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DEFENCE FORCE

HEI MANA MŌ AOTEAROA
A FORCE FOR NEW ZEALAND

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NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE DOCTRINE NZDDP-D (FIFTH EDITION)

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New Zealand Defence Force Publication *New Zealand Defence Doctrine* (NZDDP–D) (5th Edition) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in Defence doctrine.



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PREFACE

Scope

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has a unique culture that is underpinned by the shared values of Courage/Tū Kaha, Commitment/Tū Tika, Comradeship/Tū Tira, and Integrity/Tū Maia. These cultural values are the tenets from which the NZDF builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, appropriately equipped, and capable of serving the interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand Government. This culture provides the foundation for New Zealand's approach to conducting military operations.

The NZDF has been involved in activities across the full spectrum of operations in all corners of the world. Historically, most of New Zealand's involvement in operations overseas has always been as part of a coalition framework, alongside nations and organisations with interests that complement our own. These past experiences and the influence of defence partners have helped shape New Zealand's approach to conducting military operations.

Purpose

The NZDF articulates its philosophical approach to the conduct of military operations through military doctrine. *New Zealand Defence Doctrine* (NZDDP–D), which sits at the pinnacle of the NZDF's hierarchy of doctrine publications, is the capstone doctrine publication. It introduces the philosophical concept of military doctrine and its application by the NZDF.

NZDDP–D focuses primarily on the doctrinal components of New Zealand's military strategy, but it also describes the New Zealand approach to military activity at all levels. New Zealand's military doctrine is formulated and based on our own national experiences of making strategy and conducting military operations. NZDDP–D conveys broad principles that require judgement in their application according to situational imperatives. Doctrine is not mandatory dogma to be applied in all circumstances; that is simply not the New Zealand Defence Force's way of doing business.

Application

This publication is primarily intended for NZDF commanders and staff at all levels.

Structure

NZDDP–D (5th Edition) has six chapters.

- Chapter 1: *Geopolitical Context from Cooperation to Conflict*
- Chapter 2: *Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine*
- Chapter 3: *Security, Confrontation, and Deterrence*
- Chapter 4: *Military Capability and Fighting Power*
- Chapter 5: *The Principles of War and Operational Tenets*
- Chapter 6: *Employing the New Zealand Defence Force*

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The New Zealand Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to overseas military doctrinal publications, including the following.

- ADF–C–0 *Foundations of Military Doctrine*, 4th Edition, December 2021, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia
- ADF–C–0 *Australian Military Power*, 2nd Edition, 2024, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia
- AJP–01(F) *Allied Joint Doctrine*, December 2022, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels, Belgium
- JDP 0–01 *British Defence Doctrine*, 6th Edition, November 2022, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom
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- *Future Force Design Principles*, 2023, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, New Zealand
- *National Security Strategy 2023–2028*, 2023, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, New Zealand
- *National Resilience System Handbook*, May 2025, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, New Zealand
- *Making Strategy Better*, July 2022, Royal College of Defence Studies, London, United Kingdom.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter One: Geopolitical Context from Cooperation to Conflict

Understanding war and why states decide to use armed force against each other depends on first understanding the fundamentals of international relations. There is always competition between governments, between groups and factions within states, and between state and non-state actors. Such relationships can be plotted on a continuum spanning from cooperation to competition and escalating into armed conflict.

States are concerned with internal stability, which requires them to respond to human security: the needs and wants of their populations. Externally, states use hard and soft power to further their interests and to maintain their national security. Internal and external factors can cause states to move from stability to crisis, which if not managed can lead to conflict and war.

The nature of war does not change; it is violent, destructive, and chaotic. War has four essential qualities: friction, uncertainty, actions and reactions, and violence and destruction. However, technological, economic, societal, and cultural forces are constantly changing the character of warfare. Waging war is an intrinsically violent and bloody affair producing destruction, terror, suffering, and death for combatants and non-combatants alike.

The security environment is becoming unstable. It is characterised by strategic competition, which is threatening the international rules-based order and making cooperation between states more difficult and more important. Intensifying strategic competition is increasing global and regional tensions and raising the prospect of military confrontation and conflict.

The Indo-Pacific is a primary geographic theatre for strategic competition. Rising competition and tensions in the wider Indo-Pacific are playing out in New Zealand's immediate region, which spans from Antarctica through to the South Pacific.

Climate change remains the primary security concern for

Pacific Island countries. Both climate change and growing strategic interest in the Pacific are layering on top of other regional security challenges, including vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards, transnational organised crime, illegal fishing, and maritime security threats. Civil disorder has also demonstrated the potential for instability in the Pacific.

Chapter Two: Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine

Under the Defence Act, 1990, New Zealand's armed forces are raised and maintained for defending New Zealand, protecting its interests, contributing forces under collective security treaties, agreements, and arrangements and to the United Nations, providing assistance to civil functions, and delivering any public service as directed by Government.

When the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) uses force, it is subject to national and international law. Its objectives and conduct are subject to government control. Applying fighting power is limited to what is necessary to achieve the desired end-state. Commanders' decisions are directly informed and framed by New Zealand Government policy as well as the political situation in the joint force area of operations (JFAO) and the broader region.

Decisions are made at four levels: national strategic, which is the Government level; military strategic, directed by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF); operational, directed by Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ); and tactical, which the joint task force commander (JTF Comd) and force element commanders lead.

New Zealand's arrangements for dealing with national security issues are referred to as the National Security System. The National Security System operates at three levels: the Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee comprised of Ministers and led by the Prime Minister; the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC); the National Security Board (NSB) comprising security sector chief executives; and senior officials and other officials in committees, working groups, and watch groups.

Policy is a statement of intent or a commitment to act. National policy is the nation's response to the accepted strategic environment. It articulates the Government's positions about necessary actions to further national interest. The

Introduction

Government of the day determines the national security interests that shape defence policy, which articulates how the NZDF works to achieve national security interests with other government agencies and departments or independently. Defence policy establishes the ends of military strategy and shapes and directs Defence's contribution to achieving national security objectives within resource and other constraints.

Strategy is a high-level plan for creating and using instruments of national power to achieve long-term policy outcomes or objectives. It integrates policy ends (what needs to be achieved) with ways (how it will be done) and means (the resources needed to do it) to support decision-making and achieve successful outcomes. Military strategy is the high level direction for how military power will be employed by the Government as part of New Zealand's response to specific challenges.

Military doctrine has important relationships with defence policy and strategy. In contrast with the potentially fluid and changeable nature of policy and strategy, military doctrine is informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about how military forces can be used effectively in support of policy. Doctrine is more enduring and less subject to change than policy, although it should not be inflexible.

Chapter Three: Security, Confrontation, and Deterrence

There is seldom complete peace or total war. Cooperation, competition, and conflict are continuous between states, non-state actors, and groups and factions within states. The NZDF must be ready and able to conduct military campaigns or operations for all kinds of security events on the continuum ranging from cooperation to conflict. The range of security events extends from assisting with emergency relief to national survival. The NZDF needs to have clearly defined roles, risks, and tasks for these different kinds of operations.

New Zealand's security depends on protecting and promoting its sovereignty and national interests. National security is shaped by a complex combination of geostrategic factors, including environmental, resource, social, political, scientific, technological, and military influences. New Zealand's security is integrated with our neighbours' and partners' security

and dependent on it. Defence identifies strategic trends to mitigate short-term fluctuations in the geopolitical environment and it analyses how trends could affect the future security environment. These assessments offer a range of potential outcomes, which are subject to chance, contingency, and strategic shocks. Even so, strategic assessments are essential for informed decision making.

The eight instruments of national power—the military, information, diplomatic, finance, intelligence, economic, law, and development—are employed in concert as the circumstances demand. The military instrument is but one of the means at the Government's disposal. Commitment to a comprehensive approach helps the NZDF understand how it may best support and be supported by other instruments of national power in achieving New Zealand Government objectives.

Collective security is an essential pillar of New Zealand's overall security system. It has three principles: diplomacy for resolving disputes, acting collectively, and trust. Maintaining alliances and relationships generates significant diplomatic, economic, and military advantages, but it also has obligations, including New Zealand being requested to use force overseas.

Deterrence is convincing a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires maintaining a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. New Zealand as an independent nation is not big enough to have the range or scale of capabilities needed to effectively deter potential adversaries. New Zealand, as it does for security, relies upon collective deterrence arrangements.

New Zealand pursues de-escalation, diplomatic conflict resolution, and deterrence to prevent competition from becoming conflict and security events from becoming crises, it is ready and willing to use hard power, including the military instrument of national power, where and when it is legitimate.

Defence assets have utility beyond threatening or using hard power. International Defence Engagement (IDE) is how New Zealand uses the NZDF's personnel, equipment, and activities to achieve influence without the use or threat of force. While New Zealand pursues de-escalation, diplomatic conflict resolution, and deterrence to prevent competition from becoming conflict and security events from becoming crises,

it is ready and willing to use hard power, including the military instrument of national power, where and when it is legitimate.

Chapter Four: Military Capability and Fighting Power

Military capability is whatever is needed for achieving operational objectives and sustaining required effort for a designated period. Military capability goes beyond just equipment: it includes all the required elements to create specified effects. Its components are personnel; research and development; infrastructure and organisations; concepts, doctrine, and collective training; information technology; equipment, logistics, and resources (PRICIE). It also involves preparedness: being ready and able to do what is required when it must be done.

Warfighting capability directly contributes to fighting power. Unlike military capability, fighting power emphasises the people who are fighting. Fighting power is the NZDF's potential warfighting ability. It comprises a preeminent moral component (the will to fight) along with conceptual (the knowledge to fight) and physical (the means to fight) components. Each component mutually supports and informs the other.

The operational level of capability (OLOC) is the level that NZDF military forces need to be to do their military tasks effectively. A force element is at OLOC when it is ready, combat viable, deployable, and sustainable. NZDF preparedness is based on a capability baseline that determines the peacetime states of readiness the NZDF needs to meet its commitments. Analysis of the strategic environment informs NZDF decisions about how it distributes resources to meet peacetime readiness requirements.

Defence Reserve forces are an integral part of the NZDF because they provide complementary or supplementary skills as individuals, small groups, and units to sustain and surge. The Reserve helps to sustain deployed forces by providing round-out, reinforcement, and rotation elements.

Chapter Five: The Principles of War and Operational Tenets

Understanding war's enduring nature makes it possible to

formulate what are known as the 'principles of war', which provide guidance for military action. The principles of war maintain relevance, applicability, and relative importance even though the character of warfare is constantly changing. They are selection and maintenance of the aim—the most important principle—, maintenance of morale, offensive action, security, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, cooperation, and sustainability.

The NZDF operational tenets are essential elements of its military operations and are fundamental to all levels of New Zealand military doctrine. A warfighting ethos provides NZDF personnel with the vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with most of the circumstances they are likely to confront in operations across the range of security events. The manoeuvrist approach is based on using an indirect method to defeat the adversary's will to fight. Mission command emphasises responsiveness to superior direction. It also promotes decentralised command to enable subordinate freedom, speed of action, and initiative. Interoperability is the ability of the NZDF, government departments, agencies, and the military forces of our allies and partners to act coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve common agreed tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Flexibility and pragmatism are the final operational tenets.

Chapter Six: Employing the New Zealand Defence Force

New Zealand responds to the geostrategic context, global instability, and conflict by using the most appropriate instruments of national power to shape the security environment and mitigate potential risks at their source. This approach recognises overseas military operations might be required and that security is a prerequisite for political and economic stability and progress. An internationally agreed legal framework allows New Zealand to use force to protect its legitimate interests.

Military responses involve actions on three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. These levels are interrelated, and concurrent military activities are routinely planned and prosecuted on all three of them. Tactical actions combine into operations and a series of operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space are campaigns. These activities are done in

Introduction

five operational domains: maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace / electromagnetic spectrum. The operational domains provide a framework for organising the military instrument and represent spheres of military activity within the engagement space of the operational environment.

Operational art translates strategy into operational and tactical action. It is a conceptual framework underpinning the planning and conduct of campaigns and operations. Operational design is creating a framework that develops and refines joint commanders' vision of how they see the operation unfolding to provide detailed and actionable plans for its execution. Military doctrine provides know how for conducting military operations: it is about how things are done now.

A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective. Campaigns are set out in military strategy and orchestrated through operational art. Campaign authority is established by international forces, agencies, and organisations within a given situation. Creating and maintaining campaign authority requires continuously assessing the effects and consequences of activities being done.

The NZDF is the only group in society that is authorised to use large-scale offensive lethal force on behalf of the nation against targeted adversaries. NZDF personnel must always respect and comply with the laws of armed conflict whereas rules of engagement (ROE) are specific orders: they are not comprehensive statements of either the law or policy, although they take both into account. ROE limit activity but they do not limit the legal right to act in self-defence when it is reasonable and necessary.

The NZDF can perform a range of operations, all of which depend on its combat capabilities. This is because many of the skills, discipline, determination, and equipment needed for combat are transferrable to other types of operations. However, the reverse is not the case: combat operations require forces that have been specifically prepared for fighting and winning. The NZDF can do the following types of operations: combat, counter irregular activity, stabilisation and reconstruction, peace support, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian operations, and domestic tasks.



