

## FINAL REPORT BY THE MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP ON SERVICE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 1950 TO 2011

December 2013

#### FINAL REPORT OF THE MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP ON SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1950 TO 2011

#### Part 1:

Further Research by the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (JWG) on Naval Service in South-East Asia 1950 to 2011– including the Final Recommendations by the JWG – dated 2 December 2013

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A. Transits of the Indonesian Straits by RNZN Ships between July 1957 and April 1967

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- B. Transits of the Taiwan Strait by RNZN Ships between May 1956 and October 1975

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- Example of a Ship's Log HMNZS ROYALIST for Monday 20 May 1963 when the Ship transited the Taiwan Strait on passage to Hakata, Japan
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- List of the documents found in the NZDF Classified Registry, HQNZDF, Wellington about transits of the Taiwan Strait. These documents were declassified in January 2013

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Interim report of the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group on Service in South-East Asia 1950 to 2011 – dated 2 November 2011

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- B. Checklist for Submissions
- C. Summary of Submissions Service in South-East Asia 1950 to 2011

#### Part 3:

Report on Medallic Recognition of New Zealand Military Service in South-East Asia 1950-1975 – by Peter Cooke, Independent Historian – dated 1 July 2011

#### Annex to Part 3:

A. Terms of Reference

Minister of Defence

#### FURTHER RESEARCH BY THE MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP (JWG) ON NAVAL SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1950 TO 2011 -INCLUDING THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE JWG

#### **References:**

- A. Interim report to the Minister of Defence dated 2 November 2011
- B. Minister of Defence's comments on NZDF Coversheet dated 7 November 2011 - NZDF Tracking # 349/2011
- C. Report on Medallic Recognition of New Zealand Military Service in South-East Asia 1950-1975 by Peter Cooke, Independent Historian, dated 1 July 2011

#### Introduction

1. In November 2011, the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (JWG) submitted an interim report on military service in South-East Asia (Ref A). The JWG's preliminary conclusion was that no additional medallic recognition is warranted for service in South-East Asia from 1950 to 2011.

2. Before finalising their report, however, the JWG asked that further research be undertaken by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) into service on RNZN ships which went to action stations while transiting the Straits of Indonesia in the period leading up to, and during, Confrontation and while transiting the Taiwan Strait.

3. At Ref B, the Minister of Defence requested that the JWG also provide more detailed comment on the appropriateness, or otherwise, of the NZDF's interpretation of the regulations for medallic recognition of naval service off Borneo from 8 December 1962 to 11 August 1966.

4. Further research has been conducted in the Reports of Proceedings, the Ships Logs, and other RNZN subject files. The results of this research are discussed below.

#### 'Action Stations' and 'Damage Control Status'

5. The term 'Action Stations' indicates the alert status for a ship. It ranges from **Status 1 operations** (Action Stations) with associated damage control status indicated in order 'X', 'Y'', and 'Z'. The highest level of alert and damage control is 1Z - at this stage 100% of the ship's company are stood to and full damage control measures are in place.

- 6. The lower levels of ship operations are:
  - a. **Status 2 operations** ('Defence stations') normally 50% manning and use the same scale of damage control measures.
  - b. **Status 3 operations** are 'Normal sea operations' with no known immediate threat to the ship. At that stage the normal Ships watches are in place and the damage control status is set by the weather and sea conditions more than any other cause. Typically damage control will be set at X or Y status 3X and 3Y are very common status conditions when at sea.
  - c. **Status 4** is 'In Port Mode', normally when the ship is tied up with duty crew on the gangway and control stations only.

7. 'Action Stations' and 'Defence Stations' also needed to be practiced while at sea, to ensure that the Ship's Company was ready for combat operations, if and when required.

#### Transits of the Indonesian Straits

8. From the late 1950s Indonesia claimed sovereign rights over waters in its archipelago that other nations (including New Zealand) regarded as international waters. During Confrontation New Zealand military aircraft avoided Indonesian airspace but our naval vessels continued to transit waters within the Indonesian archipelago.

9. Indonesia had first claimed waters out to the 12-mile limit in 1958, a claim which would have affected passage by other nations' ships through a number of its straits. If accepted this would have turned the Java, Banda and Flores seas and the Straits of Macassar into internal waterways. New Zealand responded in accordance with its Commonwealth Strategic Reserve partners, and took guidance from the Commander Far East Fleet over the passage of warships.

10. Passage by RNZN warships was still made, but with heightened levels of precaution but without any visible measure that could be seen as provocative. Occasionally an Indonesian warship was seen. In times of tension RNZN ships transited these waters while at defence stations or action stations, but no actual incidents occurred.

11. The recommendation of the Cooke Report (Ref C) was: 'From available evidence, transits of the Indonesian Straits and onboard exercises during such transits were part of normal peacetime naval activities and therefore should not qualify for medallic recognition. Further research may be appropriate on this matter.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Rear Admiral Ian Hunter, RNZN (Rtd) noted on 13 February 2012 that the 'onboard exercises and drills carried out during transits had to be restricted in content to ensure they could not be construed as provocative'.

12. **Further research.** The further research requested by the JWG has confirmed that the New Zealand government directed that RNZN Ships were to transit through the Straits as normal but without provocation. This entailed clearly flying the National Ensign, ensuring that all weapons were trained fore and aft and that normal passage speed was maintained. At normal passage speeds of 12-15 knots the longest transit time for any individual Indonesian Strait would be 10 hours for the Sunda Strait. The cumulative time for transits would be between 12 and 24 hours. The shortest route from Singapore to the Indian Ocean is 750 miles via the Gaspar and Sunda Straits taking two days. The main route to pass north of Australia was through the Karimata Strait then to Lombok Strait out into the Indian Ocean, a distance of 1250 miles taking up to four days depending on speed.

13. The decision on whether the ship would be at 'Action Stations' during a transit, or at a lower level of readiness, was normally made by the Ship's Captain shortly before the transit began based on the latest intelligence signals.

14. On some transits prior notification was given to the Indonesian Government through diplomatic channels of the route and broad timings of the passage of RNZN warships through the Straits. Advance notice, under certain circumstances, was part of the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand agreed policy for such Strait transits by their warships. The purpose of the advance notification was as 'a matter of courtesy' and to minimise the risk of any incidents while transiting the Straits.<sup>2</sup>

15. The NZDF have located the New Zealand Navy Office instructions for the passage through Indonesian claimed waters by HMNZS OTAGO in August 1966. These instructions (quoted in full in Annex A, pp.A-19 to A-21) are very clear that OTAGO was to withdraw if Indonesian military forces threatened to use force to prevent OTAGO's transit of the Karimata or Lombok Straits.<sup>3</sup>

16. There were no transits of the Indonesian Straits from early September 1964 (when New Zealand soldiers started searching for Indonesian troops who had landed on the Malay Peninsula) through to mid-August 1966 (the officially negotiated end of Confrontation). In this period the New Zealand Navy Office directed that RNZN Ships sail via Manus Island, Papua New Guinea and/or Pearl Harbour and travel 'south of Mindanao [in the Philippines] and north of the claimed Indonesian waters'.<sup>4</sup> Though using more fuel, this route avoided the need to sail south of Borneo via the Gaspar, Sunda, Karimata, Sapudi, Wetar and/or Lombok Straits.

17. At Annex A is a schedule of all 21 identified transits of the Indonesian Straits between July 1957 and April 1967 with quotes from the Reports of Proceedings, Ships Logs and other RNZN subject files. The Indonesian Confrontation with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For example, the policy in April 1962 specified that 'prior notification will be given as a matter of courtesy of the passage of (HM, HMA or HMNZ) Ship by unusual routes (i.e. those not listed in "Ocean Passage of the World") or in unusual concentrations (i.e. three or more warships).' Source: NA 018/4/8 dated 5 April 1962 (paragraph 9) - NZ Navy Secretary to the Commanding Officer HMNZS TARANAKI (file held by HQNZDF, Wellington).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Annex A to NA 018/4/8 dated 29 July 1966 (file held by HQNZDF, Wellington).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 2 - Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS OTAGO - 12 January 1962 to 30 June 1965. Also see the more detailed discussion in Annex A (pp.A-17 to A-18) of this report.

Malaysia, Singapore and their British Commonwealth allies ended on 11 August 1966, but the research period has been extended to include a transit in April 1967 described by Mr John Titmus, ex-RNZN in his submission to the JWG dated 21 August 2011.

18. These records show clearly that although there were some potential threats, overall the transits involved minimal risk to the RNZN Ships. The Ships' Captains enacted best practice and the ships were in varying states of readiness in case anything went wrong. However, the expectation by the New Zealand Government and the British led Headquarters of the Far East Strategic Reserve was that the likelihood of any incidents was low or very low. If there had been serious concerns about the safety of the RNZN Ships they would have either avoided the contested waters or always sailed through in naval convoys.

19. **Recommendation.** No medallic recognition is warranted for transits of the Indonesian Straits.

#### Transits of the Taiwan / Formosa Strait

20. The Taiwan / Formosa Strait was transited by ships of the RNZN at least 15 times between 1956 and 1975.

21. One of the reasons for transiting the Taiwan Strait other than to get from 'point A-to-B' was to assert New Zealand's position on the Taiwan Strait as an international waterway in accordance with the law of the sea (exercising the right to sail through international waters).

22. The recommendation of the Cooke Report (Ref C) was: 'From available evidence, transits of the Strait of Taiwan and onboard exercises during such transits were part of normal peacetime naval activities and therefore should not qualify for medallic recognition. Further research may be appropriate on this matter.'<sup>5</sup>

23. **Public submissions.** The submission from Lieutenant Commander (Rtd) A.N. (Tony) Forsyth, RNZN discusses HMNZS ROYALIST in 1963 transiting the Taiwan Strait 'on what was essentially a war like footing.' He asks: 'If this was not an operational situation with the inherent associated risks why were the transits conducted under such circumstances?'

24. **Further research.** The further research requested by the JWG has confirmed that the New Zealand government directed that RNZN Ships were to transit through the Straits as normal but without provocation. This entailed clearly flying the National Ensign, ensuring that all weapons were trained fore and aft and that normal passage speed was maintained. Transits of the Taiwan Strait normally took less than 24 hours in total. The decision on whether the ship would be at 'Action Stations' during a transit, or at a lower level of readiness, was normally made by the Ship's Captain shortly before the transit began based on the latest intelligence signals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Rear Admiral Ian Hunter, RNZN (Rtd) noted on 13 February 2012 that the 'onboard exercises and drills carried out during transits had to be restricted in content to ensure they could not be construed as provocative'.

25. At Annex B is a schedule of all 15 identified transits of the Taiwan Strait between May 1956 and October 1975 with quotes from the Reports of Proceedings (ROPs), Ships Logs and other RNZN subject files.

26. These records show clearly that although there were potential threats, overall the transits involved minimal risk to the RNZN Ships. The Ships' Captains enacted best practice and the ships were in varying states of readiness in case anything went wrong. However, the expectation by the New Zealand government and the Far East Strategic Reserve was that the likelihood of any incidents was low or very low. If there had been serious concerns about the safety of the RNZN Ships they would have either avoided the contested waters or always sailed through in naval convoys.

27. **Recommendation.** No medallic recognition is warranted for transits of the Taiwan Strait.

#### Naval service off Borneo 1962 to 1966

28. No RNZN ships served off Borneo between 8 December 1962 and 23 December 1962. Therefore no RNZN ships qualified for the award of the British General Service Medal (GSM) 1918-62 with clasp 'Brunei'.

29. The British GSM 1962 -2007 with clasp 'Borneo' requires 30 days service in theatre between 24 December 1962 and 11 August 1966. The eligibility criteria are strict in that qualifying days for this medal must involve "operating on the rivers or inland waters of Sabah, Sarawak or Brunei, or operating off the coast in support of the forces ashore and upriver". The distance off the coast was defined as "within sight of shore" or around 20 nautical miles, to exclude high-seas sailing activities.

30. Four RNZN deployments met the strict eligibility criteria and qualified for the award of the GSM with clasp 'Borneo'.<sup>6</sup> All of these ships were specifically sent by (British Commonwealth) Far East Fleet Command to the east coast of Borneo on Tawau patrol duty or guardship duty or to the north coast of Borneo on Sarawak patrol duty. The Tawau patrols were along the coastal border between Sabah and Indonesia. The Sarawak patrols were along the coast of Sarawak and in the inland rivers of Sarawak. Patrols in both locations involved anti-infiltration inspections of predominately Indonesian trading vessels carrying tobacco or food.

31. A fifth RNZN deployment was sent on Tawau patrols but only accumulated 14 days towards the GSM with clasp 'Borneo'. This deployment spent about another four days in or relatively near Borneo, with a refuelling stop at Labuan Island while sailing between Pearl Harbour and Singapore, and the transit time between Singapore and Tawau related to its Tawau patrol period. The deployment qualified for the British GSM 1962-2007 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' for other service during this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> HMNZS SANTON (first crew) 10 April 1965 to 25 November 1965, HMNZS HICKLETON (first crew) 12 April 1965 to 27 November 1965, HMNZS TARANAKI 3 November 1965 to 23 April 1966, and HMNZS HICKLETON (second crew) November 1965 to 30 July 1966.

deployment, so its crew qualify for both this GSM and the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (NZOSM).<sup>7</sup>

32. Two other RNZN deployments were dispatched for four days each to Sarawak to escort Royal Navy commando carriers. Neither deployment accumulated the required 30 days service.<sup>8</sup> Their days of operational service, however, do count towards the NZOSM. The NZOSM was instituted in 2002. One of the reasons for its institution is to ensure that those who undertook seven or more days operational service while on the posted strength of a military unit or ship, but do not have enough qualifying days for a campaign medal (often requiring 30 days service, or in the case of most United Nations medals 90 days service) receive medallic recognition.<sup>9</sup>

33. Four RNZN deployments in South-East Asia between 24 December 1962 and 11 August 1966 spent no time in or relatively near Borneo.<sup>10</sup> The remaining RNZN deployment spent only two days in or relatively near Borneo, with a refuelling stop at Labuan Island while travelling between Guam and Singapore.<sup>11</sup>

34. The recommendation of the Cooke Report (Ref C) was: 'Unless the criteria for the British General Service Medal with clasp 'Borneo' changes, such service will not entitle participants to the award of this medal. To reduce the qualifying period of time for the medal would debase the award for those who already hold it. Involvement in these deployments should not qualify for medallic recognition.'

35. **Further research.** The further research requested by the Minister of Defence has confirmed that the RNZN service which does not already count towards the British GSM with clasp 'Borneo' and the NZOSM:

- a. did **not** directly contribute to the military operations against Indonesian forces.
- b. involved **minimal** or **no** military threat to the ships and their crews.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> HMNZS OTAGO 15 October 1964 to 10 May 1965.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> HMNZS TARANAKI 5 to 8 April 1964 and HMNZS ROYALIST 21 to 24 June 1965. HMNZS TARANAKI spent no additional days in or near Borneo on this deployment. HMNZS ROYALIST spent at most an additional eight days in or near Borneo on this deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The crew of HMNZS TARANAKI's 15 December 1963 to 20 August 1964 deployment qualify for the award of the NZOSM for seven days or more operational service by aggregating their 5 to 8 April 1964 service with four days qualifying service in August 1964 towards the GSM 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula'. The crews of HMNZS ROYALIST's 20 May 1965 to 29 October 1965 deployment qualify for the NZOSM due to their eligibility for the GSM 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' (through more than 30 days qualifying service). The GSM 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' was awarded for Confrontation related service in West Malaysia (the Malay Peninsula, Singapore and related sea areas) between 17 August 1964 and 11 August 1966.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> HMNZS TARANAKI 18 May 1962 to 12 March 1963, HMNZS ROYALIST 14 March 1963 to 26 June 1963, HMNZS OTAGO 5 June 1963 to 25 November 1963 and HMNZS ROYALIST 19 May 1964 to 17 July 1964.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> HMNZS OTAGO 29 April 1966 to 2 September 1966, which qualified for the GSM 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' and the NZOSM for other service during this deployment.

(1) For example, patrols in the areas of the South China Sea more than 20 nautical miles from shore.

36. **Recommendation.** The NZDF's interpretation of the regulations for medallic recognition of naval service off Borneo from 8 December 1962 to 11 August 1966 (the period of Confrontation) is appropriate. No changes to the interpretation should be made.

#### New Zealand Defence Service Medal (NZDSM)

37. Nearly all New Zealand military personnel who served in South-East Asia between 1950 and today are eligible for the New Zealand Defence Service Medal for their three years military service and/or completion of their initial military engagement. The JWG's view is that the NZDSM is the **appropriate medallic recognition** for all service personnel who served New Zealand loyally in many countries and under a wide range of conditions that do not meet the criteria for 'operational service'.

38. The JWG continues to believe that geographic / 'theatre of service' clasps for the NZDSM should **not** be instituted. In September 2010, the Minister of Defence agreed with the JWG's recommendation that clasps should differentiate only the broad type of service rendered: that is, Regular, Territorial, C.M.T. and National Service. To award clasps for specific 'geographic' areas would raise questions (and ongoing grievances) about which areas should be recognised by a clasp and why and how long the service should be for each clasp.

#### Summary

39. It is the unanimous view of the JWG that no additional, or extended, medallic recognition is warranted for military service in South-East Asia between 1950 and 2011.

#### Recommendations

- 40. It is recommended that the Minister of Defence:
  - a. **agrees** that the transits of the Indonesia Straits and Taiwan Strait by RNZN Ships do **not** warrant medallic recognition.
  - b. **agrees** that the NZDF's interpretation of the regulations for medallic recognition of naval service off Borneo from 8 December 1962 to 11 August 1966 is appropriate.
  - c. **agrees** that no further medallic recognition is instituted for service in South-East Asia between 1950 and 2011.
  - d. **agrees** that the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group is disestablished, as its tasked work has been completed.

#### Signed in original

Neil Walter Chair, Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group

2 December 2013

#### Annexes:

- A. Transits of the Indonesian Straits by RNZN Ships between July 1957 and April 1967.
- B. Transits of the Taiwan Strait by RNZN Ships between May 1956 and October 1975.

#### ANNEX A TO DATED 2 DECEMBER 2013

### TRANSITS OF THE INDONESIAN STRAITS BY RNZN SHIPS BETWEEN JULY 1957 AND APRIL 1967

1. HQNZDF, Rear Admiral Ian Hunter (Rtd) and the Navy Museum compiled a list of 21 transits of the Indonesian Straits by RNZN ships between July 1957 and April 1967.

2. HQNZDF staff subsequently checked all known relevant official records about these transits, including the RNZN Ships Logs, Letters or Reports of Proceedings (ROPs), and subject matter Defence and single Service files.<sup>1</sup> Some of the relevant subject matter files were at the time classified files; they have all since been declassified and are available to the public at Archives New Zealand, Wellington.

3. As part of the research, HQNZDF staff searched the NZDF Classified Registry for any records about transits of the Indonesian Straits. The documents found are listed at Appendix 3. These documents were declassified in January 2013.

4. The recorded information on each transit is quoted in full, below.

5. The <u>highest</u> recorded alert status for the transits of any Indonesian claimed Strait was as follows:

- a. **Status 1 operations** ('Action Stations') for two transits;
- b. **Status 2 operations** ('Defence Stations') for five transits;
- c. **Status 3 operations** ('Normal sea operations') with no known immediate threat to the ship for seven transits;
  - (1) **Note:** In each case, the alert status in the Ships Logs for the day or days in question is listed at Status 3Y. No changes in the alert status are recorded, nor are any details about the transits.
- d. **Unspecified** An unspecified increase in alert status for two transits;
- e. **Not recorded** Alert status not recorded at all in official records for five transits.

#### Notes:

(1) For the purposes of this Annex, a transit of the Indonesian Straits (e.g. on the way from Singapore to Darwin) is counted as one transit, regardless of whether one, two, three or four individual Straits claimed by Indonesia were transited by the Ship during the one to three days passage in, or close to, Indonesian-claimed waters.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> An example of a Ship's Log and a ROP are included as Appendices 1 and 2.

- (2) The primary sources of the highest recorded alert status listed in this Annex are the Ship's Logs where these were available. For one transit an increased alert status is also recorded in the ROPs.<sup>2</sup>
- (3) The Ship's Logs do **not** always record the exact times or length of the periods of Action Stations and Defence Stations, just that the Action Stations and/or Defence Stations happened on a certain day for an unspecified amount of time.
- (4) (Royal Navy) Fleet Operational and Tactical Instructions (FOTI 4102) and the RNZN Navy Office General Instructions on Rules of Engagement (FE General 677P Oct) were the key instructions for RNZN Commanding Officers transiting the Straits in Nov 1963. For example, FOTI 4102 and FE General 677P Oct "were complied with [by HMNZS OTAGO] and as a precaution against the possible but unlikely event of attack, a modified form of Defence Stations was maintained until the ship was clear of Sunda Strait." <sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ROPs HMNZS PUKAKI 7/8 Jun 1966. Lombok and Karimata Straits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> ABFK W4010 7395 Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-65. Ship's ref: O T 2/4 dated 16 Dec 1963 covering period 4 Nov to 14 Dec 1963.

#### Transits (in date order) through the Indonesian Straits

#### 1. 14 July 1957 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Darwin to Singapore. Transited Lombok, Raas and Karimata Straits.<sup>4</sup>

Highest alert status for the transits: Not recorded. No Ships Log located.

HMNZS ROYALIST departed Darwin on 11 July 1957 and arrived in Singapore on 18 July 1957.

"10. ROYALIST left Darwin at 1700 and proceeded to Singapore using the route south of all Islands in the Java Sea to Lombok Strait then through Raas Strait to Karimata Strait and East of Riow Archipelago. We crossed the equator at 1900 on 17 July... [Notes on crossing the line celebration]. Approaching the Singapore Naval Base, the ship entered Johore Strait at 0900 on 18 July."

Source: AAYT, 8490, Box 577, 18/36/75Y. Letters of Proceedings – HMNZS ROYALIST 1956-Jul 1958. Ship's ref: RY 258/993 dated 5 Sep 1957, para 10 covering period 3 Jul to 24 Aug 1957. [CAPT G.D. Pound]

#### Notes:

1) It is not known if the Ship's Log covering the period of this passage still exists. No such Ship's Log is held by either Archives New Zealand or the RNZN Museum.

2) Nothing recorded in the daily intelligence brief or the messages from the ship about the transit. The daily ship messages indicate normal routine only.

Source: ABFK Series N1 (Intelligence), Box 195, 8/210/56

### 2. 17/18 June 1958 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Singapore to Cairns. Transited Karimata and Wetar Straits. <sup>5</sup>

Highest alert status for the transits: Not recorded. No Ships Log located.

Departed Singapore 1130 hrs on 16 June 1958.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the Naval General Service Medal (NGSM) with clasp 'Malaya', the New Zealand General Service Medal 1992 (non-warlike) with clasp 'Korea 1954-57' and the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (NZOSM) for other service on their 1957-1958 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the Pingat Jasa Malaysia medal (PJM) from the Government of Malaysia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See previous footnote.

"13. The ship passed through the CARIMATA [sic. Karimata] Strait during the night of 17/18 June, the WETAR Strait on 21<sup>st</sup> June and TORRES Strait on 24<sup>th</sup> and arrived off CAIRNS at 0700 26<sup>th</sup>..."

Sailed for Auckland at 1400 the same day [26 June 1958].

Source: AAYT, 8490, Box 577, 18/36/75Y. Letters of proceedings – HMNZS ROYALIST 1956-Jul 1958. Ship's ref: RY 258/2732 dated 9 Jul 1958, para 13 covering period 3 Jun to 4 Jul 1958. [Capt G.D. Pound]

#### Signal CINCFMS to ROYALIST 14 June 1958:

"Depart Singapore 1130 hrs 16 June. Via Rhio, Carimata, Wetar and Torres Straits then inside Great Barrier Reef entering Cairns for fuel and mail, 26 June thence as safe navigation permits to Auckland. ETA Devonport 0730 hrs 3 July 1958."

Source: ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 17. Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - 62/1/1.

