threat Level Definitions	Operational Threat	Health Threat
High	s.6(a)	
Very High		

**Table 1: Probability of a Threat Eventuating**

16. However, there will be instances when the assessed overall operational or health threat level does not reflect the actual degree of risk associated with a deployment. If this occurs, I will inform you of the other factors I have taken into consideration and the rationale for the adjustment I have made to the overall operational or health threat level. I have made such an adjustment with the relief effort for the Republic of Vanuatu (Vanuatu) in the wake of Tropical Cyclone Pam, as is described further along in this brief.

17. This approach (of assessing deployments as meeting the threshold for operational service where the threat level is medium or above) accords with the approach taken by previous Ministers of Veterans' Affairs, and with the findings of the Law Commission and the decisions of Cabinet leading up to the passage of the Veterans' Support Act 2014.

18. Declarations make clear who might be entitled to support from Veterans' Affairs, and there is merit in reassessing in future whether this default threshold is the correct one. The Veterans' Support Act is scheduled to be reviewed at the end of next year, and this issue is one of the matters expected to be considered as part of this review.

#### *Strategic Military Threat Assessments*

19. Since June 2003, the NZDF has undertaken SMTAs for the geographical areas where the NZDF is considering deploying personnel.

20. The purpose of a SMTA is to identify and evaluate the threats posed to NZDF personnel and equipment during a deployment.

21. An SMTA has two threat components – operational and health:

- a. the operational threat component assesses the threats to an NZDF contingent from individuals and groups, including threats from introduced operational dangers such as unexploded ordnance; and
- b. the health threat component assesses health and environmental issues, such as access to water, food and sanitation.

22. An SMTA includes an 'Assessed Threat Level Summary Table', which sets out the assessed threat levels for the different types of threats in a geographical area. I will provide you with a copy of this table when I recommend that service in a geographical area be declared operational service.

23. For your information, I have enclosed a document that describes how the NZDF prepares an SMTA.

### *The Scope of Declarations*

24. I recommend that geographical areas, rather than operations, be the basis for future declarations of operational service where appropriate.

25. There are two reasons why I am proposing this change of approach:

- a. It will significantly reduce the potential for uncertainty about who has coverage under the Act.

The names of operations change as task groups and task forces are established and disestablished during the course of a deployment. For previous deployments, this has created uncertainty as to which members of the NZDF have coverage under the Act. Using geographical areas as the basis for declarations of operational service will significantly reduce the potential for this issue to re-occur.

- b. It will avoid the need for multiple overlapping declarations of operational service.

The NZDF frequently has multiple operations in an area, because of the diffuse nature of current conflicts, with NZDF units operating in multiple geographical areas and members of the NZDF being seconded to the armed forces of other nations. If operations are used as the basis for declarations of operational service, multiple overlapping declarations will be required to ensure that all members of the NZDF who are at significant risk of harm have coverage under the Act.

26. Geographical areas have been the basis for all the declarations of operational service that you have made as Minister of Veterans' Affairs to date.

27. Consequently, I am requesting that you endorse this ongoing change in approach.

### **Informing the Minister about the Risks Associated with Deployments**

28. For deployments I am recommending be declared operational service, I will provide a briefing that contains:

- a. a description of the deployment;
- b. Assessed Military Threat Level Summary Tables for the geographical areas where a member or contingent of the NZDF will be deployed;

- c. descriptions of the operational and health threats in the geographical areas where the member or contingent of the NZDF will be deployed;
- d. the rationale for my recommendation; and
- e. a draft notice for the Gazette.

29. For deployments that I am recommending *not* be declared operational service, or where I am recommending that the period of operational service be shortened or ended, I will provide a briefing that contains:

- a. a description of the deployment;
- b. the overall health and operational threat levels for the geographical areas where a member or contingent of the NZDF will be deployed;
- c. descriptions of any other factors I have taken into consideration;
- d. the rationale for my recommendation; and
- e. a draft notice for the Gazette (if it is required).

30. These briefings will be in addition to the weekly briefing you receive about operations the NZDF is undertaking, which are prepared by the Strategic Commitments and Engagement Branch of the NZDF.

### **The Deployments I am Recommending Not be Declared Operational Service**

31. I am recommending that the following deployments not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act, because I am satisfied that the members of the NZDF participating in these deployments are not at significant risk of harm:

- a. The relief effort for Tropical Cyclone Pam;
- b. Operation Haku;
- c. Operation Takapu;
- d. Service **s.6(a)** as part of Operation Troy;
- e. Service in the State of Kuwait (Kuwait) as part of Operation Mohua; and
- f. Service in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as part of Operation Monitor.

32. The Military Threat Level Summaries covering the period since the Act came into force, on 7 December 2014, are in Annexes A to E. Military Threat Level Summaries cover the period from the date they are published to the day before the next Military Threat Level Summary is published.

*The Relief Effort for Tropical Cyclone Pam*

33. Tropical Cyclone Pam passed through Vanuatu on 12 and 13 March 2015, with sustained winds of 250 km/h at its peak. This resulted in a number of deaths and considerable damage to property and infrastructure.

34. In response, the New Zealand Government ordered the NZDF to assist the relief effort. NZDF involvement included:

- a. reconnaissance flights by an Orion P-3K2;
- b. a C-130 Hercules and a B200 King aircraft which transported personnel and delivered relief supplies; and
- c. a joint reconnaissance team, 1 Brigade Force elements and HMNZS *Canterbury* delivering relief supplies.

35. The deployment commenced on 14 March 2015 and ended on 22 April 2015, when HMNZS *Canterbury* departed Port Vila for New Zealand.

36. The overall operational threat level was very low and the overall health threat level was high for this deployment. The assessment of the health threats was based on personnel being domiciled in rural areas of Vanuatu.

37. NZDF personnel that participated in the relief effort were not domiciled in rural areas of Vanuatu. They were either aboard aircraft that operated out of New Zealand, aboard HMNZS *Canterbury* or based in Port Vila. Consequently, the actual overall health risk to members of the NZDF was low.

38. Given the above, I recommend that NZDF involvement in the relief effort for Tropical Cyclone Pam not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act.

*Operation Haku*

39. Operation Haku was the deployment of a frigate, HMNZS *Te Kaha*, to conduct patrols in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean in support of the Combined Maritime Forces in May and June of this year. During the course of the deployment, HMNZS *Te Kaha* visited a port in the Sultanate of Oman (Oman).

40. The overall operational threat was low and the overall health threat level was medium for Oman. However, the health threat assessment for Oman was for land-based personnel only. Consequently, the actual overall health risk was low for the crew of the HMNZS *Te Kaha*. The overall threat levels for all the other areas that HMNZS *Te Kaha* operated in was lower than medium.

41. Consequently, I recommend that Operation Haku not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act.

*Operation Takapu*

42. Operation Takapu is the deployment of 53 personnel and a P-3K aircraft s.6(a). Two of the personnel are based in Qatar. The P-3K Orion is

conducting flights in support of the Combined Maritime Forces and the Seychelles Peoples' Defence Forces.

43. In all of the areas that the Orion is operating, the overall operational threat levels and health threat levels are lower than medium.

44. Consequently, I recommend that Operation Takapu not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act.

#### *Operation Troy*

45. Operation Troy is the deployment of personnel to s.6(a) and Republic of Iraq (Iraq) as the New Zealand National Support Element for the NZDF deployment in Iraq.

46. The personnel in Iraq are covered by the declaration of operational service that you made on 23 April 2015 (the date when the declaration was published in the New Zealand Gazette).

47. As at 5 June 2015, the overall operational threat was low and the overall health threat was low-medium s.6(a).

48. Consequently, I recommend that service s.6(a) as part of Operation Troy not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act.

#### *Operation Mohua*

49. Operation Mohua is the deployment of personnel to the Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Command in Baghdad and to coalition headquarters for the United States-led Operation Inherent Resolve in Kuwait.

50. The personnel deployed in Iraq are covered by the declaration of operational service that you made on 23 April 2015.

51. The overall operational threat level was low and the overall health threat level was medium for Kuwait as at 5 June 2015. However, the assessment of the health threat is on the premise of land operations in the field. For this mission, the personnel are situated in Kuwait City in air-conditioned accommodation. In these circumstances the health risk is low.

52. Consequently, I recommend that service in Kuwait as part of Operation Mohua not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act.

#### *Operation Monitor*

53. Operation Monitor is the deployment of three officers to the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission in South Korea. This deployment includes monitoring the de-militarised zone between South Korea and the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea).

54. As at 5 June 2015 the overall operational threat was low and the overall health threat was low-medium for South Korea.

55. Consequently, I recommend that service in South Korea as part of Operation Monitor not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Act.

### **Declaring that Two Declarations of Operational Service have been Superseded**

56. I am recommending that you declare that the declaration of emergency status (the equivalent of operational service under the Act) for service with the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon (UNMACC SL), for the period from 11 February 2007 to 7 February 2008, has been superseded.

57. The declaration is no longer required because service with UNMACC SL is covered by the declaration of operational service that you issued on 6 August 2015 for service with United Nations in South Lebanon, for the period on or after 1 January 1978 until declared otherwise.

58. I am recommending that you declare that the declaration of emergency status for service for the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), for the period from 22 May 2012 to 22 August 2012, has been superseded.

59. The declaration is no longer required because service with UNMIS is covered by the declaration that you issued on 6 August 2015 for service with United Nations in the Syrian Arab Republic, for the period on or after 1 January 1974 until declared otherwise.

60. The recommended declarations will not result in any reduction in coverage for members of the NZDF that have served with UNMACC SL and UNMIS.

61. Draft notices for the New Zealand Gazette are in Annexes F and G for you to review. Please note that notices in the New Zealand Gazette are not signed.

### **The Progress of Veterans' Affairs Review of Previous Deployments**

62. Veterans' Affairs is reviewing all deployments that the NZDF has undertaken from and after 15 August 1945 (the day when the ceasefire with Japan came into effect) to 6 December 2014 (the day before the Act came into force), to ensure that current and ex-members of the NZDF have appropriate coverage under the Act and the Burial and Cremation Act 1964.