CHAPTER 1:

GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT FROM COOPERATION TO CONFLICT



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Introduction

1.01 This chapter provides geopolitical context for using the military instrument of national power. It describes the competition continuum, which is a conceptual model for understanding the relationships between states and how they use hard and soft power to further their interests. The chapter then looks at the relationships between security, stability, and crises and how the latter can escalate into conflict and war. It outlines the differences between war, the nature of which is unchanging, and warfare, the characteristics of which are constantly changing. It concludes by considering some important characteristics of the current security environment, including climate change and grey zone activities.

Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict

1.02 Understanding war and why states decide to use armed force against each other depends on understanding the fundamentals of international relations. Governments, groups, and factions within states, and states and non-state actors always compete. Such relationships can be plotted on a continuum beginning with cooperation, moving towards competition, and finally escalating into armed conflict. These relationships are almost always complex, dynamic, and aspects of them can overlap. The competition continuum is shown in Figure 1-1.

1.03 Cooperation is when states or states and non-state actors work together to achieve the same or mutually compatible objectives. Such relationships tend to be long-term and stable. However, domestic and international relations normally involve parties with divergent interests, such as economic competition, even during cooperation. In cooperation, the military may support diplomacy through military exercises and engagements.

1.04 Competition is when two or more states or non-state actors have incompatible interests that they pursue to the potential detriment of the other while avoiding direct confrontation or conflict. Rivalry is normal in international relations and most states compete according to the rules-based international order. However, some states compete in ways that undermine the rules-based order or intentionally damage their rivals while still cooperating in other areas.

This can involve grey zone activities (this is discussed in more detail later in this chapter) and lawfare.¹ If compromise is rejected and differences can no longer be reconciled, competition can escalate to conflict. During competition, the military instrument may be required to reinforce the civil authority to protect New Zealand's borders, the resilience of our supply chains or civilian use of the cyber domain.

1.05 Conflict exists whenever states resort to armed conflict or there is armed violence between governments and organised armed groups within a state. Crossing the threshold into armed conflict depends on surrounding circumstances. During conflict, the military may be tasked with fighting and winning the nation's wars (For greater discussion on war and warfare see the section on war later in this chapter).

1.06 The terms war and armed conflict are often used interchangeably. Armed conflict is different from war because the latter has an added political-strategic dimension and usually the goal of a decisive military victory. However, they are otherwise very alike so the following discussion largely applies to each.

Escalation from Competition to Conflict

1.07 The boundary between competition and conflict is often blurred and frequently crossed. Conflict often results when disputes cannot be resolved peaceably, or policy goals are pursued with threats or coercion. Parties escalate conflict into war if they believe they have no alternative to achieve their objectives. Diplomacy and negotiation then become more difficult.

Smart Power

1.08 States and organisations apply power using the instruments of national power (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) to achieve policy goals through a blend of 'hard' and 'soft' power. These are described below. Smart power is knowing when to use differing levels of each as necessary. All states seek to be successful. Understanding their different concepts of success is critical for identifying their motivation and goals and how they will use hard and soft power.

¹ Lawfare is deliberate and strategic use of legal processes, procedures, and institutions to achieve political or military goals.



COOPERATION

COMPETITION

CONFLICT

Figure 1-1: The competition continuum.

1.09 History has shown that soft power is slower and more unwieldy than hard power, but it is often cheaper, and its effects may be more enduring. Hard and soft power frequently need to be used together. However, hard power, especially threatening or using force, is irreplaceable during severe instability or conflict.

1.10 **Hard Power.** Hard power uses military capability and economic strength—whether sanctions or incentives—to influence states, groups, or individuals to act differently. The NZDF’s warfighting capability is a source of hard power. Sometimes, such as during coalition power projection, it is an effective deterrent to potential opponents. Similar outcomes can sometimes be achieved with soft power.

1.11 **Soft Power.** Soft power is how states or a combination of them influence others by using cultural and ideological persuasion or by encouraging emulation, which can be reinforced with financial and material incentives. It includes using:

- culture when it is attractive to others
- values when they are seen to be sincere in their application
- foreign policies when they are seen as legitimate by others.

1.12 Popular culture and media are sources of soft power as well as common language, sharing technical and commercial information, and normative behaviours. Credibility is an important source of influence.

Human Security

1.13 States wanting to maintain authority and remain stable in the longer term need to address the political,

economic, societal, religious, and environmental needs of their populaces. These needs are collectively termed human security. It includes:

- ideology and politics
- education
- commerce and economy
- wellbeing and health
- freedom of movement and information
- aspiration and contentment
- gender and age
- race, ethnicity, and religion
- military
- police
- diplomacy, administration, and governance
- civil society
- history and culture.

1.14 More global competition for resources is increasingly threatening human security, which leads to national and regional instability. Individuals may transfer loyalty to groups appearing or promising to meet their needs. They include non-governmental and transnational organisations. Beneficiaries of insecurity may seek to perpetuate crises and attempt to undermine national or international responses.

National Security

1.15 States seek to protect and further their interests amongst other states while responding to shifting internal



Figure 1-2: The New Zealand Defence Force's warfighting capability is a source of hard power.

pressures. Taken together, these measures are national security. In democratic states, national security comprises everything that is done so their citizens can go about their daily business confidently, free from fear and interference, and maximising opportunities. It includes preparedness, protection, and preservation of people, property, and information. Enablers include preserving the nation's territorial integrity, maintaining economic viability, and protecting its civil society, legal institutions, and governance.

Key Term

National Security

The safety of a state and its protection from both external and internal threats.

1.16 External threats to national security include invasion, attack, blockade, and cyber-attacks. Internal threats

include terrorism, subversion, civil disorder, criminality, insurgency, sabotage, and espionage, some of which can be sponsored externally. However, they would require internal popular support to cause systemic disruption. National security can also be unintentionally damaged, such as by financial crises, climatic events, and pandemics.

Crisis and Stability

1.17 Movement between cooperation, competition, and conflict happens in either direction gradually or rapidly. Relationships can be unpredictable and fluctuating or stable and enduring. Two states might have a fundamental disagreement, but their relationship can be stable and include cooperation in other areas. Stability is relative but long periods too close to armed conflict or war are obviously undesirable.

1.18 When destabilisation moves a relationship too



Figure 1-3. Modern firepower largely destroyed Gharajol in only 50 days.

far towards conflict, it creates a crisis and war becomes possible. There can be many different triggers and all crises require different responses. However, the aim is always to move relations away from conflict. It is sometimes easier to institutionalise disagreement and reduce its effects rather than wasting valuable effort trying to resolve the irresolvable.

1.19 Crises involve shifting priorities and objectives so crisis management must be responsive and flexible. This is problematic for the master principle of war — selection and maintenance of the aim — because a clearly stated and hard objective is the basis for mission planning. Crises can cause mismatches between political pragmatism and military requirements for clear, firm, and enduring aims.

War

1.20 When competition escalates through crisis into conflict, it can lead to war: the use of armed force between

states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups within a state.

The Enduring Nature of War

1.21 War is a political activity. It is an instrument of policy characterised by organised violence. The aim is defeating the enemy’s military forces that support and sustain its political structure and will to fight. Clashing and opposing human wills are intensified by the firepower and destructive capabilities of modern weapons. This produces environments and outcomes that are rarely predictable.

1.22 War is either used instead of the other instruments of national power or with them to achieve national security objectives or protect national interests. It can involve attacking the enemy’s other instruments of national power with the military one and vice versa. War has four principal features:



Figure 1-4: New Zealand retains the right to use armed force as a signatory of the United Nations Charter.

- **Friction.** Friction makes difficult what seems easy and what is difficult become seemingly impossible.² Friction can be in the human environment, such as leaders' personality clashes and commanders' indecisiveness. It can be in the physical environment: for example, casualties, vehicles breaking down, loss of communications, difficult ground, and bad weather. It can be in the information environment, as when information about the enemy is incomplete or unreliable. Friction is intensified by one's opponents simultaneously attempting to impose their will.
- **Uncertainty.** Warfare is always uncertain. Information, intelligence, and situational awareness about enemies or the area of operations are always limited and conditional despite advances in information processing

and data management. This uncertainty is 'the fog of war'. Its pervasiveness often hinders effective decision making. Uncertainty can be reduced by developing trust between leaders and subordinates and applying military judgement, experience, and intuition to situations. Simple flexible plans and good standing orders and operating procedures also help to mitigate it. Clearly articulated and understood commanders' orders and intentions and empowering subordinates to use initiative and independent thought and action do likewise. Even so, the fog of war can never be totally dispelled.

- **Actions and Reactions.** War involves applying the principles of war (see Chapter 5) to a continuous series of actions, reactions, and situational changes. New challenges and difficulties continually arise, which provide opportunities for exploitation. Operational tempo depends on forces accelerating or decelerating activities, including synchronising combat functions.

² Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated from German by O.J. Mattijis Jollies, New York, The Modern Library, 1943.

- **Violence and Destruction.** Waging war is violent and bloody. It causes destruction, terror, suffering, and death for combatants and non-combatants. Weapons used in modern conflict are lethal and diverse, ranging from sidearms to weapons of mass destruction. Unprecedented firepower is available to states' militaries and non-state adversaries, who can often more easily access off-the-shelf, commercial, and black-market technologies.

1.23 War's purpose is changing the enemy's human, information, and physical environments so that one's desired end state is achieved. Offensive end-states include territorial gains and losses, leadership change, securing resources, and economic advantage. Purely defensive end-states include resisting adversarial intentions and maintaining the status quo. However, all wars involve a mixture of offensive and defensive and the balance can shift during conflicts.

1.24 New Zealand has consistently taken the position that it will not use war as an extension of policy. New Zealand formally renounced the use of war as an instrument of state policy when it signed the Pact of Paris in 1928 and again when it signed the Charter of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. However, the military remains a legitimate instrument of national power and New Zealand retains the right to use armed force for individual or collective self-defence and for the purposes of the UN.

Warfare

1.25 Warfare is conducting war. Warfare is the *how* to war's *what*; it is what nations' armed forces do. The nature of war does not change: it is always violent, destructive, and chaotic. However, warfare's character is always changing. Technological, economic, societal, and cultural factors determine how much and how fast it changes. Current drivers are rapid and deep information and technology developments, especially in space and cyber as well as emerging and disruptive technologies.

1.26 Even so, the war in Ukraine reminds us that attrition and mass of people, equipment, and munitions remain fundamental in protracted conflicts between peer or near-peer nations. Combatants who understand warfare's changing character and context can make informed decisions about force structure, force preparation, how to

campaign and operate, and rules of engagement.

Forms of Warfare

1.27 There are two basic categories of warfare: traditional warfare and irregular activity.

1.28 **Traditional Warfare.** Traditional warfare is nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states using lethal military force. Military operations in traditional warfare normally focus on defeating an adversary's armed forces to influence its government. It typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries use conventional military capabilities against each other. Traditional warfare generally assumes that the civilians in the operational area are not belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate.

1.29 The traditional warfare model encompasses non-state and proto-state actors³ who use conventional military capabilities to achieve traditional warfare outcomes as well as asymmetric tactics employed by conventional forces, such as cyber-attacks coordinated with other capabilities. Irregular forces—partisan and resistance fighters opposing occupying conventional military forces—are also included.

1.30 **Irregular Activity.** Irregular activity is using or threatening force by irregular forces, groups, or individuals to challenge, change, or maintain governments or authorities⁴. It includes criminality, disorder, insurgency, and terrorism, which can be combined or conducted alongside regular adversarial actions by a state's armed forces. Regular forces can do irregular activities to destabilise and defeat irregular actors, which is a New Zealand special operations forces (NZSOF) role.

1.31 Irregular actors are unlikely to defeat conventional military forces so they are forced to take asymmetric actions with strong political or psychological impacts. Irregular actors try to outlast and discredit their opponents by using a range of activities outside regular state-on-state warfare. Common irregular activities include:

³ Examples are national liberation movements and pirates who control territory and resources and provide a degree of civil administration to the peoples they control.

⁴ Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine*, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence 2008, Swindon, UK.



Figure 1-5: Irregular activities are done by both state and non-state actors.

- terrorism
- economic warfare (attacking key infrastructure systems and industries to disrupt normal life)
- cyber-attacks (corrupting or disabling key information databases and systems)
- environmental warfare (deliberately destroying or damaging eco-systems to sabotage economic activity or restrict access to resources).

1.32 Irregular activities are usually done by irregulars (groups or individuals not legitimately representing a state). They tend to live amongst local populations and sometimes operate in complex terrain like urban areas or jungles. They are adaptive and often shift between different types of irregular activity. Irregulars typically operate in ungoverned areas, but modern communications technology often give them international reach.

Key Terms

War

A state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country.

Warfare

The action of carrying on or engaging in war.

Current Security Environment

1.33 States cooperate, compete, and coerce, which can create conflict and lead to using armed force in a complex and dynamic security environment. This system is currently in flux. The security status quo is being challenged by actors transgressing the rules-based international order, testing national resilience, and exploiting the porous boundaries of



Figure 1-6: Russia disregarded international rules by invading Ukraine in 2022.

an interconnected world, including by using hybrid warfare⁵ and disinformation.