### 3. 7/8 June 1959 - HMNZS PUKAKI. Passage - Townsville to Singapore. Transited Lombok and Karimata Straits. <sup>6</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Not recorded. Classified as 'Defence Stations' – Status 2 operations. See para 32 as the indication, no Ships Log has been located.

"32. In view of the uncertain nature of the Indonesian Government steps were taken on reaching the vicinity of Indonesian waters on Monday 1<sup>st</sup> June to put the ship at a higher state of readiness. i.e. ammunition was provided at the guns, and from this time a cruising watch of guns crews were always in the vicinity of their stations. An asdic watch was also maintained from this time.

33. From Mon 1<sup>st</sup> until Thursday 4<sup>th</sup> [June], the ship proceeded along the south coast of Java finally passing into the Java Sea through Lombok Strait during the first watch on Thursday night [4 June]. To keep clear of Indonesian territorial waters, course was then shaped to pass through Karimata Strait. From a navigational point of view, this route is not recommended there being numerous shoals out of sight of land fixes and strong currents. Fortunately visibility was good with clear skies on this occasion enabling astronomical fixes to be obtained and the passage was without incident."

HMNZS PUKAKI arrived in Singapore on 8 June 1959.

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 165, 72/3/6, pt 1. HMNZS PUKAKI ROP Jul 1958 to Sep 1964. Ship's ref: PK 14/12/209 dated 9 Jul 1959 covering period 8 May to 8 Jun 1959. [CDR W.R. Williams]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the NGSM with clasp 'Malaya' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1959-1960 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

### 4 and 5. mid January 1960 - HMNZS PUKAKI. Passage - Singapore to Surabaya, Java, and return. <sup>7</sup>

Highest alert status for the passages to and from the Indonesian Surabaya Naval Base visit: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

"16-17 Jan visited Surabaya Naval Base in Indonesia. No shore leave was granted because the locals were communist. Captain gained the impression that the Indonesian Navy was ill-equipped. The visit was unsuccessful, as no publicity for NZ was gained. On 18 Jan ship took on some Indonesian Navy officers for a demonstration of ship's equipment."

Research Note: Which strait(s) was transited is not recorded. However, at least one must have been transited on each leg of this return passage, as there is no way to sail between Singapore and Surabaya without transiting at least one Indonesian claimed strait. Karimata Strait is the most likely strait to have been transited, since it was the most direct route.

The discussion related to the port visit to the Surabaya Naval Base in Indonesia provides some more contextual information about interactions between the New Zealand and Indonesian navies at this particular point in time.

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 165, 72/3/6, Part 1 - HMNZS PUKAKI ROPs Jul 1958 to Sep 1964. Ship's ref: PK 14/12/1083 dated 7 Apr 1960 covering period 1 Jan to 2 Mar 1960 [CDR W.R. Williams].

### 6. 8 April 1960 - HMNZS ROTOITI. Passage - Cairns to Singapore. Transited Lombok, Roti, Sumba and Gaspar Straits.<sup>8</sup>

Highest alert status for the transits: Not recorded. No Ships Log located.

"8 April, left Cairns for Singapore. Our route ... took us through the Roti, Sumba, Lombok and Gaspar Straits and at no time whilst in these waters did we sight any Indonesian shipping or aircraft. Arrived at Singapore on 19 Apr, prepared for SEATO Exercise Sea Lion."

Source: AAYT, 8490, N1, Box 575, 18/36/75P, Part 1 - HMNZS ROTOITI ROPs, 1958-65. Ship's ref RO 2/4 dated 12 Jun 1960 covering period 2-30 Apr 1960.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See previous footnote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the NGSM with clasp 'Malaya' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1960-1961 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

### 7. 27 December 1960 - HMNZS OTAGO. Passage - Singapore to Fremantle, West Australia. Transited Gaspar and Sunda Straits. <sup>9</sup>

Highest alert status for the transits: Not recorded. No Ships Log located.

"Departed Singapore Naval Base 26 Dec 0900 hrs XO Freemantle [sic]. Transited Sunda Strait 26/27 Dec at 14 knots. Normal ops throughout".

Source: HMNZS OTAGO Ship's Log (N112, Box 1/8)

#### Signal from OTAGO to CINC.

"27 Dec 1960. Ex Singapore Naval Base 0900 26 Dec XO Freemantle [sic]. East of Bintang and via Gaspar and Sunda Straits."

Source: N1. 62/1/28. Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS OTAGO.

Departed from Singapore at 0930 on Monday 26 December 1960.

"... we proceeded through Gaspar Strait on the morning of 27 Dec and through the Sunda Main Channel that evening. The volcano Krakatau was performing in spectacular fashion throwing up great mushrooms of smoke with fire cracker stems every few minutes – its normal state I understand; this was the only incident – indeed practically the only activity noted in Indonesian waters."

Arrived at Fremantle at 0600 on 1 January 1961.

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-65. Ship's ref: OT 2/4 dated 10 Apr 1961 covering period 21 Jun 1960 to 19 Jan 1961. Page 32, Para 92. [CDR M.J. McDowell]

### 8. 22 to 24 February 1962 - HMNZS OTAGO. Passage - Darwin to Singapore. Transited the Lombok and Sapgedi Straits. <sup>10</sup>

Highest alert status for the transits: Action Stations - Status 1 operations.

Ships Log reports:<sup>11</sup>

"22 Feb at status 3X, 1400 Exercise all hands, Action Stations. 1411 DC State to 1XB. 1415 Steering exercise. 1505 Fired six light mortars. 1509 reverted to 3X."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for this passage from the United Kingdom to New Zealand, via Singapore.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their one month in South-East Asia for Exercise JET 62.

Ships Log HMNZS OTAGO, AAYT 8576 N112 Box 1.

23 Feb at status 3X, 1617 Exercise Action Stations (A/S) 1Y. 1632 to DC State 2Y.

24 Feb 0330 revert from 2 Y to 3 X. Normal routine commences."

Left Darwin 21 February 1962 for Singapore.

"The passage through Indonesian waters was uneventful. (See Appendix G). As usual the transit of the Lombok Strait on the evening of 23<sup>rd</sup> provided some spectacular scenery over Bali."

Note: HMNZS OTAGO arrived in Singapore 26 February 1962. Left Singapore 28 February for exercise JET 62. Returned to Singapore after Jet 62, refit in Singapore. Left Singapore for NZ on the morning of 24 March 1962.

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-65. Ship's ref: OT 2/4 dated 23 Mar 1962 covering period 9 Feb to 28 Feb 1962. [Signature unreadable.]

#### Appendix G to ROP HMNZS OTAGO dated 23 March 1962:

#### "PASSAGE OF INDONESIAN WATERS.

HMNZS OTAGO entered Indonesian claimed territorial waters at 1600 on 22nd February [1962]. In view of the current unsettled international situation in the area, I decided to take the following precautions:

- (i) At 1615 on the 23rd on approaching the Lombok Strait itself, the ship went to Action Stations, maintaining 'S' band silence, and keeping a listening watch on all sonars. We reverted to Defence Stations once Bali was opened and remained in that state for the night.
- (ii) Care was taken that [sic] to ensure there were no overt precautions being undertaken.
- (iii) The ship was darkened to navigation lights only.

Defence Stations were finally secured at 0330 on 24th after a completely uneventful passage. ....

#### SIGHTING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST MERCHANT VESSEL.

At 1348 on the 25th [February] while in the South China Sea, the Chicom [Chinese Communist] Merchant vessel YOUTI was sighted and passed 3/4 mile from OTAGO. She was apparently bound for an Indonesian port. A particular feature of the deck cargo was two L.C.M.s. [Landing Craft Mechanised]."

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-65. Ship's ref: Appendix 'G' to OTAGO ROPs OT 2/4 dated 23 Mar 1962 covering period 9-28 Feb 1962. [Signature unreadable]

#### Signal from HMNZS OTAGO to CINC. 27 February 1962

"OTAGO was not challenged in any way by Indonesian ships or aircraft during the transits of Lombok or Sapgedi Straits."

Source: HMNZS OTAGO Ship's Log (N112, Box 1/8.) N1. 62/1/28. Operations – Movements of HMNZS OTAGO.

### 9. 25/26 March 1962 - HMNZS OTAGO. Passage Singapore to Fremantle West Australia. Transited Gaspar and Sunda Straits. <sup>12</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Status 3X operations throughout voyage from 25 Mar to 29 Mar on entry to Fremantle. (Source: Ships Log) <sup>13</sup>

"4. OTAGO proceeded from Singapore at 0900 on Saturday 24 March 1962. ... [Farewell notes on Flag Officer]

5. [Notes on navigation]

6. Gaspar Island came up on radar to the south, distant 36 miles at 0100 on 25 March and Gaspar Strait was subsequently negotiated between 0400 and 0630. Apart from small fishing craft, no other activity was noted. ... [weather notes].

7. On clearing Gaspar Strait, course was altered to SE for Sunda Strait and by 1500 the same day came out into the Indian Ocean. As with Gaspar Strait, no maritime activity was noted in the shallows. ... [We set course for the WA coast]."

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-1965. Ship's ref: O.T 2/4 dated 1 May 1962 covering period 1 Mar to 28 Apr 1962. Paras 4-7. [Signature unreadable]

### 10. 20/21 May 1962 - HMNZS PUKAKI. Passage Singapore to Auckland. Transited Gaspar and Sunda Straits. <sup>14</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log located. ROPs indicate normal operations as below.

"8. The transit of Gaspar Strait was completed by 2100 [20 May] and that of Sunda Strait by 1015 Mon 21 May – both without incident."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Ships Log HMNZS OTAGO, AAYT 8576 N112 Box 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Ships Log HMNZS OTAGO, AAYT 8576 N112 Box 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any British Commonwealth or New Zealand campaign medals for their service on the 1961-1962 deployment to South-East Asia. However, this deployment meets the Government of Malaysia's requirements for award of the PJM and this medal is issued by NZDF on application from eligible ex-Service persons.

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 165 72/3/6 Part 1 - HMNZS PUKAKI ROP Jul 1958 to Sep 1964. Ship's ref: PK 14/12//1083 dated 11 Jun 1962 covering period 9 May to 12 Jun 1962. [CDR P.L. Bardwell]

#### 11. 17-20 May 1962 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage – Darwin to Singapore. Transited Lombok, Sapudi and Karimata Straits. <sup>15</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Action Stations (Source: Ships Log) <sup>16</sup>

Ships Log reports:

17 May – 1600 Action Stations Ex Batu, 1720 Revert to Defence Stations. 1743 – All clear revert to status 3Y.

Remained at 3Y for remainder of voyage until berthed in Singapore 0915 hrs 21 May when reverted to 4X.

#### ROPs record:

"8. Passage to Singapore from Darwin was via LOMBOK, SAPUDI and CARIMATA [sic Karimata] Straits. No trouble was experienced from Indonesian Ships or aircraft, the only possible contact being a small gunboat which passed on reciprocal course 8 miles off in the Java Sea."

HMNZS TARANAKI left Darwin at 0530 on 14 May 1962 and arrived off Singapore Naval Base at 0900 on 21 May 1962.

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 168, 72/3/20, Part 1 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs Jun 1961 to Sep 1965. Ship's ref: T.A. 2/4 Dated 5 Jun 1962 covering period 1-30 May 1962. Para 8. [CDR N.D. Anderson]

Letter from Navy Board Secretary 0 T 2/129 dated 30 April 1962 to Secretary External Affairs and Trade, Wellington.

"1. As discussed... the following is the itinerary for HMNZS TARANAKI en route to the Far East Station:

Depart Darwin	140530Z May
South of Roti Eilander	152230Z May
Enter Lombok Straits	171499Z May
Enter Sapoedi Straits	180200Z May
Pass East of Bintang	201830Z May
Arrive Singapore	211830Z May 1962

2. The TARANAKI has a standard displacement of 1840 tons and is commanded by Cdr N.D. Anderson, RNZN."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any British Commonwealth or New Zealand campaign medals for their service on the 1962-1963 deployment to South-East Asia. However, this deployment meets the Government of Malaysia's requirements for award of the PJM and this medal is issued by NZDF on application from eligible ex-Service persons.

HMNZS TARANAKI Ships Log May 1962 – AAYT 8577 N113 Box 2.

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 26, 62/1/29, Part 1 - Operations -Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS TARANAKI 10 Feb 1961 to 23 Jun 1962.

# 12. 11/12 November 1962 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage – Singapore to Freemantle, Australia, via Christmas Island. Transited Gaspar and Sunda Straits 11/12 November 1962. <sup>17</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Normal sea operations – Status 3Y operations throughout voyage except for RIX ABC Exercise south of Indonesia, after Straits passages were completed.

Departed Singapore 10 November 1962 (0625).

"We sailed from Singapore in company with H.M. Ships CAVALIER (S.O.) and HMS BLACKPOOL for exercises off Singapore and passage and Exercise DINKUM ONE en route to Fremantle.

The force passed through the Gaspar Straits a.m. Sunday 11th November. ... [comment on the Crossing the Line ceremony on board]. After rejoining, the three ships passed through the Sunda Straits at 0730H on Monday 12th November; independent Damage Control exercises and RIX, M12 competitive voice manoeuvring and flag hoisting exercises being carried out prior to replenishing with R.F.A. FORT CHARLOTTE at 1500H. [Mon 12 Nov]"

Sources:

 ABFK W4010 Box 168, 72/3/20, Part 1 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs Jun 1961 to Sep 1965. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 dated 4 Dec 1962 covering period 1-30 Nov 1962. [CDR N.D. Anderson]
 HMNZS TARANAKI Ships Log Nov 1962 – AAYT 8577 N113 Box 2.

### 13. About 8/9 December 1962 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage – Fremantle, Australia to Singapore. Transit of an unspecified Indonesian claimed Strait (probably either Sunda Strait or Lombok Strait). Encounter in Strait of Malacca.

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Normal sea operations. Ship maintained Status 3Y outside of Exercise periods.

2 December 1962 - sailed from Fremantle for Exercise DINKUM THREE on the first stage of the passage to Singapore.
10 December 1962 - arrived at HM Naval Base, Singapore.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> HMNZS TARANAKI Ships Log May 1962 – AAYT 8577 N113 Box 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ships Log HMNZS OTAGO, AAYT 8576 N112 Box 1.

**Note:** No mention in the ROPs for HMNZS TARANAKI of the route from Fremantle to Singapore which was followed. Presumably via either the Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait.

The ROPs state: "2. The period was spent mainly on passage with two exercise periods DINKUM THREE and DINKUM FOUR being included in the passage from Fremantle to Singapore."

**Note:** Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 are comments on the exercises and the ships involved.

"6. The Australian ships, TAPIR and TACITURN parted company at 0900 on Tuesday 4th December and the Far East Fleet units began passage to Singapore, carrying out further exercises on passage (DINKUM FOUR). These included A/S Gunnery, A.B.C.D. and replenishment serials and frequent O.O.W. manoeuvres. Of particular value were the night steaming serials in blackout conditions and EMCON silence and the evening when station changing in sectors was exercised throughout the night. The (Officers of the Watch) O.O.W.'s also enjoyed the leapfrog serial on Wednesday 5th. It is considered that the TIGERFLY and ASAIREX serials were of little value to this ship."

"7. Just before arrival at HM Naval Base [Singapore] at 0917 hrs on Mon 10 Dec HMS BLACKPOOL and TARANAKI were privileged to cheer ship for Admiral Frewen as HMS TIGER passed, this being the Admirals last day in command."

**Note:** Command of HMNZS TARANAKI changed to Captain L.G. Carr on 21 December 1962 in Singapore.

Source: ABFK 7395 W4010 Box 168, 72/3/20, Part 1 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs Jun 1961 to Sep 1965. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 dated 21 Dec 1962 covering period 1-21 Dec 1962. [CDR N.D. Anderson]

#### Public consultation submission in 2011:

The Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group received a submission from Mr Warren Power, ex-RNZN. He stated there was a threat to HMNZS TARANAKI from three Indonesian fast patrol craft in the Strait of Malacca in December 1962.

#### MRJWG and NZDF Notes:

- 1) The ship's ROPs (discussed and quoted above) do **not** record the encounter described by Mr Power.
- 2) The Strait of Malacca is the strait between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and the western coast of the Malay Peninsula. It contains an international border between Indonesia and Malaysia. Consequently, it

is different to the other straits discussed in this Annex. The other straits are all between Indonesian islands and were viewed by the British Commonwealth as international waters.

- 3) The encounter described by Mr Power is included in this Annex to provide a complete record of the naval encounters and incidents brought to the attention of, and considered by, the JWG.
- 4) It has been normal practice since 1950 for RNZN Ships (and ships of allied navies) while serving in South-East Asia to undertake exercises in the Strait of Malacca and visit ports on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. The only ship access to these ports from Singapore or from further south is through the Strait of Malacca. RNZN Ships also used the Strait of Malacca to transit from Singapore to India, the Middle East and Europe.
- 5) During Confrontation anti-infiltration patrols in the Strait of Malacca by Commonwealth naval ships were undertaken to intercept and/or deter Indonesian military infiltrators. Such patrols between 17 August 1964 and 11 August 1966 count towards the seven days operational service required for the New Zealand Operational Service Medal and the 30 days operational service required for the General Service Medal 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula'.
- 6) The official start of Confrontation in East Malaysia (i.e. in and around the island of Borneo) was 8 December 1962 when a rebellion / coup d'etat took place in Brunei. The official start of Confrontation in west Malaysia (i.e. in and around the Malay Peninsula and Singapore) was 17 August 1964, when Indonesian military forces landed on the southern end of the west coast of the Malay Peninsula.

#### Submission from Mr Warren Power, ex-RNZN

Mr Power's submission states:

"Upon leaving Fremantle on the 2 December 1962 we did exercises with a fleet of allied ships. The exercises were called Dinkum Three and Dinkum Four. On the 4 December the two submarines left and after that the rest of the Fleet left and headed for Borneo. This left HMNZS Taranaki to proceed back to Singapore by herself.

On entering the Straits of Malacca, at 0400, the ship crossed over some listening device. This was picked up by the Underwater Control ratings and our Captain, Commander N.D. Anderson, was informed of it. He then had the ship turn around and checked it out for himself. Having confirmed it was a listening device he closed the ship up at Action Stations. .... The large flag flying on the quarterdeck was taken down and the Battle flag raised on the mainmast. This was 0430. We continued on in darkness. I later was told that two huge white ensigns had been placed amidships, one on either side.

Some time ago I spoke to a number of ratings on that trip and they confirmed these facts. Also Jim McQuinlan [e-mail address supplied] mentioned that he helped put the white ensigns up amidships.

As daylight came we saw that we were coming up to a large island on our port side. About 0730 we were level with the beginning of the Island and had passed some hundreds of yards when two Indonesian Fast Patrol Boats came racing around the far end of the Island heading for us, one fine on the starboard bow, and the other, sweeping wide, on the starboard bow.

I wondered how we were going to fight these craft as they were moving at a very fast rate towards us and we only had the one turret on the foclse [*sic* fo'c'sle] two 4" barrels. I was the lookout on the port side, and a few minutes later another Fast Patrol Boat came out from behind the Island, astern of us, on our port quarter.

We were on high alert by this time and expected that we would have to take defensive action very soon. I could not imagine how we were going to take on the three of them. Maybe we would get lucky and shoot the two forward boats out of the water. As they got closer I watched the turret traverse around and aim, expecting them to open fire at any moment.

Then as if in unison the three boats did a 180° turn and raced back the way they had each come. We were left amid the silence of the day, with just the hustle of the water against the ships side. Deadly quiet, and we just sat there closed up for another half an hour. It was then that I came to the conclusion they must have seen our Battle flag and the two white ensigns. Perhaps this was enough to tell them we weren't Malaysian. We all stood down from Action Stations and went to breakfast. .... The rest of the trip was uneventful and we were glad to get back to Singapore and normal life.

.... HMNZS Taranaki's transit through the Straits of Malacca at this time must be considered beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service, and I consider there was a real risk of casualties from enemy activities, and that the use of force was imminent. The three Indonesian Fast Patrol Boats must be defined as a potential enemy, and their actions at the time were definitely a threat to our well being. From where I was I could not tell what armament these vessels had and they may have had torpedoes at the ready.

The rules of engagement had been laid down by the raising of the Battle Flag and the two White Ensigns. Defensive measures were taken the moment we came across the listening device and the whole of the ship's company closed up action stations. This was further heightened upon visual contact of the Indonesian Fast Boats racing towards us at a great rate of knots. We did expect to have to engage these vessels and were waiting for the Captain to give the command to open fire."

Source: Submission to MRJWG from Warren Power, ex-RNZN, Victoria, Australia. Undated submission received on 9 August 2011.

### 14. 10/11 March 1963 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage – Singapore to Darwin. Transited Lombok Strait ca. 10/11 March 1963. <sup>19</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Status 3 Y throughout voyage. (Source: Ships Log)<sup>20</sup>

Departed Singapore 1530 Saturday 9 March 1963.

"4. HMNZS TARANAKI slipped and proceeded from HM Naval Base, Singapore at 1530 Sat 9 Mar 1963 and set course for Darwin via the JAVA Sea and LOMBOK Strait. On passage a RV at sea was arranged with HMNZS ROYALIST when unofficial Chinese laundry men, tailors and shoemakers were transferred by jackstay.

5. On arrival at Darwin on Fri 15 Mar... [Notes on boiler damage report] "

Source: ABFK W4010, Box 168, 72/3/20, Part 1 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs Jun 1961 to Sep 1965. Ship's ref: TN2/4 dated 29 May 1963 covering period 1 Mar to 8 Apr 1963. [CAPT L.G. Carr]

#### 15. 15 March 1963 – HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage – Darwin to Port Swettenham via Singapore. Transited Lombok, Sapoedi and Karimata Straits. <sup>21</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Defence Stations - Status 2Y for transit of Sapoedi Strait 1400 to 1522 hrs,15 Mar 1963. 3X for balance of voyage. See Ships Log<sup>22</sup>.

"Between 0430 and 0800 on Friday 15<sup>th</sup> March, I made an uneventful transit of LOMBOK Strait. At 1430 the same day I entered SAPOEDI STRAIT where I skirted the minefield and preserved a distance off, of 3 miles from the land on the starboard side. The remainder of the passage via JAVA Sea, KARIMATA Strait and CHINA Sea was uneventful."

17<sup>th</sup> March (1400) Anchored off Johore Shoal Buoy [Singapore Strait], for refuelling before proceeding on to Port Swettenham".

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 3 - HMNZS ROYALIST – ROPs. Ship's ref: R.Y. 258/2675 dated 24 Mar 1963 covering period 11 Oct 1962 to 24 Mar 1963. [CAPT J.O'C. Ross]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> HMNZS TARANAKI Ships Log May 1962 – AAYT 8577 N113 Box 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> HMNZS TARANAKI Ships Log Mar 1963 – AAYT 8577 N113 Box 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their three months in South-East Asia in 1963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 14.

### 16. 22/23 June 1963 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage – Singapore to Darwin. Transited Lombok and Sapoedi Straits. <sup>23</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Defence Stations – Status 2 operations. 2Y from 1950 hrs 22 Jun to 1020 hrs 23 Jun while transiting Sapoedi and Lombok Straits – 3X for rest of voyage. Source - Ships Log<sup>24</sup>.

Departed Singapore for Darwin at 0900 on 22 June 1963.

"Passage to DARWIN was via SAPOEDI and LOMBOK Straits and on Wednesday 26th June I chopped from the operational control of Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Far East Fleet to Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (for passage) on crossing 10<sup>0</sup> South Latitude."

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 3 - HMNZS ROYALIST – ROPs. Ship's ref: R.Y. 258/3189 dated 1 Jul 1963 covering period 10 Jun to 26 Jun 1963 [CAPT J.O'C. Ross]

### 17. 23/24 November 1963 - HMNZS OTAGO. Passage - Singapore to Auckland. Transited Sunda Strait. <sup>25</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Normal sea operations. Ships Log<sup>26</sup> shows status 3X was maintained for whole voyage except for: 23 Nov 0840 3Y until 1122 when reverted to 3X. 25 Nov 3Y from 0858 to 0930 'fired mortars'. Otherwise 3X throughout voyage.

Departed Sembawang Naval Base, Singapore 0900 Saturday 23 November 1963.

