



Headquarters  
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New Zealand

OIA-2024-4884

31 January 2024

Dear [REDACTED]

I refer to your email of 13 December 2023 requesting, under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) requesting *...copies of all lessons learned documentation, after exercise reviews or memos, and other documents to a similar effect (including communiques, circulars or other similar documents in any written or electronic format), regarding Exercise Cartwheel '23, Exercise Luluai, Exercise Al-Alamein[sic] and Exercise Talisman Sabre '23 (all 2023).*

Decisions regarding your previous requests for *all lessons learned documentation* have stated that observations and lessons learned provide specific information on the tactics, techniques and procedures used by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) for their improvement. For this reason, observations and lessons learned for these exercises are withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA. Post Activity Reports (PARs) for Exercises Talisman Sabre 23, Cartwheel and El-Alamein are enclosed. With respect to the PAR for Exercise Talisman Sabre 23, the unit specific PARs (listed as annexes) are withheld in full for the same reason that observations and lessons learned are withheld. The PAR for Exercise Luluai is yet to be finalised and remains under review. It is therefore withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA to maintain the effective conduct of public affairs.

Where indicated, information has been withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the OIA so as to not prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand. Personal information is withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(a) of the OIA to protect privacy. Signatures and contact details are withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(k) of the OIA to avoid the malicious or inappropriate use of staff information, such as phishing, scams or unsolicited advertising.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at [www.ombudsman.parliament.nz](http://www.ombudsman.parliament.nz) or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

**AJ WOODS**

Air Commodore  
Chief of Staff HQNZDF

**Enclosures:**

1. Exercise Talisman Sabre 2023 PAR
2. Exercise Cartwheel 2023 PAR
3. Exercise El Alamein 2023 PAR

# Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles

## Commanding Officer's MINUTE 039/2023

13 Oct 23

E7-0024/07

See Distribution

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: EX TALISMAN SABRE 23 (EX TS23) POST ACTIVITY REPORT (PAR)

Reference:

A. HQJFNZ EXINST 076/23: TALISMAN SABRE 2023 (TS23)

#### 1. Introduction

- a. Ex TS23 was a bilateral, biennial, Australian (AU) hosted and United States of America (USA) supported combined exercise focused on the planning and conduct of a high end, mid-intensity warfighting scenario. The NZDF contributed Force Elements (FE) and augmentee personnel, who primarily participated in the maritime manoeuvre and joint land combat activities.
- b. IAW Ref A, the purpose of this minute is to provide an executive summary of the key NZDF outcomes from Ex TS23. Further detail pertaining to a specific capability or deployed FE is contained within the individual unit PARs that are provided as annexes to this minute.

#### 2. Preparation and Deployment

- a. There were a significant number of augmentee personnel deployed on Ex TS23. It is apparent there was a lack of centralised control of these personnel, limiting their preparation for roles on Ex TS23. It is recommended a liaison network that coordinates with HQJFNZ and can manage all augmentees across the services, be established for Ex TS25.
- b. Given the issue of unit hollowness, QAMR was severely tested in its capacity to act as the Mounting HQ (MHQ). Assuming the NZDF contribution to Ex TS25 increases in scale, it is essential that a cohesive, and sufficiently resourced MHQ is established in support of the contributing units.
- c. The current individual readiness criteria for overseas exercises results in a requirement for a high number of waivers. Whilst readiness criteria for overseas exercises should be reviewed in the context of risk management etc, units need to be proactive in ensuring individual readiness criteria is met, and reserves are identified and sufficiently prepared.
- d. The planning and delivery of PDT for Ex TS23 was inconsistent across the services. A PDT that is common for all deploying personnel that can be delivered across home unit camps and bases is required.
- e. There was difficulty in identifying the correct ADF POCs and units. It is recommended that once POCs are identified, key personnel within the Joint

National Support Element (JNSE) and deploying units are granted direct liaison authority to maintain liaison and engagement before deploying.

- f. Confirmation of unit participation on Ex TS23 was not clear until after the Final Planning Conference (FPC). This created confusion amongst MHQ staff as to participant numbers and identities, and subsequent equipment requirements.
- g. HQJFNZ provided clearly directed when units were to confirm participation and there must be adherence to this timing across NZDF for future activities so as to minimise the administrative burden on the MHQ.