Strategic Competition

1.34 The near to medium term principal challenge to New Zealand’s security interests is strategic competition. New Zealand has benefitted from a strategic environment regulated by an international rules-based system aligned with its values and supporting its interests. This system comprising laws, rules, and norms has underpinned international interactions since its formal establishment in 1945. It has contributed to stability and enabled cooperation on a range of issues, including collective security.

⁵ Hybrid warfare is a fusion of conventional and nonconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion. They are synchronised to exploit an adversary’s vulnerabilities and achieve synergistic effects.

1.35 However, some states are more actively seeking to advance alternative regional and global alignments in ways directly opposed to the consensus-based cooperative international rules-based system. Strategic competition is becoming normalised in international relations. Even so, states are continuing to cooperate when it serves their interests, including when they are competing in other areas.

1.36 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is the latest and most flagrant example of Russia’s ongoing disregard for fundamental international laws and norms. Russia is an acute threat to European security. It is continually challenging the international rules-based system and undermining states’ security and wellbeing by using hybrid warfare, political interference, grey zone tactics, and economic coercion.

1.37 China is assertively pursuing its strategic objectives and it is the major driver of strategic competition between

states. Increasing competition between China and the United States has the most serious implications but China's actions also have significant global and regional consequences, including in the South Pacific. An increasingly powerful China is using all its instruments of national power to challenge and reshape international rules and norms. Beijing continues to invest heavily in growing and modernising its military: it is increasingly able to project military and paramilitary force beyond its immediate region, including into and across the wider Indo-Pacific.

1.38 Growing strategic competition will make confrontation and conflict more likely. Short of open conflict, strategic competition will intensify in domains such as space and cyber-space. Competition and conflict in these global domains directly threaten New Zealand's peace and security domestically, in its immediate region, and in the wider Indo-Pacific as well as in Antarctica and the Deep South. However, strategic competition in the South Pacific is the most serious: China is overtly undermining New Zealand's long-term interests by attempting to reshape the South Pacific security environment for its own economic and security benefit.

Climate Change

1.39 Climate change remains the primary security concern for Pacific Island countries. It is driving increasing and intensifying natural disasters. Over time climate change could directly cause critical challenges for some Pacific countries as well as exacerbating other security issues.

Other Sources of Strategic Competition

1.40 Strategic competition and climate change are intersecting with other security challenges and trends.

- **COVID-19.** The COVID-19 pandemic directly contributed to strategic competition. Pandemic responses involved extensive international cooperation but COVID-19 also exposed states and multilateral institutions' vulnerabilities to complex global shocks such as significant supply chain disruptions.
- **Competition for Natural Resources.** State and non-state competition for natural resources is destabilising cooperative global norms. Marine resources, rare earth minerals, food stocks, freshwater, and energy sources are examples of contested resources.

- **Technological Advances.** Technological advances are rapidly changing warfare's character. Impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum technologies could be transformational and information technology developments are already changing how militaries operate as newly developed capabilities are combined with more traditional ones.
- **Disinformation.** The growth of online spaces has allowed global dissemination of disinformation. It has undermined trust in democratic institutions and elected authorities as well as reducing social cohesion and increasing polarisation.
- **Terrorism and Violent Extremism.** Terrorism and violent extremism are threatening political stability. Online radicalisation and decentralised networks are increasingly prevalent and effective countermeasures can be difficult to reconcile with democratic norms.
- **Transnational Organised Crime.** Transnational organised crime is becoming increasingly sophisticated. Its activities are creating serious social consequences, including in the Pacific. State and non-state actors can collaborate and leverage these networks to undermine national security, for example by destabilising governance.

The Grey Zone

1.41 The grey zone is not new. Governments and other actors have conducted activities such as propaganda, sabotage, clandestine military actions, and foreign interference throughout history and across the globe. However, more states are strategically competing by operating in the grey zone: the uncertain space between peace and war. Distinguishing between public and private, foreign and domestic, state and non-state, and virtual and physical is becoming increasingly difficult.

1.42 Actors undertake grey zone activities to create or exploit uncertainty, which can shape others' perceptions of escalation risk, including thresholds for armed conflict. These activities provide states with plausible deniability and make attribution difficult. They are inadequately addressed in international law, which can weaken the legitimacy of countermeasures and responses. Space, cyberspace, and the high seas are especially exploitable.



Figure 1-7: China building South China Sea military bases was a notable grey zone campaign

1.43 China's incremental transformation of South China Sea reefs into functioning military bases from 2013 to 2018 was a notably successful grey zone campaign. Grey zone activities were also significant in Russia's annexation of Crimea. More broadly, contemporary mis- and disinformation campaigns can be seen as grey zone activities.

Key Term

Grey Zone Activities

Coercive activities below the threshold of armed conflict.

CHAPTER 2:

POLICY, STRATEGY, AND DOCTRINE



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Introduction

2.01 New Zealand is a democratic country pursuing its interests, promoting its values, and maintaining its security along with those of its friends, partners, and allies. It does so in an increasingly complex, changeable, and unpredictable security environment that can rapidly fluctuate between cooperation, competition, and conflict. New Zealand must formulate coherent and achievable ends, ways, and means that enable it and other states to achieve peace and prosperity.⁶ This includes having effective and credible armed forces for supporting national security and the international rules-based order.

2.02 This chapter outlines the main features of New Zealand's strategic policy that support its interests in the current security environment and how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) contributes to New Zealand achieving its strategic policy objectives. It also discusses national security and the purpose of policy, strategy, and military doctrine and the relationships between them.

Key Terms

Ends

Operational objectives or conditions that must be attained in the operational area to achieve the strategic or national aim.

Ways

How actions are arranged in time and space to achieve operational objectives or conditions.

Means

What capabilities or other resources should be used within established limitations to best produce operational objectives or conditions.

The Legal Basis of the New Zealand Defence Force: The Defence Act 1990

2.03 Under the Defence Act 1990, New Zealand's armed

forces are raised and maintained for:

- defending New Zealand and any other area New Zealand is responsible for defending
- protecting New Zealand's interests in New Zealand or elsewhere
- contributing forces under collective security treaties, agreements, and arrangements
- contributing forces to the United Nations (UN) for its purposes or in association with other organisations or states in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN.

2.04 The Act also allows the armed forces to be made available in New Zealand or elsewhere for assisting the civil power during emergencies and providing any public services.

Legitimacy and Force

2.05 The NZDF's use of force is subject to national and international law. Its objectives and conduct are subject to government control, which is exercised by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Applying fighting power will be limited to what is necessary to achieve the desired end-state.

Legitimacy

2.06 Legitimacy is the legal, moral, political, diplomatic, and ethical propriety of military forces. It is the justification for using force and how it is applied. Legitimacy is based on subjective considerations, such as the values, beliefs, and opinions of a variety of audiences (at home and overseas) as well as demonstrable and objective legality. It is collective and individual and each directly affects the utility of force. Legitimacy mandates and constrains military activity as well as bolstering morale and promoting cohesion within a force and between coalition partners.

2.07 Maintaining legitimacy is crucial. Perceptions of legitimacy are unlikely to be universal or unequivocal. They are shaped by many factors, including the media. How the public perceives military forces' conduct significantly influences those who provide campaign authority.

⁶ Ends, ways, means is a simple framework that helps planners understand the objective (ends), what options can be used to achieve the objective (ways) and what tools/capabilities can be employed (means).



Figure 2-1: The Defence Force's use of force is subject to democratic parliamentary control.

Legality

2.08 New Zealand prides itself on being a democratic member of the international community and a good world citizen. NZDF operations must demonstrably comply with relevant international, domestic, and host nation law (provided the latter has not been excluded by international law or any agreed modifications). They must also have clearly articulated rules of engagement.

2.09 Use of force should be justified, such as by UN Security Council Resolutions, which give legal authority and determine the mission and desired end-state. New Zealand's right of individual or collective self-defence under international law also justifies using force.

Ethics and Morality

2.10 Ethics and morality are fundamental for operational

decision-making and military conduct. Commanders are accountable for their actions and those of subordinates. They are duty-bound to maintain the highest operational moral and ethical standards, including when fighting adversaries with different moral, ethical, and legal constraints and values. Commanders do so by personal example, promoting a robust ethos, training, and education.

2.11 The NZDF operates under intensifying scrutiny: parliament, humanitarian organisations, non-governmental organisations, and the media continuously monitor operations' moral and ethical impact. More transparency and greater regulation of NZDF activities mean it must meet the expectations of the society it serves and whose values it reflects.

2.12 Maintaining campaign authority includes respecting local traditions, customs, and practices as well as being appropriately attentive to vulnerable groups' needs, such

as women, children, and ethnic minorities. Operational effectiveness must be balanced against complying with greater legal regulation and oversight, situational appropriateness, and moral correctness.

Command and Government Policy Direction

2.13 New Zealand Government policy directly informs commanders' decisions as does the political situation in the joint force area of operations (JFAO) and the wider region. The Chief of Defence Force's (CDF) and Commander Joint Forces New Zealand's (COMJFNZ) command directives give military guidance for campaigns and operations. Deployed Ministry of Defence policy advisors (POLAD) directly assist and advise joint commanders. Joint commanders are expected to elevate potential and emerging policy risks, receive advice via the chain of command, and liaise with the regional New Zealand diplomatic post.

Key Term

Joint Force Area of Operations

That portion of a theatre necessary for joint military operations and their administration as part of a campaign

Levels of Decision Making

2.14 Decisions are made at four different levels across the competition continuum (see Figure 2-2). These levels correspond with the levels of military operations in Chapter 6.

- **National Strategic.** The national strategic level involves the New Zealand Government defining strategic objectives and end states. Military activities are coordinated with other elements of national power and necessary resources are given to subordinate levels. The Ministry of Defence supports the national strategic level.
- **Military Strategic.** CDF and COMJFNZ direct the military from the military strategic level. Military strategic activities focus on how the NZDF will contribute to achieving the national objective.
- **Operational.** COMJFNZ directs operational level activities. It involves planning and conducting campaigns

and operations to achieve strategic objectives.

- **Tactical.** The joint task force commander (JTF Comd) and force element commanders lead at the tactical level, where battles, engagements, and other activities are planned and conducted.

2.15 Military officials must seek policy guidance from ministers when developing, implementing, and adjusting strategy. Campaign and operational strategy and their narratives should be clearly articulated. Tactical commanders should know how their actions contribute to the overall strategy.

National Security System

2.16 The national security system comprises New Zealand's arrangements for national security and responding to crises. It uses a coordinated interagency approach for monitoring and responding to emerging threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. It does not override chief executives', statutory officers', and relevant Ministers' statutory powers and responsibilities.

2.17 The Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee (FPS) sits at the top of the national security system. Beneath it are various boards, standing multi-agency committees, issue-specific working groups, and ad hoc watch groups. Most such bodies will have NZDF representatives. The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) coordinates the national security system's activities.

- **Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee.** The Cabinet Foreign Policy and National Security Committee (FPS) of relevant senior Ministers—including the Minister of Defence—oversees the national intelligence and security sector, including relevant policy and legislative proposals. It coordinates and directs responses to national crises and domestic and international situations relevant to national security. The FPS can act without further reference to the full Cabinet when urgent action and operational or security considerations require it. The Prime Minister chairs the FPS.⁷

⁷ The committee filling this function has had different names over time. In the future the name may change but the function will likely remain regardless of the title of the committee.




Figure 2-2: Levels of decision making.

- Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination.** The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) is a committee of Chief Executives—including CDF—that manages New Zealand’s national security responses. DPMC’s Chief Executive chairs ODESC.
- Security Governance Boards.** The National Hazards Board and the National Security Board are security and risk management governance and oversight boards. Their members are Government Chief Executives and they are chaired by DPMC’s Chief Executive.
- Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.** DPMC advises and supports the Prime Minister and Cabinet. DPMC is also responsible for the national risk approach, national security intelligence priorities, and core national security strategy. Its National Security Group (NSG) focusses on relevant policy, assessments, and coordination and its Risk and Systems Governance

Group (RSG) supports the national security and hazard risk system.

2:18 The *National Resilience System Handbook* contains more detailed information about the NSS.

Policy

2:19 Government policies are coordinated intentions, decisions, and directions for framing, influencing, or changing a problem or issue. Policies are statements of intent or commitments to act. They are administrative or legislative. National policy states the Government’s intended actions to shape and respond to the domestic and strategic environments.

Defence Policy

2:20 Defence policy is a subset of national policy. It articulates the NZDF contribution to achieving national

security objectives. Defence policy establishes the ends of military strategy within resource and other constraints.

2.21 Defence policy should be reviewable and revisable because strategic circumstances change. The strategic environment has stable and sometimes fixed characteristics—such as geography— that have lasting influence on strategic thinking, including military strategic doctrine. Defence policy is expressed in a variety of places including formal policy statements, speeches, Cabinet papers, Government decisions and more. Current Defence policy is primarily expressed in the Government’s Strategic Defence Policy guidance released as a part of the 2025 *Defence Capability Plan*.