"12. The passage through Indonesia was uneventful. One Indonesian Naval vessel, an Allap class patrol vessel, was sighted South-East of Bintan Island on the first afternoon [pm 23 Nov 1963]. Otherwise neither Indonesian ships nor aircraft were seen. FOTI 4102 and FE General 677P Oct, were complied with and as a precaution against the possible but unlikely event of attack, a modified form of Defence Stations was maintained until the ship was clear of Sunda Strait."

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-65. Ship's ref: O T 2/4 dated 16 Dec 1963 covering period 4 Nov to 14 Dec 1963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any British Commonwealth or New Zealand campaign medals for their six months service on the 1963 deployment to South-East Asia. However, this deployment meets the Government of Malaysia's requirements for award of the PJM and this medal is issued by NZDF on application from eligible ex-Service persons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ships Log HMNZS OTAGO – AAYT 8621 W2375 Record NW2375/1.

#### 18. 15 July 1964 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Singapore to Darwin. Transited Sapoedi and Lombok Straits ca. 15 July 1964. <sup>27</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transits</u>: Defence Stations – Status 2Y operations from slipping at Singapore to 1610 hrs in Johore Strait – then 3X for remainder of voyage to Darwin. (Source: Ships Log)<sup>28</sup>

Returned to Singapore on 11 July 1964, and then left for Darwin on 14 July at 1405.

"15. Passage to Darwin was made via the Java Sea, Sapoedi and Lombok Straits along the recognised sea routes through these disputed waters. No incident occurred and precautions to avoid offence by securing the armament from daily tests in the event of being overlooked by Indonesian aircraft or ships were not needed. Only sailing vessels on passage were sighted, plus one British merchant ship making the same passage in the same direction."

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 5 - HMNZS ROYALIST ROPs 1959-66. Ship's ref: R.Y. 258/897 dated 17 Aug 1964 covering period 4 Jul to 3 Aug 1964. [CAPT B.E. Turner]

### 19. 21/22 August 1964 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage - Singapore to Darwin. Transited Lombok Strait. <sup>29</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Defence Stations – Status 2Y operations. (Source: Ships Log)

Ships Log <sup>30</sup> records:

"20 Aug. 0800 set at 2Y to 0945 for move out of Singapore, then reverted to 3X. 1557 hrs stepped up to 2Y for transits until 1617 hrs 22 Aug then reverted to 3X for remainder of voyage to Darwin.

Sat 22 Aug at 0830 hrs entered Sapoedi Strait. At 1432 hrs entered Lombok Strait and exited at 1540 hrs.

"6. At 0815 on August 20th, H.M.N.Z.S. TARANAKI slipped from the Singapore Naval Base and proceeded to sea.

7. There were no incidents while passing through Indon [Indonesian] claimed waters; On Sat 22 Aug at 1000 hrs at a range of approx 7 miles, (note from Ships Log) a submarine was sighted on the surface in one of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their two months in South-East Asia in 1964.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the NZOSM for other service on their 1963-1964 deployment to South-East Asia, as discussed on p.6 of the main section of this RNZN research report. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> HMNZS TARANÁKI Ships Log Aug 1964 – AAYT 8577 N113 Box 3.

Indonesian exercise areas and while not close enough for a positive ID, the sail resembled that of a Whisky class sub. Throughout the passage the weather remained calm enabling upper deck work to be progressed steadily. PT attended primarily by married men determined to reduce their girth before arriving home was held each evening. A .22 shooting competition took place, and several games competitions started. At 0800 on 26 August TARANAKI berthed at Darwin for the purpose of fuelling."

Source: ABFK W4010, Box 168, 72/3/20, Part 1 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs Jun 1961 to Sep 1965. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 dated 21 Sep 1964 covering period 8 Aug to 7 Sep 1964. [CAPT L.G. Carr]

#### 19a. There were no transits of the Indonesian Straits from early September 1964 (when New Zealand soldiers started searching for Indonesian troops who had landed on the Malay Peninsula) through to mid-August 1966 (the officially negotiated end of Confrontation).

On 19 February 1965, Rear Admiral R.E. Wasbourn, CB, DSO, CBE, the New Zealand Chief of Naval Staff directed:

"On External Affairs advice, until further notice the route to be taken by HMNZ Ships to and from Hong Kong /Taiwan or Singapore is to be via Manus [Island in Papua New Guinea]. Ships are to remain south of Mindanao [in the Philippines] outside 3 miles and north of Indonesian claimed waters. St. George Channel is to be used west of New Caledonia. This will ensure HMNZ Ships remain clear of internationally disputed waters claimed by Philippines and Indonesia."

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 2 - Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS OTAGO - 12 Jan 1962 to 30 Jun 1965.

By sailing on this longer route RNZN Ships travelling to and from South-East Asia avoided the need to sail south of Borneo via the Gaspar, Sunda, Karimata, Sapudi, Wetar and/or Lombok Straits.

The alternative routes taken by the four RNZN deployments to join and/or leave the Far East Strategic Reserve between early September 1964 and mid-August 1966 were:

a. via Pearl Harbour, Midway and Guam when travelling to South-East Asia; <sup>31</sup> and

**Note:** Three of the four deployments also refuelled at Labuan (an island off the north coast of Borneo) before arriving at Singapore.

b. via Labuan and Manus Island when returning to Auckland.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> HMNZS OTAGO Oct 1964, HMNZS ROYALIST May 1965, HMNZS TARANAKI Oct to Nov 1965, and HMNZS OTAGO Apr to May 1966.

Sources:

- 1. ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 2 Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships HMNZS OTAGO 12 Jan 1962 to 30 Jun 1965.
- 2. ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 3 Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships HMNZS OTAGO.
- 3. ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 3 Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships HMNZS ROYALIST Jul 1962 Dec 1965.
- 4. ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/29, Part 2 Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships HMNZS TARANAKI.

### For example, May 1965 - HMNZS OTAGO. Passage - Singapore to Auckland. No Indonesian Strait transit. <sup>33</sup>

The New Zealand Navy Office instructed HMNZS OTAGO to avoid transiting any Indonesian claimed waters during its return to New Zealand in May 1965.

The route taken on passage to New Zealand from Singapore was instead to the north and north-east of Borneo:

Depart Singapore 8 May 1965 Tawau (refuel) 12/13 May 1965 Manus 19 May 1965 'HMNZS OTAGO is to stay south of Mindanao Island and north of claimed Indonesian waters.'

Source: Signal from Navy Office 62/1/28 dated 19 Feb 1965 and related signals to and from HMNZS OTAGO (in ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 2 - Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS OTAGO - 12 Jan 1962 to 30 Jun 1965).

#### 11 August 1966 – Official end of Confrontation.

**Note**: The MRJWG and NZDF have deliberately included in this research report records about the first two RNZN ships to transit the disputed straits following the end of Confrontation. The same procedures were still being followed as despite Confrontation ending, the Indonesian claim to these waters continued.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> HMNZS OTAGO May 1965, HMNZS ROYALIST Oct to Nov 1965, and HMNZS TARANAKI Apr 1966. Note: HMNZS ROYALIST broke down on 1 Nov 1965, after having sailed from Manus.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the GSM with 1962 clasp 'Malay Peninsula' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1964-1965 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

### 20. 31 August 1966 - HMNZS OTAGO. Passage Singapore to Darwin. Transited Karimata and Lombok Straits. <sup>34</sup>

#### Highest alert status for the transits:

Ships Log records:

29 Aug: Normal routine except 1221 to 1348 at 3Y then reverts to 3X. 30 Aug: Normal routine through daylight, 1820 to 3Y, remains in place overnight until stood down at 0630 31 Aug. Then 3X until docked at Darwin.<sup>35</sup> OTAGO departed Singapore about 0900 hrs 29 August 1966.

"Course was set for Horsburgh Light, a familiar scene of so many anti-Infiltration patrols and then for Karimata Straits and passage through the Java Sea to Lombok. Passing through Lombok Straits on the night of the 31<sup>st</sup>, course was set for Darwin, where immediately on completion of fuelling; the ship will sail for Townsville and the next leg of the homeward journey."

Source: ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 168, 72/3/19, Part 2 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs - Jul 1965 to Oct 1968. Ship's ref: OT 2/4 dated 1 Sep 1966 covering period 1-31 Aug 1966.

#### New Zealand Navy Office instructions for the passage through Indonesian claimed waters by HMNZS OTAGO in August 1966:

'Annex A to NA 018/4/8 dated 29 Jul 1966  $^{\rm 36}$ 

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR PASSAGE THROUGH INDONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS - HMNZS OTAGO, AUGUST 1966

1. The Indonesian Naval authorities will be advised, informally, as an act of courtesy, approximately thirty-six hours in advance of your passage. They will be given broad details of your route and timings.

2. If your right of passage through Karimata Strait is questioned you should make it clear that the authorities in Djakarta have been informed of your route and you should proceed unless threatened by force. Should this happen, withdraw to Singapore making it clear that your withdrawal in no way recognises New Zealand acceptance of the right of Indonesian ships to prevent innocent passage of ships on internationally accepted routes and that you are withdrawing solely in order to await instructions from your Government.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the GSM 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1966 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment did <u>not</u> accumulate enough days of service to qualify for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Ships Log HMNZS OTAGO – AAYT 8621 W2375 Record NW2375/1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> File held by HQNZDF, Wellington. The document quoted from was declassified by HQNZDF on 10 January 2013.

- 3. If your right of passage is questioned in Lombok Strait you should:
- (a) point out that you have already transitted [sic] Karimata and that Indonesian Naval authorities were informed in advance of your route;
- (b) if objection continues invite the other party to confirm the facts from Djakarta, pointing out that your departure from the Java Sea in any direction entials [sic] transit of an Indonesian claimed strait. Make what headway you can to southward in the meantime;
- (c) if threatened with force withdraw to northward for further instructions after making the point in 2 above that withdrawal does not imply recognition.
- 4. You are to report immediately details of any encounter with Indonesian forces, the signals exchanged and your intended action. All signals arising from these instructions should include NZNB [NZ Naval Board], NZDEF Singapore, CINCFE [Commander in Chief Far East], COMFEF [Commander Far East Fleet] and where appropriate ACNB in the address.'

'Annex B to NA 018/4/8 dated 29 Jul 1966  $^{\scriptscriptstyle 37}$ 

#### GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDING OFFICER HMNZS OTAGO IN HANDLING OF PRESS ENQUIRIES REGARDING ROUTE SINGAPORE-NEW ZEALAND

1. It is desirable that publicity concerning your route home should be kept to a minimum. However, as you will be the first NZ ship to call at Darwin for some time press interest may be evident.

2. Any press enquiries regarding the ship's route or the reasons for calling at Darwin should be handled by the Commanding Officer. The ship's company is to be warned before arrival in Darwin against making any statements to the press onboard or ashore in both Australia and New Zealand.

3. If you are asked why you called at Darwin you should rely to refuel. If it is pointed out that NZ ships in the past have called at Manus say that it is NZ policy to vary the routes of ships.

4. If on arrival in Darwin, Brisbane or Auckland you are asked about your route from Singapore you should answer that the route of naval vessels is not normally disclosed, but that you followed a well established route. If a direct question regarding passage through Indonesian claimed waters cannot be avoided point out that Lombok and Karimata are internationally recognised international waterways and that you used them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> File held by HQNZDF, Wellington. The document quoted from was declassified by HQNZDF on 10 January 2013.

5. If asked if the permission of the Indonesian Government was obtained say this does not arise since the Strait is an international waterway; however, purely as an act of diplomatic courtesy, the Indonesians were informed of your passage.

6. If asked whether any precautions were taken against possible Indonesian action answer that the only precautions taken on passage were those associated with normal passages in confirmed international waters.

7. In the case of hypothetical questions on, for example, what action you would have taken in case of resistance to your passage you should answer quote I cannot answer hypothetical questions unquote.

8. Should you be questioned by the press on the matters above you are to report the gist of your conversations by signal to NZNB and if possible obtain the relevant press cuttings.'

### 21. 21/22 April 1967 - HMNZS BLACKPOOL. Passage Singapore to Darwin. Transited Wetar Strait ca. 21/22 April 1967. <sup>38</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Ships Log <sup>39</sup> records 'normal ships routine' 3X throughout voyage.

"14. The passage down through the JAVA Sea and then into the Timor Sea via Wetar Strait was uneventful. With the sun north of the equator, the weather was perfect, enabling the 'tiddly bits' about the weather decks to be completed. Looking aft in the afternoon, one was reminded of a cruise liner, with the no. of hands sunbathing on their cheerful canvas and alloy stretchers on the upper deck. ANZAC Day, 25 April was celebrated with prayers being held during the forenoon and on completion, hands were piped down."

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 169, 72/3/24 Part 1 - HMNZS BLACKPOOL ROPs 1966 to 1969. Ship's ref: BL 2/4 dated 17 May 1967 covering period 1-30 Apr 1967. [CDR J.I. Quinn]

**Note:** This transit of the Wetar Strait is described by Mr John Titmus, Ex-RNZN in his submission to the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (MRJWG).

In his submission Mr Titmus was not sure which Strait had been sailed through, but thought it may have been through the Lombok Strait. He describes the transit as:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their five months in South-East Asia from 6 November 1966 to 21 April 1967.

"The ship was darkened and a heightened level of readiness at either action or defence stations."

Source: Submission to MRJWG by John Titmus, ex-RNZN dated 21 August 2011.

#### Appendices:

- 1. Example of a Ship's Log HMNZS OTAGO February 1962.
- 2. Example of a Ship's Reports of Proceedings HMNZS OTAGO covering the period 9 to 28 February 1962.
- 3. List of the documents found in the NZDF Classified Registry, HQNZDF, Wellington about transits of the Indonesian Straits. These documents were declassified in January 2013.

S-322 (Revised October 1959).

H.M.S.

See Articles 2910, 3141-2 & 3408 of Queen's Regulations.

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For Instructions as to disposal see para 1 page II.

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Flag Officer Second-in-Command carried out his harbour Inspection on the forenoon of 16th May, inspecting the Ship's Company at Divisions and following this, between Deck and Upper Deck rounds.

The remaining days at Hong Kong were spent resting and shopping.

Cn Friday 17th May, my Executive Officer, Commander R.T. Hale, O.B.E., R.N.Z.N., was relieved by Commander V.W. Were, R.N.Z.N.

#### PASSAGE TO JAPAN

I sailed from Hong Kong on 20th May under the Command of Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Far East Fleet, wearing his flag in H.M.S. LION and accompanied by other Fleet Units.

On passage a further series of exercises were carried out and on 23rd May I detached from the Flag to proceed independently to Hakata.

The health and morale of the Ship's Company continues to be satisfactory.

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Sir,

Your obedient servant.

(J.O'C. ROSS) CAPTAIN.

The Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Far East Fleet, H.M. Naval Base, SINGAPCHE.

The Navy Secretary, Navy Office, <u>WELLINGTON</u>.

of the Officer

Watch

ILS.

of the Quarter master

> (Copy to: The Flag Officer Second-in-Command, FAR EAST FLEET. )

#### APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A DATED 2 DECEMBER 2013

#### LIST OF THE DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE NZDF CLASSIFIED REGISTRY, HQNZDF, WELLINGTON ABOUT TRANSITS OF THE INDONESIAN STRAITS. THESE DOCUMENTS WERE DECLASSIFIED IN JANUARY 2013.

1. Item 4 of Minutes of Meeting (COS(58)M.3) of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held 18 February 1958 – Passage of RNZN Ships through Sunda and Lombok Straits. (File reference 018/4/8)

2. Memorandum to The Commanding Officer, HMNZS ROTOITI dated 9 March 1960 from the Navy Secretary, by direction of the Naval Board – Indonesian Territorial Waters. (File reference 018/4/8)

3. Memorandum to The Commanding Officer, HMNZS PUKAKI dated 29 May 1961 from the Navy Secretary – RNZN Contribution to Commonwealth Strategic Reserve – Notes on Current Procedures. (File reference 018/4/8)

4. Orders on handling and destruction of classified memoranda by ships operating in the Far East Strategic Reserve. Title: Far East Secret Memoranda. Issued by Commander in Chief, Far East Station, HM Naval Base, Singapore dated 23 December 1961. (Reference FES.455/16.W.(c))

5. Memorandum to The Commanding Officer, HMNZS TARANAKI dated 5 April 1962 from the Navy Secretary – RNZN Contribution to Commonwealth Strategic Reserve – Notes on Current Procedures. (File reference 018/4/8)

6. Letter to The Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington from New Zealand House, London dated 18 September 1962 - Passage of Naval Vessels through Indonesian Waters. (Reference 159/1/2)

7. Letter to the Navy Office, Wellington from the British High Commission, Wellington dated 29 April 1963 – Informing the British and Australian Embassies in Djakarta of the movements of Commonwealth warships through Indonesian waters. (Reference BDLS/147)

8. Letter to The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Wellington and the Secretary of External Affairs from Wing Commander A.F. Tucker, RNZAF, New Zealand Joint Services Liaison Staff (Singapore) dated 21 June 1963 – Warships in International Waters in South East Asia. (File reference 262/2/3)

9. Memorandum to The Commanding Officer, HMNZS OTAGO, dated 29 July 1966 from the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defence (Navy), Navy Office, Wellington – HMNZS OTAGO - Passage through Indonesian claimed waters, August 1966. (File reference 018/4/8)

Annex A: Instructions for passage through Indonesian claimed waters -HMNZS OTAGO, August 1966

Annex B: Guidance for Commanding Officer HMNZS OTAGO in handling of press enquiries regarding route Singapore-New Zealand

#### TRANSITS OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT BY RNZN SHIPS BETWEEN MAY 1956 AND OCTOBER 1975

1. HQNZDF, Rear Admiral Ian Hunter (Rtd) and the Navy Museum compiled lists of the 15 known transits of the Taiwan Strait (also referred to as the Formosa Strait) by RNZN ships between May 1956 and October 1975. Research by HQNZDF was extended to October 1975 to ensure there was a full review of the main period when the Communist Chinese Government disputed international shipping passage rights of the Taiwan Strait.

2. HQNZDF staff subsequently checked all known relevant official records from the period May 1956 to October 1975. This included RNZN Ships Logs, Letters or Reports of Proceedings (ROPs), and subject matter Defence and single Service files. Some of the relevant subject matter files were at the time classified files; they have since been de-classified and are now available for public view at Archives New Zealand.

3. As part of the research, HQNZDF staff searched the NZDF Classified Registry for any records about transits of the Taiwan Strait. The documents found are listed at Appendix 3. These documents were declassified in January 2013.

4. The recorded information on each of the identified **15 transits** is quoted in full, below. Note that the alert status of the ship is not always clear from the Ships Log and in some cases, changed during the transit up to and down from 'Action Stations' to a range of lower status 'Defence Stations' conditions depending on the risk perceived by the Commanding Officer and/or Duty Officer at the time. Weather conditions also played a part in these decisions so that the ship was more fully manned during severe weather conditions.

5. The <u>highest recorded alert status</u> for the transits of the Taiwan Strait (as best as can be identified) is as follows:

- a. **Status 1 operations** ('Action Stations') for nil transits;
- b. **Status 2 operations** ('Defence Stations') for one transit;
- c. **Status 3 operations** ('Normal sea operations') with no known immediate threat to the ship for two transits;
- d. Unspecified: An unspecified increase in alert status for zero transits.
- e. Not recorded: Alert status not recorded in official records for 12 transits.

6. For completeness of research, NZDF has examined all available ROPs and Ships Logs between September 1966 and October 1975. In 10 cases (all listed in this Annex) there is no mention of a Taiwan Strait transit. This does not mean there was no transit through the Taiwan Strait, but simply that any such passage was not recorded in the known official records.

#### Transits (in date order) of the Taiwan Strait (also called the Formosa Strait)

### 1. 7/8 May 1956 - HMNZS KANIERE. Passage - Hong Kong to Sasebo, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait.

Highest alert status for the transit: Not recorded. No Ships Log located.

'3.(a) KANIERE, in company with HMS ST BRIDES BAY sailed from Hong Kong at 1330 on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1956. The passage through the Formosa Strait was made in thick fog, which cleared am 9<sup>th</sup> May, allowing the planned passage exercises to take place. At 2200 on 10<sup>th</sup> May, KANIERE and ST BRIDES BAY altered course towards the British Ship OCEAN TRADER, which was off the coast of Toi Misaki, Japan. This ship had a violent man aboard and had requested a British Warship communicate with her. She could not be contacted on 500 kcs, and at 0600 11<sup>th</sup> May, both ships resumed course for Sasebo.

Comms were subsequently established with OCEAN TRADER when it was learnt that the situation was under control.'

Source: AAYT,8490, Box 576, 18/36/75Q, Part 1 - Letters of Proceedings - HMNZS KANIERE May 1956 - Jul 1958. Ship's ref: ROP dated 29 Jun 1956 covering period 7 May to 22 Jun 1956. [LT CDR V.W. Were]

#### Public consultation submission in 2011:

The Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group received on 15 July 2011 a submission from Mr Gerry Wright, ex-RNZN. He states:

HMNZS Kaniere - 1956-57 - Part of the British Far East Fleet -

'c. Kaniere twice patrolled off the Nationalist Chinese Islands close off the mainland which had fired on passing British merchant ships.'

#### <u>Comment [by Gerry Wright]</u>

'Except for two patrols by Kaniere off Nationalist Chinese held islands on the mainland coast, (see item c above) when Kaniere was at action stations for several hours, I am satisfied that every medallic recognition has been made for the periods that I served in the South East Asia region.

The above patrols, although of a slightly tense occasion, does not meet any of the criteria set out above.'

'We would need to seek KANIERE Deck Log for May 1956 for corroboration. KANIERE went close to the Nationalist Chinese Island off the mainland on her way from Hong Kong to Japan in May 1956. We were at action stations for several hours. Val Were was the CO. The problem was the Nationalist Chinese batteries were firing on British Merchant Ships'.

#### MRJWG and NZDF Notes:

1) The Ship's ROPs (discussed and quoted above) do **not** record the patrols described by Mr Wright.

Source: AAYT, 8490, Box 576, 18/36/75Q, Part 1 - Letters of Proceedings - HMNZS KANIERE May 1956 - Jul 1958. Ship's ref: ROP dated 29 Jun 1956 covering period 7 May to 22 Jun 1956. [LT CDR V.W. Were] and ROP dated 11 May 1956 covering period 4 Apr to 7 May 1956 [LT CDR V.W. Were.]

## 2. 4/5 October 1957 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Hong Kong to Yokosuka, Japan. Probably transited Taiwan Strait.<sup>1</sup>

Alert status for the transit: Not recorded. No Ships Log located.

"Departed Hong Kong 3 October 1957, arrival at Yokosuka 8 October 1957".

Source: AAYT, 8490, 18/36/75Y Letters of Proceedings – HMNZS ROYALIST 1956-Jul 1958. Ship's ref: RY 258/1281 dated 28 Oct 1957 covering period 23 Sep to 25 Oct 1957. [CDR G.D. Pound]

A transit of the Taiwan / Formosa Strait is not mentioned.

#### Notes:

- 1. It is not known if the Ship's Log covering the period of this transit still exists. No such Ship's Log is held by either Archives New Zealand or the RNZN Museum.
- 2. Nothing is recorded in the daily intelligence brief or the messages from the ship about the transit. The daily ship messages indicate normal routine only.

Source: ABFK Series N1 (Intelligence), Box 195, 8/20/56, Part 1 - 1956-1957.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the Naval General Service Medal (NGSM) with clasp 'Malaya', the New Zealand General Service Medal 1992 (non-warlike) with clasp 'Korea 1954-57' and the New Zealand Operational Service Medal (NZOSM) for other service on their 1957-1958 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the Pingat Jasa Malaysia medal (PJM) from the Government of Malaysia.

## 3. 13 November 1957 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Sasebo, Japan to Hong Kong. Transited Taiwan Strait.<sup>2</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located. ROPs report states

"16. ROYALIST left Sasebo at 1400 11 Nov for Hong Kong.

17. [Comment not applicable to transit.]