63. The review is being staggered to make it manageable. Consequently, groups of related deployments are reviewed, rather than a single review of all deployments since 1945.

64. Operations are being reviewed in reverse chronological order i.e. the most recent operations are being reviewed first.

65. I recommend that I report on the conclusions of these reviews only when I recommend that you issue new declarations of operational service or that you modify existing declarations of operational service.

66. Veterans' Affairs is currently reviewing NZDF's involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan.

67. I expect to be able to report on the outcome of this review by the end of September 2015.

### Recommendations

68. I recommend that you:

- a. **Endorse** the criteria I intend to use to determine which deployments I recommend be declared operational service;

ENDORSED / NOT ENDORSED

- b. **Endorse** how I intend to inform you about the risks associated with deployments;

ENDORSED / NOT ENDORSED

- c. **Note** that further consideration of which deployments should be covered by the Veterans' Support Act 2014 is a matter which should be examined during the upcoming review of the legislation, which is scheduled to occur as soon as practicable after 7 December 2016;

ENDORSED / NOT ENDORSED

- d. **Endorse** using geographical areas, rather than operations, as the basis for declarations of operational service where appropriate;

ENDORSED / NOT ENDORSED

- e. **Agree** that New Zealand Defence Force involvement in the relief effort for Tropical Cyclone Pam not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- f. **Agree** that Operation Haku not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- g. **Agree** that Operation Takapu not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- h. **Agree** that service **s.6(a)** as part of Operation Troy not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- i. **Agree** that service in the State of Kuwait as part of Operation Mohua not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- j. **Agree** that service in the Republic of Korea as part of Operation Monitor not be declared operational service for the purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- k. **Agree** to declare that the declaration of emergency status for service with United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon, made under the War Pensions' Act 1954, has been superseded by the declaration of operational service for service with United Nations in South Lebanon, which you made on 6 August 2015;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- l. **Agree** to declare that the declaration of emergency status for service with United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, made under the War Pensions' Act 1954, has been superseded by the declaration of operational service for service with United Nations in the Syrian Arab Republic, which you made on 6 August 2015;

AGREE / DISAGREE

- m. **Note** the review of deployments from and after 15 August 1945 to 6 December 2015 is being staggered to make it manageable and that the most recent deployments will be reviewed first; and

NOTED

- n. **Agree** that I will report on the conclusions of the reviews of deployments from and after 15 August 1945 to 6 December 2015 only when I am recommending that you issue a new declaration of operational service or that you modify an existing declaration of operational service.

AGREE / DISAGREE



**K.R. SHORT**  
Air Vice-Marshal  
Vice Chief of Defence Force

Date: 15 Nov 15

**Hon Craig Foss**  
Minister of Veterans' Affairs

Date:

**Annexes:**

- A. NZDF Strategic Military Threat Level Summary s.6(a)
- B. NZDF Strategic Military Threat Level Summary
- C. NZDF Strategic Military Threat Level Summary
- D. NZDF Strategic Military Threat Level Summary
- E. NZDF Strategic Military Threat Level Summary
- F. Declaration – declaring that the declaration of emergency status for service with the UNMACC SL has been superseded.
- G. Declaration – declaring that the declaration of emergency status for service with the UNMIS has been superseded.


**Enclosure:**

- 1. New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication: Military Threat Assessments (2<sup>nd</sup> edition)


s.6(a)




s.6(a)




s.6(a)



s.6(a)



s.6(a)



**Declaration of Operational Service for the Purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014**

In accordance with section 9 of the Veterans' Support Act 2014 ("the Act"), I hereby give the following notice.

**Notice**

1. I declare that the declaration of emergency status under the War Pension Act 1954 for service with United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon, which was made by the Honourable Nathan Guy on 25 June 2012, has been superseded by the declaration of operational service for service with United Nations in Southern Lebanon, which I made on 6 August 2015.
2. All members of the New Zealand Defence Force, and any person seconded to the New Zealand Defence Force with the permission of the Chief of the Defence Force, covered by this declaration, shall have access to the entitlements and services specified in the Act and the Veterans' Support Regulations 2014.
3. I am satisfied that there is a significant risk of harm to those that undertake this service, as required by the Act.

Dated this 10 September 2015

Hon CRAIG FOSS, Minister of Veterans' Affairs

**Declaration of Operational Service for the Purposes of the Veterans' Support Act 2014**

In accordance with section 9 of the Veterans' Support Act 2014 ("the Act"), I hereby give the following notice.

**Notice**

1. I declare that the declaration of emergency status under the War Pension Act 1954 for service with United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, which was made by the Honourable Nathan Guy on 19 September 2012, has been superseded by the declaration of operational service for service with United Nations in the Syrian Arab Republic, which I made on 6 August 2015.
2. All members of the New Zealand Defence Force, and any person seconded to the New Zealand Defence Force with the permission of the Chief of the Defence Force, covered by this declaration, shall have access to the entitlements and services specified in the Act and the Veterans' Support Regulations 2014.
3. I am satisfied that there is a significant risk of harm to those that undertake this service, as required by the Act.

Dated this 10 September 2015

Hon CRAIG FOSS, Minister of Veterans' Affairs



## Veterans' Affairs New Zealand

### Minister of Veterans' Affairs

<b>Subject:</b> Review of deployments with emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954		
<b>Date:</b> 22 October 2009	<b>File Number:</b> WPE 2 / 2	
<b>Action Sought</b>	<b>Deadline</b>	
For the Minister to review and indicate her agreement or disagreement. Whilst there are recommendations throughout the paper, the Minister is asked to give a final indication of agreement or disagreement at pages 26-28 of the paper.	-	
<b>VANZ Contact:</b> Rick Ottaway Kartini Havell	<b>Telephone:</b> s. 9(2)(a)	<b>Cellphone:</b> s. 9(2)(a)
<b>Other Agencies/ Organisations Consulted in the preparation of the brief</b>	NZDF	
<b>Minister's Office to Complete</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Seen <input type="checkbox"/> Noted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Agreed <input type="checkbox"/> not seen by Minister <input type="checkbox"/> overtaken by event <input type="checkbox"/> Referred to	
<b>Ministers Office Comments</b>		

## **Deployments without Emergency Service under the War Pensions Act 1954**

### **Proposal**

1. This paper asks the Minister to indicate which deployments she would like given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.
2. The paper also recommends that all the deployments named in this paper be given entitlement to burial in a Services Cemetery under the Burials and Cremations Act 1964.

### **Background**

3. The deployments outlined in this paper do not have emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954. These deployments have varied risk profiles. The paper outlines the nature of these deployments and makes a recommendation for each deployment. The recommendations are based on the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment model. The deployments that have been recommended for cover under the War Pensions Act 1954 are those that would fall into the medium to very high level categories under the treat assessment model.
4. In researching this paper, VANZ consulted with the NZDF historian and referred to a wide range of other source materials and primary documents. This enabled us to ensure that the material in this brief is historically accurate. While the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment model is a recent development, this was applied retrospectively in discussion with NZDF.
5. Section 80A of the War Pensions Act 1954 confers authority on the Minister of Veterans' Affairs to determine whether particular deployments are given emergency status for war pension's purposes. For deployments that occurred prior to 1 April 1974 this means that ex-service personnel who currently have coverage under the War Pensions Act 1954 on the basis of their non operational, routine, service a lower evidential threshold would be applied when applying for a War Disablement Pension for service related disabilities. For veterans who served after 1 April 1974 it means access to a War Disablement Pension and ACC for service related disabilities.
6. Section 55 confers authority on the Minister of Veterans' Affairs to give war pension cover to civilians, in the employ of the New Zealand Government, who are deployed in connection with any war or emergency.
7. It is not recommended that all the deployments be given war pensions cover under the War Pensions Act 1954. Personnel who served in any of these deployments could be given an entitlement to burial in a Services Cemetery under the Burials and Cremations Act 1964. For those who are not given war pension coverage this gives a form of recognition and would provide an

entitlement to subsidised memorial plaques or headstones and internment in a Services Cemetery.

8. Entitlement to burial in a Services Cemetery under the Burials and Cremations Act 1964 can be given by the Minister of Veteran's Affairs, after consultation with the Minister of Defence and the RNZRSA. The costs of the memorials and the burial are met by family, unless the death is attributable to service.

### **The Berlin Airlift**

*1 September 1948 to 11 August 1949*

*Approximately 13 NZ personnel*

9. On 25 June 1948 the Soviet Union blockaded the access routes into West Berlin. To counter this, the Western Allies mounted a massive airlift of essential supplies into the city. New Zealand contributed three flight crews to fly Royal Air Force transport aircraft to fly in essential supplies. The airlift ended in August 1949 when the Soviet Union ended the siege.
10. Although the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the consequent Western Allies' response did not escalate to full blown hostilities, the crisis greatly increased international tensions and the threat of escalation appeared at the time to be very real; for example, nuclear-configured B29 bombers were deployed from the US to Britain during its course as part of the Allied deterrent. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

### **Recommendation**

11. It is recommended that service in the Berlin Airlift is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) and its detachments**

*May 1954 to current*

*250 NZDF personnel*

12. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was founded to monitor the terms of the armistice agreement reached between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in 1948. New Zealand first contributed military observers to monitor the cease-fire agreement and to investigate incidents in breach of the agreement in May 1954. New Zealand continues to support UNTSO with about 250 New Zealand personnel having served with it since 1954.
13. From time to time UNTSO sub-units have provided observers to other UN operations in the area. Observers were provided to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Jerusalem and Sinai in 1956-57, the United Nations Observer Group Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958 and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978-86, the United Nations Yemen

Observer Mission (UNYOM) in 1963-1964, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in 1960-64, the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in 1973 – 1979, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights in 1974, 1982 and 1986, and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) over 1988 – 1991.