2.22 **Defence Policy Interests.** New Zealand’s four Defence policy interests are:

- **A Secure, Sovereign, and Resilient New Zealand.** New Zealand’s national security relies on strengthening and maintaining democratic government, safeguarding territorial integrity, protecting New Zealand’s expansive maritime domain, and exercising New Zealand’s sovereign authority.
- **A Stable and Secure Region.** New Zealand needs freedom to act regionally to support shared interests and values. New Zealand’s region is vast, diverse, and largely maritime, spanning the Indo-Pacific⁸ from Antarctica through to the South Pacific and westwards toward Australia and Southeast Asia. New Zealand’s national interests depend on regional security and stability.
- **A Strong and Effective International Rules-Based System.** New Zealand’s international relations and national security rely on multilateralism, liberal democratic values, and the international rules-based system, which New Zealand promotes, defends, and strengthens for itself and other nations.
- **Collective Security Through a Strong Network of Partners.** International relationships are particularly important for smaller states like New Zealand. They support New Zealand’s security and prosperity and amplifies its influence. New Zealand’s closest defence

and security partners are states that closely share its values and interests.

2.23 **Defence Policy Objectives.** The NZDF’s principal roles are expressed as Defence policy objectives. Defence acts early and deliberately to shape our security environment in response to the challenges discussed in Chapter 1, with an emphasis on supporting Pacific security. This policy approach involves acting proactively and credibly to achieve three current objectives:

- protect and promote the security of New Zealand and the immediate region
- enhance the ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand’s most important security partnerships
- contribute to achieving New Zealand’s global interests.⁹

2.24 More detailed information about New Zealand’s defence policy interests and updated policy objectives re included in the *Defence Capital Plan 2025*.

Strategy

Strategy is to derive from the [policy] aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.

Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke

2.25 Strategies are high-level plans for creating and using instruments of national power to achieve long-term policy outcomes or objectives. Strategy integrates policy ends (what needs to be achieved) with ways (how it will be done) and means (the resources needed to do it).

⁸ The “Indo-Pacific”, which broadly encompasses the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is increasingly used in security contexts rather than other concepts and terms such as the “Asia-Pacific”.

⁹ Defence Policy Objectives are drawn from the *Defence Capability Plan 2025*.

2.26 Strategy and policy are interdependent. National political objectives and desired outcomes are articulated in policy and implemented through strategy. Policy ends can only be achieved with credible and practical strategies whereas strategy needs definite and clearly articulated policy end states.

2.27 Strategies coherently justify resources necessary for achieving strategic, operational, and tactical success, which makes achieving policy objectives more likely. The military instrument should be used as part of an integrated national strategy.

The Elements of Strategy

2.28 Clear strategic purpose is paramount but effective strategies also align power, commitment, and national interest with political realities. Good strategies have the following characteristics:

- rational
- connection
- simplicity
- clarity
- dynamic
- grounded
- realistic
- competitive.¹⁰

2.29 A compelling narrative—a story giving meaning and coherence to a set of facts and actions—and clear and easily understood declarations of policy and outcomes are also essential.

National Strategy

2.30 New Zealand's national security strategy coordinates the instruments of national power to achieve national policy aims. The Prime Minister and Cabinet articulate the Government's political intentions as either national strategic aims or end-states supported by strategic objectives. New Zealand's national security strategy will

overlap, complement, or conflict with other states' ones and so it needs to be dynamic and iterative. The National Security Strategy states agreed security objectives and how government departments will achieve them. For more information see *New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023*.

Instruments of National Power

2.31 New Zealand's national strategy is an integrated all-of-government approach for using its military, intelligence, diplomatic, finance, information, economic, the law, and development (MIDFIELD) instruments of national power.¹¹

- **Military.** Military power is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power. It ranges from deterrence and coercion through to lethal force. The military instrument is most effective when coordinated with the other instruments. Warfighting is the military instrument's pre-eminent purpose and core competence but the NZDF can also operate and compete effectively below the threshold of armed conflict.
- **Information.** New Zealand uses information activities (including strategic communication) within a cross-government information strategy that effectively exerts diplomatic, economic, and military influence. Intelligence and information received across government shapes planning and execution at all levels. Efficiently managing information promotes unity of effort and understanding and it creates opportunities for coherently influencing audiences.
- **Diplomatic.** Diplomacy manages international relations. Successful diplomacy depends on persuasiveness. It is reinforced by possible coercion and enhanced by reputation and integrity and coordinating the other instruments. It is based on the nation-state system but also includes other opinion formers, powerbrokers, and third parties. The diplomatic instrument is constantly used—including during conflicts—to influence allies, neutrals, and adversaries. Defence diplomacy also reduces hostility, builds and maintains trust, and develops responsible, competent, and democratically accountable forces.

¹⁰ Sourced from RCDS paper *Making Strategy Better*.

¹¹ MIDFIELD has superseded the previous DIME (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) construct.



Figure 2-5: Military strategy is high level direction for how Government uses military power.

- **Finance.** The financial instrument specifically uses banking systems to project power and target countries, organisations, companies, and individuals. It includes compelling private banking institutions to deny currency loans or credit; blacklisting individuals, corporations, or states; utilising financial sanctions; and freezing assets.
- **Intelligence.** Intelligence involves interdisciplinary activities and organisations converting data about the environment, future capabilities and intentions, and relevant actors into value-added products that give advantages to New Zealand’s policymakers and military commanders. Intelligence and information overlap but intelligence creates decision advantage whereas information activities influence target audience.
- **Economic.** Economic power encompasses incentives, boycotts, tariffs, and sanctions for influence decisions and changing behaviour. Potential impacts can be diminished by economic integration and the political sophistication of recipient countries. The economic and military instruments are closely connected and are often used together. Military force sometimes needs to support the economic instrument.
- **Law.** New Zealand furthers its interests by strengthening and participating in international legal institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and using such instruments to persuade and coerce rogue actors and to bring state criminals to trial. However, state and nonstate actors are increasingly engaging in lawfare: deliberately and strategically using legal processes, procedures, and institutions to achieve political or military goals.
- **Development.** Development involves improving countries’ long-term economic, social, and political wellbeing and stability in ways favourable to New

Zealand. New Zealand's development policy¹² has four development principles focussed on the Pacific:

- effectiveness
- inclusiveness
- resilience
- sustainability.

2.32 As crises develop, all instruments of national power might need to be used. DPMC coordinates government departments' contributions so strategic decision-making and activities are coherent and appropriate.

Key Term

Lawfare

Deliberate and strategic use of legal processes, procedures, and institutions to achieve political or military goals.

Military Strategy

2.33 Military capability needs to be used purposefully. Military strategy provides the high level direction for how Government uses military power as part of New Zealand's response to specific situations. Military strategy enables coherent and effective strategic planning because it states how military capabilities are operationally used.

2.34 Military strategy also shapes military advice to Government including that which CDF provides to the Prime Minister. It must meet immediate requirements as well as being compatible with long-term policy ends. It also needs to be responsive to politicians and policymakers while informing the options Defence provides to Government. Military strategy is joint and so it sits above single-Service interests.

Key Term

Military Strategy

High-level direction for using military power.

The New Zealand Defence Force Strategy

2.35 The NZDF Strategy is the organisational strategy that provides high-level direction for organising and managing Defence resources to create fighting power. It is guided by the Defence Capability Plan (DCP)¹³ and the military strategy. The NZDF Strategy is informed by a system of interlocking components including policies, concepts, strategic plans, and operational plans.

Implementing Strategy

2.36 Strategy is rarely straightforwardly implemented, especially because taking the initiative often requires strategic flexibility. The actions of rivals and adversaries as well as allies and partners can also necessitate strategic adjustments and shifts of emphasis as can unforeseen events. Every effort should be made to maintain the original policy ends but they sometimes will need to be reformulated and ways and means adjusted. Strategy-making is a continuous process.

Military Doctrine

Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.

General George H. Decker
Chief of Staff United States Army 1960–62

2.37 Military doctrine has an important relationship with defence policy and strategy. Policy states *what* is to be achieved whereas military doctrine explains *how*. Policy and strategy are often flexible and changeable whereas military

¹² *International Cooperation for Effective Sustainable Development*. Approved by Cabinet 25 November 2019.

¹³ The DCP outlines the major investments Government intends to make in Defence capabilities including people, infrastructure, and digital capabilities. The plan includes indicative funding and proposed time horizons.

Chapter 2

doctrine is informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about how military forces can best be used. Even so, doctrine should not be dogmatic or too specific.

2.38 Doctrine is about how current military operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained, and recovered. Military doctrine provides knowhow for conducting military operations, so it is an important source of strategy's ways. It is about neither the past nor the medium- to longer-term future: it is about how things are done now.



CHAPTER 3:

SECURITY, CONFRONTATION, AND DETERRENCE



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Introduction

3.01 This chapter focuses on what can lead to New Zealand using a military response. It begins by explaining the range of security events to which the New Zealand government responds according to policy of the day. It outlines how events can escalate and ways to stop it. The relationship between security events and national security is then discussed. This is followed by explaining how New Zealand manages these effects, which includes the comprehensive approach and collective security. It finishes with a section about deterrence.

The Range of Security Events

3.02 There is seldom complete peace or total war. Instead, geopolitics is a complex and dynamic blend of cooperation, competition, and conflict between:

- states
- groups and factions within states
- other state and non-state actors.

3.03 Chapter 1 explained the continuum from cooperation to conflict. It can lead to many different crises. The NZDF must be prepared for military campaigns and operations in all conditions. These security events are plotted in Figure 3-1.

3.04 The range of security events extends from assisting with emergency relief to national survival. It is based on likelihood versus consequence.

- Events in the upper left quadrant are typically urgent and unconventional events threatening New Zealand's sovereignty.
- Events in the upper right quadrant are less urgent and often do not directly threaten New Zealand's sovereignty but are risks to collective security.
- Events in the lower left quadrant are typically urgent but less threatening events that require the NZDF assist the civil powers.
- Events in the lower right quadrant encompasses are less urgent but they provide opportunities for New Zealand to contribute to global peace and security.




Figure 3-1: Range of Security Events



Figure 3-2: New Zealand's security depends on protecting and promoting its sovereignty and national interests.

3.05 The Government needs the NZDF to undertake concurrent operations responding to multiple security events while maintaining its core combat capabilities. The NZDF needs to have clearly defined roles, risks, and tasks for different kinds of operations.

National Security

3.06 New Zealand's security depends on protecting and promoting its sovereignty and national interests. The Government must maintain New Zealand's territorial integrity, the overseas territories for which it has constitutional responsibility and New Zealanders' security and freedom, including New Zealand nationals living overseas.

3.07 National security is shaped by a complex combination of geostrategic factors, including environmental, resource, social, political, scientific, technological, and

military influences. Furthermore, New Zealand has many overseas economic interests. Its stability, prosperity, and wellbeing depend on imports, exports, and accessing global information flows. New Zealand cannot be secure on its own. New Zealand's security and that of its neighbours and partners are interdependent. New Zealand is committed to collaborating with its ally Australia and its other security partners.

3.08 Defence identifies strategic trends to mitigate short-term fluctuations in the geopolitical environment and analyses how trends could change the future security environment. Such assessments propose possible outcomes subject to chance, contingency, and strategic shocks. Even so, informed decision making relies on strategic assessments.



Figure 3-3: New Zealand collaborates with its ally Australia to promote collective security.

Collective Security

3.09 Collective security is essential to New Zealand's overall security system. Collective security has three principles:

- diplomacy to resolve disputes
- agreement to act collectively
- trust.

3.10 New Zealand is an active UN member and it collaborates with other countries on a range of security issues and challenges. New Zealand contributes to collective security through its alliance with Australia, membership in the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), and close relationships with Canada, Britain, and the United States of America. New Zealand is also a member or partner nation of major international and regional organisations including the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the

Commonwealth, the Pacific Island Forum, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+ (ADMM+). Other multilateral organisations in which New Zealand participates include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). New Zealand's alliances, partnerships, and relationships have significant diplomatic, economic, and military advantages as well as costs and obligations, including New Zealand being requested to use force overseas.

Key Term

Collective Security

Where a group of sovereign states form a general system of organisation designed to deal with peace as an indivisible entity, and therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire group of states, which must agree in advance both to react to such a threat and how to react against it.

The Defence Contribution to Deterrence

3.11 Deterrence is convincing potential adversaries that the costs of aggression would outweigh potential gains. It depends on credible military capability and political will. It is impossible to deter all threats so New Zealand must decide what can and must be deterred. Deterrent posture during persistent competition needs to be actively managed according to threat level and the will and means to act.

Key Term

Deterrence

Convincing potential aggressors that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains.

Comprehension

3.12 Comprehension means thoroughly understanding one's intentions, strengths, and weakness along with those of other actors. It improves escalation management by prioritising actions and activities across government and acknowledging where more risk can be tolerated. Continually evaluating how our activities influence target audiences helps Defence to be strategically decisive and operationally unpredictable. Comprehension is fundamental for communicating more active deterrence postures.

Capability

3.13 Deterrence depends on credible NZDF and multinational capabilities denying benefits and imposing costs on adversaries. This involves shaping the security environment and mitigating deterrence failures.

- **Deny Benefits.** Denying benefits means deterring adversaries by convincing them that they are unlikely to get what they want; for example, by having sufficient forces to defeat an invasion.
- **Impose Costs.** Imposing costs means accepting adversaries might achieve objectives while making them pay unacceptably high costs for them. It involves identifying adversaries' points of influence and vulnerabilities and using them to impose costs, which relies on understanding the adversary's tolerance for escalation.

