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21st July 2023



Dear 

I refer to your email of 22 June 2023, confirming you would like the documents the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) identified, covering strategic overviews, executive and ministerial briefs, and post activity reports for the end of rotations to be considered for release.

Enclosed is a copy of *Observations from New Zealand Forces in Afghanistan 2003 – 2013*. Where indicated, information is withheld in accordance with section 6(a) of the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) where the making available of the information would be likely to prejudice the security of New Zealand. Information that has been provided on a basis of confidence from the Government of another country is withheld in accordance with section 6(b)(i) of the OIA. Identities of personnel are withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(a) of the OIA to protect privacy. Legal advice is withheld in accordance with section 9(2)(h) of the OIA.

Consideration of the remaining documents continues and decisions regarding these will be communicated as they are finalised. Given the nature of the information, review includes input from operational personnel and international partners. As a result, and to account for any unforeseen matters that may arise, a final decision will be provided as soon as possible and no later than 15 September 2023.

You have the right, under section 28(3) of the OIA, to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request. Information about how to make a complaint is available at www.ombudsman.parliament.nz or freephone 0800 802 602.

Please note that responses to official information requests are proactively released where possible. This response to your request will be published shortly on the NZDF website, with your personal information removed.

Yours sincerely

AJ WOODS

Air Commodore

Chief of Staff HQNZDF

Enclosures:

1. Observations from New Zealand Forces in Afghanistan 2003 – 2013



OBSERVATIONS FROM NEW ZEALAND FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN 2003 - 2013







FOREWORD

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has a unique culture that is underpinned by the shared values of courage, commitment, comradeship and integrity. These cultural values are the tenets from which the NZDF builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, appropriately equipped, and capable of serving the interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand Government. This culture provides the foundation for New Zealand's unique approach to the conduct of military operations.

New Zealand's decision to become directly involved in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) saw significant military coalition contributions, ranging from frigate deployments and P3K Orion aircraft to the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Horn of Africa, to C130 strategic airlift support and numerous personnel as staff in Coalition Headquarters and other facilities. The decision to deploy a Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Bamyán Province, Afghanistan from 2003 to 2013 should be viewed within the context of the coalition effort to OEF.

The aim of this publication is to present a narrative from the 10 year campaign in Afghanistan that illustrates collective findings and effects of observations and reports from the PRT.

COMJFNZ





ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

J8 Branch acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to independent documents including:

- *'Deployment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan'* – NZ Ministry of Defence, Jun 2005.
- *'New Zealand's Achievements of Development Assistance in Bamyan, Afghanistan'* - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 2013.
- *Memoranda of Understanding (Various)* - New Zealand Agency for International Aid.







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Part One:

OVERVIEW








RECENT HISTORY

Afghanistan has long been a route for invasion and the site of occupation and conflict since 642 AD, when Arabs invaded the region and introduced Islam. Throughout history, Afghanistan's disparate peoples have displayed a strong streak of independence and resistance to foreign occupation and influence. This included the more recent Soviet occupation that ended in 1989 with the Soviet withdrawal following a peace accord between the Soviet Union, USA, Pakistan and Afghanistan.



The Mujahedeen were not signatories to the accords, and fighting continued. Surprisingly, the Soviet supported regime headed by President Najibullah remained in place for some three years but collapsed after a key regional warlord, the Uzbek northern strongman Dostum, changed sides and aligned himself with the Mujahedeen.



In 1992 the Mujahedeen took over Kabul and ousted Najibullah who then came under the protection of the United Nations (UN). The Mujahedeen leader, Professor Rabbani, was then named as President. Infighting had been endemic within the Mujahedeen and this victory simply brought more violence as the Mujahedeen fractured along ethnic and religious lines.


Partly in response to this violence and lawlessness, an Islamic student movement known as the Taleban emerged in 1994. Following a series of military successes Pakistan switched its allegiance from the Mujahedeen to the Taleban, which resulted in Rabbani fleeing from Afghanistan, enabling the Taleban to capture Kabul in September 1996. The Taleban had developed from an essentially southern faction into a nation-wide force that ruled 80 per cent of the country.

BAMYAN

(Other recognised spellings of Bamyan are: Bamiyan or Bamian)

The Bamyan region is located in central Afghanistan, about 130 km from Kabul, and covers about 17,500 sq. km. The region includes fertile valleys that traditionally provided sufficient arable land for agriculture to be the primary economic activity of this otherwise arid and mountainous area. Bamyan Province used to produce sufficient crops to supply its own needs, with some surplus for markets outside the region. Due to the economic hardship brought on by long periods of conflict, subsistence agriculture has become crucial to the survival of many Afghans.

There are about 250,000 people in the entire region, the majority of whom are Hazara (20 per cent of the Afghan population), with a number of Tajiks particularly in the northern part of the region. As a minority ethnic group the Hazara are a mainly Muslim population who suffered significant atrocities under Taleban rule, and have most to gain from changes in Afghanistan.



The Bamyan valley was well known for its numerous statues of Buddha cut out of the cliffs by Buddhist monks almost 2000 years ago. Particularly interesting were two great figures (one 53 m high, the other 37 m), which were carved from rock and finished in fine plaster. These statues were destroyed in 2001 by the Taleban who considered them idolatrous; this attracted worldwide attention and widespread condemnation.



KEY DATES

September 1996: The Taleban forced President Rabbani and his government out of Kabul, Najibullah was executed and the Taleban started to enforce their strict interpretation of Islamic law, the Sharia.

1998: After the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, the US requested the Taleban hand over Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation, who was believed to be involved in the attack. Bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian national, was a veteran of the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen war and had taken refuge in Afghanistan when the Sudan, under severe international pressure, forced him to leave there. When the Taleban refused to hand over Bin Laden, the US launched cruise missiles against an Al Qaeda terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. In the meantime the Taleban continued to concentrate on the defeat of the forces of Ahmed Masoud, commander of the anti-Taleban alliance, in order to gain total control of Afghanistan. Masoud led the alliance until the Taleban assassinated him in September 2001.

October 1999: The UN Security Council passed sanctions against the Taleban on grounds that they continued to offer sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden.

December 2000: Additional sanctions were passed against the Taleban for their continuing support of terrorism and cultivation of narcotics.

September 2001: After terrorist strikes on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon using hijacked airliners, the US once again demanded the handover of Bin Laden. The Taleban refused which led to the US, backed by a Coalition of mainly Western Nations and Russia, formally declaring the Taleban and Al Qaeda as enemies.

October 2001: The US and Allies commenced attacks on the Taleban and Al Qaeda.

December 2001: Following the rapid disruption of the Taleban, the Bonn Agreement created a framework for re-establishing control of a legitimately



elected and internationally recognised government in Afghanistan. It provided for the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghanistan Interim Authority in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.

August 2002: New Zealand sent a recce team (mixed military and civilian) to Afghanistan to determine what level of support or participation could be involved with ISAF. The outcome was that New Zealand would best serve the international effort by way of rebuilding local infrastructure.

Mid 2003: The US-led coalition under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) continued to conduct operations designed to destroy remaining Al Qaeda and hard-line Taleban resistance, as well as establish a democratic government in Afghanistan.

September 2003: New Zealand assumed command of the Bamyán PRT, expanding both the base and operations conducted from it.



RESPONDING TO THE CRISIS

Afghanistan is a shattered society. The participants in the Bonn Conference have set for the leaders and people of their country the formidable challenge of consolidating the peace process in less than three years. But it will take much more than 36 months to heal the wounds left by 23 years of war.

The process of healing has started, however, and the members of the international community must be careful not to allow that process to reverse itself. This requires from all, a continued commitment and determination to stay the course. It also requires that realistic and achievable objectives be set.

– Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary-General, 18 March 2002

On 28 March 2002, through resolution 1401, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for an initial period of one year. UNAMA was established in an effort to integrate and co-ordinate all UN activities in Afghanistan. There were some 16 UN agencies in the country working together with their Afghan government counterparts and with national and international Non-Government Organisation (NGO) partners. All UN programmes lent support to the Afghan transitional process and recognised the lead role played by the Afghan Administration. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, who was the UNAMA lead, had overall responsibility for all UN activities in the country.



UNAMA's mandate included:

- Promoting national reconciliation
- Fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the UN in the Bonn Agreement including those related to:
 - human rights.
 - the rule of law.
 - gender issues.
- Managing all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in co-ordination with the Afghan Administration.



New Zealand's support for UNAMA was provided in the form of a PRT, a concept that was widely used by the United States during the Vietnam War. In the Afghan context, a PRT was defined as a task oriented, civil-military organisation tailored to operations at a regional level. It is important to recognise that the PRT's were not conventional military units, but a multi-national, inter-agency team.



LEGAL MATTERS

OEF was a legitimate exercise of the right to collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This provided the legal basis for the United States and other nations acting in support, including New Zealand, to use armed force against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Under Article 51, the United States continued their actions in Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1368 explicitly recognised the right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51, which was further strengthened by subsequent UN Resolutions. UNSCR 1383 calls for a commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The deployment of the initial PRT was officially linked to the Coalition's simultaneous announcement that it was moving into a rebuilding phase, which enabled military resources to be diverted from the war against terrorism to reconstruction. The PRT operated under the Bonn Agreement, a humanitarian based arrangement that made it different from other OEF missions, which were operating in a context of armed conflict under a UN mandate.

A Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and subsequently, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was negotiated between New Zealand and the Afghan Transitional Authority. The MTA specified the mission objectives for the PRT and the SOFA was sufficiently broad to encompass members of the wider PRT that included staff from non-NZ NGOs.

The deployment of NZDF personnel to provide a PRT was consistent with the UN mandate to provide support to the Interim Authority and the wider re-development of Afghanistan.

Section 5 of the Defence Act 1990 provides that armed forces may be raised and maintained for a number of purposes, including:



- a. The contributions of forces under collective security treaties, agreements or arrangements; and
- b. The contributions of force to, or for any of the purposes of, the United Nations, or in association with other organisations or States and in accordance with principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). There was no state of war existing between New Zealand and any other country at the time when the PRT was launched, but there was a state of armed conflict in Afghanistan to which New Zealand forces were going to be a party. The LOAC applied to all NZDF operations under OEF given that New Zealand is a signatory to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977. These were notable amongst the principle LOAC documents that governed the operations of NZ forces during OEF.

DEPLOYED FORCES

The primary focus of this publication is on the PRT but there were other NZDF force elements and personnel deployed into Afghanistan, and other locations, in the preceding two years before the PRT actually arrived in Bamyán. The periods below are based on fiscal years running from 1 July to 30 June.

2001 – 2002. NZDF Special Forces deployed on active service in support of OEF under the US led coalition force operating in Afghanistan. NZDF staff officers served in the US Headquarters Central Command in Tampa, Florida, and in the Coalition Joint Task Force HQ in Bagram.

There were also staff officers working in the HQ International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan (ISAF) and an Air Loading Management Group (ALMG) that operated in Oman, Karachi and Kabul while attached to British Forces; the ALMG commitment ceased in July 2002. It was reported that our personnel received high praise for their military capability and performance in the harsh operating environment, and this did much to boost New Zealand's international reputation.