### 3. **Command and Control (C2)**

- a. There needs to be a clear and identifiable C2 structure for all deploying FE. This is necessary for the Senior National Officer, and the National Command Element (NCE), to maintain effective oversight of all deployed elements. There was confusion amongst disparate FE as to who their chain of command was in-theatre, resulting in a lack of communications with the NCE, thereby limiting situational awareness.
- b. Once the MHQ has been established, a clear C2 and reporting line with HQJFNZ is vital. It is recommended that LOs are identified so the MHQ, JNSE, and HQJFNZ remain connected, enabling the passage of information for the duration of the exercise.

### 4. **Exercise Conduct and Partner Interoperability**

- a. All NZDF FE demonstrated the agility and adaptability to embed and successfully operate with their Australian and coalition partners. Constraints were primarily imposed by difficulties in integrating tactical communications (both land and air), networked CIS, s.6(a) support networks and s.6(a) support supply chains.
- b. In particular, the efforts of HMNZS MATATAUA to re-orientate from the exercise to a real-time recovery task as part of a multi-national MCM TG, following the loss of the ADF MRH-90, should be acknowledged and demonstrates the level of interoperability that was achieved to that point.
- c. NZDF FE deployed on Ex TS23 gained vital experience and assurance that they can operate within a partnered environment in a war-fighting context. This reinforces the quality and value of the training systems generating NZDF capabilities at the sub-unit and small team level. It does, however, reinforce the importance of consistent exposure to activities of this scale and complexity.
- d. It is apparent that NZDF personnel require greater exposure to operating within a higher HQ. The value of embedding personnel within a multi-national higher HQ is clear, as this will build the foundation for the deployment of the Motorised Infantry Battle Group (MIBG) (-) and Rotary Wing Task Unit (RWTU) deployments in 2025.


### 5. **Theatre Logistics, Combat Service Support (CSS) and Medical Support**

- a. The JNSE, and deployed FE, endeavoured to utilise the ADF supply chains in-theatre (where possible) however significant issues were encountered in

delivering stores and equipment within the exercise scenario. This demonstrates the importance of a national intra-theatre logistic support and liaison structure, embedded within the ADF system that ensures delivery to deployed NZDF FE.

- b. The JNSE played a central role in coordinating the air and maritime movements both inter-theatre and intra-theatre, but was impacted by the lack of SQEP personnel and visibility of movements planning across all NZDF FE. The structure and establishment of the JNSE in future activities of this scale will need to be resourced sufficiently to manage relatively complex movement planning and coordination.
- c. Given the unavailability of HMNZS CANTERBURY, a civilian vessel was required to deploy the NZLAV and MHOV vehicles. The significant delays in the arrival and departure timings both to and from Australia adversely impacted the combat team's pre-exercise training and integration programme, as well as the RTNZ and reconstitution programme for QAMR. This highlights the importance of the military sealift as the primary means for deployment of vehicles and larger scale equipment.
- d. The battlefield casualty evacuation chain was exercised throughout the joint land combat activity, which provided a valuable training experience for the medical team however, it should be noted that both medical personnel, and the combat team, were impacted by a lack of medical equipment and individual first aid kits (IFAKs). It is recommended that the level of individual all-arms tactical trauma care training be reviewed to identify and subsequently resolve, the gap in the level of interoperability with ADF tactical trauma care training.

## 6. Deployed C4ISR

- a. As stated in para 4.a, a lack of interoperability between the ADF and NZDF tactical communications impacted command and control with partner units. <sup>s.6(a)</sup>  

- b. A lack of consistent liaison pre-exercise resulted in C4ISR support tools, such as the Mission Partnered Environment, not being available to NZDF FE during the exercise. This was unable to be rectified once the exercise commenced and demonstrates the need for robust engagement and liaison between C4 planners at the operational and tactical level to ensure the requisite systems are interoperable prior to deployment.
- c. The training environment prohibited 'white fleet' communications as well as personal cellular devices. This was beneficial to testing the resilience of individuals and units in a communications-denied environment and should be enforced more consistently within NZDF exercises. However, there is a need for a robust national communications plan in a restricted communications scenario to ensure information flow to the national command element.


## 7. Defence Public Affairs (DPA)

- a. Given the significant benefit to the NZDF's media profile resulting from Ex TS, it is important that a requisite level of DPA capability is deployed. This requires a task-organised team that can capture and generate content across multiple

activities and locations. Therefore, it is recommended that DPA prioritise support to future activities to an increased level than was available as part of Ex TS23.