18. Typhoon 'KIT' gave some cause for concern during 13<sup>th</sup> Nov until it was confirmed that the storm was on a NNE or NE course. Going through the Formosa [Taiwan] Strait, the ship encountered a forty to fifty knot following wind and heavy seas, but conditions were not uncomfortable. Synthetic air plotting and NCB control exercises were all that could be carried out on the 14<sup>th</sup> Nov owing to the weather.

19. All ships (HMNZS ROYALIST, HMAS TOBRUK and HMAS ANZAC) arrived in Hong Kong at 0900 on 15<sup>th</sup> Nov."

Source: AAYT, 8490, Box 577, 18/36/75Y Letters of Proceedings – HMNZS ROYALIST 1956-Jul 1958.

**Note**: Nothing is recorded in the daily intelligence brief or the messages from the ship about the transit. The daily ship messages indicate normal routine only.

Source: ABFK Series N1 (Intelligence), Box 195, 8/210/56.

# 4. Night of 4/5 July 1958 – HMNZS ROTOITI. Passage – Hong Kong to Tokyo. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>3</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

#### "2. PASSAGE TO TOKYO

When detached by you on 4<sup>th</sup> July course was set for the Formosa Strait with HMS MOUNTS BAY and **HMNZS ROTOITI** in company. Typhoon TESS was reported to be heading towards FORMOSA and consideration was given to passing south of that island. By the evening of the 4<sup>th</sup> however, TESS was reported to be dissipating and the original plan was adhered to.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See previous footnote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the NGSM with clasp 'Malaya' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1958-1959 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

(a) The Strait was entered during the night (4/5 July) and the normal amount of shipping was encountered. At 0900 on 5<sup>th</sup> July two war vessels were sighted on the port bow and identities were exchanged. The ships, who announced "We are Chinese warships", are described in Appendix One together with a few further sightings".

Appendix One to ROPs dated 14 August 1958 "Table of sightings in FORMOSA Strait 4-6 July 1958					
Date	Time	Description	Identification		
Sat 5 July	0820	CHINAT frigates x 2	V7 & V8		
	0915	2 M.D.'s	nil		
	0935	DD proceeding to HK	USS BOYD		
	1440	Patrol boat x 1	Hull no. 123 – 'PET'		
	1445	Neptune a/c	As above		
	1725	DD x 1	USS ANDERSON		

Sat 6 July 0710 Neptune a/c Not identified"

Source: ROPs HMS CRANE dated 14 Aug 1958 at Singapore. Note: These ROPs cover the period 4 Jul to 14 Aug 1958 during which time several ships were under command of the Royal Navy Flag Officer based on HMS CRANE. These ships were: HMS MOUNTS BAY; HMNZS ROTOITI; RFA GOLD RANGER; and HMAS VOYAGER. Other ships were accompanying this fleet for short durations as part of a series of naval exercises in the Far East Station.

Source: ABFK Series, N1 575, 18/36/75P, Part 2 - 1957 to 1958.

## 5. 9/10 May 1959 - HMNZS Royalist. Passage – Hong Kong to Inchon (Korea). Transited Taiwan Strait.

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded in ROPs, and no Ships Log found for this period.

"7. On Sat 9<sup>th</sup> May left Hong Kong for Inchon (Korea) and in company with H.M. Ships CEYLON. CHEVIOT and COSSACK and the RFA WAVE MASTER proceeded via the Formosa Strait to arrive, after a calm passage at the mouth of the Inchon River at 0800 on Wednesday 13<sup>th</sup> May."

Source: ABFK, 7395, W4010, Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 2 - Letters of Proceedings - HMNZS ROYALIST 1959 - 1961. Ships Ref: RY 258/5132 dated 28 July 1959 covering period 1 May to 23 July 1959. Capt C.C. Stevens, RNZN.

### 6. Night of 16/17 March 1960 - HMNZS PUKAKI. Passage – Hong Kong to Kobe, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>4</sup>

Highest alert status for the transit: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

From the comments in the ROPs (below) the highest alert status was no higher than 'Defence Stations 2'.

"4. With the delayed arrival in Hong Kong there was time for a quick storing only before sailing for Kobe on Wednesday 16 March. This passage was by no means as pleasant as the last with strong winds and wintry conditions, the first felt since leaving Auckland. However all on board took it well regarding it as a useful dummy run for the Fiji-Auckland passage to come. Extra precautions were taken passing through the Formosa Strait as regards lookouts and state of the armament but neither ship nor aircraft were observed in the area."

At 1030 on 21 March 1960 PUKAKI berthed alongside at Kobe.

Source: ABFK W4010, 7395, Box 165, 72/3/6, Part 1 - HMNZS PUKAKI ROPs 1958-1964. Ship's ref: PK 14/12/12021 dated 16 May 1960 covering the period 1 Mar to 30 Apr 1960.

## 7. 24 May 1961 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Hong Kong to Kobe, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait. $^{\rm 5}$

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located. Taken from ROPs comment as no more than 'Defence Stations'.

"15. I sailed at 0900 on 23 May 1961 for Japan. TIDEREACH joined the group outside of the harbour. R.I.K., plotting exercises and other Officer of the Watch manoeuvres were carried out during the day. Next day [24 May] ships were at the third degree of A.A. readiness during passage through Taiwan Strait, which was accomplished in poor visibility and periods of heavy rain. During the passage north, gun salute firings and manoeuvres were exercised with TIDEREACH controlling one session of the latter."

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 2 - HMNZS ROYALIST ROPs 1959-1961. Ship's ref: RY 0180/1641 dated 22 Jun 1961 covering period 23 May to 20 Jun 1961. [CAPT J.O'C. Ross]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the NGSM with clasp 'Malaya' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1959-1960 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any British Commonwealth or New Zealand campaign medals for their five months service on the 1961 deployment to South-East Asia. However, this deployment meets the Government of Malaysia's requirements for award of the PJM and this medal is issued by NZDF on application from eligible ex-Service persons.

# 8. 27 December 1961 - HMNZS PUKAKI. Passage - Hong Kong to Beppu, Osaka and Kobe, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>6</sup>

Highest alert status for the transit: Defence Stations level 2.

"Slipped [from Hong Kong] and proceeded in company with H.M.S. CAESAR at Tathong Point to passage of the Straits of Taiwan. The weather deteriorated slowly until winds of force 7 were experienced in the Straits of Taiwan. Very little shipping apart from a few trawlers was met on this passage and the only company was a U.S.A. Neptune which flew low over the ship during the forenoon of the 28th December."

Sources:

- 1. ABFK 7395, W4010, Box 165, 72/3/6, Part 1 HMNZS PUKAKI ROPs 1958-64. Ships ref: ROPs dated 5 Jan 1962 covering period 11 Oct to 27 Dec 1961.
- 2. N 1 Box 576, 18/36/75Q parts 1, 2 and 3. HMNZS PUKAKI and HMNZS KANIERE ROPs 1961 to 1965. Ships ref: ROPs dated 12 Feb 1962 covering period 27 Dec 1961 to 31 Jan 1962.

# 9. 20 - 23 May 1963 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Hong Kong to Hakata, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>7</sup>

Highest alert status for the transit: Normal sea operations – 3X.

Ships Log records<sup>8</sup>: 20 May from 0820 to 1000 class 2Y when leaving Hong Kong, then 3X for remainder of voyage. Ship went to Class 2Y on 24 May for 45 minutes on berthing 0800 to 0845 hrs.

#### "PASSAGE TO JAPAN.

I sailed from Hong Kong on 20<sup>th</sup> May under the command of Flag Officer Commander in Chief, Far East Fleet, wearing his flag in HMS LION and accompanied by other Fleet units.

On passage a further series of exercises were carried out and on the 23<sup>rd</sup> May I detached from the Flag to proceed independently to Hakata [Japan]."

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 3 - HMNZS ROYALIST ROPs 1962- 1963. Ship's ref: RY 258/3016 dated 27 May 1963 covering the period 8 Apr to 23 May 1963. [CAPT J.O'C. Ross]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any British Commonwealth or New Zealand campaign medals for their eight months service on the 1961-1962 deployment to South-East Asia. However, this deployment meets the Government of Malaysia's requirements for award of the PJM and this medal is issued by NZDF on application from eligible ex-Service persons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their three months in South-East Asia in 1963.

Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 15.

#### Public consultation submission in 2011:

One submission discussed a double transit of the Taiwan Strait by HMNZS ROYALIST in May and June 1963. Lieutenant Commander (Rtd) A.N. Forsyth, RNZN states that these transits of the Taiwan Strait are <u>not</u> fully described in the ROPs. He writes:

"The first of these transits occurred when after sailing from Hong Kong the ship '*detached from the 'Flag', and proceeded independently to Hakata*' (Japan (Reference D [ROP RY 258/3016 dated 27 May 1963]). The ROP makes no mention of the fact that the Strait was transited."

Source: Submission to Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (MRJWG) by Lieutenant Commander (Rtd) A.N. Forsyth, RNZN dated 19 August 2011.

### 10. Between 10 and 13 June 1963 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Loki, near Tokyo (Japan) to Hong Kong. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>9</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Class 3X throughout – Normal sea operations.

Ships Log<sup>10</sup> records whole voyage was at status 3X. There is no mention of strait transits or of any changes in status until berthed in Hong Kong.

ROPs record: On 10 June, "ROYALIST had detached from the Fleet off Loki for independent passage to New Zealand."

"Passage to Hong Kong was uneventful, enlivened only by a careful interest in the behaviour of Typhoon 'Rosie' which fortunately recurved east of Taiwan while I chose passage by Taiwan Strait. I berthed on the West Arm, Naval Base at 0830 on Friday 14th June."

Source: ABFK ,W4010, 7395, Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 3 - HMNZS ROYALIST ROPs 1962-1963. Ship's ref: 258/3058 dated 11 Jun 1963 covering the period 23 May to 10 Jun 1963. [CAPT J.O'C. Ross]

#### Public consultation submission in 2011:

One submission discussed a double transit of the Taiwan Strait by HMNZS ROYALIST in May and June 1963. Lieutenant Commander (Rtd) A.N. Forsyth, RNZN states that these transits of the Taiwan Strait are <u>not</u> fully described in the ROPs. He writes:

"The second transit [by HMNZS ROYALIST] took place on the return passage from Japan to Hong Kong. The second transit is briefly discussed at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See previous footnote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 15.

Reference E [ROP RY 258/3189 dated 01 July 1963]. On this occasion the author of the ROP states he 'chose passage by Taiwan Strait'. Why the author of the referenced ROP filtered content to the degree he (and others) did cannot now be established; at least not by me. A possible reason being that as ROYALIST was at that time under command of the Commander Far Eastern Fleet, and not the then New Zealand Naval Board, the Commanding Officer may not have wanted to inform those at home (political as well as naval) of this part of the ships programme. However those onboard were witnesses to more than that recorded and conveyed in the subsequent ROP.

<u>Political Climate</u>. At the time of both transits of the Strait, China was acting in a belligerent manner towards Formosa (as it was then known) and claimed the Strait as its territorial waters. It was made known to those onboard ROYALIST at the time that the ship would transit the Strait to *emphasise and exercise a right to sail through international waters* (emphasis is mine).

<u>Transit by ROYALIST</u>. I cannot recall whether the ship was closed up at Action Stations, Defence Stations, or a modification of either conditions but certain unusual preparations preceded the transit. Firstly Union Flags were tied down flat on top of the turrets; no doubt to assist in identification from the air. Secondly a large Battle Ensign (Royal Navy White Ensign) was hoisted. The Union Flags and Battle Ensign would clearly identify the ship as associated with (if not belonging to) the Royal Navy. For the duration of the transits the ammunition hoists were loaded and live ammunition was supplied to the guns; the gun crews were closed up. I was one of the crew for the left gun in 'B' Turret. I cannot recall the duration of the transits but it would have been partially during the hours of darkness as the flags were to be floodlit.

.... transiting the Straits on what was essentially a war like footing. If this was not an operational situation with the inherent associated risks why were the transits conducted under such circumstances?"

Source: Submission to MRJWG by Lieutenant Commander (Rtd) A.N. Forsyth, RNZN dated 19 August 2011.

**Research Note**: Log shows Action Stations in transit for brief periods during voyage from Japan three times – they appear to be random and therefore are assumed to be for exercise purposes only.

### 11. 11 September 1965 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Hong Kong to Tokyo, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>11</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are already eligible for the GSM 1962 with clasp 'Malay Peninsula' and the NZOSM for other service on their 1965 deployment to South-East Asia. This deployment also qualifies for the PJM from the Government of Malaysia.

"48. At 1230 we parted DEVONSHIRE bound for TOKYO, and the British Trade Fair, and ROYALIST to OTARU by way of the Taiwan and Korea Straits.

49. The passage to Hokkaido was uneventful apart from dodging large numbers of junks in the approaches to the TAIWAN STRAIT."

[A detailed description of the subsequent transit through the Korea Straits follows in the ROP].

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 5 - HMNZS ROYALIST ROPs 1965-1966. Ship's ref: 258/3919 dated 28 Sep 1965 covering the period 1 Jul to 28 Sep 1965 – see page 5. [CAPT J.O'C. Ross]

### 12. 8/9 October 1967 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage Hong Kong to Chinhae (Republic of Korea) and Fukuoka (Japan). Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>12</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

'Sat 7th [Oct] at 1315 the ship slipped, turned inside the basin and proceeded for Chinhae. The weather proved to be boisterous with 30 knot head winds and rough seas until clear of the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait. During the forenoon of Thurs 10 [Oct] the ship was stopped for two hours while sonar beam pattern checks were carried out.'

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 26, 62/1/29, Part 4 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs May 1966 to Jan 1970. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 dated 29 Nov 1967 covering period 1 Oct to 15 Nov 1967 - see paragraph 3. [CDRE P.R.H. Silk]

## 13. 2/3 May 1969 - HMNZS BLACKPOOL. Passage Hong Kong to Fukuoka, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>13</sup>

<u>Highest alert status for the transit</u>: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

<sup>6</sup>2. HMNZS Blackpool spent her last day in Hong Kong 1<sup>st</sup> May sailing for JAPAN at 0900 Fri 2 May. Shaping course through the Taiwan Strait at 14 knots in fine overcast weather all appeared set for an uneventful passage.

Medallic Note: The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their seven months in South-East Asia in 1967 from late April 1967 to 24 November 1967.
 Medallic Note: The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their five months in South-East Asia from 15 January 1969 to 15 June 1969.

However at 1230 a signal was received from COMHK ordering BLACKPOOL to rendezvous with the Soviet merchant ship 'NEVER' at 1600 to assist in the helicopter transfer of an appendicitis patient.

3. Shaping course to SW at 26 knots in moderate visibility 'NEVER' was detected by radar at 1515 at 12 miles and visually identified at a range of about 5 miles... [The ROP then records details of the transfer of the patient].

4. ... the transfer was completed by 1720. On completion course for JAPAN was resumed.'

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 169, 72/3/24, Part 1 - HMNZS BLACKPOOL ROPs 1966 to 1969. Ship's ref: BL 2/4 dated 9 Jun 1969 covering May 1969 [CDR D.J. Cheney]

### 14. 1/2 February 1972 - HMNZS WAIKATO. Passage Hong Kong to Nagasaki, Japan. Transited Taiwan Strait.<sup>14</sup>

Alert status for the transit: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

<sup>6</sup>2. The ship was on passage from Hong Kong to Nagasaki at the beginning of the month and a rough voyage was expected. However the sea remained calm and the atmosphere was so still that thick fog prevailed for 30 hours during which time the ship proceeded through the Straits of Taiwan. It was possible to maintain passage speed as there was little sea traffic around so the ship arrived off the entrance to Nagasaki at 0800 on Thurs 3 Feb.'

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/25, Part 1 - HMNZS WAIKATO ROPs Jan to 16 Feb 1972. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 covering period Nov 1971 to Feb 1972. [CDR N.R. Win]

Note: HMNZS WAIKATO deployed to South-East Asia from 6 October 1971 to 15 April 1972.

### 15. 4 August 1972 - HMNZS TARANAKI. Passage Amuri, Japan to Hong Kong. Transited Taiwan Strait. <sup>15</sup>

Alert status for the transit: Not recorded. No Ships Log has been located.

"3. ... The ship passed through the Taiwan Strait on 4 Aug and arrived alongside in Hong Kong at 0900 hrs 5 Aug."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their six months in South-East Asia during their 1971-1972 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their five months in South-East Asia during their 1972 deployment.

Source: ABFK W4010, 7395, Box 27, 62/1/29, Part 6 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs 1971–1974. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 dated 22 Sep 1972 covering period 1-30 Aug 1972. See paragraph 3. [CDR L.J. Temporo]

Note: HMNZS TARANAKI deployed to the ANZUK Force, South-East Asia from April to September 1972.

# 15a. 29 May to 7 June 1964 - HMNZS ROYALIST. Passage - Hong Kong to Philippines for Exercise LIGTAS based at Subic Bay. It appears unlikely that a transit of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>16</sup>

<u>Highest alert status recorded</u>. Class 3X - normal sea operations apart from actions taken during the Exercise.

Ships Log<sup>17</sup>: records – Exercise LIGTAS

3 Jun. 0155 'Action Stations' then 'simulated missile firing' 0455 revert to 3X. 0945 step up to 2Y for resupply at sea with stand down to normal operations at 1145 hrs.

4 Jun. 0445 'Action Stations' then 'Commence simulated shore bombardment'. Revert to 3X at 0745 hrs.

#### Notes:

- 1. It is <u>not</u> clear from the ROPs for this period whether or not a transit of the Taiwan Strait was undertaken.
- 2. The same ROPs do <u>not</u> record the death and the subsequent burial at sea of a RNZN sailor who died at sea from natural causes during this exercise. Ships Log<sup>18</sup> records the death of a sailor at 0540 hrs [Rogers JL] from natural causes coronary occlusion. At 1530 body was transferred to USS Paul Revere for RTNZ. Correspondence from ROYALIST in 1964 on this death is contained in the individual's military file. This gap in the coverage of the ROPs was brought to the attention of the MRJWG by Lieutenant Commander (Rtd) A.N. Forsyth, RNZN in his submission dated 19 August 2011.
- 3. During the naval exercise, the ship was only in and out of 'Action Stations' as part of the exercise.

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 5 - HMNZS ROYALIST ROPs 1965-1966. Ship's ref: 258/585 dated 12 Jun 1964 covering the period 14 May to 11 Jun 1964. [CAPT B.E. Turner]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their two months in South-East Asia in 1964.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ships Log HMNZS ROYALIST – ABFK W3595 Box 15.

### 15b. HMNZS OTAGO - Deployed to South-East Asia from 15 October 1964 to 10 May 1965. It does <u>not</u> appear that a Taiwan Strait transit took place.

The Ship's journey from New Zealand to South-East Asia was through Hawaii, Midway, Guam, Labuan then to Singapore. There is no mention in official records of a Taiwan Strait transit.

#### Sources:

- 1. ABFK W4010 7395 Box 168, 72/3/19, Parts 1 and 2 HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 1961-65 and 1965-68.
- ABFK, W4010, 7395, Box 26, 62/1/28, Part 2 Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS OTAGO - 12 Jan 1962 to 30 Jun 1965.

### 15c. HMNZS ROYALIST - Deployed to South-East Asia from 20 May 1965 to 29 October 1965. It does <u>not</u> appear that a Taiwan Strait transit took place.

The Ship's journey from New Zealand to South-East Asia was through Hawaii, Midway, Guam, Hong Kong, Bangkok then to Singapore. There is no mention in official records of a Taiwan Strait transit.

Source: ABFK W4010 7395 Box 17, 62/1/1, Part 5 - Operations: Movements of HMNZ Ships - HMNZS ROYALIST Sep 1964 to Jul 1966.

### 15d. HMNZS WAIKATO - Deployed to South-East Asia from 01 January 1970 to 31 March 1970. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>19</sup>

No Ships Log covering this period was found. The only ROPs found for this voyage cover the period to 31 Dec 1969. They show the route taken to South-East Asia was via Hawaii, Guam, Hong Kong then to Singapore.

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 170 72/3/25, Part 2 - HMNZS WAIKATO ROPs covering period up to 31 Dec 1969.

# 15e. HMNZS WAIKATO - Deployed to ANZUK Force, South-East Asia - 20 June 1972 to 17 January 1973. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>20</sup>

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/25, Part 1 - HMNZS WAIKATO ROPs 1972 to 1978. Ship's ref: TN 2/4 covering period Jun 1972 to Jan 1973. [CDR N.R. Win]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their five months in South-East Asia during their 1969-1970 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their seven months in South-East Asia during their 1972-1973 deployment.

#### 15f. HMNZS OTAGO - Deployed to South-East Asia - 15 January 1973 to 18 April 1973. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred.<sup>21</sup>

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/25, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs covering 16 Jan 1973 to 18 Apr 1973. [CDR N.R. Win].

15g. HMNZS TARANAKI - Deployed to ANZUK Force, South-East Asia - January to July 1973. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred.<sup>22</sup>

Source: ABFK, W4010, 7395 Box 27, 62/1/29, Part 6 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs 1971-1974. [CDR L.J. Temporo]

15h. HMNZS OTAGO - Deployed to ANZUK Force, South-East Asia - 12 November 1973 to April 1974. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred.<sup>23</sup>

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/19, Part 1 - HMNZS OTAGO ROPs 12 Nov 1973 to 15 Apr 1974. [CDR N.R. Win]

15i. HMNZS WAIKATO - Deployed to NZ Force South-East Asia (NZFORSEA) 25 March to 12 August 1974. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>24</sup>

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/25, Part 1 - HMNZS WAIKATO ROPs 1972 to 1978.

#### 15j. HMNZS TARANAKI - Deployed to NZFORSEA - 24 June to 5 December 1974. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>25</sup>

Source: ABFK W4010, 7395 Box 27, 62/1/29, Part 6 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs 17 Feb 1972 to 6 May 1976.

### 15k. HMNZS WAIKATO - Deployed to NZFORSEA - 5 March to 18 July 1975. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>26</sup>

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/25, Part 1 - HMNZS WAIKATO ROPs 1972 to 1978.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their three months in South-East Asia during their 1973 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their six months in South-East Asia during their 1973 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their five months in South-East Asia during their 1973-1974 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their four months in South-East Asia during their 1974 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their five months in South-East Asia during their 1974 deployment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their four months in South-East Asia during their 1975 deployment.

#### 15I. HMNZS TARANAKI - Deployed to NZFORSEA - 13 May to 10 October 1975. Unclear if a transit(s) of the Taiwan Strait occurred. <sup>27</sup>

Source: ABFK W4831 7395 Box 54, 72/3/20, Part 5 - HMNZS TARANAKI ROPs 17 Feb 1972 to 6 May 1976.

#### Appendices:

- 1. Example of a Ship's Log HMNZS ROYALIST for Monday 20 May 1963 when the Ship transited the Taiwan Strait on passage to Hakata, Japan.
- 2. Example of a Ship's Reports of Proceedings HMNZS ROYALIST covering the period 8 April to 23 May 1963.
- 3. List of the documents found in the NZDF Classified Registry, HQNZDF, Wellington about transits of the Taiwan Strait. These documents were declassified in January 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> **Medallic Note:** The crew of this deployment are not currently eligible for any medals for their six months in South-East Asia during their 1975 deployment.

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#### APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B DATED 2 DECEMBER 2013

#### LIST OF THE DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE NZDF CLASSIFIED REGISTRY, HQNZDF, WELLINGTON ABOUT TRANSITS OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT. THESE DOCUMENTS WERE DECLASSIFIED IN JANUARY 2013.