Credibility

3.14 Credibility depends on adversaries believing New Zealand will do what it has said it will do. Consistent behaviour and demonstrating New Zealand's willingness to act increase credibility. Sometimes it is necessary to risk communicating the strength of New Zealand's commitment. Following through and acting depends on political will and the capability to impose costs and deny benefits.

Communication

3.15 A common narrative reinforces deterrence strategies. Ambiguously communicated outcomes, objectives, and actions increase the likelihood of confusion, misinterpretation, and potentially unintentional escalation. Communication must be clear and confirmable.

Collective Deterrence

3.16 New Zealand is too small to have enough capabilities to deter all potential adversaries, so it relies on collective deterrence arrangements. Groups of nations cooperate to deter potential adversaries by maintaining and combining credible deterrence and defence postures. New Zealand's collective deterrence arrangements have included the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the New Zealand/Australian aspects of the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) treaty.

Escalation Management

3.17 Escalation and de-escalation strategies, actions, and words can be managed at different levels across operational domains. This means taking an all-of-government approach alongside like-minded partners to detecting, understanding, attributing, and responding to the full range of threats.

3.18 **International Defence Engagement.** International defence engagement (IDE) is how Government uses NZDF personnel, equipment, and activities to gain influence without using or threatening force. IDE may make conflicts less likely but engagement or public commitment can draw New Zealand into conflicts it might have otherwise avoided. New Zealand's closest defence relationships have come from operating alongside other countries. They have all been different but most have involved engagement activities including:




Figure 3-4: Credible capability is an important part of an all-of-government approach to deterrence.

- senior defence official dialogue
- defence personnel exchanges
- multinational military exercises
- high level visits
- intelligence and information sharing.

Military Responses

3.19 New Zealand uses de-escalation, diplomatic conflict resolution, and deterrence so competition does not become conflict and security events do not become crises. However, it is ready and willing to use hard power—including the military instrument of national power—when it is required and legitimate. The rest of this book will explain how and when this is done.



CHAPTER 4:

MILITARY CAPABILITY AND FIGHTING POWER



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Introduction

4.01 This chapter is about the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) warfighting potential and how it is generated. It begins by discussing military capability: everything needed to achieve operational objectives. It explains the elements of capability and processes used for developing them. The second part details how military capability results in fighting power. It explains the importance of human capability and the moral, conceptual, and physical components of fighting power. It concludes with sections about preparedness and reserve forces.

Generating Warfighting Capability

4.02 The NZDF does not maintain a large standing military force. The NZDF currently focusses on long-term development and investing in multipurpose military capabilities the New Zealand Government can use for a range of likely defence contingencies. The NZDF will always have limited resources. The Capability Management System (CMS) prioritises competing capability generation demands across the NZDF because investing in one area will generally reduce resources for others.

Key Term

Military Capability

The ability to achieve a desired operational objective in a selected environment and to sustain that level of effort for a designated period.

Military Capability

4.03 Military capability is everything needed to achieve operational objectives and sustain required effort for a designated period. Military capability is more than equipment. In the NZDF it comprises preparedness and the following components: personnel; research and development; infrastructure and organisations; concepts, doctrine, and collective training; information technology; and equipment, logistics, and resources (PRICIE) (see Figure 4-1).

4.04 **Personnel.** Operational capability is delivered by people, the only component of capability that can add value to it. Without them, the other components are unused potential. The right people are the most difficult component of capability to acquire, manage, change, and cease employing. The following factors must be considered:




Figure 4-1: The components of military capability.




Figure 4-2: Auckland's Devonport Naval Base is part of the infrastructure and organisations component of capability.

- how many personnel are needed to deliver, sustain, support, command, and control the capability along with associated administrative support
- organisation structure
- skills and competency profiles
- recruiting implications
- training and education requirements
- morale
- timely identification and management of personnel risk.

4.05 **Research and Development.** Research and development (R&D) drives continual modernisation of the NZDF. The NZDF must be a smart buyer and user of technology so that it maximises its limited assets' effectiveness and stays interoperable. The NZDF must be

aware of future technology trends and how they relate to future capabilities. Defence Science and Technology (DST) is the prime provider of R&D support to the NZDF.

4.06 **Infrastructure and Organisations.**

- **Infrastructure.** Infrastructure includes buildings, structures, property, plant equipment, exercise and training areas, and firing ranges. It also includes facilities such as civil engineering and utility works.
- **Organisations.** NZDF units need optimal staffing, appropriate competencies and skill sets, correct structure, and adequate command and control arrangements.

4.07 **Concepts, Doctrine, and Collective Training.**

- **Concepts.** Concepts explain how the NZDF may operate in the medium- to long-term future. They respond either



Figure 4-3: The New Zealand Army's 105mm Light Guns are part of its indirect fire support capability.

to the changing strategic and security environments or emerging technology. While they must still be tested, they guide future capabilities.

- **Doctrine.** As discussed in earlier chapters, doctrine is authoritative operational guidance for military forces.
- **Collective Training.** Collective training is done across combined, joint, and Service elements and vertically down to unit levels. Organisational elements must undergo comprehensive and ongoing collective training, which is validated against Government's detailed preparedness requirements.

4.08 **Information Technology.** Effective information technology and management as well as information superiority cannot be achieved without properly deployed and managed communications and information systems. Communications and information systems (CIS) enable

commanders to exercise command and control and disseminate vital information. They increase situational awareness, which leads to decision superiority. Information management includes systems' architecture, hardware, and software.

4.09 **Equipment, Logistics, and Resources.**

- **Equipment.** Equipment includes major platforms and weapon systems such as ships, armoured vehicles, aircraft, missile systems, major electronic systems; and sub-items needed to operate and support them.
- **Logistics.** Logistics includes supply, services, and administrative support for sustaining military activities, including fuel, food, ammunition, and spares.
- **Resources.** Resources include financial and non-financial assets for meeting operational and output commitments to the New Zealand Government.




Figure 4-4: The seven fundamental defence capabilities.

Fundamental Military Capabilities

4.10 Seven fundamental interdependent military capabilities are required to meet Government requirements. They are shown in Figure 4-4.

- **Command.** Robust and responsive command is needed for directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces.
- **Inform.** An informed command needs a process for acquiring, collating, processing, managing, and distributing information.
- **Prepare.** Preparing forces involves all activities for defining, resourcing, and delivering operational forces within Government readiness criteria.
- **Project.** Appropriately prepared and equipped forces must be projected and recovered in a timely manner.
- **Protect.** NZDF forces need to be protected from natural, human, and technological threats.
- **Operate.** NZDF forces must be able to do its core military tasks—above all combat—including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvre.
- **Sustain.** Forces must be sustained with enough fighting power to achieve their objectives.

Force Design Principles

4.11 Eleven principles guide designing the future NZDF.

- **Fixed.** There are three fixed principles:
 - a systems approach
 - kaitiakitanga
 - people.
- **Sliding.** The eight sliding principles allow Government to change settings to shape or respond to changes in strategic environment:
 - combat capability
 - concurrency
 - resilience
 - flexibility
 - scalability
 - partnered
 - technological approach
 - system complexity.

4.12 These principles apply to organisations and capability. More detailed information is in *Future Force Design Principles 2023*.

Fighting Power

4.13 Warfighting capability directly contributes to fighting power. Unlike capability, fighting power emphasises




Figure 4-5: The components of fighting power.

the people who are fighting. Fighting power is the NZDF’s potential warfighting ability. It has a pre-eminent moral component (the will to fight) along with conceptual (the knowledge to fight) and physical (the means to fight) components. Each component mutually supports and informs the other. This is shown in Figure 4-5.

Human Capability

4.14 Fighting power depends on human capability: people’s valuable skills, knowledge, and experience, including contractors and operational partners. The NZDF takes a whole-of-force approach to generating human capability, so it has the right combination of regular and reserve forces, civilian staff, and contractors.

Human Factors

4.15 Understanding group dynamics and people’s motivations supports assessing behaviour in complex situations. Applying scientific expertise to social, psychological, and behavioural aspects of human behaviour can increase fighting power.

Context

4.16 Fighting power involves the following variables.

4.17 **Situation.** The situation and conditions determine how fighting power should be used, including political, resource, and legal constraints.

4.18 **Environment.** Topography, climate, societal and cultural factors, and urban, agricultural, and industrial environment present threats and opportunities. NZDF personnel must be mentally and physically prepared for the environments in which they operate.

4.19 **Adversaries.** Adversaries must be understood case-by-case. For example, some will have numerical superiority giving them an attritional advantage whereas others will compensate for not having it by using asymmetric tactics in urban areas. Fighting and winning always depends on the NZDF knowing how its fighting power can be best used against a given adversary.

4.20 **Allies, Partners, and other Agencies.** Interoperability is about how NZDF joint forces’ fighting power complements and is deconflicted with multinational forces alongside which it operates. It includes specialisation and burden sharing, both of which can increase efficiency. However, over-specialisation can make independent operations more difficult and technological alignment with partners can be prohibitively expensive. Cooperation and collaboration between the diplomatic, military, and



Figure 4-6 Environmental factors will affect the range of options available to commanders.

economic instruments involve the NZDF operating with other Government agencies. Doctrine must account for non-military actors and their cultures, practices, and procedures.

4.21 **Culture and History.** Thoroughly understanding relevant cultural and historical factors and incorporating them into planning, training, and operating are essential for appropriately applying fighting power.

Moral Component

Battles are won in the hearts of men.

Field Marshal Montgomery

4.22 The moral component of fighting power is about creating and sustaining Service members' will to fight and win. It depends on good morale and a morally and ethically sound purpose, which create offensive mindedness and determination. Training, reliable and effective equipment, fair

and firm discipline, self-respect, situational understanding, and purpose all inform fighting power's moral component. Motivation, leadership, and management build it.

4.23 **Motivation.** Motivation comes from personal commitment and a sense of purpose. NZDF personnel must believe in what they are doing and know they belong to a team. However, warfighting means military units need genuine comradeship that stays strong despite violence, injury, and death. Such esprit de corps comes from a units' identity and history, the individual members sense of belonging and their duty to country, Service, unit, and very importantly their friends.

4.24 **Leadership.** Leadership is fundamental for maintaining morale. Without it, morale can crumble in adversity. Military leadership means projecting personality and character so subordinates do what is required. Projecting confidence instils initiative and acceptance of risk and



Figure 4-7: Studying historical leaders such Bernard Freyberg and Howard Kippenberger helps to develop new ones.

responsibility. Leadership is developed by training, education, experience, studying great historical leaders, and knowing military doctrine. Individuals then develop their own styles of leadership.

4.25 Leadership starts with continuous self-discipline. Leaders' decisive action, precepts and examples, advice, encouragement, and admonishment all contribute to it as does empowering subordinates to contribute and use initiative. Leadership and self-discipline sustain morale. More detailed information about leadership is in NZDDP—00.6 *Leadership*.

4.26 **Followership.** Good followership creates unity of purpose. Followership is about actively supporting and contributing to a leader's vision. It is characterised by being responsive to leadership, contributing to shared objectives, and demonstrating commitment and trust. It is not blind obedience, but rather being accountable, influencing the

leader's views, and challenging them constructively when necessary.

4.27 **Management.** Management is making the best use of resources, and efficiency depends on it. It directly relates to two principles of war—economy of effort and sustainability—and the physical component of fighting power, notably for logistics. Maintaining morale and motivation becomes difficult without good resource management and sufficient administrative support. Good management is about avoiding having either too much or not enough resources, each of which undermines concentrating effort on the main objective.

4.28 **The New Zealand Military Culture.** The NZDF has a unique culture underpinned by courage / *tū kaha*, commitment / *tū tika*, comradeship / *tū tira*, and integrity / *tū maia*. These values are the tenets on which the NZDF builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, and appropriately equipped. The NZDF's culture

and military values are fundamental to how it conducts military operations. NZDF personnel come from different cultures and backgrounds, all of which shape the NZDF's culture. However, its core characteristics are:

- independence
- initiative
- strong junior leadership
- endurance
- conscientiousness
- adaptability.

4.29 **Moral Cohesion.** Moral cohesion is having a consistent set of beliefs. It gives personnel the moral courage to fight and continue fighting. Shared experiences, a common sense of worth, discipline, collective identity, self-esteem, and tradition all contribute to moral cohesion. Each Service also has a unique professional ethos that builds and strengthens members' moral consistency.

4.30 **Moral Integrity.** Moral integrity means staying true to one's values. It is instilled by personal discipline, training, and education and reinforced by each Service's values and standards. Commanders are responsible for their units' moral integrity and for ensuring operations are done within the international legal framework.

The Conceptual Component

4.31 The conceptual component is the knowledge needed to fight. It comes from lessons from the past and thinking about how the NZDF can best operate today and in the future. It includes strategic analysis and assessment, conceptual development, and military doctrine. Along with commanders' imagination and initiative, they provide the intellectual force driving the NZDF's fighting ability.

4.32 **Strategic Analysis and Assessment.** Strategic analysis and assessment inform long-term decision-making and policy and capability development by examining and deriving implications from current and future trends. It involves three interconnected activities:

- understanding of the strategic context
- building evidence

- challenging assumptions.