2002 - 2003. The destruction of Al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan had not diminished the threat of terrorism as the group adapted and evolved into widely dispersed smaller cells. The bombings in Bali clearly demonstrated that affiliates of Al-Qaeda were active in our own region and that terrorism remained a serious, real-time global threat. For this reason, counter-terrorism missions in support of OEF was a significant focus for the NZDF.

HMNZS TE KAHA departed Devonport Naval Base in August 2002 for a deployment to South East Asia, conducting exercises, training and diplomatic port visits. TE KAHA was redirected in November 2002 to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) in the Middle East Region (MER), contributing to the multinational effort against trans-national terrorism. The ship conducted surveillance, escort, intercept and boarding operations, primarily in and around the Straits of Hormuz, as part of a Canadian led coalition task group.

TE KAHA was relieved by HMNZS TE MANA in late February 2003, remaining in the role until early July 2003. A three-person shore team provided liaison and logistics support to the deployed ships throughout.

An NZDF P-3K Orion aircraft deployed to the Gulf of Oman in May 2003 conducting MIO in the Arabian Sea and an NZDF C-130 aircraft, support crew and air loading team deployed in late June 2003 to Kyrgyzstan as New Zealand's contribution to ISAF support in and around Afghanistan.

An Army Engineer Assessment Team deployed to Afghanistan from September to December 2002 to provide site survey assistance to the Coalition Joint Civil/Military Organisation Task Force.

2003 – 2004. New Zealand's contribution to OEF was clearly indicative of the priority the New Zealand Government placed on the international effort to respond to threats from terrorism. This was also the year of the first PRT deployment to Bamyán.



OEF saw the largest continuous deployment of a naval combat force in the Gulf region for more than twenty years and TE MANA was once again deployed in April 2004 for a four month period to conduct MIO in the Arabian Sea.

The number of personnel deployed to the ISAF HQ had increased to four in the support, works, plans and mine awareness areas. Two NZDF personnel assisted in the training of the Afghan National Army as part of a British Army Training Team.

The P-3K Orion returned to New Zealand in February 2004 although nine NZDF personnel remained in the MER to support air operations for OEF. The C-130 deployed to Kyrgyzstan in support of ISAF returned to New Zealand in October 2003.

2004 – 2005. Defence and Foreign Policy work together as a partnership in a comprehensive way to meet our collective needs and global responsibilities. New Zealand remains committed to the principles and obligations of the United Nations Charter and, despite the comparatively small size of the NZDF, have consistently demonstrated that we are prepared to use our capabilities to defend those principles. While New Zealand did not face any direct military threat, international terrorism remained a serious and significant issue. For this reason, the deployment of NZDF personnel and assets in support of OEF remained an operational priority.

The PRT was into its fifth rotation by this stage with an increase in deployed numbers to 115. The ongoing support necessary for the PRT to carry out tasking in Bamyán saw an increase of staff in the National Support Element (NSE) and Liaison Officers at Bagram; seven personnel were deployed in these roles. One NZDF Officer was deployed as a Military Liaison Officer (MLO) with UNAMA.

A C-130 and 28 support personnel deployed twice during this period to conduct rotations of the PRT, and for the extraction of personnel and equipment from Iraq.



2005 – 2006. There were some minor changes in personnel numbers during this period, which tended to indicate that the support to OEF had ‘settled’ in terms of tasking.

In July and December 2005, and April 2006, a C-130 aircraft and support personnel deployed to the Middle East to conduct rotations of PRT personnel. Additional personnel in the NSE and the Liaison Officer role in Bagram increased overall numbers by 12.

2006 – 2007. Our participation in United Nations peace support operations underlined our wider commitment to collective security, and New Zealand’s credentials as a good international citizen. We continued to sustain a company-sized contribution to the reconstruction of Bamyan Province.

The MLO role for UNAMA had been well established in the Military Advisory Unit (MAU) where the incumbent worked as the Chief of Staff and Deputy to the Senior Military Advisor in Kabul. The MAU provided the strategic interface between the UN and Afghan authorities, and primary liaison between ISAF and the UN, for security sector reform.

In October 2006, and April 2007, a C-130 aircraft and support personnel was again deployed to conduct PRT rotations.

2007 – 2008. In the global arena, the NZDF continued to contribute to collective security operations, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement conducted by the United Nations and other multinational agencies.

There was a presence of 135 personnel deployed as part of the PRT, including the NSE component of 12 in Bagram, and the C-130 was again utilised to support rotations of PRT contingents. An RNZAF B757 was used for strategic personnel lift between New Zealand s. 6(a) to facilitate rotations.

Two medical personnel were attached to the Canadian lead Multi Nation Medical Centre based in Kandahar.



TE MANA, with a crew of 175 and a land based support team of five, was deployed to the Arabian Gulf in May 2008 in support of Coalition Maritime Security Operations.

2008 – 2009. During this period, it was necessary to factor into future planning the impacts of the global recession and tighter fiscal realities. The contribution the NZDF was making to strategic interests and foreign policy goals other than Afghanistan was reflected in our high operational tempo, which was greater than initially forecasted.

There was a Government approved increase of four personnel to the PRT that ensured the level of force protection and security was suitable; the total number deployed was now 139.

2009 – 2010. The level and variety of activities undertaken by the NZDF over this period exceeded that of previous years. In addition to the range of operations conducted around the globe, it was necessary to respond to a tsunami, cyclones and other tragedies that took place in the Pacific region.

A total of ^{s. 6(a)} Special Forces and NZDF support personnel deployed to Kabul in September 2009.

Five personnel were now working with ISAF; one Staff Officer, one Liaison Officer and one driver were located at HQ ISAF in Kabul; one communications specialist in Bagram Airbase; s. 6(a)

The support of two NZDF medics to Canadian forces ceased in October 2009.

There were two attachments to platforms in the MER; an RNZN officer was onboard a Royal Navy ship working in the Northern Arabian Gulf (OP CORVUS), and another was onboard a United States Navy ship for anti-piracy operations being conducted in the Indian Ocean/Horn of Africa area (OP BARBARY).

2010 – 2011. The Government's Defence White Paper was launched in November 2010, which clearly sets out the direction for the role of the NZDF.



The core task identified the conduct of military operations and interoperability with our principal partners as a key theme, particularly around New Zealanders expectations that resources going into defence will provide options for responding to regional crises. However, the commitment to Afghanistan was sustained as one of our operational priorities. Personnel deploying to the country were wearing the latest, battle tested survivability gear and had more protected mobility; this was in response to increased insurgent activity.

There were a number of high profile visits to Kiwi Base during the reporting period. One notable visitor was Commander ISAF (General David Petraeus) who commented that the NZ PRT Transition Process would serve as a blueprint for future transition tranches.

The numbers in the PRT stood at 127; the support team in the NSE had reduced to ten.

The Special Forces and NZDF support personnel were reduced s. 6(a) following an operational review.

2011 – 2012. The deployment to Afghanistan continued to be one of the most significant missions; predominantly Army but supported by Navy and Air Force personnel. Air Force elements, including C-130 Hercules and Boeing 757 aircraft, provide re-supply and rotation support to deployed forces. Planning and preparation had started for the PRT to be withdrawn in 2013.

During this period, NZ Special Air Services personnel supported the Afghan Police Crisis Response Unit in engaging insurgents who had launched a complex night attack in the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. The SAS ceased operations at the end of March 2012, in accordance with NZ Government direction, and returned to New Zealand the following month.

2012 – 2013. The PRT was withdrawn from Afghanistan in April 2013. Over 3,500 NZDF personnel had deployed in support of the mission, the majority serving with the PRT in Bamyán. They worked alongside colleagues from the



New Zealand Police, Foreign Affairs and other government and non-government agencies, helping the people of Afghanistan build a better future.

The revised mandate for NZDF personnel serving in Afghanistan was reduced to 27. This was a time of transition where residual force elements were returning to New Zealand while additional elements were transiting in and out of theatre on a regular basis; the outcome was temporary variations to mandated numbers.

A new mission was established in Kabul, which included three personnel in ISAF HQ, three in the NSE and 12 personnel providing planning support.

The attachment of two personnel to the British Army Training Team since 2003 ceased in June 2012 in accordance with New Zealand Government direction. A new training element contributing to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) was launched in September 2013.

In summary, a small group of specialists remained in Afghanistan to provide a range of training, planning and logistics tasks in support of ISAF capacity-building activities for the Afghan military forces.





Part Two:

PREPARATION







MISSION APPROVAL

A Cabinet Minute dated 11 November 2002 outlined the continuing support by the New Zealand Government to OEF under the mission name of Operation ARIKI. In May 2003, an Inter-Departmental Working Group, comprising the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), HQ NZDF and the Ministry of Defence, submitted an analysis of options to the Government. Ministers were advised that contributing to a PRT would be well within the NZDF's professional competence, and would make a positive contribution to nation building in Afghanistan. A Warning Order from the Chief of Defence Force dated 29 May 2003 proposed a New Zealand led PRT to Bamyán for the period of one year under the mission name of Task Group CRIB (TG CRIB).

The approval for the deployment of a Joint Reconnaissance Team to Afghanistan was made by Cabinet on 09 June 2003. The team consisted of NZDF, foreign affairs and trade personnel, and was tasked with assessing the feasibility of New Zealand contributing a PRT, or elements of a team, to OEF. The reconnaissance team recommended that New Zealand take over the United States-led PRT for Bamyán Province as one of the more benign provinces in Afghanistan; the security risk was still assessed as medium to high. The main risks to personnel were identified as random land mines and the environment. The main risk to the deployment was logistics and supply given the isolated area, the distance from New Zealand, and the poor roads and extreme climatic conditions that meant lines of supply were extended and unpredictable.

The conduct of the mission was authorised and on 07 July 03, Cabinet approved the deployment of up to 100 NZDF personnel to form the Bamyán Province PRT. In September 2003, Cabinet approved the deployment for a period of 12 months, with the provision for a 12 month extension. In November 2003, Cabinet approved a permanent increase to the security element of the PRT, which brought the total number of personnel to 107. Ongoing extensions were granted until the mission was closed in April 2013. The establishment at Bamyán continued to grow over the years and was approximately 160 strong at the end;



this included non-NZDF military, civilian staff and Afghani personnel, who were principally interpreters and locally employed civilians providing support to the camp.

The purpose of the PRT mission was to strengthen the influence of the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan in the Bamyan province by assisting with the reconstruction of Afghan institutions, facilitating aid efforts, monitoring disarmament, and marginalising the causes of instability. This was intended to create a safe and secure environment preventing the re-emergence and export of terrorism from Afghanistan. In general terms, the aim of the PRT was to: promote security, promote the influence of Central Government, and promote the conditions for economic recovery.

PRT MISSION PLANNING

In April 2002, the United States-led coalition shifted its focus to reconstruction rather than combat operations. The aim of reconstruction efforts was to create a secure environment that would enable a legitimate and internationally recognised government to re-establish control and stability in Afghanistan.

There were four types of reconstruction organisations operating in the country:

- 16 specialised agencies of the United Nations.
- Bi-lateral agencies, including the United States and United Kingdom Agencies for International Development.
- Non-government organisations.
- Government organisations, including PRT's.