14. UNTSO has been declared as emergency service for the purposes of the War Pensions Act 1954, as have its detachments the United Nations Observer Group Lebanon (UNOGIL), the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM), and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The other detachments of UNTSO do not have emergency cover at this time.

### ***United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)***

*1956 to 1957*

*2-3 NZDF Personnel*

15. The first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis to supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, and thereafter to remain as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces and supervise the ceasefire.
16. New Zealand initially offered to raise a contribution to UNEF I, to be based in the Gaza strip. However Egyptian doubts regarding New Zealand's neutrality following our diplomatic support of Britain during the crisis led to UN indication that the New Zealand offer would not be accepted.
17. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

### ***Recommendation***

18. It is recommended that service with the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### ***Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)***

*October 1973 to 1979*

*2 NZDF personnel*

19. The second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) was established to supervise the ceasefire and redeployment of forces in the Sinai following the Egypt – Israel armistice of 1973. Later, its mandate was expanded to manning the buffer zones set up under agreements of 1974 and 1975.
20. Although the New Zealand government considered making a official contribution to UNEF II, this did not eventuate. Two New Zealand officers were rather seconded from their duties with UNTSO to assist with the initial deployment of the force.
21. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

22. It is recommended that service with the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)***

*1974 to current time*

*3 NZDF personnel*

23. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established in June 1974 to supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Syria in the wake of the October 1973 war, and to establish and monitor a buffer zone in the Golan Heights region.
24. New Zealand officers serving with UNTSO have been detached to UNDOF at various times since its inception.
25. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

26. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)***

*1978 to current day*

*NZDF personnel*

27. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created by the UN Security Council following the 1978 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was mandated to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces and restoring peace and security in the region.
28. New Zealand officers from UNTSO have worked closely with UNIFIL since it was established. New Zealand personnel attached to the Fijian armed forces have in the past served for short periods of time with the Fijian battalion which forms part of UNIFIL.
29. Ongoing tensions in the area have complicated the UNIFIL mission. Lebanon has been subject to ongoing internal divisions. While Israel initially withdrew, it handed over control to Lebanese anti-Government forces. Israel invaded southern Lebanon again in 1982. There has been ongoing military activity in the area and in April 1996, hundreds of Lebanese civilians sheltering at a UN compound in Qana were killed or wounded after it was shelled by the Israeli Defence Force.
30. Following the escalation of hostilities between the Hezbollah and Israel over July/August 2006, UNIFIL's mandate was extended to monitor the cessation of hostilities in that crisis, to support the Lebanese armed forces as they

deployed throughout southern Lebanon, and to provide humanitarian support to the civilian population of southern Lebanon. UNIFIL peacekeepers were caught up in the cross fire of the crisis, and 5 were killed during this period.

31. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

32. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)***

*July 1988 to 28 February 1991*

*103 NZDF personnel*

33. To monitor compliance with the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the United Nations established the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). New Zealand first contributed 10 personnel in 1988, followed by an RNZAF transport aircraft, to serve with UNIIMOG.
34. During the first weeks of the ceasefire, there were many breaches of the ceasefire and the observers were sometimes caught in the middle of artillery exchanges. Landmines also posed a threat. From July 1988 until January 1991, 103 New Zealand personnel served with UNIIMOG.
35. Participation in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) involved risk from the frequent violations of the ceasefire and the observers were sometimes caught in the middle of artillery exchanges. The situation was worsened by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
36. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

37. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

## **Suez Crisis**

*29 October to 5 November 1956*

*Approximately 550 RNZN personnel*

38. Following Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in late 1956, Great Britain and France in collusion with Israel mounted an attack on Egypt on 29 October. While there was popular and governmental support for the British approach within New Zealand, there was an international outcry against the attack which deterred New Zealand from the prospect of becoming actively involved in the conflict.
39. In October 1956 as the Suez crisis mounted the New Zealand Cruiser *Royalist* was in the Mediterranean, attached to the Royal Navy Mediterranean Fleet on exercises. The British Government asked the New Zealand Government for permission to use *Royalist* as part of their naval force for action in Suez, but while the New Zealand Government was sympathetic to the request, there was disquiet about the implications of joining a military action that did not have United Nations Security Council support.
40. While the New Zealand Government prevaricated around making a final decision, *Royalist* remained attached to Mediterranean fleet and acted as a radar picket to the fleet for 2 or 3 days. By 2 November however it was clear that approval for *Royalist* to take an active role would not be forthcoming from New Zealand, and she was ordered to withdraw from the operational area by the British Admiralty.
41. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

## **Recommendation**

42. It is recommended that service in the Suez Crisis is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

## **Thailand**

*1962 to 1971*

*NZDF Personnel*

43. Operation Scorpion was a joint US/British/Australian/New Zealand deployment to north-east Thailand, on the border with Laos, following the outbreak of a Laotian crisis in May 1962. A detachment of no. 41 Squadron RNZAF was deployed to courier passengers and freight around Thailand. A 30-strong SAS detachment was also deployed in June 1962, but this was primarily a political gesture intended to show New Zealand's commitment to the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and the SAS detachment was occupied training with other SEATO forces for the duration of their deployment.

44. In September 1962 the US announced the Special Logistic Aid Thailand (SLAT) programme, a significant programme for the development of logistic facilities in Thailand. In December 1962 the New Zealand Cabinet approved the detachment of up to 3 Bristol freighters from Singapore to Khorat, Thailand as a contribution to the SLAT programme.
45. In 1964, under 'Operation Crown' a RNZE construction squadron was deployed to Mukdahan, Thailand, to assist in building an all-weather airfield. The squadron was composed of engineers and drivers. They took personal weapons with them but did not carry or need them while they worked. There was a minor risk from banditry in the region, but not from enemy combatants, and the airfield camp was well guarded.
46. The Thailand Feeder Road project was an economic development project initiated by SEATO. A New Zealand Army Engineers unit was deployed to the project between 1966 and 1971. This was a non-warlike engineering assistance in an area considered to be low threat. While some enemy activity took place in Thailand during this time, the reported incidents were at distance from the feeder road project.
47. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment these four operations are all deemed to have been low risk.

#### ***Recommendation***

48. It is recommended service with Operation Scorpion, the Special Logistic Aid Thailand programme, Operation Crown and the Thailand Feeder Road project is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### **United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

*May 1964 to June 1967*

*79 New Zealand Police*

49. Following the independence of Cyprus from Britain in 1960, violence broke out between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Serious fighting broke out in December 1963 and in response; in March 1964 the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was established to maintain order between the two communities.
50. Between 1964 until 1967, 79 members of the New Zealand Police served with the United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) in Cyprus. They were armed with pistols and sub machine guns. The situation was at time extremely tense, and exchanges of fire between Turks and Greeks took place in areas where the New Zealanders were based. However, they were not themselves directly involved in hostilities but used relationships and negotiations as a means of diffusing potentially violent confrontations.
51. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

### ***Recommendation***

52. It is recommended that service by the NZ Police who were part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) – Operation Midford**

*23 December 1979 to 5 March 1980*

*Approximately 74 Army personnel*

53. In December 1979, following a cease-fire between the warring Government and Patriotic Front forces in Rhodesia, the Commonwealth provided a monitoring group to observe the terms of the ceasefire during the lead-up to the national elections. New Zealand contributed an army contingent to monitor the ceasefire and investigated breaches of its terms.
54. The New Zealanders were tasked with processing and disarming Patriotic Front guerrillas who had emerged from the bush to be reintegrated into their tribal homelands prior to the election. The general population was largely supportive of the CMF presence and there were few breaches of the ceasefire; however, some of the Patriotic Front guerrillas would not agree to being disarmed and there were instances in which the NZDF contingent were obliged to deal with armed and unstable PF guerrillas.
55. The New Zealand personnel left the operational area on 5 March 1980 after the successful settlement of the Rhodesian dispute and the establishment of the independent state of Zimbabwe.
56. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

### ***Recommendation***

57. It is recommended that service with the Commonwealth Monitoring Group - Operation Midford is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)**

*25 April 1982 to current*

*770 NZDF personnel*

58. After the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 a non-UN monitoring force, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was established to observe and monitor the terms of the peace treaty in a 164 km buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula.
59. In 1982 New Zealand's initial contribution to the MFO was a RNZAF helicopter detachment to provide support to other elements of the MFO. In March 1986 the helicopter detachment was withdrawn and replaced by an Army training team and personnel for the MFO Headquarters. In early 1989,

the Chief of the New Zealand General Staff, Major General Donald McIver, was appointed MFO Force Commander, becoming the first New Zealand officer to command a major international peace-support operation. General McIver commanded the MFO for two years. New Zealand has continued its commitment to the MFO, with over 770 New Zealand personnel having served since 1982.

60. The presence of the MFO has the full support of the governments of Israel and Egypt. The hazard level for New Zealand personnel deployed to the MFO is generally low. While the status of the MFO may alter in future if regional tensions escalate, in accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is so far deemed to have been low risk.

#### ***Recommendation***

61. It is recommended that service with the Multinational Force and Observers is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### **Operation Armilla – Indian Ocean**

*21 June 1982 to 20 September 1983*

*Approximately 800 RNZN personnel*

62. During the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1989, the Royal Navy deployed a task group to protect merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean. During the Falkland War, as British naval vessels were needed for service in the South Atlantic, New Zealand offered the use of a naval frigate to maintain the British peacekeeping presence in the Indian Ocean.
63. The New Zealand frigates Waikato and Canterbury were both deployed twice to the Armilla patrol in 1982 and 1983, conducting patrols and monitoring merchant shipping and belligerent activities near the Gulf of Oman.
64. The Armilla patrol is considered a low risk operation. The patrols were not the focus of hostilities and primarily ensured the safe passage of merchant vessels through the sea passages adjacent to Iran and Iraq. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

#### ***Recommendation***

65. It is recommended that service in Operation Armilla is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### **United Nations Mine Clearing Training Team: Pakistan and Afghanistan (UNMCTT)**

*February 1989 to 31 December 1991*

*17 NZDF Personnel*

66. When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in early 1989, millions of land-mines were left behind. In response, the UN Coordinator of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan established a

mine-awareness programme, 'Operation Salaam'. As part of this programme, the United Nations Mine Clearing Training Team (UNMCTT) was set up. The UNMCTT consisted of small groups of military engineers who taught mine awareness and clearance techniques to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Once the refugees had been trained, they were to return to Afghanistan and begin clearing mines.