1. Memorandum for the Minister of Defence from the Navy Secretary dated 11 March 1954 - Attachment of RNZN Frigates to Far East Station. (File reference NA 06/1/31)

2. Memorandum for the Minister of External Affairs from the Secretary of External Affairs dated 21 April 1954 - Attachment of RNZN Frigates to Far East Station. (Reference PM.264/3/15)

3. Memorandum from the Navy Secretary to the RNZN Liaison Officer, London dated 6 May 1954 - Attachment of RNZN Frigates to Far East Station. (File reference NA 06/1/31)

4. Letter to the Captain (F) Third Frigate Squadron and the Captain (F) Fourth Frigate Squadron from the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, Singapore dated 28 June 1954 - Administration of RNZN Frigates on the Far East Station. (Reference FES.753/3/54)

5. Letter to the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice Marshal W.H. Merton, CB, OBE) from the Chief of the Naval Staff dated 15 September 1954 - Terms under which RNZN Frigates operate under the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station. (No file reference)

**Note:** The enclosure to this letter has not been found in the NZDF Classified Registry, HQNZDF.

6. Letter to the Chief of the Naval Staff (Commodore Sir Charles Madden, Bt) from the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice Marshal W.H. Merton, CB, OBE) dated 16 September 1954 - Terms under which RNZN Frigates operate under the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station. (Reference 227/9/4 CAS)

 Memorandum from the Office of the Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong dated
 June 1955 - Formosa Strait Patrol Orders. (Reference H.K. No.17/21/5) Appendix: Message 980P of 25 June 1952

8. Letter from the Chief of Staff, Office of the Commodore-in-Charge, Far East Station, Singapore to Captain C.M. Hudson, RAN and Commander E.P. Reade, DSC, RN dated 28 June 1955 - Formosa Strait Patrol. (Reference FES.537/2/55S.C.)

**Note:** This letter was the cover letter to the 1 June 1955 memorandum listed above.

Minister of Defence

Minister of Veterans' Affairs

### INTERIM REPORT OF MEDALLIC RECOGNITION JOINT WORKING GROUP ON SERVICE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA 1950 TO 2011

#### **Executive Summary**

The Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (JWG) has now completed its consideration of the submissions received during the recent public consultation period. Our preliminary conclusion is that no additional medallic recognition is warranted for service in South East Asia.

Before finalising our report however we have asked that further research be undertaken by NZDF into service on RNZN ships which went to action stations while transiting the Straits of Indonesia in the period leading up to, and during, Confrontation and the Taiwan Straits.

#### Report

For some years complaints have been received from ex-Service personnel who consider that their service in South East Asia has not received appropriate medallic recognition. In 2005 historian Peter Cooke was requested by the government to undertake research into aspects of New Zealand military service in South East Asia in the period 1950 to 1975 which had not received New Zealand or British medallic recognition for operational service. He concluded that there were no outstanding instances of operational service which had not been properly recognised.

A summary of Peter Cooke's report is attached at Annex A - see pp.12-22.

In 2009 you agreed that the Joint Working Group (which includes representatives of the RNZRSA, Veterans' Affairs New Zealand and NZDF) should review these findings. The period covered by the review was extended earlier this year to take in all military service in South East Asia from 1950 to the present day. It was further agreed that there should be a public consultation process.

Submissions were duly invited from interested parties over the period 12 July to 23 August 2011. (A copy of the Checklist for Submissions is attached at Annex B.) 68 submissions totaling some 1200 pages were received from 63 individuals and organisations representing a wide range of units and periods of service. These submissions were considered by the Joint Working Group in September 2011.

A summary analysis of the submissions is attached at Annex C. In brief, the submissions fell into three categories: those asserting that all service in South East Asia should be given additional recognition; those claiming that a particular type of service should have been classed as 'operational service';

and those suggesting that one or more incidents warranted special medallic recognition.

The Joint Working Group considered all the submissions against the government's agreed criteria (see Annex A, pp.7-11). It considered that further research was needed into service on RNZN ships which went to action stations while transiting the Straits of Indonesia in the period leading up to, and during, Confrontation and the Taiwan Straits. The JWG has requested NZDF to undertake this research and report back. For the rest, it was unanimously of the view that no other cases advanced by submitters warranted recognition in the form of an additional medal for operational service.

#### **Next Steps**

NZDF is now undertaking research into the two RNZN cases. We will submit our final recommendations once NZDF has reported back to the JWG.

Please let me know if you would like to discuss this interim report with JWG members.

'SIGNED ON ORIGINAL'

Neil Walter Chair, Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group

2 November 2011

Annexes:

- A. Medallic Recognition of New Zealand Military Service in South-East Asia since 1950 - Summary Consultation Document prepared by the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group - publicly issued on 12 July 2011.
- B. Checklist for Submissions.
- C. Summary of Submissions Service in South-East Asia 1950 to 2011.

Medallic Recognition of New Zealand Military Service in South-East Asia since 1950

# Summary Consultation Document prepared by the Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group

July 2011

Note: Public consultation ends 23 August 2011

### Medallic Recognition of New Zealand Military Service in South-East Asia since 1950

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#### **Executive Summary - Service since 1950**

Some aspects of the service by New Zealand military personnel in South-East Asia between 1950 and 1989 are currently not eligible for medallic recognition. In 2005, the Minister of Defence instructed that this situation be researched and reported upon for the period 1950-1975. An independent historian was employed by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to research the subject and prepare a report covering the period up to 1975. His full report is available on the NZDF Medals website at http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/seasia/about.html

The Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group (JWG), established by the current Government under the leadership of Independent Chair Neil Walter has received the full report, published this consultation document, and made the full copy of the report freely available on the NZDF Medals website. The JWG has concluded that in the interests of fairness and completeness it should extend the consultation to cover all military service from 1975 to the present day.

Accordingly, the JWG invites submissions on all military service from 1950- May 1975. It also invites submissions on military service in South-East Asia from May 1975 (end of the Vietnam War) to the present day.

#### Brief to the Independent Military Historian

The instructions to the independent historian were to assess examples of military service that do not currently qualify for medallic recognition, and assess whether that service should qualify under current criteria as "operational service".

#### Service which already qualifies for medallic recognition

Most operational service up to 1966 already qualifies for some medallic recognition by New Zealand. This includes operational service in Malaya/Malaysia, Thailand, the Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam.

#### Principles for medallic recognition

The assessment of service for medallic recognition is based on the Government's principles for recognising operational service. These principles were approved by Cabinet in 2000.

Peacetime service overseas may be demanding and of strategic value but is generally similar to that completed in New Zealand. Under Principle 1 of the New Zealand Government's Principles for the Medallic Recognition of Operational Service: *"Medals are awarded to recognise service that is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand"*.

The Government's policy has been that "No service is recognised by the award of a medal for operational service unless there has been operational activity involving a risk of casualties and the possible use of force may be required".

So while the New Zealand military presence in South-East Asia from 1950 to 1989 was part of our contribution to strategic forward defence, only operational service in relation to the conflicts in Malaya/Malaysia, Borneo, Thailand and Vietnam currently qualifies for medallic recognition.

The independent historian found no examples of service that should have been recognised under the existing guidelines.

### The closing date for submissions is Tuesday 23 August 2011.

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Submissions (with supporting evidence and a completed Checklist for Submissions) can be e-mailed to <u>medals.admp@nzdf.mil.nz</u>; or posted to: Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group C/- Deputy Director Medals Policy Defence Personnel Executive Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force Private Bag 39997, WELLINGTON 5045

Electronic copies of the Submission checklist; Summary of the Consultation Report and the full report can be downloaded from the NZDF Medals Website , <u>http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz</u>

We welcome your comments and submissions.

Neil Walter, CNZM Independent Chair Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group 12 July 2011

**Note:** This review will <u>**not**</u> consider eligibility for entitlements under the War Pensions Act 1954.

#### Disclaimer

This document is based on a survey of known activities by New Zealand forces in South-East Asia over the period 1950-1975. There may have been activities other than those detailed in this document, for which medallic entitlement should also be assessed. If so, this will be undertaken on a case by case basis, when any such activities are brought to the attention of the Joint Working Group and/or the New Zealand Defence Force. No research and analysis has been undertaken about the activities undertaken at Government behest by New Zealand civilians in South-East Asia during the review period.

### Definitions

#### Period

The period covered by the Summary of Research Findings (pp.12-20 below) from the report of the independent historian starts with New Zealand's first major deployment in theatre and ends on 1 May 1975, the end date for the Vietnam War. Prior to 1955, there were New Zealand service personnel working in Malaya as attached officers with British and Fijian units. Their service has been recognised by appropriate campaign medals.

The JWG believes that it is also important to consult with stakeholders on service in South-East Asia after May 1975 (end of the Vietnam War). It accordingly invites submissions on service from 1950-1975 and also on service since May 1975.

#### Region

Geographically, the region known as South-East Asia is taken to cover all land between the longitudinal edges of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and latitudes from the southern sea boundary of Indonesia to the southern sea boundary of Japan in the north, and all sea and air spaces on the internal lines of communication therein.

<u>Note</u>: This does <u>not</u> include service in the Korean Peninsula and all sea and air spaces within that theatre.

Specifically, for New Zealand deployments the research focused on Malaya (called Malaysia from 16 September 1963), Singapore, Borneo, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong and Japan, and the Java Sea, Andaman Sea, South China Sea and East China Sea.

#### **NZDF** Operational Service categories

The New Zealand Defence Force defines three categories of operational service: warlike, hazardous, and non-warlike.

- Warlike In a state of declared war, or with conventional combat operations against an armed adversary, or peace enforcement between belligerents who have NOT consented to any intervention.
  - o For example, Vietnam and the 1990-1991 Gulf War.
- Hazardous Peace enforcement between belligerents who HAVE consented to intervention or requested assistance, or missions where casualties may be expected.
  - For example, service in Bougainville since 1997.
- Non-warlike Military activities in which casualties are not expected, including peacekeeping or sanctions-enforcing missions in benign situations, disaster relief in locations where there are belligerents or other hostile groups, observer activities and other hazardous activities.
  - For example, service in Mozambique and Cambodia from 1994.

For the purposes of medallic recognition for service between 1946 and 2000 warlike campaign medals (e.g. the NZGSM 1992 Warlike) are awarded for warlike missions, while non-warlike campaign medals (e.g. the NZGSM 1992 Non-Warlike) are awarded for missions assessed as being hazardous or non-warlike.

### **Principles for Medallic Recognition of Operational Service**

The assessment of operations for medallic recognition is based on the Government's eight principles for recognising operational service. These principles were approved by Cabinet in 2000. All eight principles are relevant for reviewing un-recognised service in South-East Asia between 1950 and 1989. They are:

### Principle One – Service that goes beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service is eligible for recognition.

Medallic recognition will be provided only where NZDF units or personnel are engaged in operations, whether warlike or non-warlike. In this context, non-warlike operations include peacekeeping operations or other hazardous activities. (Also see the Definitions on p.7 above). The nature of the service performed will be the primary consideration for the medallic recognition of operational service. Additional considerations include details of the area of operations, enemy faced or parties dealt with, and time served in the location. Awards may be either a specific New Zealand campaign medal or the New Zealand General Service Medal in silver or bronze.

# • Principle Two – Deserving service by New Zealand personnel should be recognised by a New Zealand award.

Where New Zealand personnel are involved in an operation that meets the definitions described in Principle 1, that service is to be recognised by a New Zealand award.

### Principle Three – A balance must be kept between maintaining the exclusivity of awards and recognising significant service.

While service that meets the requirements of these principles will be recognised, the prestige of awards depends to a degree on their

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exclusiveness. Service associated with a particular operation or operational area will not necessarily qualify for the recognition extended to personnel serving in that operation or operational area. For example, recognition might not be appropriate for logistic support to a deployed force or planning activities in a headquarters outside the operational area.

 Principle Four – There should be only one New Zealand medal to recognise each period of operational service, in all but exceptional circumstances.

Awards made under the Imperial system, prior to the establishment of the New Zealand General Service Medal, remain New Zealand medals that were awarded on the advice of the New Zealand Government. Specific New Zealand medals will not be awarded in respect of service already recognised by an existing New Zealand or Imperial award.

- Principle Five Awards will be continued only where the service rendered continues to meet all other requirements for the award of a medal. One crucial consideration must be the end date of a period of medallic recognition. This applies particularly to longrunning operations where the situation that originally merited the award of a medal changes to the extent that such recognition is no longer appropriate, especially where the service no longer meets the definitions of warlike or non-warlike operations.
- Principle Six Medals for operational service should be open for award to civilians in appropriate circumstances.

These circumstances will include situations where the New Zealand Government deploys Police or other civilians to operations or where civilians are working with the NZDF or other New Zealand Government contribution as part of a deployed force.

- Principle Seven The fairness and integrity of any award must be transparent, and such awards should also be timely. Where an award has not been created in the five years following service, as for all service reviewed in this paper, there should be evidence of a substantial grievance that requires redress, claims from individuals should be verifiable from official records, and a significant number of participants should be able to claim a medal personally.
- Principle Eight Approval will be sought to wear foreign medals where the service performed is consistent with principles above.

### **Guidelines for Assessing service against Principle One**

The JWG will be applying the following guidelines to assess whatever service between 1950 and 1989 was operational service, which is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service.

To be assessed as operational service, all of the following criteria should have been met:

- Service must be beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service. Normal peacetime duties such as training and garrison duties will not be assessed as operational service unless undertaken in a location where there is a credible threat from enemy military forces.
- b. There is a real risk of casualties from enemy activities, e.g. combat, landmines, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, assassinations, raids, etc.
- c. The use of force may be required.
- d. The existence of a defined enemy or potential enemy.
- e. That enemy by actions or statements is deemed to pose an immediate threat or immediate potential threat.
- f. The enemy has the military capability to make the threat credible.
- g. Rules of engagement have been issued.
- h. Defensive measures have been taken to the level that would apply if combat were imminent.

It is important to note that for Principle One to apply actual combat does not have to occur, only that a credible expectation of it exists.

# Service 1950-1975 - Summary of Research Findings from the Independent Historian's Report

#### **ARMY SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1950-1975**

Service by the New Zealand Army in South-East Asia (after the initial deployment of the NZSAS Squadron in 1955-1957) revolved around the infantry battalion based in Malaysia (until 1969) and Singapore (until 1989), with a range of attachments of supporting services. From 1969 to 1989 the battalion regularly traveled to Malaysia for training.

The battalion received regular drafts of reinforcements with the typical tour of duty being two years. Married personnel had families accompany them with accommodation provided. The battalion (1 RNZIR) after its transfer from Terendak in Malaysia 1969 remained in Singapore until 1989 and the unit then returned to New Zealand.

#### **Deaths Overseas**

Deaths overseas in peacetime or outside the 'operational areas' cannot be taken as an indication of a level of abnormal danger or threat. In fact, almost all came from illness or accidents, mostly vehicular. Though tragic, such accidents were a feature of normal peacetime training in both New Zealand and South-East Asia. Forty-two deaths among the infantry alone are attributed to accident or illness in South-East Asia from 1958-1975.

In the same period a significantly larger number of New Zealand military personnel have died in similar normal peacetime training or off-duty accidents in New Zealand.

#### **SEATO Ground Exercises**

After the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was formed, the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve was designated as one of its forces available for contingency planning. New Zealand units in the Reserve therefore became involved in SEATO exercises from the early 1960s. The first involvement by New Zealand ground forces seems to have been in Exercise Rajata, an air transportation and ground Command Post Exercise (CPX) on 8-16 March 1961 in Thailand. This exercise predates the period in which medallic entitlement for service in Thailand begins (1962), and while it may have been staged to intimidate Communist Terrorist (CT) groups, it was not an operational tour of duty.

In subsequent exercises New Zealand contributed small numbers of observers to the exercises mainly in the Exercise HQ. This pattern characterised New Zealand involvement in SEATO exercises until they ended in the mid 1970s.

#### **Exercise Dhanarajata**

Exercise Dhanarajata (sometimes rendered Dhana Rajata) was a SEATO exercise held in the eastern border region (Ubon province) of Thailand in mid-1963, and was the first with major participation by New Zealand ground troops in Thailand. It came after the NZSAS deployment in Thailand in June-September 1962, which begins the period when operational service in Thailand qualifies for New Zealand medallic entitlement.

Exercise Dhanarajata does not currently qualify for medallic recognition because it is not considered by HQ NZDF to have involved any operational service. The exercise took place from 11-19 June, with all 1 RNZIR personnel arriving back in Terendak between 7 and 14 July 1963. It was described by a SEATO committee as *"largely a political exercise"*.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Other Thailand Service**

Some service in Thailand 1962-1971 qualifies for a non-warlike clasp to the New Zealand General Service Medal (NZGSM). 1 Ranger Squadron,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Margin note on JAPC(63)4, Principal Admin Officer's Committee Joint Admin Planning Committee Exercise Pool Expenses: SEATO Ground Defence Ex 1963, p1. 'SEATO Exercises', EA w2668 120/5/4, part 6, Archives NZ, Wellington

NZSAS, was deployed to Thailand between June and September 1962. The NZSAS were supported in theatre by three RNZAF Bristol freighters with ground crew personnel. Engineers were sent to Operation Crown, the Mukdahan airfield project in Thailand, 1964-65, and to the Thailand Feeder Road project between 1966 and 1971.

#### **RAAF Butterworth**

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) had based air combat units at RAAF Base Butterworth as part of its contribution to the Far East Strategic Reserve since 1958, but handed the base to Malaysia in a bilateral arrangement in March 1971. In support of its Malaysian ally, New Zealand offered to contribute infantry companies to perform airfield defence duties there from March 1971 to July 1973.

Army HQ in Wellington at the time looked upon the tours to Butterworth as *"providing valuable training opportunities... including ranges"* for shooting practice. While there might have been slightly increased tension at the time, Communist Terrorist (CT) activity was of very slight significance to the New Zealand deployments to Butterworth, and did not characterise the tours there in any way.

#### **Live Ammunition**

The question of live ammunition being issued has also been cited by some ex-service personnel as a reason why service in South-East Asia, notably exercises, should qualify for medallic entitlement.

Live ammunition was issued in a range of exercises in the area, but this was to be *"carried for life-saving purposes in accordance with 28 Inf Bde Training Instruction No 8".* The Administration Instructions were more specific as to its use: the live ammunition was *"only to be used if confronted by tigers and elephants".* 

When it was issued, live ammunition was usually in a single magazine, taped up to indicate that the contents were live. For most exercises unless there was a particular need for live ammunition, blank ammunition was issued.

#### Jalan Ulu Exercises

As well as personnel based in Singapore, the Army at times sent troops from New Zealand to participate in exercises in the Singapore / Malaysia region. A series of exercise deployments were the 'Jalan Ulu' exercises.

They were primarily to test 1 RNZIR in jungle conditions, alongside units of the Malaysian Army. They also involved relatively large contingents (up to company size) from units in New Zealand (usually 2/1 RNZIR, but with some Territorial Force soldiers).

The series started in September 1972, with a deployment of engineer troops to a Singapore exercise. The first deployment from New Zealand was Jalan Ulu II, 26 March–30 April 1973, when troops went to participate in Ex King Cobra, a 28 ANZUK Brigade exercise. The Jalan Ulu series continued until at least Jalan Ulu 28, 1-7 March 1986.

#### NAVAL SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1950-1975

In 1955 New Zealand agreed to base a warship in Singapore as part of this country's contribution to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Up to 1960 New Zealand's warships took part in operations during the Malayan Emergency. The crews on these deployments, and on many of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) deployments to South-East Asia during the Confrontation with Indonesia (8 December 1962 to 11 August 1966), have received British Commonwealth / New Zealand medallic recognition for their operational service in the Malaya/Singapore and/or Borneo operational areas.

## RNZN service off the Malay Peninsula from 1 August 1960 to 16 August 1964

RNZN service off the Malay Peninsula between 1 August 1960 and 16 August 1964 currently does not qualify for New Zealand medallic recognition.

New Zealand's focus changed from 1961 to participating more in the SEATO air, land and sea exercises held around the region, and flag-waving ship visits to ports in various friendly nations.

This left little time to undertake service in support of army border operations, and there are no known instances of support by naval vessels to operations in the northern border area off the Malay peninsula: whether by gunfire support, the use of landing parties, or by intercepting seagoing vessels carrying suspected Communist Terrorists. Given the long distance inland to where the CTs were operating, it seems doubtful whether the RNZN ships would have been able to provide any assistance, even if required. There is also no evidence of any threat to RNZN ships from CTs in this period.

The most eventful and dangerous activities undertaken by RNZN ships off the northern Malay peninsula, or any other area of the Malay peninsula, between August 1960 and August 1964 were exercises with other navies

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and activities such as when HMNZS PUKAKI "rescued 2 people from [a] capsized dinghy".

#### RNZN service off Borneo from 1950 to 7 December 1962

Numerous RNZN ships transited through the waters off Borneo or visited Borneo between 1950 and 7 December 1962. Some naval vessels also exercised in these waters. [added by DDMP on 30 Mar 11 as otherwise there is a disconnect with Peter Cooke's full report].

#### RNZN service off Borneo from 8 December 1962 to 11 August 1966

Most RNZN service off the coast of North Borneo between 24 December 1962 and 11 August 1966 does not meet the strict criteria for the General Service Medal 1962 with clasp 'Borneo' which is 30 days service in theatre. Qualifying days for this medal must involve "operating off the coast in support of the forces ashore and upriver". The distance off the coast was defined as "within sight of shore" or around 20 nautical miles, to exclude high-seas sailing activities.

#### RNZN service in South-East Asia from 12 August 1966 to 1975

In the period 1966 to 1975 the Type-12, Whitby and Leander class frigates, HMNZS TARANAKI, OTAGO, BLACKPOOL and WAIKATO were deployed to Singapore to meet New Zealand's obligations to the CSR (and its successors), SEATO and the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).

A routine deployment for one of these frigates in the period 1966 to 1975 in South-East Asia usually included:

- periods of overhaul and maintenance in Singapore.
- sporting matches, visits, ceremonial events, and day-to-day maintenance tasks in Singapore.
- exercising and training in the Singapore Exercise Areas, the waters off Singapore and both coasts of Johore.
- deployments to exercises with other Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR), SEATO and ANZUK forces in the Gulf of Thailand,

South China Sea or around the Philippines, or occasionally starting in one locale and ending in another. These often involved working in close proximity to Allied warships.

- gunnery exercises both live and blank.
- helicopter flying exercises ship to ship and ship to/from shore.
- routine efficiency/training exercises conducted on most voyages, such as man-overboard, casualty exercises, full-power trials or defence stations for all or part of the crew.
- visits to friendly ports on flag-waving activities (this included ports in Malaysia, Philippines, Japan and, less often, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia).
- occasional search-and-rescue activities, usually while en route.
- voyages in and out of theatre, and end of deployment, usually returning to Auckland via the Indonesian archipelago, Darwin, Townsville or other Australian ports.

#### **SEATO Naval Exercises**

SEATO was an anti-communist Cold War alliance that New Zealand joined in 1954. Among other activities New Zealand's membership involved participation in maritime exercises which carried a small measure of risk.

#### Transits of the Straits of Taiwan (or Formosa)

These Straits were transited by ships of the RNZN at least 17 times between 1960 and 1975.

One of the reasons for transiting the Straits of Taiwan other than to get from A-to-B was to assert New Zealand's position on the Straits of Taiwan as an international waterway in accordance with the law of the sea (exercising a right to sail through international waters).

#### **Transits of the Indonesian Straits**

From the late 1950s Indonesia claimed sovereign rights over waters in its archipelago that other nations (including New Zealand) regarded as international waters. During Confrontation New Zealand military aircraft avoided Indonesian airspace but our naval vessels continued to transit waters within the Indonesian archipelago.

Indonesia had first claimed waters out to the 12-mile limit in 1958, a claim which would have affected passage by other nations' ships through a number of its straits. If accepted this would have turned the Java, Banda, Flores and Malacca seas and the Straits of Macassar into internal waterways. New Zealand responded in accordance with its Commonwealth Strategic Reserve partners, and took guidance from the Commander Far East Fleet over the passage of warships.

Passage by RNZN warships was still made, but with heightened levels of precaution and without any visible measure that could be seen as provocative. Occasionally an Indonesian warship was seen. In times of tension RNZN ships transited these waters while at defence stations or action stations, but "no actual incidents occurred".

The issue came to a head in August 1964 when Indonesia attempted to close the Sunda Strait during a naval exercise. Britain challenged this attempted closure of an international waterway. Indonesia relented and thereafter Commonwealth warships were able to transit through the various Indonesian straits, provided due notice was given. New Zealand vessels continued to do so and the issue faded.