The PRT's already established in country were regionally based with the US operating their PRT's predominantly along the more unsettled southern Afghanistan border with Pakistan, whilst those of other countries were operating in the northern areas of the country. The size of PRT establishments varied with each country, being subject to existing national and coalition support infrastructure arrangements as well as the regional requirement.

The level of PRT contribution was determined by the following criteria:



- Tier One – lead of a PRT either by building of a new PRT base or assuming the leadership of an existing PRT.
- Tier Two – making a major contribution to a PRT led by another nation.
- Tier Three – making a partial contribution to a PRT led by another nation.
- Tier Four – political support to Afghanistan (financial or otherwise).

At the time, only the US and UK were operating PRT's and discussion **s. 6(a)**

. This resulted in the focus of NZ contribution at Tier One by assuming leadership of an existing PRT.

The concept of operations was to establish an NZ PRT, with support from other coalition force and local personnel, in Bamyan Province for an initial period of 12 months. Planning determined that the NZ PRT could be operational by end Sep 03, having conducted a two week Relief in Place with US forces; this timeline was achieved.


Planning and preparing for deployment of the PRT was defined by the following factors:

- The nature of the team and specified tasks for individual personnel was not straightforward as this was a new concept for the NZDF and represented an unusual military and reconstruction task. The New Zealand team did not have the same supporting national infrastructure in Afghanistan that was afforded to the United States team it was replacing.
- The New Zealand intention was to undertake long-range patrolling and community engagement, which differed from the US approach.
- The PRT represented the largest and most complex planning evolution undertaken by HQ JFNZ since it was established in 2001. Planning was taking place at the same time as five other deployments were being planned or implemented.

The PRT was structured to consist of four liaison patrols made up of a commander, deputy, driver, medic, signaller, intelligence operator, interpreter and force protection. The patrols were supported by combat, engineering, intelligence, communications and logistics personnel at the base in Bamyan,



and the NSE located at Bagram airfield. The outline command structure is shown below.





FORCE GENERATION

The intent of Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) was to prepare and deploy NZDF personnel to contribute to PRT operations. Compared with similar-sized NZDF units, the PRT had a higher ratio of officers to other ranks. The team comprised of 24 officers, 16 Senior Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO) and 58 other ranks. The total number aligns to an infantry company that would normally consist of five officers and five SNCO's. Planning also had to take into account the non-NZDF personnel attached to the PRT for whom New Zealand had administrative and some protection responsibilities.

Tri-Service Deployments. The concept of operation for a PRT was not well defined initially although this constraint was unsurprising in view of the lack of PRT doctrine and the infancy of the concept within Afghanistan. The issue was perhaps further compounded by the mission being joint in nature; detailed Position Descriptions could not be formally verified until some experience had been gained in Bamyán.

The outcome resulted in some difficulty selecting the right personnel from the three Services. The requirement to identify jobs deemed to be joint in nature generated debate around the roles of patrol commanders and their second-in-command. The issue was around whether these roles were principally liaison and therefore appropriate for individuals of suitable rank from any service, or whether they required land-force combat skills and experience that are clearly more aligned to Army personnel.

It was determined that the liaison aspect of the role was particularly important and for the early rotations of TG CRIB, the patrol leaders and deputies were filled by personnel from all three services. Additional training in individual and collective military skill was provided where necessary to enable operations in a land-centric environment. However, by 2005, liaison patrol commanders and their deputies were being drawn mainly from Army. The majority of personnel, including the Senior National Officer (SNO) and the second-in-command, were also Army personnel and as the mission developed and PDs were refined, it



became easier to identify and prepare suitable personnel for the roles they were expected to undertake.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

Preparing the PRT for deployment was achieved through the completion of pre-deployment training (PDT), a process effectively increasing the team from a directed level of capability (DLOC) to an operational level of capability (OLOC). The focus of training was building capability to deploy and support liaison patrols, and ensuring personnel could survive in a 'worst-case' scenario.

A further period of in-theatre preparation alongside coalition forces prior to assuming control of the PRT in Bamyán, completed the required training. The 3rd Land Force Group (3 LFG), based in Burnham Camp, was tasked with training, mounting, deploying and sustaining the initial PRT to Bamyán; PDT was conducted during July and August 2003.

The initial PDT programme for TG CRIB was identified as a 'difficult training event' because it brought together people with a wide variety of skill-sets from the three Services to form an ad-hoc unit that doctrinally, was not fully defined. The key link between the operational mission analysis and the Training Management Plan (TMP) was the Joint Mission Essential Task List, contained in the TG CRIB Syllabus of Training that included the standards and conditions the training should adhere to. It was recognised that the TMP and syllabus were under-developed documents and both were subjected to review and restructure in mid-2006. There remains no single DLOC standard that can be applied to all three Services so additional training is delivered for personnel where certain skills and standards are required for some mission posts.

The initial PDT Training Team was an ad-hoc organisation stood up a short time prior to the PDT by 3 LFG training staff outside of their normal duties, and supplemented by instructors and staff from several organisations. Despite the best efforts of 3 LFG, time and circumstances impacted the initial TG CRIB deployment from being a cohesive and highly trained unit resulting in a higher degree of risk being accepted by COMJFNZ prior to departure for Afghanistan.



To meet the evolution of the mission, there was a need to constantly refine the PDT programme throughout the life of TG CRIB. This is still the case with missions today but Afghanistan proved to be more challenging than most. On some occasions, the Command element of the next TG CRIB rotation preparing for their mission completed a short period of reconnaissance into theatre to assess characteristics of training, deployment and the conduct of operations. This provided the opportunity to gather situational awareness that assisted with the subsequent mission analysis and development of plans. In terms of PDT, specific information on key mission aspects influenced the training necessary to achieve the desired outputs.

PDT was constantly reviewed and adjusted over the 10 year duration of TG CRIB, transforming into a well-structured programme of instruction coordinated under the supervision of the NZ Collective Training Centre based in Linton Military Camp. The PDT programme content for all missions continues to be managed by a dedicated team in J7 Branch, HQ JFNZ.

There were a considerable number of observations made relating to PDT, indicating a wide-ranging reflection of how varied the changes were from one rotation to the next, and the value of some aspects of training. However, this is considered quite normal as such feedback is encouraged to ensure necessary amendments to programmes reflecting the continuously evolving nature of a complicated mission.

Individual Readiness. TG CRIB rotations were assessed for DLOC on joining PDT, which regularly revealed differing standards across the three Services. There was a problem in accepting only those that met all aspects of DLOC as it would have resulted in a limited pool of personnel deploying overseas repeatedly. The trainers were responsible for identifying an individual who was not making the grade, which further complicated the issue as a replacement had to be identified and trained within a reduced time frame.

This situation was largely generated through individuals having an expectation that any elements of readiness not achieved would be addressed at PDT, despite the programme not being designed to account for additional training



on an individual basis. The current HR programme (Human Resource Management Information System – HRMIS) operates on a self-administration basis allowing personnel to monitor their deployable readiness. Active monitoring of nominated personnel can be conducted by line managers and planners; those falling short of qualifications are reminded of their responsibility early to rectify any shortcomings.

Language Training. Key personnel who interacted with Afghanis in the normal course of their daily tasks included liaison teams, engineers and logistic elements. In 2004 it was reported that despite language training being scheduled, the overall training tempo and lack of Dari instructors during PDT meant that only the first period of instruction was completed. In 2005, there was a further recommendation that more in depth language training was needed, but in 2007 there was further comment that language training was somewhat of a nugatory effort. These were completely contrasting views but demonstrated how observations were driven by individual assessment. It was agreed with the interpreters in theatre that they would provide language training as required, which left room for greater focus on cultural awareness during PDT.

Driver Training. The limited time allocated for driver training during PDT was not commensurate with the expected tasks in theatre. It was recommended that units identify drivers for deployment early and conduct training prior to PDT, including urban driving skills for those personnel in support and security roles, particularly in Kabul. This training was subsequently introduced outside of allocated PDT and later improved following a formal training needs assessment.

In order to validate the training being delivered, a driving instructor was deployed to Bamyán in a surge role in 2007 to gain updated situational awareness of the hazardous conditions in theatre, and to conduct some driver training as part of the relief in place programme.

Specialist Training. In 2007, there was an observation stating that not enough emphasis was being placed on specialist training during PDT. A new timeline



was introduced to cater for trade/branch specific training to occur prior to the main body PDT but the onus for training content remained a Subject Matter Expert (SME) responsibility rather than on PDT instructors.

Helicopter Familiarisation. On some occasions, personnel were required to travel on US helicopters but the pilot or crew provided no familiarisation of the aircraft prior to departure. No helicopter training of any sort was conducted during PDT, which was recognised as a shortcoming, and resulted in 3 Squadron producing a DVD on General Helo Safety that met the in-theatre requirement.

Force Protection. This element of training is clearly important given the threat environment that personnel were deploying into. It was observed in 2008 that the preparation appeared to be more focused on 'mission failure' rather than preparing for the Lines of Operation that will create mission success; governance, development and security. The aim of Exercise AFGHAN STEP was to conduct a collective training exercise in order to confirm the trained state of personnel preparing to deploy as part of the PRT. This exercise subsequently provided the patrols with their first real introduction to the governance and development aspects of the mission.

Role of the Chaplain. PDT provided the chaplain with the opportunity to get to know the personnel deploying but, other than leading a church service during Exercise AFGHAN STEP, there was nothing in the programme to utilise chaplaincy skills. The patrol teams rehearsed being ambushed, including casualties being airlifted out, but did not rehearse the process in the event of a death. It was recommended that at least one training scenario resulted in a fatality and was taken to its full conclusion. The process gave the chaplain the opportunity to conduct Critical Incident Stress Management and deal with the handling of human remains.

Administration Support. There were a number of observations made in 2011 commenting on the reduced level of support by administrators to PDT that had been practised in previous years. Support was provided to PDT by the Deployed Personnel Support Centre (DPSC) in HQ JFNZ on an 'as available' basis, but



normally resulted in an administrator being temporarily posted to the PDT to assist the deploying S1.

The DPSC was manned by specialist personnel from all three services, but the disbandment of the Army and Air Force administration trades and the creation of a centralised administration construct generated significant manning issues. Whilst the DPSC establishment remained extant without any reduction of duties, the availability of suitably qualified administrators to fill that establishment was vastly reduced and some positions remained gapped.

The intent was for DPSC to focus on the direct support to operational missions while the Human Resources Service Centre (HRSC) provided the support role for general administration and pay. Other services traditionally processed by an administrator were being progressively pushed to HRMIS that would remove the need for numerous paper actions. The onus was placed on individuals to check that personal details were in date without reminders from administration staff. This progression required a significant culture change throughout the NZDF but was regarded as a transitional phase.

The key observations raised at this time were largely based around the workload of the deploying S1 having to deal with routine administration tasks as a result of HRMIS going live, often without the traditional support of DPSC, rather than focusing on PDT. One recommended course of action was to assign at least two DPSC personnel to the PDT for the first ten days and again in the final week. This was simply not an option following the reduction in DPSC manning and the ongoing requirement to provide a service to all missions. DPSC is now an establishment mix of military and civilian although some posts remain gapped.