4.33 **Concept Development.** A concept is a notion or idea of how the NZDF may operate in the future. It is normally set out in a document providing guidance for different operational domains and which may lead to the development of a policy or doctrine. Concept development involves:

- exploring, understanding, and defining problems
- finding workable solutions to military problems
- contributing to policy, doctrine, and capability development

4.34 Concepts are developed and should be tested through experimentation for discovering new information, testing hypotheses, and validating decisions. Concepts development can result from operational lessons, technological advances, policy and strategy changes, academic research, and horizon-scanning. A successful concept sometimes leads to corresponding doctrine.

4.35 **Military Doctrine.** Sound military doctrine challenges conventional wisdom and codifies established practice. Commanders must use their judgement whether applying doctrine and experience or departing from it. Unorthodoxy and flexibility are needed to seize the initiative. Even so, doctrine provides commanders with up-to-date operational knowledge tailorable to circumstances.

4.36 The NZDF routinely participates in multinational operations, so it builds interoperability into its doctrine. Australian, British, American, Canadian, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrine is used for developing NZDF publications. The Government's Closer Defence Relations joint ministerial statement with Australia means that the NZDF prioritises ADF doctrine. Standardisation agreements, information sharing agreements,¹⁴ and cooperation also enable interoperability.

The Physical Component

4.37 The physical component of fighting power is the physical means to fight. The physical component comprises personnel, equipment, integrated performance, readiness, and sustainability.

¹⁴ Such as the Five Eye Combined Joint Multinational Master Military Information Exchange Memorandum of Understanding, 2024

Chapter 4

4.38 **Personnel.** NZDF personnel are highly trained, educated, experienced, and skilled volunteers. The military personnel go through a rigorous selection and initial training process. They undergo further professional development and collective training that makes them effective combatants. Their skills need to be nurtured, developed, and retained.

4.39 **Equipment.** Warfighting capability needs effective and appropriate equipment and systems. The NZDF procurement uses military off-the-shelf (MOTS) when required and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) when appropriate. Targeted investment in appropriate military technology maintains comparability and interoperability with our partners.

4.40 **Readiness.** Readiness is the availability, proficiency, and serviceability of allocatable personnel, equipment, facilities and consumables. Timeliness is a key criterion because crises occur unexpectedly, and deployment can be short notice. Government readiness criteria for NZDF force elements include priorities and specific response times.

4.41 **Sustainment.** Sustainment is providing ongoing personnel, logistic, and other support needed until operational objectives have been achieved or revised. Sustainment is as important as firepower. Planners and commanders must be ready for operational contingencies causing unforeseen sustainment challenges as well as fixed conditions such as the NZDF's inevitably long resupply lines.

4.42 The NZDF's sustainment capability comprises organic NZDF elements and non-organic support by civil infrastructure and Defence industry. It also includes support from international sources—including supply arrangements for NZDF weapons, platforms, systems and equipment—and supplementary resupply arrangements with operational partners. More information about sustainment is in NZDDP—4.0 *Defence Logistics* (2nd Edition) and the NZDF approved ADDP—4.2 *Logistic Support to Operations* (3rd Edition) and its New Zealand Supplement.

Preparedness

4.43 Preparedness is how ready and sustainable forces are for operations. It results from readiness and sustainability. Force elements reaching their operational level of capability (OLOC) means they are ready, combat viable, deployable, and sustainable. Holding military forces at OLOC is expensive

and demanding on equipment, readiness, and personnel availability. Force elements' response times are how long is required to reach OLOC.

4.44 A capability baseline determines the peacetime states of readiness the NZDF needs to meet its commitments. The NZDF is funded to maintain this capability baseline so it can provide the Government with military options. Analysing the strategic environment determines how the NZDF distributes resources to the Government's requirements.

Defence Reserve Forces

4.45 Reserves make a critical contribution to the NZDF. Reserves provide round-out, reinforcement, and rotation elements—individuals, small groups, and units—for increasing mass, operational effectiveness, and sustainment.

4.46 Reserves provide complementary and specialist skills to regular forces. They include technological roles vital for keeping pace with developments in warfare and conflict management as well as working with civil society for transport, governance, finance, logistics, industrial production, and delivery.

4.47 Defence Reserves also connect the NZDF with local communities. Supporting New Zealanders during natural disaster emergencies is one of the Reserve Forces' strengths, such as after Tropical Cyclone Gabrielle in February 2023. They provided operational surge and sustainment capacity and specialist skills for supporting response, recovery, and relief.



CHAPTER 5:

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OPERATIONAL TENETS



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Introduction

5.01 This chapter identifies and explains the principles of war and the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) operational tenets. They are essential elements of NZDF military operations and so they are fundamental for all New Zealand military doctrine.

The Principles of War

5.02 The principles of war come from understanding war's enduring nature. Commanders and staffs at all levels should apply them when planning and operating. The principles of war are not rigid laws: they provide doctrinal guidance for military action. They are listed in Figure 5-1.

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

5.03 This is the overriding principle of war. It is often called the 'master principle'. Warfighting depends on selecting and clearly defining the aim. The aim should be clearly defined, simple, and directly contribute to achieving

an operation's or campaign's overall aim. Therefore, every phase of the conflict and each operation or campaign should be directed towards the overall aim. However, if the situation changes significantly this may require a reappraisal and potentially a new aim.

5.04 Multiple conflicting and changing aims cause problems. It is not unusual to have different national strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical aims. Subordinate aims must fully support and contribute to attaining higher-level ones.

5.05 Military operations are complex and uncertain so they must have clearly articulated and achievable aims against which plans and actions are tested. The remaining principles are not ordered because their relative importance changes amongst operations.

Maintenance of Morale

5.06 Operational success often depends more on morale than on materiel advantages. Force size, armaments,




Figure 5-1: The New Zealand Defence Force principles of war.



Figure 5-2: Offensive action is taken to gain and retain initiative.

and physical resources do not compensate for lack of courage, cohesion, energy, determination, endurance, skill, and a warfighting ethos. Developing and maintaining morale are essential for successful warfighting.

Offensive Action

5.07 Military forces take offensive action to gain and retain the initiative. It is almost always essential for achieving operational objectives. Commanders and their forces can exploit opportunities for capitalising on adversaries' weaknesses. Success is unlikely unless commanders are offensive.

Security

5.08 Security is needed for freedom of action. It includes a wide range of activities, such as protecting high-value assets and communication and information systems (CIS) and sea denial. Security does not mean undue caution and avoiding risks. Security should not inhibit boldness, and surprise often depends on good security. Security should be about stopping unexpected events from preventing one's offensive actions.

Surprise

5.09 Offensive success often requires surprise. It is a force multiplier, and its psychological effects can be decisive. Everything possible should be done to surprise adversaries and to stop them from surprising NZDF forces. Surprise can be gained strategically, operationally, tactically, and by exploiting new materiel. Its elements are:

- secrecy
- concealment
- deception
- originality
- audacity
- rapidity.

5.10 Surprise can be achieved by targeted counter-intelligence measures and techniques, including secrecy, counter-surveillance, concealment, and deception to destroy or neutralise adversaries' intelligence gathering, surveillance, and intelligence dissemination capabilities.

*Everything which the enemy least expects
will succeed the best.*

King Frederick II of Prussia

Concentration of Force

5.11 It is often necessary to concentrate superior moral and material force than those of adversaries' at a decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily mean massing forces. They should be positioned so they can combine for delivering the decisive blow or countering adversaries' threats. Time is often more important than location.

Economy of Effort

5.12 Economy of effort is balanced employment of forces and judicious expenditure of resources for achieving effective concentration at the decisive time and place. Economy of effort also means factoring in redundancy to meet attrition. Wastefully allocating resources increases operations' cost, and it can make achieving the aim difficult.

Flexibility

5.13 Plans need to be flexible so they can be adjusted for changing situations and unexpected developments.

Decision-making also needs to be flexible, which comes from conscientious training and education, organisation, discipline, and staff work. It also needs optimal strategic, operational, and tactical mobility for rapid and economical force concentration at decisive times and places.

Cooperation

5.14 Cooperation derives from team spirit. Coordinating all force elements to achieve the maximum combined effort requires goodwill and cooperation at all levels as well as between the Services and multinational operational partners. The NZDF must also cooperate closely with non-governmental agencies, many of which will have aims and objectives different from the military plan.

Sustainability

5.15 Logistics and administrative arrangements should give commanders maximum freedom of action. Logistics and administration should be as simple as possible. Commanders' control of logistics and administration should correspond to their responsibilities in the operational plan.

Operational Tenets

5.16 The NZDF supplements the principles of war with a set of operational tenets. They are derived from the New Zealand way of warfighting and have been distilled from its operational and campaigning experience. Figure 5-3 shows




Figure 5-3: The New Zealand Defence Force operational tenets.

the NZDF's operational tenets.

A Warfighting Ethos

5.17 Warfighting is about deliberately applying lethal force. Participants lives and wellbeing are constantly threatened. Warfighting is destructive, uncertain, confusing, and chaotic. Surprise, shock, and casualties will drain physical and mental resources. The bravest sailors, soldiers, and aviators will be afraid, but carrying on despite their fears is the true measure of their courage. Military activity is about confronting and managing risk. Warfighting is not for risk averse people.

5.18 The NZDF warfighting ethos is the moral and emotional capacity for coping with such extreme experiences. It is the willingness to:

- conduct combat operations
- seek and maintain contact with the enemy
- use lethal force
- endure hardship
- refuse defeat in the pursuit of victory.

The Manoeuvrist Approach

*Machines don't fight wars, people do,
and they use their minds.*

Colonel John Boyd, United States Air Force

5.19 The manoeuvrist approach is indirectly defeating adversaries. The indirect method intelligently and creatively attacks adversaries' critical vulnerabilities while being aware of their intelligence and adaptivity. It targets critical capabilities that support an adversary's centre of gravity. The approach emphasises achieving objectives by dislocating and disrupting an adversary and taking the initiative and applying pressure when and where the adversary least expects it. This means doing the unexpected and having ruthless determination to succeed.

5.20 The manoeuvrist approach closely relates to decision superiority: executing better decisions with more agility than the adversary so NZDF commanders get inside their decision-making cycle (see Boyd's OODA Loop in figure 5-4) and achieve an operational tempo advantage. This involves forcing adversaries to make decisions faster than they can act. They begin making more frequent and increasingly bad decisions, which leads to decision paralysis.




Figure 5-4: Boyd's observe, orient, decide, and act loop.

*One of the most valuable qualities
of a commander is a flair for putting himself
in the right place at the vital time!*

Field Marshal Viscount Slim

Mission Command

5.21 Mission command emphasises responsiveness to superior direction while promoting decentralised command, so subordinates have freedom, speed of action, and initiative. Mission command balances direction and delegation. Subordinate commanders fully understand their superior's intent and work cohesively and flexibly to support it. Mission command reinforces the manoeuvrist approach.

5.22 Mission command has four supporting command principles (see figure 5-5):

- timely and effective decision making
- thoroughly understanding superior commanders' intentions
- clear subordinate responsibilities
- determination to succeed.

5.23 For more information on mission command refer to NZDDP—00.1 *Command and Control*.

The Comprehensive Approach

5.24 If the Government decides to use the NZDF, it will likely do so in multinational or coalition operations. However, if New Zealand is involved, the eight instruments of national power—military, information, diplomatic, finance, intelligence, economic, law, and development—are used together according to circumstances. The NZDF's comprehensive approach enables it to participate more effectively when working alongside the other instruments of national power. Collaborative processes, shared understanding, and concerted action are vital for preventing and resolving crises prevention and resolution.

5.25 Joint, integrated, multi-agency (JIM) operations can involve the NZDF working with up to eleven government agencies. The NZDF also regularly supports these agencies'

operations and activities. These relationships are part of the NZDF's commitment to a comprehensive approach, which will continue to grow in importance.

5.26 The international community also often uses a comprehensive approach, including coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors. This means orchestrating, coordinating, and de-conflicting New Zealand's military and diplomatic instruments with its other instruments of national power. The comprehensive approach has three priority levels for managing crises.

- At the national- and military-strategic levels, New Zealand agencies concentrate on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors.
- The operational level priority is cooperative planning with partners for complex operations involving more frequent civil-military interaction.
- At the theatre level, NZDF force commanders cooperate and coordinate with local host nation authorities and other international actors.

5.27 The comprehensive approach to crisis management depends on shared purpose, and resolve, mutual understanding, and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing, which require political agreement about desired outcomes.¹⁵ These frequently involve security, governance, and economic development conditions. Sometimes crises' complexity and changeability mean desired outcomes cannot be precisely defined so shorter term outcomes are needed before reframing the problem and setting the ultimate desired outcome.

5.28 Even so, getting complete agreement between different actors can be difficult so at least a shared vision or unity of purpose should be developed. All instruments of national power need to contribute to achieving desired outcomes. It also requires effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, across both New Zealand government agencies and a broad range of multinational institutions, agencies, and organisations. Doing so includes:

- initiative-taking engagement between all actors before and during crises

¹⁵ A favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or because of some other form of influence.




Figure 5-5: Principles of mission command.

- shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education, and a common language
- collaboration based on mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate as well as institutional familiarity and information sharing
- focussing on outcomes
- unity of purpose.

5.29 The comprehensive approach may not be appropriate for all NZDF operations and activities. How much the comprehensive approach is used depends on situational imperatives such as complexity, duration, and nature. Nevertheless, effective defence solutions in an increasingly complex security environment are best achieved alongside government departments and agencies and multinational institutions and organisations with shared interests in given crises.