#### 8. SNO Summary

- a. Ex TS23 was a significant and beneficial activity to reinforce the NZDF's core role of war-fighting. The scale and complexity of the exercise provided ample opportunity for all participants to develop their individual and collective application of respective combat competencies. This is important for the 'confidence' of commanders that the lack of exposure to this level of training over the recent period has not adversely affected NZDF combat training to a significant degree.
- b. It is assessed that the reputation of the NZDF has been enhanced through its participation on Ex TS23. The professionalism and competence of the NZDF deployed FE was valued and trusted by our partners. In particular, the ability of HMNZS MATATAUA, the NZLAV Combat Team, and the RWTU to embed and rapidly integrate within a Battle Group or Task Group was acknowledged as favourable s.6(a)
- c. The NZDF contribution to Ex TS23 limited any logistic or real-life support requirements of the ADF to a minimum level. s.6(a)  
and the relative 'ease' in supporting and hosting the embedded NZDF capabilities was acknowledged by the ADF.
- d. Looking toward Ex TS25, the challenge for the NZDF will be to deploy and sustain larger scale formations i.e. the MIBG. In addition, equipment deficiencies and interoperability limitations i.e. tactical communications, will increasingly limit the effective integration with both the ADF and our partners.



**JM MURRAY**  
LTCOL, NZ Army  
CO

DTelN: 369 6362

#### Annexes:

- A. PAR Ex TS23: QAMR Mounting Headquarters
- B. PAR Ex TS23: HMNZS MATATAUA
- C. PAR Ex TS23: WEC Sqn HQ, QAMR
  - Appendix 1 A/S6 QAMR Comms PAR
  - Appendix 2 V Coy Minute: Battle Group RAM HQ PAR
  - Appendix 3 Company Intelligence Support Team PAR
- D. PAR Ex TS23: 3 Sqn RWTU

- E. PAR Ex TS23: 5<sup>th</sup> Sig Sqn, 1 CSR  
Appendix 1 OPSIS HQ Augmentee PAR
- F. PAR Ex TS23: Joint Military Policing Unit Detachment
- G. PAR Ex TS23: RNZAF SECFOR Detachment
- H. PAR Ex TS23: Joint National Support Element  
Appendix 1 Movements PAR
- I. PAR EX TS23: NZDF Defence Public Affairs
- J. PAR EX TS23: Ex TS23 NZDF Coaches and Adjudicators

**Distribution:**

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**External:**

NZDS Canberra

**New Zealand Army**  
**1st New Zealand Bde**  
**MINUTE**

5 Dec 23

D3-0019/13

**LCC** (Through COMD 1(NZ) BDE)

For information  
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S5 1 (1NZ) BDE  
S4 1 (NZ) BDE  
COMD JSG  
J7 HQ JFNZ

**POST ACTIVITY REPORT: EXERCISE CARTWHEEL 23**

**Reference**

A. Ex CARTWHEEL 2023 Exercise Instruction

**Introduction**

1. Ex CARTWHEEL is a five nation's military exercise based in Fiji OTP 2 – 29 Sep 23. The participants are the Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF), the US Army, The Australian Defence Force (ADF), the British Army and the NZDF. The NZDF contingent consisted of a HQ, two training teams, an infantry platoon and a support element. The total number of soldiers deployed was 96.

**Executive summary**

2. Overall Cartwheel 23 can be considered a success. While disappointing that ammunition could not be brought into the Republic of Fiji (RoFIJI) due to the unviability of airframes this should not detract from what was an interesting and engaging activity. Of note the integration of the NZDF and the RFMF both in terms living with the RFMF soldiers at D Coy lines, and the training provided was commented on by the RFMF as a template for how they want future exercises to be conducted, and by the US Army and ADF on what "Good" looked like when it comes to exercising in RoFIJI.

**Objectives**

3. The stated objective of the exercise were:
- a. To build capacity and improve integration of light infantry tactics in an urban and close country environment;
  - b. To develop RFMF Sustained Fire Machine Gun (SFMG) capabilities;
  - c. To develop RFMF 81mm Mortar Capabilities; and to

- d. Further develop ties between the five partner nations and to act as a proof of concept for future exercises.