Part Three:

DEPLOYMENT







MOVEMENT

The Advance Party (AP), consisting of the SNO and key staff, deployed by RNZAF Hercules aircraft to Manas, Kyrgyzstan on 11 August 2003, with onward movement by coalition aircraft to Bagram. In-theatre training with coalition forces was carried out at Bagram over the period 18 – 22 August. The AP moved from Bagram to Bamyan on 24 August, which signalled the commencement of the Relief-in-Place operations with United States forces.

The Main Body (MB) of the PRT were deployed on 25 August by RNZAF B757 using the same route as the AP through Kyrgyzstan. The MB arrived in Bagram on 29 August and commenced in-theatre training with coalition forces the following day. The move from Bagram to Bamyan was conducted over the period 08 – 09 September.

Equipment and vehicles for the initial rotation was achieved by chartering a commercial Antonov AN124 cargo freighter from New Zealand into Kabul, with onward movement by road and US helicopters. There was no other option as the recently acquired RNZAF B757 aircraft were limited to carrying passengers only. Conversion of these aircraft to a mixed cargo of personnel and freight was not completed until some years later and they were never intended to carry vehicles of any type or size.

FLY AWAY PLANNING TEAM

By the end of 2004, the mission had already been extended by Cabinet to 24 months, with a high likelihood of being extended by a further six to twelve months. The continually evolving nature of the mission was creating a high demand on the NZDF for personnel, equipment and strategic assets. A Fly Away Planning Team (FAPT) was raised and deployed to Afghanistan to review operational level Terms of Reference in support of a continued presence of the PRT in Bamyan.



The FAPT conducted a robust review of TG CRIB, focusing on the current mission, tasks, OLOC generation activities, and establishment. The planning information gathered was used effectively to support future rotations of personnel and equipment, as well as formulate initial extraction planning data. At this stage, there was no indication that the mission would extend to 10 years duration.

KIWI BASE INFRASTRUCTURE

The weather patterns in Bamyán were extreme in range, which provided unique challenges and varying degrees of impact on the PRT's ability to operate. A typical year would see deep snow and sub-zero temperatures in winter, mud and flooding in the spring thaw, and the heat and dust of summer.





The PRT was based in an existing camp that had supported a 40-60 person US PRT and was not deemed suitable for prolonged use of 100-plus personnel of the NZ PRT. There was sufficient living accommodation although it needed upgrading, but expanded ablution, kitchen, dining and recreational facilities were also necessary.

A command post and operations centre with secure communications facility had to be established and it required considerable effort during the first rotation to prepare huts and facilities for winter to meet minimum electrical safety and health standards.

The Joint Reconnaissance Team (JRT) proposed that the bulk of infrastructure development should be completed before the PRT took over the facility. It was recommended support engineers deploy as part of the advance party to complete the work before the main group of personnel arrived in Bamyán. However, a Light Engineer Group were already deployed to Iraq for infrastructure rebuilding tasks so forming another team to work in Bamyán was not feasible.

Initial assessments of the work required were underestimated and as a consequence, much of the effort of TG CRIB Rotation 1 was directed at upgrading the camp. It is stressed that this did not impact patrol or liaison activities.



Purchasing Officer. A key outcome of the earlier FAPT review was the recommendation to deploy a Purchasing Officer (PO) for two months in early 2005 who would coordinate the identification and procurement of materials for the Kiwi Base building and refurbishment projects. These included:

- Kitchen and dining floor replacement.
- Kitchen internal wall replacement.
- Dining room extension.
- Kitchen hot water supply upgrade.
- Regimental Aid Post water reticulation and hot water supply upgrade.
- Medical facility bunker construction.
- Engineering workshop insulation and heating upgrade.
- Construction of NZ Police accommodation.
- Additions to current accommodation.
- Re-roofing of accommodation annexes.

This list was by no means exhaustive but illustrates the extent of what improvements were needed in order to sustain the mission. More detail of some refurbishment projects are described below.



The administration requirements for deploying the PO were 'not standard' as the nominated individual was an NZDF civilian. This resulted in extensive legal and contractual research by Civilian HR to ensure all aspects of deploying a civilian into an operational mission were addressed and documented in a variation of contract. This is believed to be the core of the process that informed policy and eventually became a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for civilian support across all NZDF operational missions and exercises.

The work of the PO proved to be very successful as most material was sourced and purchased for delivery s. 6(a)

The deployment of an RNZAF C130 s. 6(a) proved both timely and invaluable as it was able to move freight into Afghanistan. It is creditable that approximately 100,000 pounds of freight presented by the PO was all moved during this deployment and without this support, civilian freight costs would have been significant. Movement of some material prior to the arrival of the NZDF C130 was provided by Canadian assets.

Heating System. The heating system installed by the US throughout the base in preparation for winter was described as excellent, but it was drawing three times more power resulting in regular overloading of the sub-mains circuits. The deployed electrician demanded a replacement cable with increased capacity but this was not available from the usual vendor used by J4 Branch in HQ JFNZ. A US supplier was found and the installation of an upgraded cable resolved the overloading issue.

Equipment and Replacement Parts. Electrical generators and the ablution hot water system was legacy equipment from US ownership of Kiwi Base and required specialist parts that were not available in NZ. The generator spares had to be held in the camp as a safeguard against power failure, and the hot water cylinder burners for the ablutions had been identified as needing replacement. The NSE in Kabul made a formal approach to US suppliers and contractors for assistance, which resulted in an arrangement that addressed maintenance needs.



Water Supply. The PRT used on average 20,000 litres of water per day to fulfil showering, toilet and laundry requirements; this increased to 30,000 litres during the summer months. The source of non-potable water was from an insecure water point some distance from Kiwi Base. The water was pumped into a water truck and transported back to the base, twice daily, seven days a week. Three Afghani locals were employed to conduct water transportation and each trip required an NZDF escort. This capacity was usually enough to support the demands of the main base personnel but when patrol teams returned back to Kiwi Base, the supply became stretched and often ran out at peak times. This problem was compounded in winter when all patrol teams were in camp, or when a relief-in-place was occurring.

At one stage, flooding washed out the road between Kiwi Base and the water point; an interim solution was for non-potable water to be drawn from a local stream but this was high in sediment and faecal content. The high sediment content of the water was clogging plumbing and associated plant fittings and the only solution was for TG CRIB to use bottled water at twice the normal consumption rate and greater cost.

In June 2005, a proposal was raised by the PRT to repair the road between Kiwi Base and the water point. The funding of up to US\$4K to achieve this was approved and the work successfully completed, although the continued use of this water source had ongoing security, manpower and financial implications. A long term proposal was raised at the same time to drill a deeper, exploratory well inside Kiwi Base with the potential of providing a more reliable water source.





Advantages and disadvantages were identified in relation to this proposed course of action. Maintaining the current process would still result in water shortages at times and there was always the risk of the road being washed out again. The existing water point was in a public place and was vulnerable to accidental or deliberate contamination. The risk of this was further compounded by there being no Environmental Health Officer (EHO) included in future rotations of TG CRIB following the initial efforts to establish Kiwi Base.

Drilling of an exploratory well was not guaranteed to produce the quality and quantity of water required but success would realise a new and secure water source with the added bonus of better supply for fire-fighting, which was assessed as a vulnerability at the time.

The cost of drilling the exploratory well was estimated at up to US\$6K and further expenditure of up to US\$10K to complete the well if the water was of suitable quality and quantity. The drilling was successful and there was no faecal contamination detected. However, the hardness of the water was higher than acceptable for use in water reticulation and waste disposal systems. In its untreated form, the water was suitable for fire-fighting, washing equipment and construction purposes i.e. making concrete. In an emergency, the water could have been used in the kitchen, ablutions and waste systems but it would have caused damage to this infrastructure in a matter of days. The yield from the well was a maximum of 10,000 litres a day, but with a continual draw for more than three days, this amount fell off to just 6,000 litres; under a third of the minimum daily requirement. There was no alternative option other than to revert back to contracting collection from the original water point. This water, treated appropriately, was suitable for personal hygiene, laundry, food preparation and clean up, human waste disposal and general equipment cleaning.

During the surge deployment of an EHO in mid-2008, there was some discussion raised around drilling a new well to a depth of 250 – 300 metres. This was not progressed as it was financially restrictive and there was still no guarantee that water quality would have improved as a result.



Vehicle Workshop. This building was not insulated when the PRT arrived in Kiwi Base and extremely cold temperatures were recorded in the workshop during the winter months. The mechanics were unable to work wearing gloves and as a result, there were some reported incidents where metal tools were actually sticking to their hands. This was rectified through a complete upgrade of the building with suitable insulation and fitting of heating and air conditioning systems to mitigate the range of temperatures.

Regimental Aid Post (RAP). There were a number of issues in the RAP that needed rectification; replacement flooring, water flow and drainage, and the hot water system. The existing wooden floor covering was not of a standard that met basic medical hygiene practices and was subsequently replaced with non-porous material that could be wet-mopped. The entire water and drainage system servicing the RAP froze during the first winter period due to inadequate in-ground piping. Temperatures were such that the ground had frozen and replacement could only be scheduled in the warmer months. Engineers also replaced the hot water system as the one fitted was too small and of low quality.

Kitchen and Dining Facilities. The kitchen walls were constructed from plywood, which created a greater fire risk by soaking up fat from the atmosphere. Effective cleaning was an issue that did not meet with Operational Safety and Health regulations. The walls were replaced with a wipe clean surface although the material was not available in country and had to be supplied from NZ. The dining room was furnished with wooden tables and chairs that were in a poor state of repair; these were replaced with more durable and hygienic steel furniture.

The floors in both areas were of plywood construct and sinking in places, making the surface uneven and hazardous to walk on. Repairs were carried out and a linoleum covering was purchased to allow better cleaning and hygiene.







Part Four:

OPERATIONS







PRT CONTRIBUTION

The contribution of PRT's in Afghanistan helped to extend the authority of the Afghan government beyond Kabul, facilitated reconstruction and dampened violence. However, it was equally clear that they could not address the underlying causes of insecurity in Afghanistan. The PRT's were a part of the overall strategy in which they served to buy time, while other instruments tackled the military threat posed by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Additionally, the infighting between warlords increased lawlessness and banditry; the expanding opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade contributed significantly to the poor prospects of the country.

In the early years of operations PRT's received very mixed reviews. The humanitarian organisations generally regarded the PRT's as a second-best solution, preferring a robust peace operation covering the whole country. Some of the harshest criticism claimed that the PRT's were doing more harm than good, constituting nothing more than a *'public relations team demonstrating that something was being done'*. This extreme view was not shared by the humanitarian community overall, and neither was any evidence presented to support it.

In contrast, NATO and the governments fielding the PRT's viewed them as a success story; an effective, flexible, low-cost instrument that could be easily adapted to other conflicts if necessary. The way PRT's operated was viewed as having an influence on shaping further responses to armed conflicts where humanitarian organisations could operate without excessive military protection.

The PRT is primarily a post-conflict vehicle that requires a relatively permissive environment in which to operate, such as Bamyan; it would have been far more difficult to operate the same model in Kandahar for example. A key element of the NZ PRT operation was the use of 'presence patrols', demonstrating the importance of being seen to be there and readily available to address the concerns of the communities they visited during those patrols.



By 2005, there were 21 PRT's operating across Afghanistan; US (14), UK (2), German (2), Dutch, US/South Korean, and NZ. The Afghan government was involved in the planning and running of the PRT's from the beginning and representatives from the Ministry of the Interior were present at most PRT HQs.