The Confrontation with Indonesia ceased in August 1966 when Indonesia signed a treaty with Malaysia, which New Zealand had supported. From this time, New Zealand's naval vessels were generally on cordial terms with those of this former enemy, though New Zealand ships are likely to have

been shadowed by Indonesian vessels or monitored electronically while transiting these waters. Some persons have argued that tension continued to varying degrees up until 1976 and that this was particularly evident in the period leading up to the major International Law of the Sea conference in 1976. More documentary evidence needs to be located to better determine the perceived level of threat from 1967 to 1976.

#### **AIR FORCE SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1950-1975**

As part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, New Zealand based a range of aircraft in theatre between 1950 and 1975.

#### Hazards

New Zealand aircraft crashed in South-East Asia but these crash rates were lower than the comparative crash rates in New Zealand over the same time period.

RNZAF personnel serving in South-East Asia suffered from non-work-related accidents, mostly vehicular. Other deployed RNZAF personnel died of natural causes while on tours of duty. Over the same period of time, however, dozens of Air Force personnel died in New Zealand of similar causes: accident, illness or disease.

#### **Servicing Embassies**

New Zealand air units based in Singapore were used for a wide range of diplomatic-support purposes, such as servicing New Zealand Embassies in the region. The unit also helped Allied embassies, such as the British Embassy in Jakarta in 1968.

#### Medevac

Medevac, or the air evacuation of personnel for medical reasons, was an important humanitarian function for the RNZAF. Such tasks can be characterised as urgent, unscheduled and sometimes hazardous, and were usually assigned to the helicopters with fixed wing used mainly for repatriation flights back to Australian or New Zealand hospitals.

#### **Other Activities**

Long-distance flights were conducted out of the region. Regular Vietnam schedules were flown from 1964 to 1975, in support of: the New Zealand

military forces deployed to Vietnam, the MFAT-funded civilian humanitarian and surgical teams at Qui Nhon, and the New Zealand Embassy in Saigon.

The RNZAF personnel involved in these flights have received operational medallic recognition for their service in a war zone.

VIPs also had access to RNZAF aircraft where such use was deemed to be in New Zealand's interests. Senior Service Chiefs could also expect the RNZAF squadrons to ferry them in the region. Members of Parliament (MPs) first toured the region using RNZAF planes early in 1957. These flights continued throughout the period of review.

#### CHECKLIST FOR SUBMISSIONS ON MEDALLIC RECOGNITION OF NEW ZEALAND MILITARY SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA SINCE 1950

Name of Submitter or Organisation:	
Address:	
E-mail address:	@
Contact name:	_ Telephone: ( )
How many people/members do you/your o	rganisation represent?

#### Notes for all submissions

1. It is preferred, to ensure clarity and understanding, that all submissions are typed. Submitters are encouraged to add additional pages and attach photocopies of any supporting evidence for their case. Please do **not** send original documents.

2. Submissions (with checklist and supporting evidence) can be e-mailed as a text response; or with an attached file; to <a href="mailto:medals.admp@nzdf.mil.nz">medals.admp@nzdf.mil.nz</a>; or mailed to:

Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group C/- Deputy Director Medals Policy Defence Personnel Executive Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force Private Bag 39997 WELLINGTON 5045

3. If your submission covers a variety of service or events in South-East Asia, we request that you complete a separate checklist for each case.

4. Only one copy of your submission is needed, and any response by e-mail does **not** need to be duplicated with a hard copy.

5. All submissions will be acknowledged and copies circulated to all members of the Medallic Recognition JWG.

6. The JWG will not be entering into any correspondence regarding the content of submissions received.

#### The closing date for submissions is Tuesday 23 August 2011

We welcome your comments and submissions.

Neil Walter Independent Chair Medallic Recognition Joint Working Group 12 July 2011 The Government's current guidelines for the assessment of operational service are listed below. **Please review and tick the criteria** before submission to show which criteria have been met in your assessment.

**Checklist and Guidelines for the assessment of operational service** (See also the Medallic Principles listed in the Consultation Document - pp.8-10)

Location/s of military service relevant to this submission.

Dates of Service covered by this submission.

List the Unit(s) involved in the military service relevant to this submission.

List the Unit(s) that you were posted to relevant to this submission.

To be assessed as **operational service**, **all** of the following criteria should have been met:

Criteria	Are the criteria met?	Is supporting evidence included? (Yes or No, and number of pages)
Service <b>must</b> be beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service. Normal peacetime duties such as training and garrison duties will <b>not</b> be assessed as operational service <b>unless</b> undertaken in a location where there is a credible threat from enemy military forces*.		
There is a <b>real</b> risk of casualties from enemy activities, e.g. combat, landmines, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, assassinations, raids, etc. The use of force may be required.		

Criteria	Are the criteria met?	Is supporting evidence included? (Yes or No, and number of pages)
The existence of a defined		
enemy or potential enemy.		
That enemy by actions or		
statements is deemed to pose an		
immediate threat or immediate		
potential threat.		
The enemy has the military		
capability to make the threat		
credible.		
Rules of engagement have been		
issued.		
Defensive measures have been		
taken to the level that would		
apply if combat were imminent.		

\* It is important to note that while actual combat does not have to occur, a **credible expectation** of it must exist.

The JWG thanks you in advance for the time and effort you have put into preparing your submission.

#### SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS SERVICE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1950 TO 2011

#### Introduction

1. The Minister of Defence directed the Medallic Recognition JWG to review all military service in South-East Asia from 1950 to 2011. Public consultation opened on 12 July 2011 and closed on 23 August 2011.

2. A total of 68 submissions, totalling about 1200 pages, were received from 63 individuals or organisations. 38 submissions were received by e-mail with 30 written submissions sent by mail. The subjects covered were:

- a. Operational service versus normal Peacetime service.
- b. Service by RNZAF personnel in SE Asia 1950-2011.
- c. Service by RNZN personnel in SE Asia 1950-1975.
- d. Service by RNZN personnel in SE Asia 1976-2011.
- e. Service by NZ Army personnel in Malaysia and Singapore 1957 -1975.
- f. Service by NZ Army personnel in Malaysia and Singapore 1975 -1989 (Not covered by the Cooke Report).
- g. Service by 1 RNZIR personnel in RAAF Base Butterworth, 1971 -1973.
- h. Service as Defence Attaché in Thailand, early 1980s.
- i. Service by Military Police in SE Asia.
- j. Service in Cambodia by RNZN personnel, 1992-1993.
- k. Definition of Operational Service.
- I. Australian medallic policy compared to NZ medallic policy.
- m Grievances associated with the Vietnam Medal service after 27 January 1973.
- n. General comments received.

3. Submissions covered all Services, a wide range of ranks and a mix of service dates from 1957 to current serving personnel. A combination of RNZRSA and non-RSA members plus some comment from serving personnel has given a wide age and experience range.

4. The ranks, dates of service, units of service, and similar information listed in this 'Summary of Submissions' are as given by the submitters in their written submissions.

#### Overview of the submissions

5. The submitters' self-descriptions of their service (and of their peers) can be described as falling into one or more of the following three categories:

- a. **Operational Service** warlike or non-warlike (as per the current NZ Government and NZDF definitions);
- b. Higher risk than service in NZ but not meeting the NZ Government's criteria to be defined as operational service; and/or
- c. **Non-operational service overseas.** Low, very low or no risk; but service that still directly contributes to the NZ Government's regional and strategic priorities.

#### **Operational Service versus normal Peacetime Service**

6. Most of the submissions received referred to the NZ Government's Principles for Medallic Recognition of Operational Service. On p.7 of the JWG Public Consultation document and p.20 of the Cooke Report the NZDF policy on what constitutes 'Warlike', 'Hazardous' and 'Non-warlike' service were clearly stated.

7. When reading the quotes from submissions, please be aware that a sizeable number of submitters have used the term 'non-warlike' when they clearly (from the context) mean 'non-operational'. For example, agreeing with Peter Cooke's findings that their service does not meet the requirements to be defined as operational service, but still requesting an NZGSM 1992 (Non-Warlike) with clasp 'SE Asia' as an alternative way to recognise their non-operational service overseas. Some of these submitters refer to the NZ Defence Service Medal as the basis / precedent for creating such 'non-operational' recognition.

# 8. The majority of submissions focused on Principle One – Medals are awarded to *recognise service that is beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service. (Bold italics added).*

Some of the submissions argued that tropical weather, wild life, carriage of live ammunition, exposure to potential tropical diseases or jungle living took them beyond "the normal requirements of peacetime service."

9. Some submissions took a broad geographical view of the 'potential risk' from the Communist Terrorists (CT) operations on the Malay Peninsula during the periods outside of the declared dates of Emergency and Confrontation. For example, incidents in northern Malaysia being 'proof' of a significant threat to New Zealand personnel based in southern Malaysia or Singapore.

#### Service by RNZAF personnel in SE Asia 1950-2011

10. A total of 12 submissions were received from ex-RNZAF personnel on their service in SE Asia. Most discussed service in the 1970s or 1980s.

11. Almost all RNZAF submissions referred to the NZ Government Principles for the Medallic Recognition of Operational Service – especially that service must be beyond the normal requirements of peace time service to be eligible for recognition. Examples include:

Sqn Ldr (Rtd) Gordon Alexander, Iroquois pilot for 41 Sqn RNZAF based at RSAF Base Tengah Singapore from 8 July 1975 to 2 August 1977. "While the majority of tasks conducted could be said to be training focussed primarily, there were some missions flown that I believe fall within the provisions of non-warlike operations, and in particular the category of hazardous activities. These missions were in support of the Malaysian Armed Forces along the Thailand/Malaysia border region and other locations on the Malay Peninsula" – Submission G.C. Alexander, 19 August 2011.

Sqn Ldr (Rtd) Christopher Lee, 75 Sqn RNZAF. Fighter pilot, 75 Sqn based at Ohakea from Feb 1977 to Dec 1981. "While our role in the region (SE Asia) did not see 'Active Service', we were an operational unit involved in manoeuvres of an operational nature."

"The missions flown in SE Asia were often challenging and risky with many sorties flown at night, often low level over unfamiliar and mountainous terrain, and included intercepts by foreign aircraft and subsequent air combat manoeuvres. The risk of hitting the ground or another aircraft during these activities was far more significant than at our home base."

Most of our missions flown in SE Asia, I believe fall within the provisions of non-warlike operations and in particular within the category of hazardous activities." Submission C. C. Lee, 23 August 2011.

Charles A.F.R. Cooke, JP, National Chairman RNZAF Association.

"We do not support further medallic recognition other than that already approved for service in SE Asia. Just "being there": does not create an entitlement to the award of a medal." Submission RNZAF Assn 13 July 2011.

12. A number of the submissions about RNZAF service described a higher risk level (than in NZ) with some of the flying tasks allocated to the RNZAF in SE Asia. Many of the RNZAF submissions cited heat, tropical insects and disease, and uncomfortable and/or temporary accommodation as reasons for recognition.

13. The RNZAF submissions (apart from the RNZAF Association submission) indicate a common theme of disappointment that their service in what they viewed as "beyond normal peacetime service" had not been recognised by medals.

#### Service by RNZN personnel in SE Asia 1950-1975

14. A total of 17 submissions were received from ex-RNZN personnel on their service in SE Asia between 1950 and 1975. The main arguments put forward for (additional) medallic recognition were:

- a. ALL service at sea is 'operational', and/or there is little difference between peacetime service in SE Asian waters and non-warlike and/or warlike service;
- Their Australian peers have been recognised for their service in the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) and they (RNZN) have not;
- c. The requirements for Navy service in SE Asia from 1950 to 1966 to be eligible for medallic recognition are more "demanding" than for Army and "most definitely" for RNZAF. The view expressed is that this is a discriminatory practice.
- 15. Examples of the comments by submitters include:

#### CPOWTR (Rtd) Royce Barker, RNZN.

"From 1955 to the early 1980's, SE Asia was the front line of the cold war. The Soviet Union and the USA fought for advantage at all levels."

"NZ war ships operated with ANZUK as a strategic deterrent to the Soviet Union/Chinese/Vietnamese/Asian Communist goals."

"The historian does not understand RNZN states of readiness. Ships go from a relaxed state to a full war footing in less than five minutes."

"Medal recognition has already been extended to RNZN Ships in similar circumstances. The deployment of RNZN ships to the Armilla patrols in 1982/1983... and the Multinational interception force in the Persian Gulf in 1996/1999." Submission R A. Barker, 8 August 2011.

#### PO A.J. Birtwistle, RNZN, HMNZS Royalist 1959-1963.

"Principle Three – A balance must be maintained between maintaining the exclusivity of awards and recognising significant service. The statutory test for War or Emergency should not require that activity took place that had an air of urgency of a high level of physical, psychological or environment risk."

"Of the three Services, the Navy have not been treated on a par with the Army and Air Force... The criteria laid down for the Naval Medal (NGSM) recognition was harsh indeed compared to Army and Air Force."

"Confrontation was arguably more dangerous for Navy personnel than the Malayan Emergency; during Confrontation there was a real naval threat from the enemy (Indonesia). Although poorly resourced, the Indonesian Navy could have seriously damaged (Navy) sections of the Commonwealth Force at the time."

"In an ideal world, Peter Cooke might be reasonably correct in his detailed research for which his huge effort I applaud, but it comes down to the fact that our Service in Malaya must surely be on a par or better than some previous GSM awards." Submission A.J. Birtwistle, 27 July 2011.

### D.A. Crick, RNZN, HMNZS Royalist and HMNZS Otago 1959 to 1963.

"Being awarded the PJM [Pingat Jasa Malaysia] medal went a long way in easing some of the bitterness I have felt over all these years and I am grateful to the Government and people of Malaysia in recognising the contribution made by their Allies in defence of their country and its rights and I am proud to wear it, however an award from a foreign government is not the same as recognition by my own Government." Submission D.J. Crick, 31 July 2011.

#### Yeoman (Rtd) Brian Edwards, RNZN.

"[I completed] four deployments to the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) [between 1961 and 1970]" .... "The ships were all there for a purpose and not just some holiday cruise." Submission Brian Edwards, 22 August 2011.

### Lt Cdr (Rtd) A.D. (Tony) Forsyth, RNZN. Submission is related to service on HMNZS Royalist 1963 and 1964 as a seaman.

"... transiting the Straits (of Taiwan) on what was essentially a war footing. If this was not an operational situation with inherent associated risks, why were the transits conducted under such circumstances? Submission Tony Forsyth, 19 August 2011

### Capt (Rtd) lain McGibbon, OBE, RNZN. HMNZS Royalist 1960 and HMNZS Otago 1969 to 1971.

"I have carefully read the remarks of the independent historian on the deployment of RNZN Ships to the Far East, but do not agree with his recommendations about no medallic recognition. His research is that of hindsight, and of what actually eventuated, but I do not believe that it takes sufficient consideration of the reasons for which the New Zealand Government deployed the RNZN ships to the Far East (at the time)." Submission I.M. McGibbon, 25 July 2011.

#### Richard Patterson, RNZN 1971-1991.

"It is also documented that RNZN warships deployed to the Far East were to be fully equipped and trained to a level at least sufficient to enable them to participate in operations at short notice against a first class Asian power, which indicates a predetermined risk existed."

*"I submit that the FESR and ANZUK Force RNZN Ships would qualify for medallic recognition under Principle 1 and the category 'non-warlike'."* Submission Richard Patterson, 6 August 2011.

### Gerry Wright, RNZN, 1956 to 1974. Based on his service on ships HMNZS Kaniere; Royalist; Santon and Otago.

"Except for two patrols by Kaniere off the Nationalist Chinese held Islands on the mainland coast, when Kaniere was at action stations for several hours, I am satisfied that every medallic recognition has been made for the periods that I served in the South East Asia region." *"I congratulate the JWG on releasing this research report."* Submission Gerry Wright, undated, received 15 August 2011.

#### John Titmus, HMNZS Blackpool June 1966 until May 1967.

"April 1967 – Transit through Indonesian Straits. On or about the 24/25 April 1967, HMNZS Blackpool transited through the Lombok Strait, the ship was darkened and a heightened level of readiness at either action stations or defence stations (was maintained).

"... the Captain would have been provided with "Rules of Engagement", possibly modified dependent on who had Operational Control". Submission John Titmus, 21 August 2011.

### Gilmore J. Wall, RNZN. Related to his service on HMNZS Otago, 1970-71.

"I am of the opinion that military service during the SEATO years should be recognised with a medal. I see little difference to service in UN ratified peacekeeping operations that our military have attended or visited that have occurred since. ... The whole point of SEATO was to ensure **continuous periods of peace** by way of a **continued military presence**."

"Whether or not a perceived military threat is obvious is irrelevant, the fact is that our service men and women were required to be there and that should be the minimum requirement needed in order to award a medal." Submission G.J. Wall, 15 August 2011.

#### Service by RNZN personnel in SE Asia 1976-2011

16. Only one submission discussed naval service at sea after 1975.

#### Robert Hall, RNZN.

"Piracy in the Malacca Straits. I was on board HMNZS Wellington in 1990 where we were in company with HMNZ Ships Waikato and Endeavour transiting the Indonesian Straits. Anti-piracy precautions were taken and Rules of Engagement were issued. This seems to fit the requirements for 'non-warlike' service."

"Indonesia claimed waters out to the 12 mile limit in 1958, a claim which would have affected passage by other nations' ships through a number of its straits. If accepted this would have turned the Java, Banda, Flores and Mallacca seas and the Straits of Macassar into inland waterways"

"Passage by RNZN warships made as late as 1990, were done so with heightened levels of precaution without visible measures that could be seen as provocative." Submission Robert Hall, 13 July 2011.

#### Service by NZ Army personnel in Malaysia and Singapore 1957-1975

17. A total of 14 submissions were received from ex-NZ Army personnel, plus one from an ex-RNZAF signals person, about Army service in SE Asia. Nearly all the submitters had served in 1 RNZIR (or predecessor units). Seven of the submissions were solely about service with the Rifle Company Butterworth (RCB) between 1 March 1971 and 27 July 1973, and three further

submissions discussed this service as part of their submission. Due to the large number of submissions on service at Butterworth these are discussed in a separate section further below.

18. Examples of the comments by submitters about land based Army service in Malaya / Malaysia and Singapore include:

### Ross Andrews, ex RNZASC, served in 90 Transport Company, ANZUK, Singapore 1972-74.

"In 1972 I left NZ to serve with the NZ Army in Singapore and Malaysia; at the time we were told we would be part of the ANZUK peace keeping force. When our unit was in Malaysia live ammo was carried."

"... we thought we had 'done our bit' like the guys had in J Force."

"I believe the Australians in our unit got presented with medallic recognition for doing the same job as us. We qualified for a rehabilitation loan on our return home, but a medal would be worn with the same pride as having 'NEW ZEALAND' on our shoulders." Submission Ross Andrews, 22 August 2011.

#### D'Arcy Bailey, ex 1 RNZIR 1963-65.

"My purpose in writing to you is in an effort to gain medallic recognition for A Company, 1RNZIR who served in Malaya during the period 1963-1965. As you are aware, the battalion did receive the British GSM (1962) with clasp Borneo and Malay Peninsular. For their service on the Thai border, 1RNZIR [less Alpha Company and some HQ elements] were subsequently awarded the NZGSM 1992 war like with clasp ."

"Alpha Company 1RNZIR remained in Terendak Camp during the battalion deployment to the Thai border area in 1964, and while we did not serve in the actual area, we were in direct logistic and admin support during this phase of operations. It is felt we should be considered for recognition in support of those that served on the Thai Border by the NZGSM 1992 – non war like..."

"Could I please request that your Committee take into account our position of not having a truly distinctive NZ Medal recognising our service?" Submission D'Arcy Bailey, 3 December 2010 and received via RNZRSA 13 July 2011.

#### WO2 (Rtd) Neil Henry, 1 RNZIR 1971-73.

"When I left NZ to join 1RNZIR in August 1971, Vietnam was still going and as far as my family were concerned, I was heading off overseas for a two year posting with a very good likelihood of serving in Vietnam. My elder brother had returned from W3 Company. So there was little doubt in my mind that I was potentially heading for a dangerous place. As it turned out, we did not get to Vietnam." Submission – Neil Henry 29 August 2011.

#### P.P. Robin, 1RNZIR March 1971 to July 1973.

"The 1RNZIR responsibility to the region finally ended in 1989 leaving behind 40 years of co-operation and its vital contribution to the stability of South East Asia during a period of significant international tension." "The role of 1RNZIR was to provide a valuable strategic forward defence force in the security of the region. Those deployed spent extensive periods of time training in the Malaysian jungle with consequent exposure to a range of debilitating tropical diseases and illnesses."

"While the service of 1RNZIR was not termed as peacekeeping in its current sense, our presence there did provide stability and the opportunity for the inexperienced armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore to train, develop and expand with a degree of reassurance and security. This is a role comparable to some other peacekeeping deployments undertaken by the NZDF in later years."

*"It is therefore sought that a recommendation of medallic recognition is made (by the JWG) for all NZ service personnel who served (in the region).* Submission P.P. Robin, 15 August 2011.

### South East Asia Association of NZ Inc by G. 'Mac' McDonald, member.

"We believe that the service in SE Asia throughout the period 31 July 1960 to 1989 (not withstanding those periods of designated Active Service) should be treated as "non-Warlike" overseas deployment which did have a hazardous component and was prolonged and arduous." Submission SE Asia Association Inc, 15 August 2011.

#### Capt (Rtd) JF (John) Sturgess, RNZIR.

"During the 1970's (at least) all field exercise deployments into Malaysia included a SOP that NCO's and commanders from Section to Company level were issued and carried, magasines of ball ammunition taped down, as an emergency measure."

"During the 1970's the 1RNZIR Signals Platoon maintained an isolated retransmission station on the Bukit Pantai feature near the Khota Tinngi Training Area in South Malaysia. It operated 24/7 and was a small self operational base camp facility with emergency ball ammunition, reserve water and food supplies and were issued with rules of engagement by the Signals Platoon Commander." Submission J.F. Sturgess, 9 June 2011 via RNZRSA.

### Service by NZ Army personnel in Malaysia and Singapore 1975-1989 (Not covered by the Cooke Report).

19. Ten submissions were received on NZ Army service between 1975 and 1989. This period was outside the research scope of the Cooke Report, so detailed descriptions from submitters have been included below, where relevant about specific incidents and/or events. No submissions on NZ Army service from 1990 to 2011 were received. Comments on service in the 1975-1989 period included:

### *Maj Steve Challies, 1 RNZIR Linton re service by B Coy, 1 RNZIR 1984 in Malaysia.*

"In Sept 1984, B and C Coys plus elements of Spt Coy (Recon pl) and Admin (Tpt Pl) deployed to the 69 Malaysian Police Field Force (PFF) Camp in Ipoh to conduct some shooting practice on the ranges, live field firing and tracking training with the 69 PFF personnel. During our stay at Ipoh, there was a contact between a group of CT and a 69 PFF patrol which resulted in a [69 PFF] casualty (9 Sep 1984 PC 67574 Hassan Zainuddin bin Hassan KIA).

"We did carry live ammunition during this exercise and the 69 PFF had cleared the area for our exercise. The contact happened where B Coy had camped the previous day. As far as we can establish, no 1RNZIR pers were involved in the contact nor the direct follow up operation – that was all done by 69 PFF personnel." Submission Challies (and others), 22 August 2011.

#### Pte Aaron Kennaway, 1RNZIR May 1985 - May 1987.

"I was posted to Bravo Coy, 1RNZIR and assigned as lead scout in 6 Platoon. In Peter Cooke's report, he relies entirely on official records of policy, procedure and formal reporting of incidents. He does not appear to have sought first-hand knowledge of events on the ground by personnel who were able to be contacted and interviewed."

"It is my own experience that on many occasions when be deployed on exercise in Malaysia, NZ troops were briefed on the current threat levels from CTs associated with the Malaysian Communist Party. Officers, Senior NCO's and occasionally private soldiers were issued live ammunition in case there was a need for self defence against unintentional interaction with these armed forces. Rules of engagement were issued concurrently."

"NZ soldiers living in the Malaysian rainforest for up to a month at a time were exposed to hazards not experienced in New Zealand. Tropical diseases, snake bite, animal attack and the threat created by the unknown whereabouts of a known enemy (Malaysian Communist Party)."