### Summary of Activities

4. The Exercise was divided into five distinct phases with a prelim and a sequel.
  - a. Prelim: The Prelim was the five nation's internal build up and mobilisation.
  - b. Phase One 02 – 05 Sep:
    - (1) RSO&I and a setup of the NZDF lines based in D Coy lines in NADI.
  - c. Phase Two 05 – 15 Sep:
    - (1) RNZA Mortar Handlers Course;
    - (2) RNZIR SFMG handler's course held principally at D Coy lines; and
    - (3) Arrival and RSO&I of main body.
  - d. Phase Three 13- 15 Sep:
    - (1) Opening of Ex CARTHWHEEL 23 at Blackrock military camp; and
    - (2) Urban training package run by the US Army and the ADF.
  - e. Phase Four 16 – 23 Sep 23:
    - (1) The close country phase was held in the NASOURI HIGHLANDS TRAINING AREA (NHTA); and
    - (2) Conduct Live Field Firing (LFF) OTP 23 – 24 Sep 23. However, due to RNZAF aircraft serviceability this was not possible.
  - f. Phase Five 24 – 29 Sep:
    - (1) Closing ceremony;
    - (2) PXA; and
    - (3) RTNZ in three bodies;
      - (a) First packet 26 Sep 23;
      - (b) Second Packet 29 Sep 23; and
      - (c) Stay behind party 2 Oct 23.
  - g. Sequel: post RTNZ administration.

### Summary of Key Observations

5. The following observations are those that are considered key to Ex Cartwheel 23. A complete list of all recorded observations can be found in Annex A to this document.
6. **Observation:** Training. Two of the stated objectives of Ex Cartwheel 23 was the development of RFMF Mortar skills and SFMG skills. The courses were well run and the RFMF stated that they were pleased with the results. It was noted that all the students were experienced with both mortars and SFMG, where the initial understanding was that the students would have limited training in the mortars and SFMG. To further strengthen this relationship it is assessed that more complex training could be undertaken on the next



iteration of Cartwheel. Training such as a Mortar Barrel Commanders, SFMG Commanders and Mortar Fire Controllers would not be out of the bounds of possibility, but would likely require additional training in New Zealand.

- a. **Recommendation:** Explore the possibility of running a mortar or SMFG commanders course to complement a handlers course.
- b. **Recommendation:** To further develop RFMF Mortar and SFMG skills, and to develop closer relationships RFMF students should be invited to New Zealand to participate in Mortar and SFMG LFF. Due to the restrictive nature of the NHTA more complex LFF that is standard in New Zealand cannot be achieved.

7. **Observation:** Training. The Urban and close country activities were at a relatively low level compared to the skill level of the NZDF Infantry soldiers. While it was not a wasted opportunity and the soldiers did gain new skills and knowledge it was mentioned that in the future the NZDF could possibly run a stand showcasing individual skills.

- a. **Recommendation:** Investigate the NZDF running a stand in either urban operations, or close country skills.

8. **Observation:** Infrastructure: The NZDF contingent stayed at D Coy Lines, NADI which is located next to the NADI International Airport. <sup>s.6(a)</sup>



9. **Observation:** Equipment: <sup>s.6(a)</sup>



s.6(a)

10. Observation: Scheduling: Due to airframe issues the ammunition for the 81mm Mortar shoot, and the SFMG shoot was not able to be lifted in to the RoFIJI.

- a. Recommendation: Fix: Ammunition should be brought into country earlier. This brings with its own issues including field storage of HE natures and the political sensitivity of holding large quantities of HE nature, but bringing the natures in early would provide redundancy in case of aircraft break down.

### Conclusions

11. Ex Cartwheel 23 can be considered a success. Statements from senior RFMF officers indicated that the format of close integration with the RFMF was desirable going forward.
12. The failure to land live ammunition in to RoFIJI was a disappointment but should not detract from what was otherwise a successful and engaging exercise.
13. Additional AAR points are contained in Annex 1.

s.9(2)(k)

s.9(2)(a)

Major  
BC 161 Bty

DTelN: s.9(2)(k)

### Annex(es)

- A. Exercise Cartwheel 23 AAR Points.