67. New Zealand provided five personnel to UNMCTT to run mine awareness education courses for Afghan civilians in Peshawar, North West Pakistan in February 1989. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.
68. In early 1991, several New Zealanders went into Afghanistan to monitor the mine clearance being carried out by the Afghans and to ensure the mine clearance methods were being applied correctly in the field. The New Zealand deployment was withdrawn in December 1991 when it was determined to commit our de-mining resources to Cambodia. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment, the detachment into Afghanistan is deemed to have been medium risk.

#### ***Recommendation***

69. It is recommended that service with the detachment of the United Nations Mine Clearing Training Team into Afghanistan is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.
70. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Mine Clearing Training Team in Pakistan is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### **United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)**

*April 1989 to March 1990*

*14 NZDF Personnel*

*Police Officers*

71. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was established to supervise the ceasefire between South African forces and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) brokered in December 1988, and to supervise Namibia's transition to independence through overseeing free elections. UNTAG was established as a combined military and civilian police operation.
72. The first elements of UNTAG arrived in Namibia in late February 1989. The contingent of New Zealand Police left for Namibia in late April 1989, to work under the auspices of the United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) in monitoring the South-West Africa Police to ensure that they carried out their duties in a non-partisan manner.
73. In mid-1989, it was agreed that a 14-strong New Zealand Army Engineer contingent would be deployed to UNTAG to assist with construction projects, de-mining efforts and the destruction of ammunition and explosives. The

detachment reached Namibia on 26 September 1989. While armed for self defence, they were not called on to use their weapons, although there was a high level of tension in the area and on one occasion a New Zealand sapper was shot at (but was uninjured).

74. Namibia became an independent state on 21 March 1990, and the NZDF and Police contingents returned to New Zealand over March 1990. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

#### ***Recommendation***

75. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### ***Bougainville***

76. The deployment to Bougainville had various phases. There was greater risk associated with some parts of the deployment than others. The recommendation for this deployment reflects the different levels of risk.

#### ***Operation Big Talk***

*29 July 1990 to 5 August 1990*

*NZDF Personnel*

77. In mid-1990, following decades of hostility and civil unrest on Bougainville, New Zealand deployed three RNZN ships off the coast of Bougainville at the request of the Papua New Guinea government to serve as a neutral venue for peace talks between government and secessionist leaders. The frigates HMNZS Wellington and Waikato accommodated the delegations and the tanker HMNZS Endeavour served as the base for negotiations. An agreement named the 'Endeavour Accord' was signed after eight days of negotiation.
78. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

#### ***Recommendation***

79. It is recommended that service with Operation Big Talk is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### ***South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF)***

*September to October 1994*

*13 NZDF Personnel*

80. By the early 1990s, fighting had resumed on Bougainville. In September 1994 a new cease fire agreement was reached between the PNG Government and the secessionists. A regional peacekeeping force, the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF), was established from contingents from Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand. New Zealanders occupied staff

positions at the force's headquarters and provided a search team which was responsible for ensuring that weapons were not brought into the neutral zones controlled by the SPPKF. Peace talks held in early October 1994 were not successful and when the SPPKF was disbanded and withdrawn from Bougainville in mid-October 1994, Bougainville remained a site of serious unrest.

81. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

82. It is recommended that service with the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***Operation Coracle***

*July 1997*

*Approximately 12 NZDF Personnel*

83. Operation Coracle was the name given to operation in which the HMNZS *Canterbury* returned delegates of the Bougainville peace talks, which had been held in Christchurch, to their home islands on Bougainville.
84. Rigid hull inflatable boats were used to ferry the delegates from HMNZS *Canterbury* to shore. Operation Coracle also involved negotiation for the release of five Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) prisoners of war, who had been held by the Bougainville Republican Army (BRA) since September 1996. A detachment of BRA delegates accompanied by the New Zealand Special Envoy and other NZDF personnel effected the release negotiations.
85. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

86. It is recommended that service with Operation Coracle is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***Truce Monitoring Group (TMG)***

*October 1997 to April 1998*

*500+ NZDF Personnel*

87. In October 1997 New Zealand agreed to a request from the Government of Papua New Guinea to lead a truce-monitoring group (TMG) on Bougainville. The mandate of the TMG was to promote and instil confidence in the peace process through interaction with the local community and monitor and report on the compliance of the parties with the terms of the peace agreement.

88. The TMG was deployed to Bougainville as Operation BELISI, and included Army elements supported by RNZAF. The force also contained elements from Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu. The TMG was unarmed.
89. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

90. It is recommended that service with the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***Peace Monitoring Group (PMG)***

*May 1998 to 30 June 2003*

*30 NZDF Personnel*

91. Following further political talks, a permanent cease-fire was agreed in February 1998 and came into effect at the end of April 1998. The TMG was transformed into a new Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in May 1998, led by Australia with a smaller NZDF component. The PMG was focussed on weapons collection and containment. Positive political developments and increased security led to the withdrawal of the New Zealand contingent by August 2003.
92. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

93. It is recommended that service with the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***Iraq***

***United Nations Special Commission Iraq (UNSCOM)***

*June 1991 to December 1999*

*98 NZDF Personnel (civilian police also involved)*

94. After the first Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission Iraq (UNSCOM) was set up to oversee the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand initially provided the medical support for the investigative team. This was then expanded to include administrative and communications support.
95. This deployment was highly politicised and posed a number of physical, psychological and environmental risks. On many occasions UNSCOM personnel were subjected to harassment and intimidation by the Iraqi people and the UN vehicles had rocks and iron bars thrown at them. The work of inspecting and destroying the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was extremely dangerous work with some personnel facing the risk of exposure to nerve gas and the hazards posed by unexploded munitions.

96. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

97. It is recommended that both the service by NZDF and Civilian personnel serving in the United Nations Special Commission Iraq is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)***

*November 2002 to 28 March 2003*

*13 NZDF Personnel*

98. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created through Security Council resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999. UNMOVIC was to replace the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter's mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological weapons and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to check Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to reacquire the weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council.
99. In response to a request from the United Nations New Zealand provided medical and communications support to UNMOVIC. Like the United Nations Special Commission Iraq (UNSCOM) deployment, this deployment was highly politicised and posed a number of physical, psychological and environmental risks. UNMOVIC inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in March 2003 following the US-led invasion.
100. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

101. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***Cambodia***

***United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)***

*October 1991 to March 1992*

*Approximately 21 NZDF Personnel*

102. After years of civil war, the various factions in the Cambodian conflict accepted a peace settlement in October 1991 and the United Nations then took control of Cambodia in the lead up to national elections.

103. The United Nations established the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to assist with the maintenance of the ceasefire and to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged to include training in mine-clearance and the initiation of a mine-clearance programme. In 1991, New Zealand contributed engineers to assist with and advise on mine clearance.
104. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

105. It is recommended that service with UNAMIC (October 1991 to March 1992) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)***

*1992 to 1993*

*Approximately 92 NZDF Personnel*

106. UNAMIC and its functions were subsumed by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992. UNTAC was established to ensure implementation of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. This included the organization and conduct of elections, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of Cambodia's infrastructure. New Zealand provided army communications personnel to UNTAC, along with naval personnel to patrol Cambodia's inland and coastal waters.
107. In the initial stages of the New Zealand involvement in Cambodia, dangers were posed by the militant Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) faction, which became increasingly hostile towards UNTAC from 1992. In several instances New Zealand personnel were held captive by the Khmer Rouge, with one New Zealand signaller attached to a small UNTAC team held under house arrest for more than a month. In an incident in May 1993, Khmer Rouge guerrillas attacked the town of Siem Riep where 8 New Zealand peace keepers were based. The guerrillas raked their house with small arms fire until deterred by warning shots fired by the NZDF personnel.
108. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

109. It is recommended that service with UNTAC (February 1992 to September 1993) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***United Nations Military Liaison Team (UNMLT)***

*1993 to 1994*

*1 NZDF Personnel*

110. On 4 November 1993, the UN Security Council determined to establish a United Nations Military Liaison Team (UNMLT). The team consisted of 20 unarmed military officers who were tasked to maintain close liaison with the Cambodian Government, reporting to the Secretary-General of the UN on matters affecting security in Cambodia. New Zealand provided military observers to the team. The Team ceased operations on 15 May 1994.
111. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

112. It is recommended that service with UNMLT is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

***Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU)***

*December 1991 to 30 April 2005*

*2 additional NZDF Personnel post-1994*

113. The de-mining programme started under UNAMIC in 1991 was developed into the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU). New Zealand engineers deployed with UNAMIC had been among the first mine clearance specialists to arrive in Cambodia and they developed the training programmes and standard operating procedures that were later adopted by all the training and clearance teams belonging to the MCTU.
114. After May 1993, the Cambodian government took over responsibility for the work formerly carried out by the MCTU. The security situation in Cambodia had improved markedly by late 1993 as evidenced by the replacement of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) by the United Nations Military Liaison Team (UNMLT) in November 1993. NZDF involvement in CMAC ended on 30 April 2005.
115. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk through 1991-late 1993. The improvement of the general security situation in Cambodia by November 1993 means that thereafter this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

116. It is recommended that service with the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) before 4 November 1993 is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

117. It is recommended that service with the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) and the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) after 4 November 1993 is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Mozambique**

*26 NZDF Personnel*

**United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)**

*December 1992 to December 1994*

118. The United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was established in December 1992 to rebuild Mozambique after over 30 years of civil war, and to establish a de-mining programme in the mine littered county. New Zealand contributed two mine clearance personnel who were based at the Mine Clearance Training Centre (MCTC). They were responsible for setting up mine clearance training programmes to educate locals in mine removal techniques.
119. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

120. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Operations in Mozambique is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Nations Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme (MADP)**

*September 1994 to 30 June 2005*

121. In September 1994, the United Nations Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme (MADP) was established to deal with the landmine problem in the country. New Zealand contributed technical advisors to MADP from 1994 to 2005. MADP was a notably successful de-mining mission, with over 2.9 million square metres of area known, or suspected, to be mined having been cleared by the end of 2002. On 30 June 2005, NZDF involvement in Mozambique ended with the withdrawal of the last NZDF officer, who had served as the Chief Technical Advisor for MADP.
122. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

123. It is recommended that service with the Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme (MADP) is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

## **United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM, UNOSOM II, UNITAF)**

*January 1993 to March 1995*

*182 NZDF Personnel*

124. In 1992, the United Nations established the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) in response to a humanitarian crisis created by decades of political unrest and a drought leading to famine. UNOSOM was tasked to monitor a ceasefire in Mogadishu, provide protection for UN personnel and ensure the secure distribution of humanitarian aid.
125. New Zealand contributed an army supply detachment of 27 personnel to UNOSOM I, and also provided three Andover transport aircraft and RNZAF personnel to support the United States-led United Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF had been formed, under the auspices of UNOSOM I, to secure humanitarian relief centres so as to ensure that aid could be distributed where it was required.
126. In May 1993 UNITAF withdrew and UNOSOM II took its place. The New Zealand supply detachment was replaced with a 43-strong supply platoon. UNOSOM II was the first UN peacekeeping force charged with restoring law and order and disarming combatants, moving beyond the traditional peacekeeping role into an active peace making role.
127. Participation in the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II and UNITAF) posed a significant risk for the personnel involved. The security situation in Somalia was extremely dangerous. Battles between warring clans often raged outside the United Nations security base perimeter with stray mortar and small arms fire posing a threat. To venture outside the compound was extremely hazardous; body armour and weapons were always carried for protection and any movement outside the UNOSOM camp was in armed convoy due to the threat of ambush. Troops were intimidated, and in one case a New Zealander was briefly held captive after his supply convoy was ambushed. Two other United Nations soldiers were killed in this attack.
128. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

### ***Recommendation***

129. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II and UNITAF) is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

## **Rwanda (UNHCR)**

*July 1994 to September 1994*

*36 NZDF Personnel*

130. Between April and July 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and Hutu moderates were killed in a genocide instigated by the Hutu extremist

Interahamwe. The Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) responded by returning to Rwanda from their base in Uganda to overthrow the Hutu government. Over two million Hutu subsequently fled Rwanda to neighbouring countries, leading to a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.

131. In response to the crisis in Rwanda, New Zealand provided an RNZAF transport aircraft along with crew and support personnel to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The New Zealand detachment operated out of Entebbe, Uganda and flew humanitarian supplies to the refugee camps at Goma, Zaire, close to the Rwandan border. NZDF personnel did not enter Rwanda itself.
132. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

### **Recommendation**

133. It is recommended that service with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Rwanda mission is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)**

*19 September 1994 to 31 March 1995*

*4 NZDF Personnel*

134. In 1993 the United Nations established the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to oversee the establishment of a peace accord after the overthrow of the Haitian military regime. An American-led multinational force peacefully occupied Haiti from 19 September 1994 after the declaration of a general amnesty.
135. New Zealand contributed four army officers to UNMIH to act as military observers. Due to the potentially dangerous situation in Haiti the officers were armed, the first time that New Zealand military observers carried weapons. They were involved in monitoring the activities of the United States lead multinational force and in investigating incidents that did occur between the Multinational Force and Haitian authorities. When the New Zealanders first arrived, the situation was very tense; on 23 September, 10 Haitian police were killed during a gun battle with the multinational force. However as the multinational force disarmed the Haiti security forces and armed civilians, conditions steadily improved. On 31 March 1995 the multinational force handed full functions over to UNMIH and the New Zealand observers left Haiti.
136. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

### ***Recommendation***

137. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Mission in Haiti is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **Multinational Interception Force (MIF)**

*August 1995 to March 1999*

*662 NZDF Personnel*

138. After the 1991 Gulf War the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq because of its failure to comply with Security Council resolutions. To enforce the sanctions an international naval force, the Multinational Interception Force (MIF), was established.
139. New Zealand agreed to provide navy frigates to assist enforce the sanctions in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. The frigates' role was to intercept and search vessels suspected of smuggling contraband in violation of the United Nations sanctions. New Zealand contributed three frigate deployments, HMNZS Wellington from October to December 1995, HMNZS Canterbury from September to November 1996 and HMNZS Te Kaha from October to November 1999. The RNZN also provided a boarding party for the US Navy from December 1998 to March 1999.
140. While the political climate of the Persian Gulf at this time was potentially volatile, the overall threat level in the Gulf as the MIF was carrying out its activities was significantly lower than today. The deployment took place before the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. The role of the MIF was to search for contraband, not hostile agents, and while personnel may have faced some potential risk from individuals while boarding their vessels, the overall context was of a low operational threat level.
141. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

### ***Recommendation***

142. It is recommended that service in the Multinational Interception Force is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **Laos National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXOL)**

*1 July 1997 to 2003*

*8 NZDF Personnel*

143. Over 2 million tonnes of bombs were dropped on Laos during the Vietnam War. These were targeted at the 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' supply route to South Vietnam which ran through Laos. This included over 80 million cluster bombs, each holding 200-600 'bomblets.' It is estimated that up to 30% of these small bombs failed to explode when launched and continue to litter the landscape. Unexploded ordnance, particularly on arable land, is a significant factor in

ongoing Laotian poverty and over 10,000 have been killed or maimed by UXO since the war.

144. The Laos National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXOL) was established to assist efforts to remove these unexploded bombs, and to educate the Laotian people on their danger. New Zealand has contributed 8 personnel to UXOL who were deployed two at a time. The NZDF personnel acted as senior technical and operational advisors and were based at UXOL headquarters. They were not themselves involved in the defusing of UXO.
145. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

146. It is recommended that service with the Laos National Unexploded Ordnance Programme is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Coalition Joint Task Force – Kuwait (CTF-K)**

*February 1998 to 2000*

*40 NZDF Personnel*

147. CTF-K was a multinational ground force stationed in Kuwait. Its function was to provide a forward command and headquarters facility in the event of a war in the Middle East. New Zealand contributed 40 personnel to CTF-K between 1998 and 2000.
148. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

149. It is recommended that service with the Coalition Joint Task Force – Kuwait is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Tsunami - Papua New Guinea**

*July 1998*

*Approximately 25 NZDF personnel*

150. On 17 July 1998 a catastrophic tsunami devastated several villages on the north coast of Papua New Guinea. Confirmed deaths were in the thousands, and several villages had been totally destroyed.
151. New Zealand provided assistance in the form of an NZDF medical team and C-130 Transport planes. The medical team was involved in working at the field hospital. The RNZAF were involved in transporting people.
152. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment, the work of the medical team in the Papua New Guinea Tsunami is deemed to have been medium risk due to the environmental risks of their deployment. The work of the RNZAF is deemed to have been low risk.

### ***Recommendation***

153. It is recommended that the service of the medical team during the Papua New Guinea Tsunami is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.
154. It is recommended that the service of the NZDF personnel involved in the RNZAF team during the Papua New Guinea Tsunami is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### ***Kosovo***

#### ***KOSMED and KOSAID***

*1999*

*28 NZDF Personnel (6 KOSMED, 22 KOSAID)*

155. In response to the humanitarian crisis affecting Kosovo's civilian population during the civil war in May 1999, New Zealand contributed an Air Force C-130 transport aircraft and support personnel (KOSAID), and a medical team (KOSMED) to assist with the international relief effort.
156. The New Zealanders with KOSAID flew medical and humanitarian supplies into Albania from Italy, while KOSMED was attached to the German Red Cross.
157. The medical team (KOSMED) sent by the New Zealand Government to Kosovo to assist with the international relief effort during the civil war in May 1999 worked in very stressful conditions. In addition, although they were sent to the area as a military medical unit they were unable to act as a military unit and worked under the auspices of the Red Cross.
158. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment, KOSMED is deemed to have been medium risk. KOSAID is deemed to have been low risk.

### ***Recommendation***

159. It is recommended that service with KOSMED is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.
160. It is recommended that service with KOSAID is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### ***United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)***

*1999 to current day*

*10 NZDF Personnel*

161. In June 1999, following the cessation of NATO operations against Serbia in 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established to establish a civilian administration in the war-ravaged Yugoslavian province of Kosovo. UNMIK was tasked to create conditions for

a lasting peace by maintaining civil law and order, basic administrative functions and human rights.

162. In 1999 the New Zealand Government agreed to send up to four Military Liaison Officers to serve with UNMIK. An additional 6 NZDF personnel have subsequently been deployed to UNMIK.
163. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been low risk.

***Recommendation***

164. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Kosovo Force (KFOR)**

*2002*

*2 NZDF Personnel*

165. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is an international force responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo. This peace-enforcement force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 under a United Nations mandate.
166. While there was no formal NZDF deployment to KFOR, two NZDF personnel deployed to KFOR with their host units while on Exercise Long Look in 2002.
167. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment KFOR is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

168. It is recommended that service with KFOR is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Sumatra Assist – Indonesia**

*27 December 2004 to 28 February 2005*

*Approx. 100 NZDF Personnel*

169. On Boxing Day 2004, a magnitude 9.1 earthquake, centred to the west of Sumatra, caused a gigantic tsunami to rise out of the Indian Ocean. The scale of the disaster was enormous, with a death toll in excess of 216,000, and millions of people left homeless.
170. In response to the Tsunami disaster, New Zealand provided transport aircraft and medical personnel as part of the international relief effort. The Air Force transport aircraft and its crew were based in Jakarta, their role the delivery of humanitarian supplies to affected areas in the region. The medical team was based in the Indonesian province of Banda Aceh. Their role was to administer medical aid to persons injured in the Tsunami. New Zealand Police and civilians were despatched to Phuket to assist with the identification

of victims. All NZDF personnel were returned home from Banda Aceh by 28 February 2005, although New Zealand police and civilians involved in the post-tsunami relief and body identification effort in Phuket remained there until late 2005.