"Despite prophylactic measures, I contracted malaria and became very ill; an illness that recurred for many years afterwards. On no less than three occasions, I encountered tigers in close proximity. These hazards are beyond the normal requirements of peacetime service in New Zealand"

"In October 1986, I was posted to the Signals pl and (then) Lt Col R.N. Upton as CO, 1RNZIR to assist a detachment of 69 PFF who had been detached from the exercise 'enemy party' to verify a sighting of armed CT in the exercise area. The task assigned to them was to track and observe this alleged CT group and report to 1RNZIR on the security of the intended exercise area. I was attached to the patrol for the purpose of providing signals (to the Bn CP)."

"I was issued with 120 rounds of live ammunition and loaded my rifle. Lt Col Upton said to me "You are now on active service, do not do anything to embarrass me or this unit". The other members of the patrol carried 500 rounds each plus explosives. The patrol I was attached to deployed and tracked a party of three armed CT who eventually made camp near the edge of the area intended for use within exercise parameters. Our patrol established an OP and maintained surveillance of the CT for several days. Members of the CT group were seen on several occasions leaving their hide, carrying rifles and returning a short time later."

"I believed that I was on active service not only because of my briefing but also because I was armed with live ammunition, patrolled in an area where it was known the armed members of the CT were operating, observed these armed persons while attached to a patrol from B Sqn, 69 PFF for a week in Malaysia before they had signed a peace agreement." Submission Aaron Kennaway, 22 August 2011.

#### Wayne Paget, 1 RNZIR 1983-85.

"There has been no provision for service recognition for those who served in South East Asia between 1983 to 1985. 1RNZIR was mobilised and put on stand by for 24 hours to serve in the Falkland's War – all leave was cancelled and equipment issued. Even though we did not see action, the fact that we were mobilised and ready to go should mean some recognition for those serving at the time." Submission Wayne Paget, 22 August 2011.

#### Service by 1 RNZIR personnel in RAAF Base Butterworth, 1971-73

20. In total, five 1 RNZIR Companies served at Butterworth in 1971, five Companies in 1972 and two Rifle Companies in 1973. This service was in rotation with Australian and British Army Rifle Companies to provide additional security to the air base and complete additional training. Most deployments were about one month in duration.

21. Essentially all ten submissions stated that service at this time amounted to 'non-warlike' operations as there was a 'constant risk of CT [Communist Terrorist] operations against the Butterworth base', 'patrols on the perimeter carried live ammunition', and the Australian military personnel serving in RAAF Base Butterworth at the same time all received at least the Australian Service Medal 1945-75 for their TOD.<sup>1</sup> For example,

22. Extracts from submissions made by ex-1RNZIR personnel in relation to Company deployments at RAAF Base Butterworth are below:

"Capt (Rtd) John Sturgess, RNZIR, states, in part:

"This subject has proved to be very controversial, complex and somewhat polarised – fundamentally – between those directly involved and those who were not. The continued stiff opposition, adamant refusal to recognise the validity of these issues, and scepticism expressed at all levels, including those appointed to the RNZRSA Medallic Committee, has been a source of bafflement and frustration to those who served in SE Asia during the time in question".

"Butterworth Airbase, North Malaysia. RAR and 1RNZIR Infantry Companies rotated though about month long deployments to provide armed security for Australian and Malaysian air assets at the base. The defence rifle companies patrolled and conducted sentry duties in field service light order with first line ball ammunition and clearly defined states of weapon readiness and rules of engagement".

**Note:** The Rotorua RSA, SE Asia Veterans Assn Inc, Thame, Robin, Ratima, Paget, Bailey, and Francis submissions repeat much of the same material and references.

Rodney Wareham, A Coy 1RNZIR, March 1970-1972 states: "At least two Companies serving at RAAF Butterworth were deployed into the Batong Salient area of the Thai-Malay border area on a patrolling

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Submission by SE Asia Veterans Association Inc – G. McDonald

activity – Alpha Company in March 1971 and Whisky Company in July 1971. Both Companies found signs of a CT presence in the area".

"Although the Australians have no difficulty in classifying service at RAAF Butterworth as Operational/Non Warlike/Hazardous, New Zealand officials give it no classification at all and, until recently, have failed to acknowledge it occurred".

In the past, when submissions for recognition of service in SE Asia have been put in front of various Ministers of Defence, particularly when the Australians have recognised the same or similar service by their own forces, the stock standard reply in refusing the request has been that "the two countries have separate medals systems and differ in their requirements for recognition".

"Rightly or wrongly, many former service personnel are of the opinion that the Australians are more proactive in the recognition of service and are therefore speedier in awarding the appropriate medals".

"Many of these former servicemen... have been disappointed with the treatment they have received as regards recognition of their service in South East Asia. They feel that their service has been seen as unimportant or insignificant and are resentful that their requests for recognition made over the years, have been dismissed without explanation. As a result, some have left feeling somewhat disillusioned with both the Government and Defence Force over this treatment". Submission Rodney Wareham, 8 August 2011.

#### Service as Defence Attaché in Thailand, early 1980s

23. One submission was received from **Capt (Rtd) Ian McGibbon, RNZN**, about his service as NZ Defence Attaché to Thailand January 1980 to March 1983. In his submission he cites visits to Communist Terrorist (CT) camps and being present in Bangkok during two abortive military coups. In part his submission states:

"I made a number of trips to the ill-defined Thai/Cambodia border, visiting most of the various refugee camps and sometimes crossing the border in order to obtain information and photographs. Three sets of photographs are included to demonstrate some of the work undertakes:

a. A visit to Ban Mak Mun, just over the border, with Defence Attaches of other countries, to observe equipment, weapons and ammunition taken by Cambodian irregular fighters from Vietnamese Forces. ...

b. A personal visit to the village of Nong Prue just over the border showing ammunition boxes and several military vehicles.

c. A personal visit to Ban Sa Ngae, the HQ of General Diel in Cambodia to which I was taken by a guide to avoid land mines, and which was used as a military school for the KPNLF. Submission Capt I.M. McGibbon, OBE, RNZN, 21 July 2011.

#### Service by Military Police in SE Asia

24. One submission (**Cpl T.W. Lobjoit, RNZAF Police, 1972-1980**) was received on the work by Military Police in SE Asia. He states in part:

*"I served in Singapore from 1977 to 1979 at the Tri Service Military Police Unit based at Sembawang. I served with NZ Navy regulators and NZ Military police".* 

"There is no doubt that overseas Military policing carries far more risks, than most other peacetime, military occupations."

"More often than not, he is the only face the victim sees, the only representative of the visiting service, and his professionalism and diplomacy in handling of the matter reflects directly to our nation's reputation. The close working relationships forged with the local civilian and military Police, is invaluable to both parties, and again reflect on our country". Submission T.W. Lobjoit, 15 July 2011.

#### Service in Cambodia by RNZN personnel, July 1992-1993

25. One submission was received requesting additional medallic recognition for the RNZN Riverine Patrol personnel (about 67 pers) deployed to Cambodia to assist the United Nations with Riverine patrols in the run up to the Cambodian General Elections. Also deployed around the same time were Engineers and Signals personnel. All except one of the RNZN pers were awarded the UN Medal for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

26. The submission from **CPO Phillip Jackson, RNZN** requests the award of "*New Zealand medallic recognition*" for this "*specific mission*", rather than simply the NZOSM which "*only indicates that the recipient partook in an operation somewhere*". He further suggests that the already instituted NZGSM 1992 (Non-Warlike) with clasp 'Cambodia' would be the appropriate additional medallic recognition "for my detachment's service. This was given to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) at the conclusion of UNTAC's mission, despite them having received the UN Special Service Medal. I feel that our case is no different to that of the successful case submitted by the Vietnam Veterans and approved in their MOU from the Government recently". Submission Phillip Jackson, 18 July 2011.

27. **Factual Note from NZDF:** The NZGSM 1992 (Non-Warlike) with clasp 'Cambodia' was instituted in 1995 because at that time there was no other medallic recognition for the NZDF personnel who had served with CMAC since 1 March 1994. Only later was the United Nations Special Service Medal (UNSSM) instituted and awarded to those who served with the United Nations as part of CMAC since 29 December 1993. Her Majesty The Queen gave approval on 31 January 2002 for eligible NZDF personnel who had served in Cambodia to accept and wear this UNSSM, in addition to the NZGSM 1992. NZDF involvement in CMAC ended on 30 April 2005.

#### **Definition of Operational Service**

28. A general submission was received from Martin van Ginkel (period and type of military service not stated). He writes in part:

"In considering this call for submissions, I believe there have been two fundamental flaws made: a. That only operational service is worthy of recognition; and

b. Your criteria for operational service.

The NZDSM which you have recently instituted is medallic recognition of non-operational service. The NZ Special Service Medal for the Asian Tsunami and Erebus are two more NZ examples of non-operational service that resulted in medallic recognition".

"The bigger issue is your criteria for operational service...There are currently NZDF personnel who are receiving medallic recognition for 'operational service' who are nothing more than sight seeing officers, while there are NZDF personnel here in New Zealand who are providing 24/7 support to military operations that are more deserving but go unrecognised.

"Your consultant did some number crunching to show that service in SEA was no more dangerous than peacetime training in NZ. I wonder how some of the missions that currently receive operational service recognition would fare if put under the same scrutiny. Are the training team in the Sinai even armed on a day to day basis? What about the people we have in Korea. The air force crew that flew peace talk representatives from the Solomon Islands to Christchurch qualify for the NZGSM Solomon Islands, how is that different to peacetime service. There are missions which have unarmed civilians receiving operational medals?

"Don't get me wrong I do not begrudge them recognition, it just seems to me that operational service criteria are flawed. The Falklands example best illustrates that".

"It is unfortunate that the JWG discounted the idea of providing a bar to the NZDSM for service that deserves recognition but falls short of deserving a medal. As I suggested in my NZDSM submission you could have also discontinued the NZOSM and replaced it with a bar on the NZDSM. At the moment the vast majority of NZOSMs awarded violate the basic medallic principle of not awarding more than one medal for the same operation/service.

So I will offer this suggestion, the US system of awarding ribbons. So rather than a full medal you could award a ribbon bar for SE Asia, Antarctica and other non-operational service that may arise. You could also discontinue the NZOSM and replace it with a ribbon bar and remove the previously mentioned anomaly".

Submission van Ginkel, undated but received by e-mail 8 August 2011.

#### Australian medallic policy compared to NZ medallic policy

29. A comparison of the "generous medallic awards" made by the Australian Government for military service in SE Asia in comparison to NZ medallic policy is made in many of the submissions received. Primarily these comparisons refer to the Australian Service Medal 1945-75 and the current Australian Service Medal (for service since 1975).

30. In 1995, the Australian Government instituted the **Australian Service Medal 1945-75** for 30 days service in a non-warlike theatre outside of Australia from 3 September 1945 to 13 February 1975. There are currently 14 clasps, of which three are awarded for service in SE Asia: 'FESR', 'SE Asia' and 'Thailand'.

31. The clasp 'SE ASIA' is awarded for 30 days "non-warlike" service with Australian elements of SEATO, ANZUS, FESR, ANZUK, Five Power Defence Arrangements in Malaysia or Singapore between:<sup>2</sup>

- a. 1 August 1960 to 16 August 1964; or
- b. 12 August 1966 to 14 March 1975.

32. The clasp 'FESR' is awarded for 30 days "non-warlike" service posted to or serving with RAN ships formally allocated to and participating in the Far East Strategic Reserve between 2 July 1965 and 31 August 1968.

33. In 1991, the Australian Government instituted the **Australian Service Medal** for service, normally 30 days, in a prescribed "non-warlike" theatre after 13 February 1975. There are currently 28 clasps, including 'SE Asia' (which is the only clasp for service in SE Asia). The 'SE Asia' clasp was awarded for 30 days "non-warlike" service with ADF elements of ANZUK, Australian Army Rifle Company, Five Power Defence Arrangements and Australian Army Survey operations between<sup>3</sup>:

- a. In Malaysia 14 February 1975 to 31 December 1989;
- b. In Singapore 14 February 1975 to 30 April 1975;
- c. With RAN ships (ANZUK) 14 February 1975 to 30 April 1975.

**Note:** Individuals are not eligible for the ASM with clasp 'SE Asia' if they are eligible for the ASM 1945-75 with clasp 'SE Asia' or with clasp 'FESR'.

#### **Grievances associated with Vietnam Medal - service after 23 January** 1973

34. Three submissions were made by ex-RNZAF personnel on behalf of the 40 and 41 Sqn RNZAF personnel who served in Vietnam after the end date for award of the Vietnam Medal. Each submission raised the same points.

35. Sqn Ldr (Rtd) Robert Davidson was the 41 Sqn Detachment Commander at the time the last of the NZ citizens were evacuated out of Saigon. He provides documentation that he strongly contested in the mid-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Australians Awarded, Renniks April 2008, pp.196-197.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Australians Awarded, Renniks April 2008, p.213.

1970s the closing off of eligibility for the Vietnam Medal with effect 27 January 1973.

36. His submission includes a series of correspondence challenging the validity of the process. The answer dated 21 April 1976 sent by Air Vice Marshal R.B. Bolt, Chief of Air Staff was, in part:

"Honours and awards are the sole prerogative of Her Majesty, who is of course the superior lawful authority in this country.

I believe there are insufficient substantive grounds for seeking a variation...notwithstanding your special recommendation, Sqn Ldr Davidson's submission is declined."

#### **General comments received**

37. A submission was received from **Brig (Rtd) John Dennistoun-Wood**, **ex 1RNZIR**, about the possibility of broad medallic recognition for all service in SE Asia, or a wide range of such service. He states:

"Such an award would represent the Americanisation of the NZ Medallic System and simply cheapen the value of those medals that have been earned for truly operational service. The concept is even worse than those attending the Operational Service Medal and the Defence Service Medal and they were borderline!" Submission John Dennistoun-Wood, 12 July 2011.

#### Enclosure:

1. List of submissions received

Serial	From	Notes on submission	General Subject
1	Mr Gordon Alexander, ex 41 Sqn RNZAF	RNZAF helicopter operations in Perak, April 1977	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
2	Mr Ross Andrews, ex RNZASC	90 Tpt Coy, RAASC 1972-74	1 RNZIR
3	Mr Craig Atkinson	Military service SE Asia 1986-89	Military Service SE Asia 1980s
4	Mr D'Arcy Bailey, ex 1RNZIR	A Coy, 1RNZIR 1963-65	1 RNZIR
5	Mr R A Barker, ex RNZN	RNZN service research in SE Asia is flawed	RNZN Service SE Asia
6	Mr A J Birtwistle, Rotorua ex RNZN	RNZN service in SE Asia - Royalist 1959-63	RNZN Service SE Asia
7	Mr Jim Blackburn, ex RNZN	Naval service - 'we serve in warships not peaceships'	RNZN Service SE Asia
8	Mr Chris Brownie, ex 3 Sqn RNZAF	Service in SE Asia (and other locations)	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
8a	Mr Chris Brownie, ex 3 Sqn RNZAF	Updated notes to above after reading JWG report	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
9	SGT David Bryant, ex RNZAF	Exercise Vanguard X, 14 Sqn RNZAF	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
10	Mr Rex Burrage, Arundel, Qld	Australian Active Service Medal 1945-75 with clasp SE Asia	Australian medallic policy compared to NZ medallic policy
11	Mr Don Carter, ex RNZAF	Vietnam Medal should be extended to 1975	Vietnam Medal
11a	Mr Don Carter, ex RNZAF	Part Two - Vietnam Medal should be extended to 1975	Vietnam Medal
12	MAJ Steve Challies, 1 RNZIR	1 RNZIR service in Ipoh, 1984 with Malaysian FFP casualties	1 RNZIR
13	Mr David A Crick, ex RNZN	RNZN service Royalist Sep 1958-Jun 1960; and Otago Feb 1962-Apr 1962; and Royalist Apr 1962 - Sep 1963.	RNZN Service SE Asia
14	SQN LDR (Rtd) R. (Bob) Davidson, RNZAF	Vietnam Medal should be extended to 1975	Vietnam Medal
15	WO Jim Dell, ex RNZN	RNZN units deployed to SE Asia were on operational defence duties	RNZN Service SE Asia
16	BRIG (Rtd) J. Dennistoun-Wood, ex RNZIR	Service by 1RNZIR 1964 -1989	1 RNZIR

Serial	From	Notes on submission	General Subject
17	Mr Brian Edwards ex RNZN	Disappointment at FESR service not being recognised	RNZN Service SE Asia
18	Mr John Fastier, ex RNZN	RNZN service should be recognised for the dangers present at all times	RNZN Service SE Asia
19	Mr Tony Forsyth, ex RNZN	Service by RNZN - Straits of Formosa 1963/64 HMNZS Royalist	RNZN Service SE Asia
20	Mr Tom Francis, ex 1 RNZIR, Singapore	JWG should consider non-warlike medal recognition - martial law etc	1 RNZIR
21	Mr Martin Van Ginkel	The criteria for 'operational service' are flawed	Operational Service criteria
22	Mr Robert Hall, ex-RNZN	RNZN service - Malacca Straights, Singapore, Malaysia	RNZN Service SE Asia
23	Mr John Harawene, ex 1 RNZIR 1972-74	Support of a non-warlike medal recognition for 1 RNZIR	1 RNZIR
24	Mr Wayne Harris, ex RNZN	RNZN service in Malacca Straits and off Vietnam	RNZN Service SE Asia
25	Mr Neil Henry	TOD in 1 RNZIR was expected to include1 RNZIRVietnam service, but did not1	
26	Mr Shane Henry	1 RNZIR service as a rifleman - 1978-1980	1 RNZIR
27	Mr John Inkster, ex 41 Sqn RNZAF	Only medallic recognition for 1964 -1975 is the Pingat Jasa Malaysia (PJM)	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
28	Mr Phillip Jackson, ex RNZN	Service in Cambodia 1992-93	Cambodia 1992-1993
29	Mr Aaron Kennaway, ex 1 RNZIR	1 RNZIR service May 1985 to May 1987 1 RNZIR	
30	Mr Christopher Lee, ex 75 Sqn RNZAF	Fighter pilot 'training' in SE Asia was at a higher RNZAF Service in SE A risk level than in NZ	
31	Mr P J (Peter) Lennard	Service in Singapore of 9 ANZUK Sigs Regt 1 RNZIR Nov 1971 to 1973	
32	Mr Morgan Lewis	Support staff in Terendak and Singapore deserve recognition for Vietnam	1 RNZIR
33	CPL T W Lobjoit, ex RNZAF Police	Military Police in SE Asia	Military Police in SE Asia

Serial	From	Notes on submission	General Subject
34	LT COL (Rtd) Eru Manuera, MC	Service with 2 NZ Regt	1 RNZIR
35	Mr Peter Mason, ex 14 Sqn RNZAF	Service with 14 Sqn RNZAF Mar to Nov 1966	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
36	CAPT (Rtd) I M McGibbon, ex RNZN	Service as Defence Attache in Thailand Jan 1980-Mar 1983	Defence Attache in Thailand
36a	CAPT (Rtd) I M McGibbon, ex RNZN - 2nd submission	HMNZS Ships Royalist 1960 and Otago 1969- 1971 in SE Asia	RNZN Service SE Asia
37	Mr Ellis McGregor, ex RNZAF	Service in Changi Base Dec 1962-Jun 1964	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
38	Mr G D (David) Neil, ex RNZN	1) Events of 1962; 2) Different rules for medallic recognition for RNZN service compared to Army and RNZAF in SE Asia	RNZN Service in SE Asia
39	Mr Geoffrey Osikai, ex NZ Army	NZ Army - Singapore 1982-84 & 1988-89, & Hong Kong 1987	1 RNZIR
40	Mr Des Otto, ex RNZN	Service in SE Asia of HMNZS Blackpool and other RNZN ships	RNZN Service SE Asia
41	Mr Wayne Paget, ex 1RNZIR	There should be recognition for 1 RNZIR 1983 to 1985	1 RNZIR
42	Mr Richard Patterson, ex RNZN	RNZN service in general - with specific examples about HMNZS Taranaki 1974	RNZN Service SE Asia
43	Mr Warren C Power, ex RNZN	RNZN service 1962-63	RNZN Service SE Asia
44	Mr Alma G Randell, ex RNZN	RNZN - HMNZS Taranaki transit off Vietnam coast 1972	RNZN Service SE Asia
45	WO1 Des Ratima, ex RNZEME	Support for submission by CAPT John Sturgess	1 RNZIR
46	Mr Tom Riddell, ex RNZN	Service in Malaya 1951 while on exchange with the Royal Navy - for which he was awarded the Naval General Service Medal	RNZN Service SE Asia
47	RNZAF Association Inc - from Mr Charles Cooke	Service by RNZAF in SE Asia - general	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
48	RNZN Communicators Association - from Mr Dave Carroll	Support for role of RNZN communicators in SE Asia 1950 to 1989	RNZN Service SE Asia

Serial	From	Notes on submission	General Subject
49	Rotorua RSA (Inc)	Military service in Malaysia and Singapore from 1966 to 1989, including 1 RNZIR in Butterworth	Military Service SE Asia, including 1 RNZIR in Butterworth
50	Mr Peter Pitiroi Robin	Service in Butterworth 1971-1973; 1 RNZIR service in Singapore to 1989.	1 RNZIR in Butterworth
51	Mr Murray Rutherfurd, ex RNZAF 75 Sqn	75 Sqn, RNZAF service in Malaysia and RAAF Butterworth	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
51a	Mr Murray Rutherfurd, ex RNZAF 75 Sqn	Part 2 notes on 75 Sqn, RNZAF service as above	RNZAF Service in SE Asia
52	Mr Richard Scrivener, ex RNZN	RNZN service in SE Asia	RNZN Service SE Asia
53	SE Asia Veterans Association Inc	NZ Army service in Malaya / Malaysia and Singapore 1960-1989	NZ Army Service in SE Asia
54	SE Asia Veterans Association Inc - from 'Mac' McDonald - 'member' of this Association	Service in RAAF Butterworth and generally SE Asia to 1989	1 RNZIR in Butterworth
55	CAPT (Rtd) John Sturgess, ex RNZIR	Service in Butterworth, Malaysia	1 RNZIR in Butterworth
55a	CAPT (Rtd) John Sturgess, ex RNZIR	Rebuttal to Cooke Report	1 RNZIR in Butterworth
56	Mr Hone Tamehana, ex 1 RNZIR 1979-81	My service was treated as a 'veteran' by VANZ and RSA, but not by medals	1 RNZIR
57	Mr Rick Thame, ex 1RNZIR 1969-71	RAAF Butterworth - A Coy incident March 1971	1 RNZIR in Butterworth
58	Mr John Titmus, ex RNZN	Service on HMNZS Blackpool 1966 to 1967	RNZN Service SE Asia
59	Mr Tom Walker, ex RNZAF	Exercise Bersatu Padu, 22 May to 5 Jul 1970 RNZAF Service in SE A	
60	Mr Gilmore Wall, ex RNZN	Naval service HMNZS Otago in Far East 1970- 71	RNZN Service SE Asia
61	Mr Rodney Wareham	1 RNZIR service at RAAF Base Butterworth, Malaysia	1 RNZIR in Butterworth
62	Robin Wilkins, ex RNZIR	Service in Singapore 1968-70	1 RNZIR
63	Mr Gerry Wright, ex RNZN	RNZN service - HMNZS Kaniere 1956/57	RNZN Service SE Asia

#### DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO STRAIT PASSAGES

### IN DISPUTED INDONESIAN WATERS

6 May 1954 to 6<sup>th</sup> March 1970

RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS

for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

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FEF. 10/80.W

6th March 1970

The Secretary New Zealand Navy Board

#### FAR EAST FLEET ORDERS

1. Spare stocks of Far East Fleet Orders held by this office are now at an extremely low level and it would therefore be appreciated if all copies of such Orders held by the New Zealand Navy Distributing Authority, Wellington, apart from those required for internal use, could be returned.

2. Several instances have occurred where Royal New Zealand Navy Ships arriving on Station have held unamended or incomplete sets of Orders thus requiring further supplement from this office.