The PRT's were equipped for self-defence only and were not intended for enforcement tasks. Like traditional peace keeping forces, they depended on their negotiating skills and the consent of the local communities for success. There still remained the option of calling in military backup in the form of rapid reaction forces and OEF air power in emergencies. This considerably enhanced their bargaining power and deterrent capability when dealing with local commanders and warlords, which identified the PRT's as more of a diplomatic than military tool. They were not equipped or mandated to stop fighting amongst the warlords or take military action against the drug trade.

PERSONNEL

The ongoing planning and coordination of TG CRIB activities provided HQ JFNZ with experience in creating, training and deploying tri-Service teams. The deployments also highlighted the need for bespoke training and exercises in provincial reconstruction type activities to accommodate a tri-Service model.

The 'ten-year' timeframe for OEF lent itself to the suggestion that New Zealand would probably participate in further deployments of this type. Sustainment of the PRT for this length of time was always going to be difficult without some personnel being stood up for a second or even third rotation; in the first few years, there was command intent of not generally permitting personnel to be deployed to Afghanistan more than once.

Reserve Forces. One of the options considered was to possibly draw more heavily on the Army's Territorial Force (TF), but the pool of eligible personnel was (and remains) limited in terms of the skill sets required to fill such roles. TF personnel have to balance civil employment and personal commitments that further reduces their availability for long deployments. A typical TG CRIB rotation was for six months actually deployed, but additional time for pre-



deployment training and leave on completion can stretch a potential engagement out to nine months. TF personnel cannot be directed to serve so availability depends entirely on individuals being willing and able to volunteer.

Personnel Availability. The impact on personnel availability was greater than just the number of personnel in each rotation of the TG; over an eight to ten week period twice a year the number of 'unavailable' personnel was up to 280. This reflects 140 undertaking PDT for the next rotation, and 140 actually deployed in Afghanistan before returning to New Zealand and taking post-deployment leave. These figures account for just one mission but at the peak of deployed personnel across all missions, unavailability rose to circa 1600.

Civilian Employment. There was some confusion in theatre over the ability of the PRT to renegotiate wages for the Locally Employed Contractors (LEC); contracts of employment were mandatory and contained specific details of wages and conditions of service. A recommendation came from theatre that future directives on the employment of LEC should be more detailed to cover the procedure for the review of contracts in theatre. However, there is a difference between amending a contract and changing the rate of pay; the former is a legal issue, the latter a finance issue.

Detailed legal instructions were issued at the time of the contract and direction was given not to make any amendments without seeking input from J09 Legal in HQ JFNZ. This was a requirement in order to avoid the repeat of a previous situation where significant changes had been made to wage structures, resulting in excessive one-off payments to LEC.

Changes to wages could be made provided they were within the agreed dollar value and there was sufficient budget to do so. However, theatre had no visibility of the budget managed by HQ JFNZ so there was a requirement to check before committing any new expenditure. There was a delegation made to TG CRIB that would facilitate payments of an ongoing and/or minor nature only.



Fuel Management. During the winter months in Kiwi Base, the fuel in the bulk holding facility had the potential to freeze in the pumps and pipes. This required the petroleum operator to keep the pump operating greater than 12 hours a day although this impacted on a secondary role as the Assistant Company Quartermaster. A recommendation was made to surge a second operator during the winter rotations on request of the TG CRIB Commander, which required CDF approval as the mandated manpower ceiling might occasionally be exceeded for a short period of time.




Patrol Drivers. There was a requirement for nominated patrol drivers to hold the NZ Army Non-Military Vehicle endorsement but to ease the pressure and demands on those drivers, it was recommended that all patrol personnel should be qualified to drive a 4x4 vehicle. Not all personnel in the patrol groups were NZ Army and in order to ease the training burden, it was further recommended that either single service endorsements or the Defence Driving Permit (DDP) be recognised. Air and Navy personnel were offered the opportunity to attend Army vehicle introduction courses where vacancies were available and the DDP was acknowledged as the standard of qualification for all three services.



Secondary Roles. There was an observation raised that Medics deployed to TG CRIB were 'expected' to act as drivers of patrol vehicles as a secondary role. Some instances were recorded where nominated medical personnel were unable to complete driver training prior to deployment. It is a unit responsibility to ensure driver training is complete but the medic's PD did not specify any requirement for driving tasks.

s. 9(2)(h)



Personnel Fitness Standards. The issue of single service fitness standards for deploying personnel has been the subject of many observations, and not only from TG CRIB. Each service has its own fitness requirements and passing whatever test is set results in that individual meeting DLOC. However, specific comments had been made about Air and Navy personnel not performing as well on a land based mission like Afghanistan as they have not undertaken and passed the Army Required Fitness Level (RFL). This resulted in some further comments of personnel being unable to 'keep up' with dismounted infantry.

There have been numerous analysis and proposals to implement a 'joint' fitness test but there has been no appetite to change the way in which the single services structure their testing. Personnel managers are not in a position to force non-Army personnel to complete an Army RFL and in contrast, there is no expectation that Army personnel embarking in HMNZS Canterbury should have to pass the Navy fitness test for example. The situation remains that there is no 'one size fits all' model.



However, this has been partially addressed by an expectation that non-Army personnel complete the Army Combat Fitness Test (CFT) when nominated to fill certain positions on a land mission. This has proven to be successful as the nominated individual is keen to prove his or her capability to carry out the tasks expected of them. The CFT is conducted in addition to the single service testing requirements, which remains a recognised deployment standard.

LOGISTICS

Every long-term mission requires services from a range of providers but the delivery of support required in Afghanistan was a greater challenge than most given the remote location from New Zealand and the potential country threat profile. The objective of HQ JFNZ was to establish logistics support through coalition partners or commercial contracts wherever possible.

The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between the Government of the United States and the Government of New Zealand was signed on 02 November 2000. Its purpose was to facilitate the interchange of logistics support, supplies and services between the US Armed Forces and the NZDF.

HQ JFNZ and the US Commander Joint Task Force 180 negotiated an administrative arrangement for provision of logistics support to the PRT. An Implementing Arrangement under the terms of the ACSA facilitates support of temporary, short duration or in isolated situations during crisis or contingency operations. This was agreed and signed on 01 October 2003 and listed the implementing authorities as HQ JFNZ J4 Logistics Branch, J9 Finance Branch and the equivalent US authorities based in Bagram. The agreement was used to effect the exchange of logistics support for: food, water, billeting, transportation, petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services. There was a further agreement drawn up that covered arrangements with the United States for critical support as a quick reaction force, aeromedical evacuation,



emergency close air and helicopter support. A vehicle incident in May 2004 substantiated that these arrangements worked well when an injured patrol member was quickly evacuated to the US Military hospital in Bagram.

National Support Element. An NSE was established at Bagram Airfield with two staff officers attached to the HQ Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, but still part of the PRT contingent. The initial concept of operations, end state and mission duration, **s. 6(a)**

s. 6(a), had a detrimental impact on early operation logistics plans and their implementation. The concept of an NSE was not well understood by Coalition Commanders at first, but the use of an NSE for the PRT proved to be invaluable. The NSE model was developed and successfully employed during operations in East Timor from which detailed NZ doctrine was developed.

Once on the ground in theatre, it took time for the NSE to establish itself, articulate its role and get itself integrated into a very large US and multi-national support environment. **s. 6(a)**

s. 6(a). It was testament to the NSE that traditional Kiwi congeniality, endeavour and initiative achieved the desired outcome.

In-country acquisitions and forwarding of freight and mail was conducted by US helicopter or road transport to Bamyan. There were periodic supply runs by RNZAF C-130 aircraft from New Zealand **s. 6(a)** to manage the onward logistics link into Afghanistan, a small attachment of NZDF personnel was integrated with **s. 6(a)**. However, while these arrangements were considered to be robust there were complications in some aspects that needed to be addressed. These were reported by



observations submitted from theatre and some of the key issues are described below.

Procurement of Stores. The role of s. 6(a) [redacted] as a procurement and supply agency was not being exploited to its full capacity, especially when a demand could be satisfied through local purchase. In 2005, there were over 320 expense-item demands placed on HQ JFNZ totalling in excess of NZ\$130K yet the cost of freighting these items to TG CRIB was almost double that amount. The procurement process was subsequently amended that would reduce the number of demands placed on HQ JFNZ and this change was clearly reinforced at the PDT logistics brief delivered to future rotations by HQ JFNZ J4 Logistics staff.

Contract Management. The TG CRIB Logistics Specialist (S4) was responsible for maintaining, and in some case establishing, contracts for services such as rental of land/buildings, water, security, rationing and vehicles. It was reported that NZ Army logisticians do not receive any formal training in contract management and there was lack of information during PDT and briefings prior to deployment. There a number of functional areas of contract management:

- Interaction with the contractor on a daily basis for task coordination;
- The finance element who process invoices and payments but usually hold little interest or awareness of the contract document; and
- The command and control aspect to manage the contract terms and conditions, formally resolve issues, and initiate legal action if required.

Aspects found to be challenging were the process for cancelling a contract, paperwork necessary for a Registration of Interest or Tender, and drafting of contracts containing appropriate penalty clauses.

There was a series of actions taken to enhance training prior to deployment. HQ JFNZ briefings were arranged to include a standard component of managing contracts and international agreements, and a revised SOP was issued as a definitive guide for logisticians. Additionally, interim action was taken to increase attendance of NZDF personnel on a course run by the Australian



Defence Force once a year. Longer term work was undertaken to address NZDF training shortfalls during Trade Training and PDT.

Non-NZDF support. There were a significant number of non-NZDF personnel operating on or from Kiwi Base, each with their own special requirements managed by the S4. These included military, Other Government Agencies (OGA), NGO, LEC, interpreters and the Afghan National Police. The incoming S4 required access to or briefing on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), International Agreements and support arrangements for each organisation. It was determined that the most effective way to understand the intricacies of in-theatre support arrangements was to engage the most recently returned S4 to provide an extensive brief prior to deployment, with theatre providing any updates to MoUs on arrival. This was supported by PDT, command briefings and SOPs.

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The type of personal equipment required for the first PRT e.g. webbing, protective jackets and night vision goggles, was in short supply. Personal support items was sourced primarily from the Burnham based units which resulted in their stores being largely emptied to meet demand. The outcome was a lack of some items, particularly tactical communications sets, available for PDT, and the impact on the operational preparedness of some Burnham units.

It was clear that the NZDF did not have sufficient stocks of materiel to support another unit the size of the PRT, should the need arise, whilst deployments to Afghanistan were ongoing. The lesson learned was to ensure sufficient stocks of equipment was available outside of the small holdings in individual camps to cover operational deployments, without affecting readiness or training of personnel. This practice was subsequently implemented and has proven to be effective over the course of the mission and beyond.



Cold Weather Equipment. There were numerous observations on the issue and suitability of kit designed for extreme cold weather (ECW) conditions. Stocks of ECW clothing and footwear was limited at the time the initial PRT deployed, but all personnel had appropriate clothing in time for winter. There was no provision in the clothing contract at the time for the carrying of contingency stocks to meet major unforeseen circumstances, although this was quickly rectified.