171. The personnel involved in Sumatra Assist on Banda Aceh were working in one of the worst affected areas. The personnel were in a very stressful environment amid high levels of human suffering, in difficult and hazardous conditions. Issues faced by the personnel included dealing with large numbers of injured and displaced people, recovering bodies and identifying victims, the physical risks of aftershocks and debris and wreckage from the earthquake and tsunami, and unhygienic working conditions. Being in this demanding environment placed high levels of stress on the personnel involved and presented great physical and psychological challenges. Personnel based solely in Phuket and Jakarta faced a significantly less demanding environment.
172. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment, Operation Sumatra Assist on Banda Aceh is deemed to have been medium risk.

### ***Recommendation***

173. It is recommended that the service of NZDF personnel with Operation Sumatra Assist based in Banda Aceh between 27 December 2004 – 28 February 2005 is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.
174. It is recommended that the service of both the NZDF and Civilian personnel involved in tsunami relief operations based in Phuket and Jakarta is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

### **United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)**

*17 September 2005 to current*

#### *NZDF Personnel*

175. Following over 50 years of conflict in Sudan, a UN resolution in March 2005 established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of National Unity (predominantly Arabic Muslim Northern Sudan) and the Government of South Sudan (predominantly Nilotic Christian Southern Sudan).
176. The security situation in Sudan is volatile with armed conflict, banditry, kidnapping, and other criminal activity of concern. There is also a potential threat of terrorist attack; statements by international terrorist groups have called for a "jihad" in Sudan against western interests, including UNMIS, and the Sudanese government.
177. In mid-July 2008, the Government approved a request from UNMIS to redeploy a New Zealand military liaison officer from Sudan's capital Khartoum to Darfur for a period of two weeks. The New Zealand Army officer assisted with planning of contingency measures for the withdrawal of UN personnel in the event of attacks against UN forces. This followed the killing of seven UN

soldiers and wounding of 19 others in an attack in Darfur in the first week and the International Criminal Court's indictments against the President of Sudan.

178. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

179. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Mission in Sudan is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon (UNMACC SL)**

*11 February 2007 to 7 February 2008*

*20 NZDF Personnel*

180. To address the huge problems caused by landmines in Southern Lebanon, with an estimated one million cluster bombs and other unexploded ordnance left behind following the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in July 2006, New Zealand provided personnel to UNMACC SL to act as mine clearance personnel. Two teams of 10 NZDF personnel, made up of Army Engineers and Navy Operational Divers, were deployed for approximately 6 months each.

181. In accordance with the NZDF Strategic Military Threat Assessment this operation is deemed to have been medium risk.

***Recommendation***

182. It is recommended that service with the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon is given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954.

**Financial Implications**

183. Applying the threat assessment criteria has the potential to increase coverage under the War Pensions Act 1954 for approximately 2000 personnel at this time. However, the net impact will likely be less due to the number of multiple deployments. For example: large number of those involved in the Commonwealth Monitoring Group in Rhodesia also served in Vietnam; a large number of those deployed to Bougainville also served in Timor. In addition, personnel involved in the deployments pre 1 April 1974 already have cover under the War Pensions Act 1954 on the basis of their non operational, routine service.

184. The claims rate for personnel deployed to emergency service in East Timor from 30 August 1999 to today is 0.005%. At its peak point in the early 1990s, the claim rate for the World War II cohort was approximately 0.09% and today is in the region of 0.04%. The highest claim rate is the Vietnam veterans, where the claim rate is 37%. This uptake rate is anomalous in comparison to other deployments.

185. It is unlikely that the increase in pension coverage resulting from this proposal would increase the total number of War Disablement Pensions beyond the current number as any new claims would be offset by the decline in the number of World War II veterans receiving war disablement pensions. As a result there would be limited financial implications from the increase in coverage stemming from this proposal.
186. Applying a broader set of criteria such as medallic recognition or giving all deployments cover would have a more noticeable impact that would, over time, be offset by the decline in the number of World War II veterans receiving war disablement pensions.

### Recommendations

187. It is recommended that the Minister:

- 1 **Agree** that entitlement to burial in a Services Cemetery under Section the Burials and Cremations Act 1964 be given to all the deployments outlined in this paper.

agree/disagree

2. **Agree** that service in the following deployments be given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954:
- a. Berlin Airlift (1 September 1948 to 11 August 1949);
  - b. United Nations Emergency Force (1956 to 1957);
    - i. Second United Nations Emergency Force (October 1973 to 1979);
    - ii. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (1974 to current);
    - iii. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (1978 to current);
    - iv. United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (July 1988 to February 1991).
  - c. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (May 1964 to June 1967);
  - d. Commonwealth Monitoring Group - Operation Midford (23 December 1979 to 5 March 1980);
  - e. United Nations Mine Clearing Training Team into Afghanistan (1991);
  - f. South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (September to October 1994), the Truce Monitoring Group (October 1997 to April 1998) and the Peace Monitoring Group (May 1998 to June 2003);

- g. United Nations Special Commission Iraq (June 1991 to December 1999), and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (November 2002 to March 2003);
- h. United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (October 1991 to March 1992), United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (February 1992 to September 1993), and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre and Mine Clearance Training Unit (December 1991 – November 1993);
- i. United Nations Operations in Somalia (January 1993 to March 1995);
- j. United Nations Mission in Haiti (19 September 1994 to 31 March 1995);
- k. Medical Team Tsunami - Papua New Guinea (July 1998)
- l. KFOR and KOSMED (1999);
- m. Operation Sumatra Assist in Banda Aceh (27 December 2004 to 28 February 2005);
- n. United Nations Mission in Sudan (17 September 2005 to current);
- o. United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre in Southern Lebanon (11 February 2007 to 7 February 2008).


agree/disagree

3. **Agree** that service in the following deployments is not given emergency status under the War Pensions Act 1954:

- a. Suez Crisis (29 October to 5 November 1956);
- b. Operation Scorpion, Special Logistic Aid Thailand programme, Operation Crown and Thailand Feeder Road project (1962 to 1971);
- c. Multinational Force and Observers (25 April 1982 to current);
- d. Operation Armilla (21 June 1982 to 20 September 1983);
- e. United Nations Mine Clearing Training Team in Pakistan (1 April 1989 to 31 December 1991);
- f. United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (April 1989 to March 1990);

- g. Operation Big Talk (29 July 1990 to 5 August 1990), and Operation Coracle (July 1997);
- h. United Nations Operations in Mozambique and Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme (December 1992 to 30 June 2005);
- i. United Nations Military Liaison Team in Cambodia (November 1993 to May 1994), and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre and Mine Clearance Training Unit (November 1993 – April 2005);
- j. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Rwanda mission (July 1994 to September 1994);
- k. Multinational Interception Force (August 1995 to March 1999);
- l. Laos National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (1 July 1997 to 2003);
- m. Coalition Joint Task Force – Kuwait (1998 to 2000);
- n. RNZAF Team Tsunami - Papua New Guinea (July 1998);
- o. KOSAID (1999), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (1999 to current);
- p. Operation Sumatra Assist in Phuket and Jakarta (27 December 2004 to 26 December 2005).

agree/disagree



Rick Ottaway  
Secretary for War Pensions

22 October 2009

2071/2 DDI

Directorate of Defence  
Intelligence

AC(Ops)

**THREAT ASSESSMENT - THE THREAT TO THE RNZN IN  
BOUGAINVILLE WATERS**

**Introduction**

1.(C) The RNZN may provide vessels to facilitate Peace Talks between the PNG Government and rebel leaders on Bougainville. If the talks eventuate the vessels would be anchored off Arawa, the capital of North Solomons Province (Bougainville). It is assumed that the PNG Government delegation will be quartered aboard the RNZN vessels whilst the Bougainville delegation would "commute" between Arawa and the vessels each day for the talks because of their requirement to confer with the various factions.

**Background**

2.(C) A rebellion against the PNG Government commenced in November 1988. Rebellious groups subsequently formed the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) and successfully waged a guerilla war against the PNG Security Forces. As part of a peace process the Security Forces were withdrawn in March 1990 and peace talks were scheduled to follow within two weeks. For a variety of reasons these talks have still not taken place. In June the BRA, in conjunction with Provincial Government and church leaders, declared Bougainville independent and formed an Interim Government.

3.(C) The BRA is a loose amalgam of disparate groups with divergent aims. It is also riven by clan and regional disagreements. The aims of other groups or individuals within the Interim Government are unknown.


**The Threat - General**

4.(S) The threat to RNZN vessels and personnel, as such, is assessed as very low but the threat to their becoming "caught in the crossfire" by the various groups is higher. s.6(a)




**DECLASSIFIED**  
On 29 July 2015  
Reference London HQ  
Appointment Declassification Panel

s. 6(a)



**DECLASSIFIED**  
On 29 July 2015  
Reference Gordon Hall  
Appointment Declassification Panel

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


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Reference London Mail  
Appointment Declassification Panel


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
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Appointment Declassification Panel

s. 6(a)



Capt  
for DDI

27 Jun 90



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MD 206

All correspondence should be addressed:  
Chief of Defence Staff,  
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Private Bag, Wellington, N.Z.  
Telephone: 4960-999



In reply please quote:  
NZDF 03302/6

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
WELLINGTON, N.Z.

18 July 1990

Mr D McDowell  
Head of Prime Minister's Department

**DECLASSIFIED**  
On 29 July 2015  
Reference Prudman/Mar  
Appointment Declassification Panel

BOUGAINVILLE PEACE TALKS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

At your meeting with AVM Klitscher on Thursday 12 July it was agreed that NZDF would propose a form of words defining the NZ national policy with respect to the NZDF role in the Bougainville talks, and, further, that NZDF would outline the Rules of Engagement which would govern the actions of NZDF units operating in the area. That detail follows. I would be grateful if you would endorse the detail and advise how Government clearance is to be sought.