Overall, Ex Cartwheel was a very successful activity. Strategically, the relationship between the NZ Army and the RFMF was further enhanced. Tactically, the training delivered was of a high standard with further room for development. Options are already being developed in terms of moving RFMF to participate in LFF in NZ; both with 16 Fd and IRU21R

s.9(2)(k)

LTCol Pattenson  
CO 16 Fd

# 3/6 Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment

## HAURAKI COY MINUTE 13 SEP 23

13 Sep 23

4995/1

See Dist List

### POST ACTIVITY REPORT: EX EL-ALAMEIN 7-10 SEP 23

#### Reference

A. Administrative Instruction 08/2023

#### Purpose

1. The Post Activity Report (PAR) of EX EL-ALAMEIN outlines resources used, and key findings and lessons learnt that were identified throughout the activity.

#### Activity Construct

2. Task org:

a.	3/6 Bn HQ/RF:	4:5
	HAURAKI Coy:	3:20
	NORTHLAND Coy:	3:15
	AUCKLAND Coy:	0:7
	Attached:	0:5
	Sub Total:	10:52
	Total:	62

#### Method

3. EX EL-ALAMEIN was designed IOT develop and practice, core infantry skills in its Soldiers and Junior Commanders in a Close Country (CC) environment IOF 3/6 RNZIR to meet 1(NZ) BDE Command Directive FY 22-24, dated 23 Aug 22.

a. EX EL-ALAMEIN was conducted in four phases.

a. **Prelim. Ex Prep (Now – 071600 Sep 23).**

- (1) Confirm all Observer Trainer (OT) and Safety Staff (SS) positions and requirements have been met.
- (2) Evaluation sheets and assessment guides have been compiled by Hauraki Coy Cadre.
- (3) Opportunities for personnel to develop competency in key Army Training levels and section weapon systems.
- (4) Conduct liaison with external 1 (NZ) Bde units seeking opportunities to enable integration and co-operation.

- (5) Develop Master Events List (MEL), prepare role players and CPX development.
  - (6) Reconnaissance of ex area and liaison with key stakeholders.
  - (7) Hauraki HQ in conjunction with the S7 Cell to conduct all planning and preparation for EX EL-ALAMEIN.
  - (8) Administration Instruction (AI) released to Coy HQ for the purposes of CMAP planning.
  - (9) Training is to be conducted for each weapon system IAW relevant P99 publication.
  - (10) Finalise and submit support documentation.
  - (11) Submit CATDEM.
  - (12) Confirm attendance NLT 18 1800 Aug 23.
  - (13) Conduct MPC (25 2000 Jul 23 MS TEAM) & FPC (22 Aug 23 MS Teams).
  - (14) Adv party to uplift ammo, stores and rations from Arch Hill NLT 070900 Sep 23.
  - (15) **ME:** Confirm stores and co-ord transport through RQMS
- b. **Phase 1 (070800 – 071800 Sep 23) Mobilisation and battle prep.**
- (1) Establish staging area at Waingaro Scout Camp. NLT 1700hrs.
  - (2) Pers march in at Coy Loc's NLT1800hrs.
  - (3) Conduct ex brief for all participants.
  - (4) Deploy to Waingaro Scout Camp.
  - (5) Hauraki/Training staff deploy to ex area to prep locations.
  - (6) Conduct battle prep for Close Country (CC).
  - (7) **ME:** Safe road movement to Waingaro Scout Camp.
- c. **Phase 2 (071800 – 101200 Sep 23). Conduct.**
- (1) Area allocated through tasks for the sections / platoon.
  - (2) Coy HQ to develop Training requirements for Officers/SNCOs Development.
  - (3) Planning for PI task. (BHE – Probe and Bug out)
  - (4) **ME:** Section Tasking's.
- d. **Phase 3 (101200 – 101300 Sep 23) Post Ex admin.**
- (1) Refurb Trg Areas.
  - (2) Move back to Accommodation.
  - (3) Conduct clearance & Class A checks.

- (4) Conduct debrief.
- (5) All reports to be completed.
- (6) All pers depart to home locations.
- (7) **ME**: Conduct Class A checks.

e. **Sequel** (101300 Sep 23 – onwards) PXA and reconstitution.

- (1) Conduct of After Action Review (AAR) as a collective.
- (2) Return to home locations of all 3/6 RNZIR sub-units and attachments.
- (3) Complete all post exercise documentation including reports and Post Activity Report (PAR).
- (4) Compilation of evaluation documents to ascertain 3C competency for pls.
- (5) Work Party required (Hauraki pers Responsibility)
- (6) **ME**. Paydocs submitted.