As the mission progressed and the extent of ECW conditions was experienced, there were further recommendations to increase the winter issue allowance. This included an additional three pairs of ECW socks, issue of a balaclava in addition to the ECW hat and facemask, and gaiters so that personnel could conduct foot patrols on the frequent occasions when access roads became impassable by vehicles in winter.

One effect of the winter conditions – temperatures were recorded as low as minus 22°C – was the performance of pack and webbing clips. The plastic clips became brittle in the ECW environment and snapped easily. A field repair kit was designed and provided to the mission as a short term solution but a longer term solution was to review equipment specifications in order to improve the quality and reliability of plastic clips at the point of manufacture.

Changes to the Scale of Entitlement (SOE) for deploying personnel were made as a direct result of collective feedback and recommendations from theatre, which highlights the importance of raising and following through observations as part of the lessons learned process.

PT Kit. There was no provision for female running attire that was culturally appropriate to wear in Bamyan. Standard issue of PT kit was based on t-shirt and shorts but long sleeve shirts and pants were deemed to be better suited in respecting cultural beliefs of the local population. s. 6(a)

. Two interpreters (one



male and one female) were consulted about the dress issues and both said it would be appropriate to cover up. A Staff Demand was raised by the PRT to change the SOE for the mission, but it was more cost effective for local purchase of items to be made rather than hold specific items in stock for issue in NZ that would potentially only be drawn by those heading to Afghanistan.

HEALTH

The major risks to personnel were motor vehicle accidents, cold climate, altitude related sickness and land mine injuries. Kiwi Base operated an emergency medical facility, which meant it was capable of providing limited resuscitation and first aid. As with all NZDF deployments, personnel had up to date medical and dental clearances before leaving NZ.

The US undertook to provide medical evacuation by air to Bagram airfield, but the isolation, mountainous terrain and extreme climate meant that such operations could be difficult, especially in poor weather. The response time for any aero-medical evacuation was approximately one and a half hours from initial request to pick up from Kiwi Base. There was also an undertaking for the US to airlift seriously injured NZDF personnel to a US military medical facility in Germany if more intensive treatment was needed. Repatriation back to NZ remained the responsibility of the NZDF.

The isolation, harsh environment and threats to security were recognised as key contributory factors to raised levels of stress. Recreation facilities and good e-mail and telephone connectivity were freely available for personnel to help maintain morale. Blood tests and psychological debriefings were conducted for the return to NZ to ensure no underlying stress issues went undetected.

There were a number of valid observations raised throughout the deployment to Afghanistan; the key issues are shown below.



Environmental Health Officer. Afghanistan was, and still is, assessed as a high health risk environment and the deployment of an EHO was considered critical to the success of the PRT during the early rotations. This ensured that the provision of drinking water, waste water disposal, food storage, pest control and animal disease vectors, among many other aspects, met the required standards.

Qualifications to practice as an EHO are gained at tertiary level and there has always been a very small number available in the NZDF.¹ This limitation meant that the same few individuals were rotating through the designated EHO post in the mission resulting in considerable strain being put on them. The introduction of an Environmental Health Technician (EHT) helped to partially ease the manning issue for a short time although training for this qualification is very limited compared to an EHO. There was no option to request the assistance of US environmental health assets as their presence in Afghanistan was limited to focusing only on their own forces. Support from NZ Reserve forces occasionally provided an important component of the EHO cover, but these were individuals practising environmental health in their civilian job and taking time out to deploy was at a premium.

An EHO was surged into theatre at the start of some rotations to conduct assessments at Kiwi Base, Forward Patrol Bases, and the NSE in Bagram. This proved to be a largely effective compromise given the medics were trained in the basics of environmental health to recognise prospective issues arising; calling up additional support in these situations was always an option open to them.

Medical Evacuation. The US provided air transport for the medical evacuation of personnel although some areas of operation were beyond the range of the American UH-60 helicopter. This restriction would mean severely injured or sick

¹ In 2017, there are 8 EHO's and 4 EHT's (with 2 undertraining) in the NZ Army. Air force health protection personnel were not available for deployment to TG CRIB and Navy have no recognised EHO capability. In 2003, there were only 3 EHO's.



personnel would have to wait many hours for evacuation to a US hospital facility for treatment.

The impact of this issue was flagged to command as a limitation on the extent of operations. The solution was for helo fuel to be stored at Kiwi Base allowing for an extended range of MEDEVAC aircraft. With the agreement of US authorities, this was achieved through the delivery of a fuel bladder and associated equipment to build a forward air refuelling point, which was fully accredited having met all aircraft fuelling regulations.

Combat Life Savers. There were some occasions when patrols were split with one half being left without a medic. It was recommended that every patrol had at least two combat life savers (CLS) to ensure on the spot first aid was available and this was reflected in the mission establishment manning accordingly.

There were some issues that needed to be addressed in terms of training where identified CLS personnel were arriving at PDT without a current qualification. There was a requirement raised and implemented for CLS to be in date and for the qualification to remain current throughout the deployment.

Avian Influenza. Afghanistan was not excluded from the world-wide impact of bird flu and there were some confirmed cases detected in the country. However, there had been no confirmed cases in humans and the associated health risk was assessed as low. The guidance provided by J1 Health was for personnel to avoid direct contact with birds, dead or alive, and ensure that eggs and poultry were well cooked before eating. All personnel were issued with personal protection equipment and doses of Tamiflu in the unlikely event of a human flu outbreak occurring. If required to be administered, J1 Health would provide direction on a suitable course of action.

Drug destruction. Periodically, the PRT was requested by the Bamyan Governor or Chief of Police to destroy opium or other drugs that had been seized and held by the Afghan National Police. The most practical means of destruction is by burning but this is classed as disposal of a hazardous material and there needed to be strict procedures in place. An SOP was developed that

gave details of opium destruction by combustion in a trench incinerator, including safety and medical support requirements. Training for the EHO/EHT was conducted alongside NZ Police.



Critical Incident Mental Health Support. This term has only been introduced in the past two years and was originally known as Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM). For the purpose of this publication, CISM has been used as it was the terminology used for the duration of TG CRIB.

Afghanistan was rated as a high Operational and Environmental Threat; personnel deployed were considered to be at greater risk of exposure to critical



incidents than most other missions. A critical incident is defined as an event outside the range of normal experience that often involves a threat to life (real or perceived) and can disrupt a person's sense of control, immediately or following the event. Examples of such potential incidents include armed conflict; aircraft accidents; fires; vehicle accidents; training accidents; contact with dead bodies; physical assault and natural disasters. Reaction to stress is particularly individual in nature, governed by a range of factors including the nature of the incident; personality characteristics; values and belief systems; prior experience (including pre-incident training); and the quality of leadership and support systems.

CISM was practised by medical personnel deployed to TG CRIB who were provided with specialist training that gave them the tools to identify a CISM requirement. This was completed in order to assess whether the surge of appropriately trained and qualified psychologists were required to deploy to conduct structured interviews and education.

An important part of CISM was the preparation of personnel to cope with incidents. During PDT, all personnel received a brief outlining the nature of critical incident stress and provided information about coping strategies to effectively manage critical incidents.

US Medical Records. In the event of US personnel attached to Kiwi Base becoming ill, there were no accessible individual medical records that would have assisted with treatment. The outcome was for NZ medical staff to treat US patients as though they were entering an Emergency Department, and seek past medical history from the US Craig Joint Theatre Hospital in Bagram. Further processes were implemented to ensure all US personnel posted to Kiwi Base brought a copy of their medical records with them.

TRANSPORT

The key tasks in Bamyan were initially identified as engagement with the local people and provision of a security presence. This required patrols to travel into remote locations and required a vehicle with the mobility to traverse

steep, narrow routes that were invariably in poor condition. The choice at the time was limited to the Toyota Hilux and the High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV or 'Humvee'). The Humvee was configured to be fitted with military weapons and radios but due to its size, it proved difficult to access some of the more remote villages. The Hilux was used as an alternate but there was still a requirement for some type of protection and



communications; the outcome was the fitting of manpack radios and an improvised machine gun seat.

The Hilux proved to be a generally reliable vehicle but in 2008, there was a clear shift between the importance of mobility and protection. An increase in the use of remote controlled improvised explosive devices saw it necessary to fit electronic counter measures to vehicles. The kinetic threat in Bamyan increased aligning with the insurgent action being experienced in bordering regions of the province; this resulted in the deployment of Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV) in 2009 to afford the PRT patrols a greater level of protection.

Vehicle Maintenance. The initial plan for vehicle maintenance was to deploy one Vehicle Maintainer (VM) and employ two local contractors to service and repair the fleet. It soon became clear that this was not adequate as the general



skills of the contractors were considered to be at apprentice level of expertise. They were able to conduct some repairs but the quality of work resulted in the VM having to conduct 'out inspections' before vehicles could be verified safe to operate. A further consequence was for vehicles having to be repaired in the field requiring the presence of the VM; this resulted in Kiwi Base being left with no cover in the event of vehicle breakdown. The decision was made to deploy an additional VM and a welder to subsequent rotations of TG CRIB.

Vehicle Safety. An ad-hoc addition to the vehicle was a gun position mounted in the back tray, which consisted of an old car seat bolted to a wooden plank that was in turn bolted to the deck of the vehicle; the gun was secured to the roof. There were no safety belts or a roll over cage to protect the gunner and no ability to traverse the weapon beyond the '10 o'clock and 2 o'clock' arcs.

There were some occasions when the welds and brackets holding the vehicle tray to the chassis were breaking due to the effects of heavy loads being carried over harsh terrain. This could be mitigated for during short patrols but the quantity of stores and equipment required for longer-range patrols meant that vehicles were overloaded. This contributed to the maintenance needs and there were not enough personnel or vehicles to spread the load by increasing the number of vehicles in each patrol.

It was recommended that investigations be made into a Commercial Off-the-Shelf solution for a specially designed seat and weapon mount if the intent was to continue with using the Hilux. The overall intent was to ensure vehicles met the requirements for a changing tactical situation. The deployment of NZ military vehicles was still under analysis so options were limited to improving the Hilux fit or using the HMMWV, which has a cupola to protect the gunner. This situation was resolved through the issue of a command directive not to use vehicle mounted gunners during patrols when using the Hilux.

COMMUNICATIONS

Secure links back to New Zealand, and with coalition partners in theatre, were essential and release of the warning order from HQ JFNZ in late June 2003 was



the catalyst to commence the procurement process for CIS equipment. There was at least a one month lead time for key equipment but there was just a two week window open to place an order for satellite and computer systems in order to meet the main body deployment. This did not include the time required for building the system, integration and testing prior to deployment, and installation in the Bagram HQ and Kiwi Base. The outcome was that basic equipment to establish the mission was successfully commissioned in theatre, with additions and enhancements being made over the first few months of operations.

Training. Communications training during PDT was scheduled for one hour to cover familiarisation of new radios; this is normally delivered on a course over a week and a half in order for attendees to be considered fully competent. It was also identified that PDT did not feature any Communications Security training, which resulted in the programme being amended accordingly to ensure sufficient time was allocated for personnel to attain competency in both disciplines.

s. 6(a)



Internet and Intranet. There were ongoing issues with connectivity to applications as programmes were effectively competing for band width on the range of information systems necessary to conduct operations. However, email and telephone connections were generally good and received favourable comments as part of welfare support to the mission.