National Objective

The national objective is to provide a secure venue for talks between the Government of PNG and the leadership of Bougainville.

National Policy

The national political policy is to foster successful negotiations between the principals without becoming a participant ourselves. The military policy is to encourage de-escalation of any warlike tensions that may exist between the two parties to the talks, without introducing new ones as a third party. In order not to hazard the national objective, the military policy will conform to the political and diplomatic process. This requires that the use of force is avoided, and therefore that opportunities for hostile action to be taken against New Zealand forces are minimised.

Military Rules of Engagement (ROE)

New Zealand is not at military odds with either of the principals. Neither can New Zealand intercede, should fighting between them resume. In that event, all New Zealand forces are to disengage forthwith, and to withdraw to await further instructions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There remains the possibility that deliberate or renegade military action by either side could be directed against New Zealand forces or against persons for the time being under the protection of New Zealand forces. Thus, if threatening or hostile actions are encountered, the following operational Rules of Engagement are authorized.

1. Primary Rule. The Commanding Officers of HMNZ Ships may use minimum force, not including the firing of weapons. Actions permitted, in broadly ascending sequence, are as follows:

- a. Challenge by light or by radio.
- b. Stationing own unit.
- c. Riding off.
- d. Overt preparedness of weapons systems.
- e. Jamming.
- f. Harassment.
- g. Training of weapon systems.

<b>DECLASSIFIED</b>
On <u>29 July 2015</u>
Reference <u>Guidelines</u>
Appointment <u>Declassification Panel</u>

2. Contingent Rule. As a contingent rule, the Commander of the Task Group may authorize the use of minimum force including the firing of weapons. Actions permitted under this Rule in broadly ascending sequence are as follows:

- a. As at Rule 1 above.
- b. Fire a blank warning shot.
- c. Fire the largest-calibre gun available or, depending on range, fire audible small arms or tracer, across the bows of an offending vessel.
- d. Close to point-blank range (if tactically safe to do so) and make clear that fire will be opened unless the offending vessel conforms.
- e. Open fire with practice ammunition or small arms tracer at the vessel's funnel from point-blank range.

3. Self-Defence. Notwithstanding the above, the commander of any NZDF element has at all times the inherent right to use such force in self-defence as may be necessary to protect his command and the lives of his men and of those who may be temporarily in his care. Action in self-defence is only justified when there is an instant and overwhelming necessity which leaves no choice of means

and no moment of deliberation. Any such action must be limited strictly to the needs of defence and may not be carried over into retaliatory or punitive action. Furthermore, dependent on the circumstances, the commander must make every effort to bring the engagement to an end.

4. Overflight. The possibility of overflight of HMNZ Ships by PNG or another nation's military or civilian aircraft cannot be discounted. The likelihood of aerial attack is, however, slight. Accordingly, there are no ROE specified for aerial action; the self-defence rule applies.

5. Changes to ROE. Authorization of changes to the military ROE rests with CDF, following consultation with the Government. Requests for change are to be made by the fastest means and are to include:

- a. a precise statement of the requested rule;
- b. a detailed justification; and
- c. the proposed command level at which it will be invoked.

*J.A. MACE*  
J.A. MACE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Defence Force

**APPROVED**  
*[Signature]*  
MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
2017/190

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On 29 July 2015  
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*[Signature]*  
MINISTER  
of External Relations and Trade.

**APPROVED**  
*[Signature]*  
Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer  
Prime Minister



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Def 03302/6

Headquarters  
New Zealand Defence Force

25 July 1990

See Distribution List

CDF OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 6/1990 : REVISE 1

NZDF ASSISTANCE FOR BOUGAINVILLE PEACE TALKS

**DECLASSIFIED**  
On 29 July 2015  
Reference Gordon H. H. H.  
Appointment Declassification Panel

References:

- A. CDF Planning Directive 5/90 dated 26 June 1990
- B. CDF Operational Directive 6/1990 dated 13 July 1990

Situation

1. Since Reference B was produced, sufficient new information is available to warrant the issue of a Revise. Accordingly, this Directive replaces Reference B which should now be destroyed.

2. The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government has requested NZ Government assistance in providing a secure neutral venue at which the PNG Government and North Solomons Province (NSP) representatives can meet and negotiate terms for the settlement of the Bougainville dispute. The NZ Government has agreed to the provision of assistance but final commitment to the operation has not yet been made by either PNG or NSP and, while the PNG Government has agreed to the conditions relating to this assistance, confirmation of agreement from the leaders of NSP has yet to be received.


3. **s. 6(a)**  


The situation in Bougainville remains fluid.

- a. Local Forces. A threat assessment and appreciation of the PNGDF and NSP force strengths and capabilities have been issued separately as 2071/2 DDI dated 27 Jun 90.
- b. Supporting Forces.
  - (1) RNZAF air transport support;
  - (2) HQNZDF Intelligence support; and

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- (3) RNZN support and liaison staffs positioned at NZ High Commission, Port Moresby and at Rabaul.
- (4) A Diplomatic Liaison Officer will be embarked for the operation.

Mission

4. To provide a secure neutral venue and accommodation for the PNG and NSP representatives who engage in Bougainville settlement negotiations.

Execution

5. Concept of Operations. In order to achieve security and the confidence of the negotiators the NSP and PNG participants are to be uplifted by separate RNZN ships from Kieta and Rabaul respectively, and transported to an open water location in international waters where they will transfer the negotiators to a third ship with conference facilities. Boat crews embarking representatives are to be unarmed and the embarkation is to be covered by helicopter surveillance. Mission timing is to be such that all preparations are complete for a conference to commence on 28 July 1990. Conference facilities are required for up to 20 participants for up to 15 days and overnight accommodation for the negotiating parties is to be on separate ships.

6. Outline Plan. RNZN Ships are to proceed to Bougainville area of operation by the most expeditious route and air transport is to be provided to transport additional elements to the area of operations (AO). An RNZN Liaison Officer is to be positioned with the NZ Head of Mission, Port Moresby. Unless essential to the conduct of the operation the positioning of personnel ashore in Bougainville is to be avoided.

7. Task Organisation.

- a. CNS is to raise a Task Force to conduct the mission.
- b. CAS is to provide air transport assistance in support of the Task Force as requested by CNS for this operation.

8. Rules of Engagement. The National Objective and Statement of National Policy have been agreed by Government and they and the Military Rules of Engagement (ROE) including the procedure for changes to ROE are detailed in Annex A.

9. Media. A PRO and photographic support is to accompany the Task Force. Their prime role is to document events for the record but if necessary, and only if called upon, they will also be available to facilitate release of joint PNG/NSP media statements.

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These will be channelled to media via HQ NZDF PRO and PM&C. Should either delegation wish to release separate media messages, facilities by which PNG delegates may communicate with Port Moresby and NSP delegates may communicate on the Bougainville Roman Catholic Radio net are to be provided.

10. Searches. All non-NZ personnel and their baggage are to be searched for hidden weapons, explosives and alcohol on each occasion of embarking from shore, or at other times as deemed necessary by the Task Force Commander. Searches are to be carried out in private and in the case of PNG officials by the Royal PNG Constabulary with an RNZN observer.

11. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be brought onboard and Commander Task Force is to use his discretion in the provision of alcohol to the conference representatives.

#### Inter Governmental Arrangements

12. Third Person Note. At Annex B is the text of a Third Person Note from the NZ High Commission Port Moresby to the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs outlining the conditions under which HMNZ Ships will be provided.

13. Initiating Letter. At Annex C is the text of an Initiating Letter which will form the basis of an agreement between NZ and PNG on personnel immunity and claims for the duration of the operation.

#### Administration and Logistics

14. Medical. Task Group is to provide general medical support facilities for conference delegates.

15. Diet and Protocol. Every endeavour is to be made to cater for and satisfy local sensitivities, protocols and dietary requirements. Detailed requirements will be advised if and when available.

16. Finance. This operation is deemed to be a Defence activity and as such costs incurred are to be met within normal service budgets. Full costing analysis and records are to be maintained.

#### Command and Signals.

17. Policy Direction. An Interdepartmental Working Group under the direction of Chief Executive PM&C and including CDF will meet

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regularly to review the situation, to brief ~~Ministers and to provide~~ policy direction.

18. Command. CDF will exercise command of the operation through CNS. The Defence Operations Centre (DOC) is to be activated with effect from 1700 hrs Thu 26 Jul 90, staffed jointly by Ops Branch and Naval Staff personnel. The DOC will be the command focus in Wellington.

19. Communications.

a. Signals. The signal address for the DOC is HQNZDF OPS (Routing Indicator - RZYXFZ). SIC E4E is to be used for the duration of the operation.

b. Nickname. The nickname for the operation is 'BIG TALK' and it is to be included in the first line of text of all messages relating to the operation.

20. Briefings. A daily Int/Ops briefing is to be conducted for CDF and CNS.

21. Reports.

a. Daily. A daily summary of activity is to be reported by the Task Force to HQNZDF, copied to PM&C, MERT and posts in Port Moresby, Port Vila and Honiara.

b. After Action. A consolidated report on the operation is to be forwarded to HQNZDF within 14 days of completion of the operation. The consolidated report is to include a full costing schedule.

  
J.A. MACE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Defence Force

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CGS  
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For Information:

COMAUCK  
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DESC Coordinator

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**OPERATIONAL SUPPORT PACKAGE:  
BOUGAINVILLE**

Directorate of Defence  
Intelligence and Security

6 November 1997

**Chapter 1**

**Background to the Bougainville Conflict**

**SUMMARY**

The Bougainville Conflict has its origins in an ongoing compensation dispute between the mining company, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), and the local landowners. The independence movement was evident in 1975 when PNG achieved independence, and is a natural and parallel issue alongside the Panguna Mine disputes.