**Endstate.** EX EL-ALAMEIN trained and measured the Soldiers and Junior Commanders within the battalion at all stages IAW NZP 62-1. EX EL-ALAMEIN DS staff went into depth to explain the “why” thing are done to give all participants the understanding of the complete processes.

All participants safely returned to home locs, all weapons and stores accounted for, PXA including the provision of assessments and reports completed and lessons identified for the incorporation into current and future training programmes.

### **Resources**

4. The following critical stores where used throughout the exercise;
  - a. Generator.
  - b. Star link, internet access allowed EXCON to concurrently prep reports and EX admin.
5. The following vehicles where used throughout the exercise;
  - a. 2 x MOGS.
  - b. 2x Unit vans
  - c. Buss (44 seater).
6. The following ammunition was expended on the exercise;
  - a. Cart 5.56mm Blank: 8000 rounds
  - b. Smoke x 32.

## Key Observations

### 7. S1 – Pers.

#### a. Observation.

(a) Based on the Task Org the exercise had lower returns from Auckland Coy pers, which was understandable after a recent surge in commitment for EX TANIWHA.

#### (2) Effect.

(a) Some 3/6 Bn pers missed out on exceptional training and development.

#### (3) Keep / Stop / Start recommendation.

(a) My recommendation is to have 3 months between these Bn Trg actys.

(b) My recommendation would be that a representative from each Coy HQ should attend each Bn Ex to maintain the level of training and be able accurately build on lessons learnt for the next Ex.

### 8. S2 – Int. N/A

### 9. S3 – Ops.

#### a. Observation.

(a) Generally the exercise ran well and achieved ATL training level and LTL outputs.

(b) The bus getting stuck was an unfortunate incident. However this was rectified and repairs completed to the satisfaction of the venue.

(c) DS provided good lessons but are to ensure soldiers are mentored or supervised at all relevant times.

#### (2) Effect.

(a) Exercise achieved stated aims and training objectives.

#### (3) Keep / Stop / Start recommendation.

(a) Keep – forward planning and de-confliction of planning Coy from exercised Coy.

### 10. S4 – Log.

#### a. Observation.

(a) Good logistics and stores preparation work went into this exercise by Coy HQ, in particular CSM, CQMS, and Cadre.

#### (2) Effect.

(a) This enabled the exercised Coy HQ to attend the exercise, issue stores efficiently, and return them without problems.

#### (3) Keep / Stop / Start recommendation.

- (a) Keep – forward deliberate planning and comms about logistics with RQMS and exercised Coy.

11. **S5 – Future Plans.**

a. **Observation.**

- (1) Training Location is good with travel time for all company pers and catered for this type of close country environment.
- (2) Allow all SNCO and Officers to attend and conduct professional training and development within the field environment, eg field TEWT.
- (3) **Effect.**
  - (a) Deployment into the field was quick and minimal down time.
- (4) **Keep / Stop / Start recommendation.**
  - (a) Keep this training location for up to a company size, will need to look at different areas for a larger group.
- (5) **Who is responsible and NLT.**

12. **S6 – Comms.**

a. **Observation.**

- (1) Prelim Phase: Need to ensure equal effort from all Coy to get pers to attend training.
- (2) **Effect.**
  - (a) If pers were not informed of the Bn training they are missing out on career development.
- (3) **Keep / Stop / Start recommendation.**
  - (a) Bring each Coy Cadre into the FPC to confirm each Coy understands the training and puts it back out to the Coy.
- (4) **Who is responsible and NLT.**

13. **S7 – Trg.**

a. **Observation.**

- (1) We have limited knowledge of the 119 radios within the unit.
- (2) **Effect.**
  - (a) Poor comes due to a lack of understanding.
- (3) **Keep / Stop / Start recommendation.**
  - (a) Recommendation is we conduct unit training on 119 and radio procedures.
- (4) **Who is responsible and NLT**
  - (a) All units need to make time to train personal with subject matter experts.

## Conclusion

14. EX EL-ALAMEIN enhanced and developed Soldiers and Officers close country skills to a (ATL 2C develop level) basic level but their understanding of individual roles and responsibility's are to a satisfactory standard. This training will allow them to build on their current knowledge moving onto the next Ex.

s.9(2)(a)

CAPT ARMY  
HAURAKI COY 2IC

DTelN s.9(2)(a)

### **Distribution:**

3/6Bn HQ  
Training Wing  
HAU HQ