PROFILE is the patient medical management system used for checking patient notes and entering consultation details; it was introduced to the RNZN in 2003 and released for use across the whole of NZDF in 2005. PROFILE was connected in Kiwi Lines to support the PRT but with the server being located in Auckland, the response time from Afghanistan was very poor and made the system unusable. It was taking 15-20 minutes just to log on and the system was very slow and unresponsive throughout the working day. The programme was entirely reliant on bandwidth availability and had the same design problems as other programmes that were not designed to work in a low bandwidth environment. This issue was never fully resolved throughout the duration of TG CRIB; reverting to recording medical consultations by hand for later entry into the system proved to be a tried and tested alternative.

Internet computers provided an important link to meet the needs of service personnel at Kiwi Base but these were also affected by the amount of bandwidth available. Internet communications programmes, such as Skype, were always in demand but data speeds were often insufficient to allow good video connections. As internet communications evolved and social media use increased exponentially there was an associated increase in expectation, although this proved to be problematic without the necessary bandwidth available to host all the programmes being used back in New Zealand.

The same could be said for intranet systems where maintaining ready access to NZDF software programmes and information resources was important in keeping up to date with developments in NZDF planning and policy through online publications. Some effects of low bandwidth included very slow access to the HR management system, inability to utilise MEDWEB as a supporting resource, and being unable to read the FUTURE 35 document online due to the excessive time needed to load each section and page.

Ancillary Equipment. Harsh climatic and environmental conditions in Afghanistan caused continual problems with items such as keyboards and printers. CIS operators were salvaging parts from three or four pieces of broken equipment to create one usable item. There was a recommendation from theatre that the TG CRIB CIS Specialist (S6) should be authorised to hold a



quantity of spares and to purchase replacement items under the guidance of the SNO rather than having to refer back to HQ JFNZ for everything. This arrangement was subsequently implemented, with HQ JFNZ J6 Branch being kept informed in order to maintain visibility of what spares were being ordered.

FINANCE

During the first deployment there was a period of settling down regarding financial responsibilities; delegations and control of the operational budget for the PRT remained with HQ JFNZ in order that the SNO was free to manage the mission. Expenditure on TG CRIB was significantly less than budgeted for the first few rotations. This was largely due to the RNZAF being able to offset more flying hours against its operating budget than expected, and the cost of food and accommodation being less than forecast.

Financial Authority. The SNO was eventually given financial authority for the mission but there was no process to sub-delegate for minor approvals, resulting in the SNO personally approving all payments regardless how minor. A recommendation came from theatre for the SNO to be given authority to sub-delegate but this was resolved by giving the second-in-command a delegation to monitor and approve general day-to-day spending. This meant that the cost centre manager maintained better control of who was authorising payments and the SNO could focus on the mission. The original concept was for the Officer in Charge NSE to control budgets but in practice there was a high level of local procurement through Kiwi Base that was proved impractical to be conducted from Bagram.

Cash Withdrawals. There were no ATM facilities at Kiwi Base and in other places, cash machines were viewed as an unacceptable means of obtaining money in Afghanistan as they were unsafe and bank charges excessive. The only means of drawing cash in Kiwi Base was through the TG CRIB imprest (cash book) account. However, the supply of cash initially was from British Forces in Kabul; this required the NSE to launch a patrol into Kabul to uplift the cash and



transport it to Kiwi Base in Bagram, presenting an increased security risk to personnel.

There was a request to investigate the feasibility of procuring cash from the US Military Finance Unit at Bagram but given there was no arrangement with the US and issues with reconciliation, that option was ruled out as undesirable. The issue was resolved when an Afghan bank opened in Bagram and Treasury approving the opening of an account there; this was consistent with the one aspect of mission output to build the local infrastructure and business environment.

SAP Accounting. The NSE had no access to the SAP Finance Module and spent a significant amount of time seeking information from HQ JFNZ J9 staff regarding outstanding invoice payments. The delays to payments were impacting negatively on TG CRIB vendors, contractors and contract management. This was another case of low band width being unable to adequately support systems in theatre.





Part Five:

RECOVERY







THEATRE EXTRACTION

Theatre Extraction is the process of repatriating a deployed force and its infrastructure from a theatre of operations without replacement, marking the end of the New Zealand presence in a mission. The Theatre Extraction Team (TET) is composed of logistics, movement and other specialists deployed from New Zealand to manage and direct the repatriation process. This should not be confused with a Force Extraction Team that is responsible for repatriating a deployed force and its replacement with, and hand over to, another New Zealand force.

In general terms, there is a requirement to leave the site(s) in a country in the same, or better, state as when it was first occupied. Infrastructure is offered back to the land owners – the Bamyán government in this case – and if it is not accepted, removal of the structure is the responsibility of New Zealand. A health ‘closeout’ assessment of the site was conducted to ensure there were no physical environmental factors that might have affected personnel who served there, or posed any threat to future users of the site.

Where operational equipment is left behind, it is done so on the premise that New Zealand has no liability for maintenance or repair once it has been handed over. There are specific procedures around the disposal or gifting of other assets such as rations and water, petroleum, oils and lubricants, construction stores and explosive ordnance. Equally, there are some items that are prohibited from disposal such as medical stores and repair parts; these are returned to New Zealand for final disposal or reconstitution. There will be some items that have been leased or loaned from within theatre and these are prepared and scheduled for hand-back in the best possible state achievable.

Withdrawal Planning. The Government of New Zealand set the withdrawal date for the PRT from Bamyán as no later than 30 April 2013, with the total extraction of TG CRIB to be no later than 01 July 2013. A JRT was deployed to Afghanistan and associated areas in theatre 21 May – 09 Jun 12. Their mission was to conduct a detailed command reconnaissance of all aspects of theatre



extraction for TG CRIB, in order to allow operational planning to be completed, and tactical level planning to be advanced. This process would confirm the scale of the challenge, resources and support available to develop a concept of operations to complete the theatre extraction task.

To facilitate the TG CRIB TET process, HQ JFNZ formed a New Zealand based element to manage the process of returning stores and equipment. This was established in Trentham Military Camp (TMC) and was referred to as the TET (TMC), where management of the receipt, border clearance and hand-over of equipment to Defence Logistic Command for reconstitution took place. The TET (TMC) structure comprised of 23 personnel from logistics supply, movements, LAV crew, and maintenance support trades. TMC was the agreed point of hand over of all equipment from TG CRIB to the Logistics Commander (Land) although an element of flexibility was applied in terms of the final receipt point as the need arose.

Theatre Plan. The general plan was for all equipment and materiel that was no longer mission essential being progressively drawn down, during the period leading to the actual mission closure date, through use of TG CRIB, OP TROY and other NZDF assets as they were available. Utilisation of coalition air assets as well as contracted air assets were also mandated as appropriate. CO CRIB was authorised to identify personnel for draw down but on the proviso of balancing the need to continue providing essential life support, security, communications and engineering support in order for the TET to conduct final materiel extraction and disposal.

Movement of Cargo. Arrival of vehicles, equipment and stores into New Zealand was by charter flights into Auckland International Airport. There were a number of factors that influenced this decision:

- Practicing the 'hub and spoke' method of stores movement was important in order to maintain a single point of reception for accounting purposes.
- The aircraft chartered to move equipment were too big to use Wellington Airport.



- Auckland International has far superior capability and capacity to deal with cargo reception.

The original plan to move equipment out of theatre back to New Zealand included utilising a chartered National Air Cargo (NAC) Boeing 747 aircraft. However, on 29 April 13, the crash of a NAC 747 at Bagram Air Base and the subsequent civil investigation meant that NAC aircraft were no longer available. This caused a significant delay to the extraction plan as alternative arrangements were pursued; heavy vehicles and equipment were airlifted to **s. 6(a)** and returned to New Zealand by sea freight, arriving in Auckland in early July 2013.

The NAC disruption also caused a delay in the commencement of processes involved in returning loan equipment, predominantly to US authorities in Bagram. The withdrawal from Bamyan was almost solely within NZDF control but this was not the case in the coalition environment at Bagram. Handover of such equipment could not be completed until the NZDF met ISAF and US requirements in terms of signing agreements in relation to the disposal of equipment. The outcome of this was to seek a revision of the mandate for the TET to remain in Afghanistan that was due to expire on 30 June 2013; the New Zealand government subsequently agreed an extension to 01 August 2013.

Auckland based activities were expected to take up to six weeks while TMC based activities were programmed for up to six months duration. The team in Auckland comprised of the OC TET (TMC), up to five logistics personnel, four movement's personnel, two LAV crew, three maintenance support and one LAV SME. These personnel relocated back to TMC once receipt of all inbound cargo had been made.

Disposal of Land and Infrastructure. There were no known ownership issues with regards to land, major facilities and infrastructure that impacted on the TET process, all of which had been sourced through either commercial lease or Coalition support. As a result, the handback process was by way of negotiated agreement in terms of the appropriate notice being given. The following conditions were agreed for all hand back activities:



- An agreed statement of condition at hand back was produced prior to the commencement of any remediation work, stipulating the scope of work required and what authorised facilities could be left on-site.
- A Certificate of Handover was raised that reflected all the conditions of hand-back had been met and the site/facility owner accepted that the NZDF had met all its obligations, and would no longer remain liable for any future issues should they arise.
- All military defensive stores and facilities (observation towers, 'sangars', razor wire, etc.) were to be dismantled, removed and destroyed regardless of what the sit/facility owners desires were. The only exception to this was if the hand over was to another Coalition Member or Host Nation Security Force Element.

Foreign Military Equipment (FME). Where an item of military equipment was identified as not of NZDF origin, it was separated from NZDF equipment and labelled as FME. Any FME was matched against extant loan records and tagged with the loan number. If there was no identifiable load record for an item, it was recorded in detail (including photographs) and reported back to J4 in HQ JFNZ. Unless specific approval was given, no item of FME was to be returned to New Zealand under any circumstances. If no originating agency or Coalition could be identified as the owners, FME items were to be destroyed in-theatre by the most appropriate means and detailed records made of all such destruction.

Customs and MPI. Close liaison with the Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI) and NZ Customs was required to facilitate reception of material back into New Zealand. The intent was to gain the necessary clearances in Auckland and arrangements were in place to carry out any additional cleaning of vehicles in particular to meet NZ bio-security regulations.

One of the major concerns for MPI was the utilisation of local in-theatre materials for packaging and boxing, specifically non-treated wood. As a consequence, every precaution was taken by the TET when considering and preparing stores for return to New Zealand in wooden crates and packing. MPI advised that whilst wood treated to New Zealand standards was preferable, heat treated timber could be used. Local timber was used as a last resort but



needed detailed inspection on arrival in New Zealand; non-conforming material was burnt resulting in equipment having to be packaged in material that met with MPI regulations.

Reconstitution. The process of reconstitution is the refurbishment of equipment to a condition whereby it is declared ready for use again in an operational environment. Logistics Commander (Land) assumed responsibility for all TG CRIB equipment although HQ JFNZ continued to fund all aspects of the reconstitution process as operational expenditure.