Interoperability

5.30 Interoperability is the ability of the NZDF, government departments, agencies, and our allies and partners to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve common agreed tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Interoperability has the following dimensions.

- **Technical.** Technical interoperability is about systems and equipment, such as communication and information systems, and how they work together.
- **Procedural.** Procedural interoperability involves measures such as common doctrine, procedures,

terminology, and standardisation agreements.

- **Human.** Human interoperability derives from mutual trust and understanding, which comes from strengthening relationships in training, exercises, and on operations.

5.31 **Levels of Interoperability.** Different levels of interoperability are required for each relationship and capability. Levels of interoperability are increased through standardisation, education, training, exercises and evaluation. Interoperability ranges from the strategic to tactical. There are four levels of interoperability:

- **Level 3 – Integrated.** Integrated forces operate together effectively without technical, procedural, and human barriers. They have common networks, capabilities, doctrine, procedures, and language.
- **Level 2 – Compatible.** Compatible forces can operate together without prohibitive technical, procedural or human barriers. They have similar or complementary doctrine, processes, and procedures.
- **Level 1 – Deconflicted.** Deconflicted forces can operate together but they have prohibitive technical, procedural and human barriers.
- **Level 0 – Not interoperable.** Forces that are not interoperable must operate independently from each other.

5.32 **Interoperability Agreements and Fora.** The principal standardisation agreements and fora that the NZDF participates are as follows.

Chapter 5

- **Air Force**
 - Air Forces Interoperability Council (AFIC)
 - Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative.
- **Army**
 - American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCANZ) Armies Interoperability Program.
- **Navy**
 - Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States agreement (AUSCANNZUKUS)
 - Naval Command Control and Communications Board.
- **Defence Research and Development**
 - Five Eyes Science and Technology (FVEY S&T).
- **Command and Control**
 - Australia/New Zealand Command and Control Interoperability Board.
- **Logistics**
 - Australia/New Zealand Operational Logistics Working Party; Communications – Australia/New Zealand Communications Forum.
- **Military Communications and Electronics**
 - Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB).
- **Other Joint Multinational Interoperability Fora**
 - Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC)
 - Quinquartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC)
 - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG).

Flexibility and Pragmatism

5.33 Manoeuvrist operations need a conditioned and resilient attitude developed through experience in training and, if possible, during operations. Manoeuvrist operations

also require thoughtful and imaginative planning and execution. Commanders should be conditioned to find new ways of doing their tasks. Imaginative and innovative thinking generates success in military operations. New Zealand doctrine encourages flexibility and pragmatism by.

- constantly reviewing it and if needed changing it to reflect best practice and the current operating environment
- allowing for deviation

5.34 Doctrine is guidance. It is not dogma. Intelligent, talented, and experienced commanders confronting unforeseen situations know better than doctrine developers how to find the best way to achieve their objectives.

*Nine tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books;
but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing
across the pool and that is the test of generals.*

T.E. Lawrence



CHAPTER 6:

EMPLOYING THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE



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Introduction

6.01 This chapter is about how the government uses the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). It begins by explaining operational context and considerations for employing armed force. It then turns to the operational domains and levels of operations. After discussing operational art and design and campaigns, it describes the types of operations, which range from combat through to humanitarian operations and domestic tasks. An annex outlines when New Zealand can use armed force.

Understanding the Operational Context

6.02 Effective military operations depend on accurately and thoroughly understanding the operational context, which is defined by:

- physical factors
- relationships between internal and external actors
- prevailing cultural nuances and characteristics.

Operational Domains

6.03 Military activities are done in five operational domains (see Figure 6-1). They comprise a framework for developing, organising, and using New Zealand's armed forces. Each is a discrete sphere of military activity intended for the operational environment's engagement space.

- **Maritime Domain.** The maritime domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily for operating below, on, and above the surface of oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas and at the high-water mark. It overlaps with the land domain in the landward littoral segment.
- **Land Domain.** The land domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily for operating on the Earth's land mass down to the high-water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward littoral segment.
- **Air Domain.** The air domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily for operating in airspace extending to the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.




Figure 6-1: Operational domains and operating sub-environments.

- **Space Domain.** The space domain comprises activities and capabilities primarily for operating in space, where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible but its capabilities are enabled by assets on Earth. The space domain includes the satellites in orbit and beyond, supporting ground infrastructure, and the information layer connecting ground and space.
- **Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Domain.** The cyberspace and electromagnetic domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily for operating in the interdependent information networks, technology infrastructures, and resident data. It includes the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, embedded processors, controllers, and the electromagnetic waves with frequencies constituting the electromagnetic spectrum.

Operating Sub-Environments

6.04 Military activities are done to create effects that change the operating environment (OE) to achieve outcomes in the national interest. The NZDF defines the OE as the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect using capabilities and influence commanders' decisions. The NZDF further divides the operating environment into interdependent three sub-environments (see Figure 6-1):

- **Physical.** The surface, sub-surface, above surface, and space where objects and people are found and activities are done as well as relevant weather and atmospheric conditions.
- **Human.** Relevant individuals, groups, organisations and their beliefs, values, interests, aims and interactions.
- **Information.** Data, information, and media conveying information and influencing actors in the operating environment.

6.05 Objectives are achieved when these environments at a given time and place have been sufficiently changed so that current conditions meet the Government's specified end-state and desired national outcomes have been reached.

Key Term

Operational Domain

Defined areas with discrete characteristics where manoeuvre, targeting, fires, and other military activities are performed to create effects or achieve objectives in the engagement space of the operating environment.

6.06 Successfully integrating actions within and across domains enables commanders to gain and maintain initiative by enhancing pre-emption, surprise, simultaneity, tempo and exploitation. This increases freedom of manoeuvre in the engagement space to change the human, physical, and information environments in the area of operations.

Levels of Military Operations

6.07 Conflict and war involve actions on three levels (see Figure 6-2): strategic, operational, and tactical. These levels are interrelated, and concurrent military activities are routinely planned and done in all of them. Tactical actions combine into operations and a series of operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives at given times and spaces are campaigns.

Strategic

6.08 The strategic level of military operations consists of two sub-levels: the national strategic and the military strategic.

6.09 **National Strategic.** The national strategic level is the macro political dimension of conflict both domestically and internationally. It is where Government organises national military and non-military resources to meet its national strategic aims. Achieving them depends on attaining strategic objectives. The national strategic level concerns national security and pursuing national interests. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

6.10 **Military Strategic.** The military strategic level includes setting military end-states and the broad military contribution to national strategy. The NZDF does so by raising, training, and maintaining operationally prepared forces for conducting campaigns and operations. Headquarters NZDF and the Ministry of Defence are




Figure 6-2: Levels of military operations.

responsible for military strategy.

Key Terms

Campaign

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective.

Operation

A series of military actions or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

Operational

6.11 Campaigns and major operations are planned and commanded at the operational level. Campaign end-states are reached when all operational or campaign objectives have been attained. The operational level links military strategy to tactics by establishing operational objectives and end-states, initiating actions, and distributing resources.

NZDF operations can be independent, interagency, or multinational. Operational art is used for planning and conducting campaigns and operations. Operational art is skilfully designing, organising, integrating, and conducting campaigns and operations.

Tactical

6.12 An operation is a coordinated series of tactical actions to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. The tactical level is where battles, engagements, and actions—the practical execution of operations and campaigns—are done by force elements. Tactical actions are the building blocks of concrete military activity. Actions generate effects: changes in the operating environment, which accumulate until the operational outcome has been achieved.

The Significance of the Levels of Military Operations

6.13 The levels of military operations provide a general framework for commanding and controlling operations and a useful tool for the analysis of political military activity before, during, and after conducting military operations. They apply



Figure 6-3: Battles, engagements, and actions are planned and executed at the tactical level.

to all military operations from warfighting to humanitarian operations. The levels of military operations also enable force to be applied coherently in different ways at different levels when pursuing strategic objectives. Being offensive at one level and defensive at another can be entirely consistent with a campaign's ultimate objective.

6.14 The levels overlap and they can be difficult to distinguish. For example, planning at all levels of operations is very closely linked, interdependent, and often concurrent. Commanders need to account for overlapping levels, especially when setting command levels and associated responsibilities. Sometimes low-level tactical actions can create immediate strategic effects.

6.15 Even so, strategic commanders should generally not bypass intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of command to directly influence the lowest tactical level. Doing so undermines the principles of mission command.

Such risks can be managed during planning and can be further mitigated by political and strategic military leaders who know the NZDF command philosophy.

Operational Art and Design

Operational Art

6.16 Operational art translates strategy into operational and tactical action, linking the three levels of operations and making them coherent. It is a conceptual framework for planning and conducting campaigns and operations. Operational art combines the science of operational planning with commanders' and staffs' skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment. Operational art encourages commanders to surprise adversaries and improvise to gain the initiative.

Operational Design

6.17 Operational art is creative whereas operational design is practical: it is the science supporting the art. Operational design is creating a framework for developing and refining how the joint commanders' vision of how the operation will unfold. Detailed and actionable planning can then be done to realise them. Operational art and design synthesise joint commanders' intuition and creativity with design's analysis and process so they can overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty. For more information on operational design see NZDDP—3.0 *Campaigns and Operations*.

6.18 Strategy is rarely straightforwardly implemented. Long-term thinking and setting priorities for the future are influenced by domestic politics and the electoral cycle against a backdrop of constant pressure from traditional and social media. Changing circumstances and adversaries' actions always lead to strategic adjustments. Policy might need to be rethought and ways and means modified. Strategy-making is continuous.

Campaigns

6.19 Campaigns are set out in military strategy and orchestrated through operational art. The current strategic context requires deeper integration of the instruments of national power. Campaign management is therefore strategic as well as operational. Campaigns are often the longest and most costly joint operations. The two types of campaigns—*theatre* and *subordinate*—are explained in NZDDP—3.0 *Campaigns and Operations*.

Campaign Authority

6.20 Campaign authority is established by international forces, agencies, and organisations for a given situation. Campaign authority has four interdependent elements:

- the mandate's perceived legitimacy
- the participant forces' perceived legitimacy and behaviour
- how much factions, local populations, and others consent to the forces' authority and if they resist or comply with it
- how well the mandated forces manage the local population's and others' expectations

6.21 Crisis management activities should be legal and purposeful. They should also be recognisably legitimate, acceptable, and appropriate. Campaign authority derives from confidence that appropriate and legitimate measures are used by intervening forces. Creating and maintaining campaign authority means continuously assessing activities' effects. Effective information strategies influence decisions and opinions, which reinforce campaign authority. They should be coordinated across all national and international partners.

Employing Armed Force

6.22 New Zealand may use force within the relevant specifically-applicable legal framework, to protect its legitimate interests.¹⁶ Force—including lethal force—may be required to:

- counter imminent threats
- diminish adversaries' capacity to act
- influence situations by degrading adversaries will and capability to act and ability to make timely and effective decisions.

6.23 Opponents are countered by being disrupted, defeated, or destroyed:

- disruption degrades specific parts of an opponent's moral and physical capability to limit their freedom of action
- defeat diminishes an opponent's will, cohesion, and overall capacity so that they cannot maintain a credible threat or prevent friendly forces from achieving their objectives
- destruction is the ultimate level of applied force, which is used when it is necessary to eliminate opponents.

Using Lethal Force

6.24 The NZDF is the only group in society that is authorised to use large-scale offensive lethal force on behalf of the nation against targeted adversaries. This offensive use of lethal force is a responsibility that weighs heavily on

¹⁶ For example, the framework could include a United Nations Security Council Resolution, the Laws of Armed Conflict, Host Nation consent, a relevant Treaty, or relevant domestic legislation.



Figure 6-4: Using force is subject to political direction.

Service members. Annex A outlines when armed force may be used.

Rules of Engagement and Political Oversight

6.25 Political direction and operational and legal provisions for using force are detailed in NZDDP—06.1 *Rules of Engagement*. NZDF personnel must always respect and comply with the laws of armed conflict; rules of engagement (ROE) are specific orders for a specific operation or campaign. They are not comprehensive statements of either law or policy, but they take each into account. ROE limit activity but they do not limit the legal right to act in self-defence when it is reasonable and necessary. ROE are for:

- ensuring military activities are legal and consistent with government policy
- defining what military personnel can legally do and not do

- reflecting the operational context.

6.26 Political decisions about using force include:

- limiting objectives and targets
- defining the theatre of operations and staffing limits
- restricting the types of weapons used
- avoiding escalation.

Joint Operations

6.27 The NZDF can undertake a range of joint operations, all of which are predicated on its combat capabilities. This is because many of the skills, discipline, determination, and equipment needed for combat are transferrable to other types of operations. However, combat operations require forces that have been specifically prepared for fighting and winning.



Figure 6-5: Combat is the most intense, demanding, and defining type of operation.

Combat

6.28 Combat operations usually involve conventional force-on-force engagements of varying scale, frequency, intensity, and uses lethal force. They are undertaken to maintain or extend freedom of action and reduce or deny it to an adversary. Combat operations often include manoeuvre by joint task forces prepared, sustained, and commanded by COMJFNZ and a joint task force commander. They are the type of operation most likely to result in casualties. The NZDF emphasises combat effectiveness because combat is the most intense, demanding, and defining type of operation for which it is equipped, trained, prepared, and required to do. Combat operations include:

- **Low-Intensity Warfare:** operations that may include sporadic episodes of combat.
- **Medium-Intensity Warfare:** operations in joint force areas

of operations where there is ongoing open conflict, such as civil war or war between states, and frequent regular combat between forces using conventional weapons.