Low key sabotage began in 1987/88 and quickly escalated. During the early months of 1989, militant activities spread and the PNG government responded by deploying elements of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) to Bougainville. The heavy handed and ill-disciplined attitude of these mobile squads provoked a greater level of violence from a group which later came to be known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).

In March 1989 PNGDF troops were deployed and the frequency of armed clashes between the militants and the security forces increased to the point at which a protest against the mining company had become an act of rebellion against the authority of the state.

In 1990 all PNGDF troops and police were withdrawn from Bougainville, and a blockade imposed on the island. The BRA declared their independence May 1990 and established their own government at the same time.

The 1990 Endeavour <sup>Accord</sup> gave the warring parties an avenue for a peaceful resolution, but mutual distrust led to breaches of the Endeavour Accords. During October 1990 the PNGDF returned to Buka island, spending the next two years re-establishing a presence throughout Bougainville.

During 1994 the BRA and PNG Government again agreed to come together for peace talks. These talks were held at Bougainville's major town, Arawa, and involved a South-Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) to supervise the security for the peace talks. NZ troops made up a small portion of this peacekeeping force.

The end of 1995 saw a number of meetings in Australia between the BTG and the BRA. Following the last of these meetings in December 1995 the BRA delegates were ambushed by the PNGDF when returning to Bougainville.

1996 was a disastrous year for the PNGDF on Bougainville with two major defeats.

During July and October 1997 the New Zealand government hosted two sets of talks at Burnham Military Camp between factions involved in the Bougainville conflict.

Since the July and October talks relative calm and optimism has been observed on the island.

## BACKGROUND

### Historical Development

1. The Bougainville Conflict has its origins in an ongoing compensation dispute between the mining company, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), and the local landowners. However it is unlikely the dispute would have escalated had it not been complicated by issues of political autonomy between the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government and the Provincial Government. The catalyst was a small group of educated militants, led by Francis Ona, who opposed their traditional leaders and demanded greater levels of compensation from BCL in 1988. The Provincial Government, led by Premier Joseph Kabui, supported the militants directing BCL to negotiate directly with them on compensation issues. The traditional leaders appealed to BCL and the PNG Government. Isolated acts of sabotage met with the heavy handed intervention of elements of the Royal Papuan New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). This in turn led to widespread payback activities, and the formation of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The addition of a secessionist agenda consolidated clan support and legitimised the use of violence. Internationally the "Bougainville Conflict", as it became known, was readily grafted onto academic theories expounding the inherent instability of Melanesian society and the regional consequences of Melanesian nationalism. As a result subsequent dialogue has centred on the representative nature of participants and the political consequences of the peace process.

**The Panguna Landowners Association (PLA)**

2. The operations of BCL spanned four language groups: Torau at the east coast port site; Nasioi extending from the Kieta district into the mountainous region of the Crown Prince Range, and Nagovisi and Banoni in the tailing disposal areas to the west. In 1980 the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) was established to centralise land ownership.

3. The establishment of the PLA had two significant consequences. Firstly it consolidated traditional ownership. Nasioi, in particular, lacked any continuity of leadership or political organisation. Nor was unity between these language groups a characteristic of the indigenous social structure. The PLA was to be a forum for the discussion of issues free of parochial divisions. A negotiated increase in compensation payments enhanced the credibility of the PLA executive. A trust, the Road Mine Tailings Leases Trust Fund (RMTLTF), was also established to invest a percentage of compensation payments for community development.

4. A dispute within the PLA arose when younger militants challenged the older Nasioi leadership for control of the PLA. The militants, led by Francis Ona, demanded greater compensation from BCL. They also alleged mismanagement of the RMTLTF. As a consequence of the dispute a more militant "new" PLA was established. The "new" PLA was recognised by the Provincial Government and endorsed by then Premier Joseph Kabui. Meanwhile the "old" PLA continued to be recognised and supported by BCL and the PNG government who, for reasons of expediency, chose to ignore the demands of the "new" PLA.

5. On 25 November 1988, militant landowners under the leadership of Francis Ona embarked on a campaign of sabotage against the installations of the Panguna copper mine, operated by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) in the North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea.

**Deployment of the Security Forces**

6. During the early months of 1989, militant activities spread. The PNG government responded to this violence by deploying elements of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) to Bougainville. The police took the form of mobile squads. The heavy handed and ill-disciplined attitude of these mobile squads provoked a greater level of violence from a group which later came to be known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).

7. In March 1989 the Papua New Guinea government dispatched troops to the province in an effort to subdue the militants. The frequency of armed clashes between the militants and the security forces increased to the point at which a protest against the mining company had become an act of rebellion against the authority of the state.

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1-4

8. On 18 April Francis Ona reportedly made contact with the NSCG, advising it that succession, not compensation, was now the issue. On May 15 BCL ceased its mining operations amidst a fresh outburst of attacks on its property and the threat of a strike by workers fearful for their own safety.

9. Violence on the island further increased over the next 12 months to a point where a state of emergency was declared on the island. During March 1990 all PNGDF troops and police were withdrawn from Bougainville, and a blockade imposed on the island.

10. The BRA declared their independence on the 17th of May 1990 and established their own government at the same time. This organisation is called the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG).

**Peace Initiatives**

11. During August 1990 the PNG government and the BRA signed peace accords aboard HMNZS ENDEAVOUR. The Endeavour Accords, as they became known, gave the warring parties an avenue for a peaceful resolution to the violence on Bougainville.

12. Mutual distrust led to breaches of the Endeavour Accords. During October 1990 the PNGDF returned to Buka island, spending the next two years re-establishing a presence throughout Bougainville.

13. During 1994 the BRA and PNG Government again agreed to come together for peace talks. These talks were held at Bougainville's major town, Arawa, and involved a South-Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) to supervise the security for the peace talks. NZ troops made up a small portion of this peacekeeping force.

14. The result of the peace conference was an agreement for a provincial governing body for the island. This body is called the Bougainville Transitional Govt (BTG).

15. The end of 1995 saw a number of meetings in Australia between the BTG and the BRA. Following the last of these meetings in December 1995 the BRA delegates were ambushed by the PNGDF when returning to Bougainville.

16. 1996 was a disastrous year for the PNGDF on Bougainville with two major defeats. The first of these took place at Aropa where a battalion group was withdrawn from its operational tasking without command approval. The second defeat occurred at Kangu beach where a company HQ was over-run and elements of a nearby platoon were surrounded. (this attack resulted in 15 PNGDF killed and 5 captured).

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17. During the October of 1996 the Bougainville Transitional Government Premier, Theodore Miriung was assassinated by junior soldiers from the PNGDF. Miriung was considered a moderate influence in Bougainvillean politics.

18. During the latter part of February 1997 the PNG government engaged the mercenary firm, Sandlines Ltd. (links with Executive Outcomes), to eliminate the BRA leadership. This scheme was exposed by the Australian government. The PNG government was to use this mercenary firm in a special forces training capacity. However it is likely these mercenary personnel would have been used in operations against the BRA and their leadership.

19. The use of a mercenary firm to resolve the Bougainville problem was a key factor behind the PNG Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, losing his seat in the July PNG general election. He was replaced by Mr. Bill Skate.

20. During July and October 1997 the New Zealand government hosted two sets of talks at Burnham Military Camp between factions involved in the Bougainville conflict. The first of these talks was between the leadership of the BRA and the BTG. The purpose of the first talks was for ethnic Bougainvilleans, from different factions, to put aside their past differences and agree upon a united Bougainvillean standpoint from which to negotiate peace with the PNG govt. The second set of talks was set at an "officials" level and had representatives from the PNG government, PNGDF, BRA, BTG and the Resistance. These groups agreed upon the parameters for a further Leaders meeting and also a truce between the warring factions on Bougainville as a prelude to a formal cease fire and an end to the conflict..

21. Since the July and October talks relative calm and optimism has been observed on the island. During this time Bougainville, along with the rest of PNG, has experienced a severe drought.

PNG Govt  
PNGDF  
Resistance

BTG → BTG

BRA

Resistance?

MINUTE

DDIS 68/204/63/1

DDIS  
ISP Branch  
HQNZDF

21 Aug 02

*A/DDIS RN endorsed*

DDSP (Pol)

Through:

*AD PAC 22/8 See comment in Ref A (Encl. 2).*

For Information:

DSP

**HISTORICAL RISK ASSESSMENTS: BOUGAINVILLE**

References:

- A. Email (Finlayson) 16 Aug "Risk Assessment: Bougainville prior to 1997"
- B. DFO 115 – Military Threat Assessments

1. In response to Ref A. (enclosure 2), based upon contemporary sources, I assess that the operational threat levels were extent to NZDF forces deployed to Bougainville were as follows:

- a. Operation BIG TALK (28-31 Jul 1990) – the threat to NZDF forces was LOW;
- b. Operation PORTUS (5-19 Oct 1994) – the threat to NZDF forces was LOW TO MEDIUM; and
- c. Operation CORACLE (23-25 Jul 1997) – the threat to NZDF forces was LOW.

2. In none of the above operations was there a desire on the part of either BRA or other key players to target NZDF personnel: indeed, the BRA's objective was to attempt to internationalise the Bougainville issue, albeit on their terms. To inflict harm on NZDF personnel or engage in other hostile acts whilst NZDF personnel were present would have been contrary to this interest. Similarly, the

PNGDF were very unlikely to target NZDF personnel or BRA personnel in the company of NZDF members.

3. The slightly higher threat for Operation PORTUS is explained by the nature of the deployment (ie semi-permanent rather than transitory), and by the slightly more contrary position taken by the pro-independence forces at that time.

4. Should you have any questions with regard to this matter, please contact me.



Travis Cunningham  
Australian Exchange Officer  
Ext: 5.6(a)

Enclosure:

1. Annex D to DFO 115 "Operational Threat Level Definitions"
2. Dixs Email (Finlayson) 16 Aug "Risk Assessment: Bougainville prior to 1997"