The reconstitution process focused on four primary functions:

- **Repair:** the level of repair was determined based on the intended distribution.
- **Routine Servicing:** applied to all equipment not requiring repair.
- **Equipment Reconfiguration:** stock that has been re-configured for distribution to NZDF units.
- **Replacement:** on a like-for-like basis where items have either been disposed of by other means, or deemed beyond economical repair where a replacement is required.

Health Surveys. The site of Kiwi Base in Bamyán was subjected to an extensive health survey in order to assess the degree of any contamination and the potential remediation or management strategies prior to the transfer back to the Afghanistan Government. The assessment focused on historic and current activities that may have created potential public and environmental threats. The study covered the facilities at Kiwi Base, identification of potential sources of contamination, hazard identification, photographic and GPS mapping of suspected contamination.

There were some limitations in this approach that included:

- Lack of a baseline survey.
- Limited soil samples and associated logistical challenges with transport of samples.
- Limited historical records pertaining to the site.



Site Use. Kiwi Base was previously a residential compound surrounded by mud walls with no reported historical or culture resources at the site. The base was extended beyond the original HESCO walled facility and housed several motor pools and fuel storage facilities; there was no recorded history of significant spills. There was one 25 metre firing range that was protected on all sides by double-stacked HESCO barriers; the range was designed for small arms use only.

Surrounding Areas. At the time of the health surveys, Kiwi Base was bordered to the north by a gravel airfield, east by small farms and residential areas, to the south by Bamyán University, sealed road and portions of the new city, and to the west by parts of the new city and grazing land. The use of adjacent areas were changing as new construction projects move the old city of Bamyán to this area.

Findings. There were 13 identified risk areas subjected to testing of which only one, the main burn pits, required corrective action prior to handing back the site to the Afghanistan Government. Surface soil exceeded guidelines for lead and total petroleum hydrocarbons, which resulted in 0.2M below ground level of soil being excavated from all surfaces of the pits. Contaminated soil was buried, covered, clearly marked and geo located. Samples taken below 0.2M were measured well below guidelines for contamination and were consistent with expected conditions.



Part Six:

PROJECTS







ESTABLISHMENT

The PRT had two main pillars of activity in Bamyan – security and reconstruction. In early 2004, a forum was established in the PRT comprising of all the development focused appointments, and was designated as the lead within the PRT for reconstruction projects. This forum was referred to as the PRT Development Group (PRTDG).

The PRTDG comprised of representatives from three nations (NZ, US and UK): US Agency for International Development (US AID), UK Department of International Development (UK DFID), US Department of Agriculture, US Civil Affairs, NZAID and the NZDF.

FUNDING

The NZ PRT received funding from three main streams - NZAID, USAID and the US Commanders Emergency Response Programme (CERP). Each funding stream had different criteria for project selection, which ensured a wide cross section of projects were covered throughout Bamyan Province. In a general sense, the following project selection criteria were used.

NZAID generally supported:

- Afghan National Police activities
- Education and Humanitarian Aid related projects
- Minor roads and bridging projects
- Minor capacity building



USAID generally supported:

- Building schools, clinics, district and provincial government buildings
- Roads and bridging
- Capacity building (governance, agriculture and health)



CERP generally supported:

- Bridging, roads and water
- Flood protection
- Temporary employment for Afghanis
- Humanitarian Aid distribution

The embedding of a small US military development contingent within the PRT meant that US military funds from the CERP could be spent in Bamyán Province. This was borne from the US experiences in leading a PRT that suggested it was important for New Zealand to have access to funding for reconstruction projects. Selection of projects was determined in close collaboration with the Afghan provincial and district authorities, and the NZDF played a key role in facilitating management and monitoring of those projects.

“Last winter, the NZDF was kind enough to give humanitarian supplies in the form of fuel (coal and wood) and a 2,500 litre water container because what we had was frozen. New Zealand helped with the vulnerable population of the prison, which includes children who are living with their mothers. Now that there is a new prison, New Zealand provided fuel-efficient stoves so that the fuel could last all winter long. In addition, NZDF engineers made play-sets for children and will also be providing water containers that will help the prisoners to grow small vegetable gardens to supplement their meagre diet. If New Zealand didn’t help with this vulnerable population then these significant improvements would not have been achievable.”

– Michelle Lindo, Judicial Advisor – International Narcotics and Rule of Law Project (INL), Correction and Systems Support Programme, US funded programme managed out of the PRT, 14 February 2013

By the end of the financial year 2012/2013, New Zealand had spent NZ\$17.8M on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction projects, of which NZ\$10.47M was delivered through the NZDF.



NZAID

NZAID was a semi-autonomous department established in 2002 as a division of MFAT; it was reintegrated back into the Ministry as the International Development Group in 2009. There was a requirement to raise an MoU between NZAID and the NZDF that reflected Ministerial guidance for PRT activities focused on the following sectors:

- Maintaining and improving security, including disarmament and reintegration processes, election registration and elections;
- Security section reform including infrastructure rehabilitation and training for the civilian police force, for the Afghan National Armed Forces, and for the judicial sector;
- Support for local government including refurbishment of office space, training and skills transfer for staffs; and
- Reconstruction of infrastructure including, local power supplies, telecommunications, construction of roads and bridges.

The following mission statement and group goals were agreed as part of the initial MoU:

“To strengthen the influence of the Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan and to promote a stable and secure environment in Bamyan Province, by supporting development initiatives through the provision of funding and technical assistance whilst collaborating with stakeholders”.

- Promote job creation and training in support of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, most notably in the agricultural sector.
- Provide a foundation for good governance throughout Bamyan Province.
- Promote political pluralism and public participation in governance.
- Provide a foundation for the rule of law and human rights.
- Develop and maintain communications networks.
- Develop and maintain effective relationships with stakeholders.



Ministers supported an approach that NZAID work through future options that leveraged New Zealand's security and humanitarian interventions, engaged with established partners on the ground, had a measurable and sustainable development impact, were coordinated with other donors, and were responsive to the needs expressed by Afghan local authorities and people. Some examples of the scoping and feasibility studies for assistance were:

- Support to the Bamyán University, to place it on a sound footing towards being a fully functional, gender integrated, high quality and sustainable education provider;
- Continued support for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission;
- Feasibility work with the Food and Agriculture Organisation in rural livelihoods;
- Feasibility work with UN HABITAT on community development, including small infrastructure rehabilitation, power and irrigation projects; and
- Feasibility work with UK DFID on watershed management and irrigation.

The MoU reflected that the development and assistance tasks, delivered by the PRT, were consistent with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development guidelines. Future iterations of the MoU were subjected to minor amendment as projects were completed and operations in the country were conducted to account for the complex, changing security situation.

PROCESS

The PRT supported development initiatives in Bamyán through the provision of funding and technical assistance whilst collaborating with key stakeholders, especially Afghanistan Provincial Government Departments, UN Agencies, International Organisations and NGOs. The PRT was responsible for the identification, management and reporting of each development initiative undertaken on behalf of NZAID within Bamyán Province and occasionally, the remainder of the Central Highlands. The guidance was approved at Ministerial level and provided a focus on the following sectors:



- Maintaining and improving security, including disarmament and reintegration processes, election registration and conduct;
- Security sector reform including infrastructure rehabilitation and training for civilian police force, for the Afghan National Armed Forces, and for the judicial sector;
- Support for local government including refurbishment of office space, training and skills transfer of staff; and
- Reconstruction of infrastructure, including local power supplies, telecommunications, construction of roads and bridges.

PROJECT OUTCOMES

Major projects carried out included:

- An extension to Bamyan Boys High School;
- A dormitory for the Teacher Training College;
- Construction of five District Police Headquarters;
- Bailey bridges in three districts;
- A Health Clinic at Doju Doshak; and
- A new health clinic, maternity block and kitchen at Bamyan Hospital.

There were many smaller projects completed that assisted the every-day lives of people in Bamyan, such as flood protection, wells, road culverts, playgrounds and security walls at schools. In total, between 2004 and 2011 the NZDF was involved in more than 200 projects, large and small, that assisted the people of Bamyan.

Identifying those projects that could be supported took considerable effort to ensure the intended development initiatives were met. A number of measures were taken to assist with the process.

- Liaison officers were attached to patrols and worked with local communities, elders and Afghan officials to identify projects that would have a positive development impact.
- Communities and district officials were encouraged and supported to implement small projects themselves, with patrols facilitating monitoring visits as the projects progressed.



- Major projects were contracted out to local construction companies, with the NZDF Engineering Officer providing technical input into both procurement and construction.

There are plenty of references to the successful completion of a project although not everything always went to plan. A project started in March 2004 was aptly named the *'Milky Cow/Woolly Sheep Project'* where the PRT undertook a livestock improvement scheme in the Bamyan district as part of the Rural Development of Central Afghanistan (RDCA) Agricultural Research and Income Generation Project. NZAID funds totalling US\$88.5K were expended between April and August 2004 for the purchase, movement, stabling and three months feeding of one bull, 10 cows and 300 sheep. Payment was made by six instalments over the four month period.

After the final payment was made, it became apparent that, while the purchase of breeding livestock and the construction of stables did take place, some of the funds had been misappropriated s. 6(a)

. There was also evidence that some of the animals were on-sold to butchers in Kabul at a profit, instead of to breeders and farmers at a subsidised rate as was intended.

The outcome was a mediated settlement where an animal husbandry scheme was established under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, s. 6(a)

A key conclusion was that project management was *'less than perfect for understandable reasons'* and steps were put in place to avoid a repetition. This is a classic example of moving from a lesson identified to a lesson learned.



“Bamyan people are very grateful for the New Zealand PRT, which has made a lot of effort to help in the development of Bamyan. In the last 10 years, we have achieved a lot in health, education and infrastructure in Bamyan. We now have 353 schools, 135,000 students of which nearly 45 per cent are girls. In terms of health we have one provincial hospital, three district hospitals and 85 health centres. In terms of infrastructure, 10 years ago you couldn’t see any sealed road and today we have over 150 kms of sealed road in Bamyan, and now New Zealand is putting in a one mega-watt energy system for Bamyan centre. The town has improved where once we had only three to five standing buildings, now every government department has its own building. These are some very big achievements for Afghanistan, but most especially for Bamyan. The PRT has played a big role in development coordination and lobbied for a lot of other donors to come to Bamyan. The PRT has played a big role in mentoring Afghan police and aiding in security in the province and something that I always admire about the Kiwis is their behaviour towards the local culture, especially towards elders and villages. For me it is unbelievable to see such behaviour. They are very kind and respectful and show trust in locals.”

– Dr. Habiba Sarabi, Bamyan Provincial Governor, 25 February 2013



ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
s. 6(a)	
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Programme
ECW	Extreme Cold Weather
EHO	Environmental Health Officer
EHT	Environmental Health Technician
FAPT	Fly Away Planning Team
FME	Foreign Military Equipment
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JRT	Joint Reconnaissance Team
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MER	Middle East Region
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MPI	Ministry of Primary Industries
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NSE	National Support Element
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other Government Agencies
PD	Position Description
PDT	Pre-Deployment Training
PO	Purchasing Officer
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SNO	Senior National Officer
SOE	Scale of Entitlement
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
TET	Theatre Extraction Team
TMC	Trentham Military Camp
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VM	Vehicle Maintainer