- **High-Intensity Warfare:** operations in joint force area of operations where there is ongoing open conflict, such as civil war or war between states, involving sustained combat over a wide area between forces using a combination of conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.¹⁷

¹⁷ Civil war and war between states can span from low to high intensity.



Figure 6-6: The New Zealand Defence Force can counter terrorism domestically and overseas.

Enforcement

6.29 Enforcement operations administer international laws or enforce United Nations (UN) mandated sanctions, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and internationally agreed sanctions on rogue nations. Enforcement operations typically have recognised mandates for using warfighting to achieve stated aims. They are not impartial because they involve coercing actors to take defined actions.

Countering Irregular Activity

6.30 Irregular activity involves adversaries—frequently ideologically or criminally motivated—using force or threatening it to change or prevent change to established governance and authority. It comprises criminality, disorder, insurgency, and terrorism. It includes insurgent, terrorist, and transnational criminal organisations' military, political,

social, informational, and economic activities. Countering irregular activity defeats such adversaries by destroying or dismantling their networks and preventing their re-emergence. It also requires influencing and changing the operating environment where irregular actors operate to reduce support for them. It includes the following types of operations:

- **Civilian and Military Counter-Insurgency.** The NZDF can contribute to comprehensive civilian and military counter-insurgency efforts, including running security assistance programs such as military education and training programs and establishing an enduring presence amongst the local population to create confidence and facilitate security and development.
- **Counter-Terrorism.** Counter-terrorism encompasses preventive, defensive, and offensive actions for reducing the vulnerability of forces, individuals, and property

to terrorist acts and recovering after them, including protecting forces, military members, high-risk personnel, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and information.

- **Counter-Criminality.** Counter-criminality is contributing to stopping organised criminal groups' activities and dismantling their networks.

Stabilisation and Reconstruction

6.31 Stability and reconstruction are normally civilian-led operations done during or after crises in states that have lost the capacity to govern themselves effectively. The initial NZDF contribution generally focusses on providing a safe and secure environment for reconstruction. Later it can involve specialised policing skills, assets, and specialists for controlling and securing areas under reconstruction and support for strengthening governance, building local capacity, and re-establishing rule of law.

Peace Support

6.32 Peace support operations use diplomacy, civil society engagement, and military actions to restore or maintain peace. They are complex operations requiring thorough understanding of their military, diplomatic, electoral, human rights, civilian police, humanitarian, and civil components.

- **Peace Building.** Peace building addresses underlying causes of conflict and longer-term needs of local people.
- **Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention monitors and identifies conflict's causes and takes timely action to prevent hostilities starting, escalating, or resuming.
- **Peace Making.** Peace making brings hostile parties to a ceasefire or a peaceful settlement after conflicts have begun.
- **Peace Keeping.** Peace keeping operations follow agreements or ceasefires.
- **Peace Enforcement.** Peace enforcement operations aim to coerce potential belligerents into either avoiding or stopping armed conflict and instead peacefully settle disputes.

Non-Combatant Evacuation

6.33 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) sometimes asks the NZDF to do non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) for New Zealand and approved foreign nationals. NEO are conducted in low to high-threat environments.

Humanitarian Operations

6.34 **Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.** The NZDF can assist emergency or disaster relief operations, either nationally or as part of an international effort. The NZDF supports the coordinating humanitarian agency for a specific task in an entirely benign posture apart from essential force protection measures.

6.35 **Humanitarian Assistance.** Humanitarian and development agencies are the primary providers of humanitarian aid. However, sometimes—especially during conflict—they cannot do so without military support. Humanitarian assistance is different from disaster relief operations because:

- humanitarian aid is not the primary mission of the military commander
- the force has been deployed for military operations
- the military transfers full responsibility for humanitarian tasks to civilian agencies at the earliest possible opportunity.

Domestic Tasks

6.36 The NZDF provides support to other government departments (see Figure 6-7), the community, and foreign and defence policy objectives. It does so with both deployable force elements, non-deployable support or training units, and Defence Reserve elements. They are either government support operations or community support operations. Domestic tasks include formal pre-planned support to specific government departments and agencies, and emergency support during crises. Such tasks typically involve operations in New Zealand's exclusive economic zone, maritime environment, and sovereign territory, such as resource and border protection operations.



Figure 6-7: Agencies supported by the New Zealand Defence Force.

International Defence Engagement

6.37 International Defence Engagement (IDE) encompasses NZDF engagement activities reducing hostility, building and maintaining trust and assisting in developing democratically accountable local armed forces. There are two broad categories of IDE:

- arms control, non-proliferation, and confidence and security building
- outreach activities such as the Mutual Assistance Programme, which enhances Asia-Pacific partners' capabilities and interoperability.

ANNEX A: WHEN NEW ZEALAND MIGHT USE FORCE

National Self-Defence: Protecting New Zealand's Security

6.38 New Zealand has the right to use armed force to protect its sovereign territory, political independence, persons, and property against an armed attack. This right extends to areas that New Zealand has a statutory responsibility to defend (such as the Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue).

6.39 Protecting New Zealand includes deterring and defeating adversarial threats to New Zealand, its territorial waters, and airspace. This also includes the NZDF supporting other government departments. Military aid to civil authorities can include providing them limited manpower during unforeseen contingencies or more significant resources, for example, when countering terrorism.

6.40 Only the New Zealand Government can decide to use force for national self-defence. Appropriate national or multinational forces can be deployed for countering direct military incursions or threats to New Zealand's territory and deterring further aggression.

Use of Force Authorised by the United Nations

6.41 The United Nations (UN) Security Council can authorise using force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter against threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggression. Security Council resolutions bind all member states including New Zealand. Member states can be asked to contribute armed forces to UN or multinational force supporting such resolutions. The rules of engagement (ROE) procedures in NZDDP—06.1 *Rules of Engagement* (2nd Edition) apply in such cases.

6.42 Force used in accordance with UN Security Council mandates can include combat operations. If so, neither force elements nor individual members of the NZDF are acting in self-defence and using force is limited to accomplishing the assigned mission.

6.43 UN operations authorised under Chapter VI or Chapter VIII of the UN Charter do not authorise using force. ROE will cover force element and individual self-defence.

Treaty Obligations

6.44 Being a treaty signatory, such as to the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty or the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), can involve military obligations even when New Zealand's security is not directly threatened.

GLOSSARY

Terms and Definitions

Administration

1. Managing and executing all military matters not included in tactics and strategy
2. Internal management of units.

Armed Conflict

A situation in which violence or military force is threatened or used, generally a contest between two opposing sides in which each seeks to impose its will on the other.

Attrition

The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel.

Campaign

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective.

Capstone Doctrine

The single, foundational doctrine publication that sits at the apex of the doctrine hierarchy, and from which all other doctrine is derived.

Centre of Gravity

The primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action, and will to fight.

Coercion

The use or threat of force to persuade opponents to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour against their wishes.

Collective Security

Where a group of sovereign states form a general system of organisation designed to deal with peace as an indivisible entity, and therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire group of states, which must agree in advance both to react to such

a threat and how to react against it.

Combat Operations

Military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.

Combined Operation

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Command

The authority that a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of his rank or assignment.

Comprehensive Approach

Responding to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and deconflicting the activities of the military, other government departments, and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

Conflict Prevention

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and—when necessary—military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. See also: Peace Support Operations.

Control

Authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Cyber

That which relates to or involves operating or acting in and through computer and information technology networks.

Cyberspace

A global domain consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers and software.

Deterrence

Convincing a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains.

Doctrine

Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

End-State

The set of desired conditions that will achieve the strategic objectives.

Ends

Operational objectives that must be attained in the area of operations to achieve the strategic or national aim.

Fighting Power

The ability of armed forces to shape, contest, and fight.

Force Element

An individual or discrete military capability comprising trained personnel, major platforms, combat systems and supplies held at a directed level of readiness.

Grey Zone Activities

Coercive activities below the threshold of armed conflict.

High-Intensity Warfare

Operations during ongoing open conflict, such as civil war or war between states, involving sustained combat over a wide area between forces using a combination of conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Insurgency

Actions of an organised and often ideologically motivated group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change within a country or a region through subversion, and that are focused on persuading or coercing the population through irregular activity.

Intelligence

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

Interoperability

The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

Irregular Activity

The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups, or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.

Joint

Activities, capabilities, and organisations in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Joint Force Area of Operations

That portion of a theatre necessary for joint military operations and their administration as part of a campaign

Lawfare

Deliberate and strategic use of legal processes, procedures, and institutions to achieve political or military goals.

Logistics

Planning and carrying out movement and maintenance of forces:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
- movement, evacuation, and hospitalisation of personnel
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services.

Low-Intensity Warfare

Operations including sporadic combat.

Manoeuvre

- movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
- employment of forces on the battlefield through movement combined with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to accomplish the mission.

Manoeuvrist Approach

Seeking to shatter the enemy's cohesion through an orchestrated series of actions exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strength, and protecting friendly vulnerabilities.

Means

Capabilities and other resources required to achieve objectives within established limitations.

Medium-Intensity Warfare

Operations during ongoing open conflict, such as civil war or war between states, including frequent regular combat between forces using conventional weapons.

Military Capability

The ability to achieve a desired operational objective in a selected environment and to sustain that level of effort for a designated period.

Military Strategy

High-level direction for using military power.

Mission

A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

Mission Command

A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about the intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.

Mobilisation

Preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources.

Mobility

A quality or capability of military forces that permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission.

National Security

The safety of a state and its protection from both external and internal threats.

National Strategic Aim

The Government's declared purpose in a situation.

Operation

A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.

Operational Art

Employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.

Operational Command

Authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy elements, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command, and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.

Operational Control

Authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units.

Operational Domain

Defined areas with discrete characteristics where manoeuvre, targeting, fires, and other military activities are performed to create effects or achieve objectives in the engagement space of the operating environment.

Operational Level

The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.

Peace Building

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and—when necessary—military means to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people.

Peace Enforcement

A peace support operation conducted to maintain a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain, and the threat of disruption is high.

Peace Keeping

A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence.

Peace Support

Operations that impartially make use of diplomatic, civil, and military means to restore or maintain peace.

Reserve Forces

Personnel, units, or formations earmarked for future use on mobilisation or against an operational requirement or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement.

Security

1. Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, annoyance, or surprise.
2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that deters unauthorised persons from attempting to gain access to official matters affecting national security.

Stability and Support Operations

Operations that impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies.

Staff

The body of military professionals who support commanders in their estimation of a situation and in formulating and executing subsequent plans, orders, and activities.

Strategic Level

The level of war concerned with the art and science of employing national power.

Strategic Objective

A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power to meet the national strategic aim.

Strike

An attack intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.

Surveillance

Systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

Tactical Level

The level of war concerned with planning and conducting battles characterised by applying concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

Terrorism

Unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Theatre

A designated geographic area for which an operational-level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operation.

Unit

1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organisation and equipment; specifically, part of an organisation.
2. An organisation title of a subdivision of a group in a task force.

War

A state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country.

Warfare

The action of carrying on or engaging in war.

Ways

How actions are arranged in time and space to achieve objectives.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABCANZ	American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Interoperability Program	DIME	Diplomatic, information, Military, Economic
ADMM+	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+	DPMC	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication	DST	Defence Science and Technology
ADF	Australian Defence Force	FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
AFIC	Air Forces Interoperability Council	FPS	Foreign Policy and National Security Committee
AJODWG	Allied Joint Operational Doctrine Working Group	FVEY S&T	Five Eyes Science and Technology
AJP	Allied Joint Publication	IDE	International Defence Engagement
ANZUS	Australian, New Zealand, United States	IMF	International Monetary Fund
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations	JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
AUSCANNZUKUS	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States Naval Command Control and Communications Board	JFAO	Joint Force Area of Operations
BDD	British Defence Doctrine	JIM	Joint, Interagency, Multinational
CCEB	Combined Communications Electronics Board	JP	Joint Publication
CDF	Chief of Defence Force	JTF Comd	Joint Task Force Commander
CIS	Communication and Information Systems	MIC	Multinational Interoperability Committee
CMs	Capability Management System	MIDFIELD	Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Finance, Information, Economic, Law, Development
COMJFNZ	Commander Joints Forces New Zealand	MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
COTS	Commercial Off-The-Shelf	MOTS	Military Off-The-Shelf
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease of 2019	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
DCP	Defence Capability Plan	NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
		NSC	National Security Committee
		NSG	National Security Group
		NZDDP	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

NZDDP–D	New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication - Doctrine
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZSOF	New Zealand Special Operations Forces
ODESC	Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLOC	Operational Level of Capability
OODA	Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
POLAD	Political Advisor
PRICIE	Personnel; Research and Development, Infrastructure and Organisations; Concepts, Doctrine, and Collective Training; Information Management; and Equipment, Supplies and Services, and Resources
QCJWC	Quinquartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference
R&D	Research and Development
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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