3. In future it is proposed that Royal New Zealand Navy Ships be supplied with a complete outfit of Far East Fleet Orders direct from the office of Commander Far East Fleet by airmail before arriving on Station. These Orders should be returned before the ship's departure.

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SIGNED

Copy to: New Zealand Navy Distributing Authority, Wellington

<sup>(</sup>D.S. WYATT) Captain for Fleet Commander

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MINISTRY	OF	DEFEN	CE



Correspondence to be addressed to THE DEMUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENCE (NAWY) PLEASE QUOTE N.A. 018/4/3

29 JUL 1966

NAVY OFFICE

2nd Floor, Departmental Building, Stout Street, Weilington

G.P.O. BOX 212, WELLINGTON DEFORE DISPATCH DOP 28 Acatos AFTER DISPATCH P/A:

The Commanding Officer,

(Copies to:-

wellington

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Entension

The Commander in Chief, Far East The Commander, Far East Fleet The Head, Hew Ecaland Defence Liaison Staff, Canberra -The Head, Hew Ecaland Defence Liaison Staff, Singapore The Secretary of External Affairs The Secretary of Defence The Commodore, Auckland

CLATED VATERS, AUGUST 1955

At Annex A are instructions for passage through Indonesian claimed waters, should you be routed via the Java Sea on return passage to New Zealand in August 1965.

2. At Annex B is guidance in the handling of possible press enquiries occasioned by passage through the Java Sea.

3. OTAGO is to acknowledge receipt of this letter and its Annexes by signal to NEWB only.

MBGOG.

(A.B, Cole) Acting Deputy Secretary of Defence (Navy)

DECL	ASSIFIED
On 10 J	ANUARY 2013
Reference	12 Abilital
Appointment_	Review Aone

by SH , 876.5

RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS

for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

SECRET

### SECRET

#### Annex A to HA 018/4/8 dated 29 JUL 1966

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PASSAGE THROUGH INDONESIAN CLAIMED MATERS - MANZS OTAGO, AUGUST 1955

1. The Indonesian Naval authorities will be advised, informally, as an act of courtesy, approximately thirty-six hours in advance of your passage. They will be given broad details of your route and timings.

2. If your right of passage through Karinata Strait is questioned you should make it olear that the authorities in Djakarta have been informed of your route and you should proceed unless threatened by force. Should this happen, withdraw to Singapore making it clear that your withdrawal in no way recognises Hew Zealand acceptance of the right of Indonesian ships to prevent innocent passage of ships on internationally accepted routes and that you are withdrawing solely in order to await instructions from your Government.

3. If your right of passage is questioned in Lombok Strait you should:

- (a) point out that you have already transitted Karimata and that Indonesian Naval authorities were informed in advance of your route;
- (b) if objection continues invite the other party to confirm the facts from Djakarta, pointing out that your departure from the Java See in any direction entials transit of an Indonesian claimed strait. Make what headway you can to southward in the meantime;
- (c) if threatened with force withdraw to northward for further instructions after making the point in 2 above that withdrawal does not imply recognition.

4. You are to report immediately details of any encounter with Indonesian forces, the signals exchanged and your intended action. All signals arising from these instructions should include NZND, NZDDF Singapore, CINCFD, CONFEF and where appropriate ACNB in the address.

DECLASSIFIET On ID JANUARY Delvisul Reference. Review Panel Appointment\_

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#### SECRET

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#### Annex E to HA 018/4/8 dated 29 JUL 1960

GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDING OFFICER MENZS CTAGO IN MANDLING OF PRESS ENQUIRIES REGARDING ROUTE SINGAPORE-NEW ZEALAND

1. It is desirable that publicity concerning your route home should be kept to a minimum. However, as you will be the first HZ ship to call at Darwin for some time press interest may be evident.

2. Any press enquiries regarding the ship's route or the reasons for calling at Darwin should be handled by the Commanding Officer. The ship's company is to be warned before arrival in Darwin against making any statements to the press onboard or ashore in both Australia and New Zealand.

3. If you are asked why you called at Darwin you should reply to refuel. If it is pointed out that NZ ships in the past have called at Manus say that it is NZ policy to vary the routes of ships.

4. If on arrival in Darwin, Brisbane or Auckland you are asked about your route from Singapore you should answer that the route of naval vessels is not normally disclosed, but that you followed a well established route. If a direct question regarding passage through Indonesian claimed waters cannot be avoided point out that Lombok and Marinata Straits are internationally recognised international waterways and that you used them.

5. If asked if the permission of the Indonesian Government was obtained say this does not arise since the Strait is an international waterway; however, purely as an act of diplomatic courtesy, the Indonesians were informed of your passage.

5. If asked whether any precautions were taken against possible Indonesian action answer that the only precautions taken on passage were those associated with normal passages in confirmed international waters.

7. In the case of hypothetical questions on, for example, what action you would have taken in case of resistance to your passage you should answer quote I cannot answer hypothetical questions unquote.

8. Should you be questioned by the press on the matters above you are to report the gist of your conversations by signal to NZNB and if possible obtain the relevant press cuttings.

DECLASSIFIED
On 10 JANUARY 2013
Reference Machinan
Appointment Review Panel

RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS

Tor HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

SECRET

SHURBL NEW ZEALAND JOINT SERVICES LIAISON STAFF (SINGAPORE). 262/2/3 259/2/3 ED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS SI 1 120 OFFICE OF THE ASIA INSURANCE BUILDING FINLAYSON TREEN, SINGAPORE, 1. Rodon John COMMISSIONER FOR NEW ZEALAND OF HO WZ DEFE Reference 21 June 1963 00 Appointmen the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee (5), WELLINGTON The Secretary of External Affairs, WELLINGTON Copy to - Kuala Lumpur CFIVE WARSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN SOUTH EAST ASI 2 8 JUN 1963 NAVY OFFICE, Further to my cables and correspondence of similar reference and subject I have ascertained that the Naval WELLINGTON, N.Z. Commander (and I think the Air Commander) raised their objections in a closed session which they had with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on 18 June 1963. As a result of this discussion I have ascertained that the Commissioner-120021 General has sent a diplomatic telegram to the Commissioner. Office - DIPTEL 366 dated June 19, which has been repeated to the British High Commissioners in Canberra and Wellingtr I have not yet been able to sight the text of this cable but suggest that you endeavour to obtain it. I am led to believe that it expresses Far East disapproval of the 2001/2012 Foreign Office recommendations. It had been discussed at Phoenix Park that an enquiry should be made to ascertain whether or not the Ministry of Defence had agreed to the Foreign Office proposals. So far as I can gather this query has not been transmitted and DIPTEL 366 represents the only acti taken by Phoenix Park. STRIBUTION: CNS PLEASE NOTE CGS PAPERS CAS (A.F. Tucker) Wing Commander RNZAF Joint Services Liaison Offi-CUL ·FD NAVA HEREWITH TINS SECRET JPS ma 8181418

## SECRET

#### MOVEMENT OF H.M. SHIPS IN INDONESIAN WATERS

In 1962 UK, Australian and NZ agreed on a procedure for notifying the Indonesian Government of the passage of HM, HMA and HMNZ ships through waters in the neighbourhood of the Indonesian coast.

Only the movement of ships using an "unusual route", i.e., one not listed in "Ocean passages of the World," or an unusual concentration of ships would be notified. Movement of RFAs not in company would not be notified.

FOCINCFEF would notify movements from the Far East and ACNB from the Australian Station (including NZ).

Because of the state of tension over Dutch New Guinea at the time, it was agreed to hold the agreement in escrow until the tension lessened, and in the meantime to notify <u>all</u> naval movements in the area informally.

In October 1962 the state of tension was agreed to have terminated. Therefore the original 1962 "agreed procedure" came into force and only the unusual movements were notified.

Now the British Government suggest that, with the new state of tension over the Indonesian confrontation policy, the agreement should revert once again to notification of all movements, but the agreement should be made reciprocal and should preferably cover Malayan waters as well.

The British doubt whether the arrangement would be acceptable to Indonesia but the offer to notify would put them (the British) in a "one-up" position and give them more freedom of action.

Subsequent planning level signals show:

- (a) the Australian JPC reaction that they are unlikely to follow UK's lead;
- (b) Singapore reaction that CINCFE and FOCINCFEF are likely to have strong reservations and may well disagree with the political move.

#### COMMENT

Although the "confrontation" tension might now be almost past, it seems this area is worth special efforts to avoid clashes.

At the same time it seems important that Britain/Australia/NZ should show a united front.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Discussion with Admiral Begg for the purpose of exchange of views.



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Lordon Hat 31, 1/2013 For HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE British Defence Liaison Staff,



SECRET

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION Government Life Insurance Building WELLINGTON, N.Z.

P.O. Box 1812. Telephone: 46-060

BDLS/14

29thApril, 1963.

The following is a copy of a letter addressed to R.N.L.C. Canberra (copy to me) and which may be of interest.

"1. I am writing to you on the question of informing the British and Australian Embassies in Djakarta of the movements of Commonwealth warships through Indonesian waters. We have recently had an exchange of signals with ACNB which indicates that they may be somewhat confused over this requirement and I believe it would help if you could put in a word in the appropriate quarter.

2. The position so far as HM Ships are concerned is laid down in FOTI 4105 para.7 which reads:-

"FOCINCFEF will inform the British Embassy Djakarta of routine movements from the Far East Station. AONB will inform the Australian Embassy Djakarta of movements from the Australian Station. The signal will include a final paragraph 'Request you inform British/Australian Embassy' when the movement includes a ship belonging to the other nation."

In fact we have a verbal agreement with BNA Djakarta not to put in the bit about informing the British Embassy; he does this automatically.

3. When we inform BNA Djakarta we always include ACNB as an info addressee and, if an RNZN ship is involved, NZNB also, so that every one concerned is in the picture. I regret that the Australians do not do this but when our ships are involved they let us know when (their) action is completed; this inevitably leads to our not being told until a very late stage and frequently results in our finding it necessary to prompt ACNB to ensure that action has indeed been taken. Additionally the Australians apply this procedure to RFAs on passage alone, which we do not - under these conditions we class them as Merchant Ships. (RFAs on passage as part of a Naval Force and in company with it are of course reported with the Naval elements).

4. Naturally the last thing we would wish to do is to be thought to be trying to teach ACNB their business but there is no doubt that if they could see their way to adopting our procedure it would save a lot of doubt and trouble and would make life much easier for the Djakarta Embassies. I should be most grateful if you would have a shot at getting this matter lined up; I am copying this letter to Terence Percy to keep him in touch."

Stocky This was a personal Collin lon 15 from Henry head on the staff of Former for Commodore C.C. STEVENS, On- 9 MAY. 19 RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS A.C.N.S. Referance Navy Office. DI DS MN49 1/201 Appointment Wellington for HQ NZ DEFENCEPORET AON

•	SECRET.	IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE REFER TO
HONE:		NEW ZEALAND HOUSE, 415, Strand,
The Secretary External Afr WELLINGTON.	DECLASSIFIED	LONDON, W.C.2.
	1	18 September 1962 Copies to: Canberra,
	Appointment Russ MNGA	Singapore

PASSAGE OF NAVAL VESSELS THROUGH INDONESIAN WATERS

We have now received a copy of a letter dated 17 September from the Admiralty to the Foreign Office which, after setting out the Australian and New Zealand replies on the final text of the "agreed procedure", goes on to say:-

"As the situation in the area is now more settled and the threat of hostilities has clearly receded following the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands on the future of West New Guinea, it is presumed that the present informal notification of all movements of warships can be replaced by the procedure for the formal notification of movements for normal times as set out in the attachment. Subject to your agreement, we propose to inform the Commander in Chief, Far East Station, accordingly."

Although our concurrence does not seem to have been specifically requested, we should be glad to learn whether you would agree that it may now be possible to put the "agreed procedure", into/effect.

all a the	REPERASO TO	RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS	
A CONTRACTOR	AG	for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE	
E Martin E	940	M. J. C. TEMPLETON	
The Navy Secretary, Navy Office, <u>WELLINGTON</u> . PM 106/22/2/2. I grateful for your comm Secretary of	pA. should be ents. A. f External Afr SECRET.	(MJ.C. Templeton) for High Commissioner	
1418			

018/4/8 On Reference 55 APR 1982 Askin Appointment 17 TARAJONI The Commanding Officer, HMNZS TARANAKI 20 Royal SITION TO COMMONWEALTH STRAT NOTES ON CURRENT PROCEDURES CONTRIBUTION STRATEGIC RESERVE RNZN M This memorandum is for your information and guidance, while serving on the Far East Station as the RNZN contribution to the 120 RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS 11/01 DEFENCE FORCE Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Mediubul CONDITIONS OF SERVICE 2. The RNZN ship while serving on the Far East Station, is placed under the operational command of the Commender-in-Chief, Far East Station, and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the ANZAM Directive to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and the Directive for RNZN ships attached to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, becomes an integral part of the Far East Fleet although retaining its national identity. (Copies of these two Directives are being iasued to you prior to your departure for the East NZ HO are being issued to you prior to your departure for the Far East × Station). DESPATCHED VISITS BY RNZN SHIPS 5. Clearances for the three types of visits defined in NZBR. 23, inticle 13/45 are obtained as follows: No. 6 The Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station requests the New Zealand Naval Board to obtain diplomatic clearance through the New Zealand Formal Visita: Department of External Affairs. Informal Visita: As above. <u>Operational Visita</u>: The Commander-in-Chief, Far Nest Station obtains clearances, keeping the Naval Board and the Commissioner for New Zealand in Singapore informed 4. The Naval Board have undertaken to inform the Department of External Affairs of all visits by New Zealand warships to foreign or Commonwealth countries in order that political considerations (if any) may be taken into consideration. There is however, no intention of interfering with the Commander-in-Chief's operational programme. INDONESIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS

#### Background

A.

5. In December 1957 the Republic of Indonesia claimed as territorial sea all waters within twelve miles of straight base-lines joining the outer points of islands of the republic, and this claim has since been re-effirmed.

6. Many Governments lodged protests, as the enforcement of the claim would deny the free use of international waterways and air routes, and the possible denial of the direct lines of communication to the strategic area of South East Asia was of particular concern to New Zealand. Apart from a few exceptions the Indonesian claim has not been supported and nations are, generally, still observing the traditional three mile limit of the indonesian of innocent persons.

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Developments 7. So far the twelve miles claim in ponet been pressed by the Indonesian Government and the present state of affairs appear acceptable to both sides.

8. Generally the ANZAM nations route warships through the international waterways such as Sunda and Lombok Straits, without prior notification to the Indonesian Government, as it is considered that the continued prior notifications of these movements could be interpreted as indicating that the ANZAM countries accepted an obligation for such an advice to avoid provoking the Indonesians. However, it was decided that the Indonesian Government would be notified of ships passing through unusual routes near Indonesia and of unusual exercises or concentrations of ships (more than three), but otherwise in the case of routine passages no notification would be given. It is emphasised that any prior advice given to the Indonesian Government is merely an act of courtesy ( and to allay any possible misgivings) and would in no way seek permission for the passage of the ships.

#### ANZAM Agreement

9. This procedure has been agreed by the three ANZAM partners and the position now is that the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand notify the Indonesian Government of the passage of HM, HMA and HMNZ Ships through waters neighbouring on the Indonesian Coast as follows:

"Prior notification will be given as a matter of courtesy of the passage of (HM, HMA or HMNZ) Ship by unusual routes (i.e. those not listed in "Ocean Passages of the World") or in unusual concentrations (i.e. three or more warships.)"

60. In addition, it is agreed that the British and Australian Ambassies in Djakarta are notified of <u>all</u> movements of HM, HMA and HMNZ warships in waters close to Indonesistenterritory. This is done in order that the Ambassadors are fully aware of these movements and able to counter possible Indonesian allegation or answer queries. Notification is given to the British Embassy by the Commander<u>in-Chief</u>, Far East Station of HM, HMA and HMNZ Ships proceeding from the Far East Station, while ACNB notifies the Australian Ambassador of HM, HMA and HMNZ Ships proceeding to the Far East Station. In every case, each Ambassador passes this information to the other. Although there is a New Zealand Consul-General in Djakarta, the British Ambassador acts in major diplomatic matters for New Zealand, and the New Zealand Consul-General is thus not notified.

#### United States Policy

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> 11. The enforcement of the 12 mile limit would strategically affect the United States less than New Zealand and consequently the views of the two countries differ. Depending on the circumstances the United States may or may not give prior warning of the passage of units of the USN. They invariably do so for large concentrations of ships.

#### Extraordinary Notification

12. During the recent period of tension between the Netherlands and Indonesian regarding Netherlands New Guinea, the Indonesian Authorities have suggested that it would be desirable to advise them informally about movements of British Ships in Indonesian waters.

13. The ANZAM partners although loath to depart from the formula as set out in paragraph 9, agree that it would be wise to forestall any possible incidents at present, and have decided, for the duration of the present emergency only, to notify the passage of all HM, HMA or HNNZ warships in or near Indonesia waters to the Indonesian authorities informally and orally. In doing this, the ANZAM partners would stress that they do not recognise any obligation to notify movements of warships on innocent passage through these waters and that the SECRET





notification is being made as an act of courtesy in response to the Indonesian request for exceptional measures during the present state of tension. Considerable care should be taken when operating in the Singapore and Malacca Straits areas not to enter or anchor in Indonesian territorial waters (three miles limit).

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### NEW ZEALAND POLICY

14. When passing through the Indonesian islands HMNZ Ships should follow the passages outlined in "Ocean Passages of the World (1950)". The selected routes should afford minimum entry into recognised Indonesian territorial waters (i.e. the three miles limit), and should avoid the Malacca Seas, Geram Seas and Banda Sea areas unless strong operational reasons pertain. To avoid possible misinterpretation, which might be construed as the right of innocent passage through international straits, exercises should not normally be carried out in or close to recognized Indonesian territorial waters.

#### EMPLOYMENT OF NEW ZEALAND FORCES

#### (a) <u>Evacuation Operations</u>

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Because of the strong nationalistic outlook of the Indonesian Government, and more especially in view of the tension in the area in recent/ments, the occasion may arise when British Commonwealth and/other European nationals may have to be evacuated from Indonesia. The Royal Navy and the United States Navy have co-ordinated plans for this possibility and the New Zealand Government have approved the use of HMNZ Ships on the same basis as RN Ships in support of evacuation operations, provided these operations are not opposed by the Indonesian authorities. In granting this approval, the Government required that HMNZ Ships should not, as far as possible, be placed in a position where they might be required to take action which the Indonesians could regard as provocative. Should the situation deteriorate to such an extent that an evacuation would have to be carried out by force the prior specific approval of the New Zealand Government would be required before New Zealand forces were committed.

#### (b) Singapore Territorial Waters

The Government, although it considered the responsibility primarily that of the United Kingdom, agreed that HMNZ Shipay or parts of ships' companies, may be used in the same manner as Royal Navy Ships for the protection of Singapore territorial waters. This does not include Internal Security duties.

(c) Protection of Shipping

Protection of shipping on the high seas (i.e. outside the three miles limit) may be afforded by HNMZ Ships. The protection given by New Zealand naval units is to be limited to British shipping, (i.e. shipping flying the Red Ensign or Red Ensign defaced) unless specific approval for other uses is first obtained from the New Zealand Government

16. Far East General Order 151 is, therefore, applicable to HMNZ Ships serving under the operational commander of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station.

> MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS ON FAR EAST STATION (Ref: NZBR. 23 articles 56/22, 56/24)

17. The arrangements made with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station for maintenance and remains to HMNZS TARANAKI are outlined in

SECRET BEFORE DESPISON CERTAINS! NA. 017/1/23 dated 29 January 1962 a copy of which was forwarded to you. AFTER DESPATCH Delete 14 18. Under normal circumstances Dockyard assistance will not be required on the Far East Station, except in circumstances outlined in NZBR. 23 articles 56/22 and 56/24. In essence any call for Dockyard assistance should be limited to urgent and essential defects affecting operational efficiency and approval of such is left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer. Details of such work would eventually be reported as in Article 56/24 (2). 1519. Naval Board approval is required before Dockyard assistance is called upon to remedy defects other than urgent and essential as indicated in paragraph 16. Brief details should be forwarded by signal. This Mandraudow is for your intermation and guidands, shile serving on the For Nart Station as the BAR southibution to the Companyentik Strutegic Becarte. (28q) 1 D' CIELK Whavy Secretary 2. You HALF this while serving on the under the egendlemail contains of any a 1500-0 TA \$2.8000 ACIAN Directive is the Commonweal Constants into them is the Westernet and And House Prove Brand As LAN Directive is the Component of the second state the Directive for fills drips stinched to the Componential interaction is interaction of the second state in the second state of the second state interactives are training its national identity. (Contract the second state interactives are training inspectives to you rive to your dependence for the Lag dese DECE SHILLES DECLASSIFIED spea of spulles defined in Milli. 23. On 10 HANLARY 2013 b. Zares Machalan Convis-Casef, Per Sent Station Reference\_\_\_\_ As here instand Hevel Score to obtain clearence through the New Lonison of Esternal Affairs. Review Aone) Appointment AN ADOVE Dustintional Visiter. The Communication Caled, For Rast Station obtains RELEASED TOR BUBLIC ACCESS JACILIUSU 1D1 1 12013 The Savel Bases too Baterhal AWalra af sid a for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE war ships to fore the Commonwealth Gooutetas Commonwealth countries of prose that peditions considerations (if its may be taken into depart or high the "Surre is however, no intention or interfering, with the Common prosecutional programmes ney be taken into doubt analyse. DERVICE THE TRUET OF LAL TATIES 5. In Pressber 1997 the Republic at Independe claimed as territorial see all enters within tarive siles of straight hangelines joining the outer points of islands of the republic, and this claim has since been re-differed. king developments ladged protents, so the enforcement of the while molid deny the free use of international metaenrow and all petters, at the possible denied of the direct lines of communications is the Attraction of the second secon this, still observing the ales successed and mettons ------

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, FAR EAST STATION, H.M. NAVAL BASE, SINGAPORE.

23rd December 1961.

FES.455/16.W.(0)

SECRETARY, AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH NAVAL BOARD. NAVY SECRETARY, NEW ZEALAND NAVAL BOARD. FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING H.M. AUSTRALIAN FLEET. COMMODORE, AUCKLAND.

FAR EAST SECRET MEMORANDA

#### Enclosures:

- (1) Far East Charge Decument No. 032 (4 in No.)
- (2) Form S.1330X

The enclosed cepies of Far East Charge Decument No. 032 are forwarded for your retention.

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2. It is requested that Article 140 of the old issue of Far East Secret Memoranda, (one of each which is held by the addressees), be destroyed and a destruction certificate forwarded to this office.

3. The Australian Commonwealth Naval Beard and the New Zealand Naval Beard are requested to arrange distribution to the R.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. ships attached to the Strategic Reserve. These ships at present issued with the eld memoranda are being requested to destroy them on receipt of the Charge Decument.

RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS 11/1/2013 for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

for Admiral

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Reference The Commanding Ont cer. H. M. N. Z. S. PUKAKI.

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R. N. Z. N. CONTRIBUTION TO COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC RESERVE NOTES ON CURRENT PROCEDURES operaiding.

lonation

This memorandum is for your information and guidance when serving on the Far East Station as the R.N.Z.N. contribution to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.

#### Conditions of Service

2. The R.N.Z.N. ship, while serving on the Far East Station, is placed under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, and, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the A.N.Z.A.M. Directive to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and the Directive for Royal New Zealand Navy ships attached to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, becomes an integral part of the Far East Fleet although retaining its national identity. (Copies of these two Directives are being issued to you prior to your departure for the Far East Station.)

#### Visits by R. N. Z. N. Ships Destan territor

3. Clearances for the three types of visits defined in N.I. 13/45 are obtained as follows:

As above differ,

Formal Visits: The Commander in Chief, Far East Station, requests the New Zealand Naval Board to E HA H, abino petur obtain diplomatic clearance through the New Zealand Department of External Affairs. the 12 miles limit would strategically less than New Lociand and consequently

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<u>Operational</u> <u>Visits:</u> <u>Commander in Chief, Far East Station</u> <u>obtains these clearances in all cases,</u> <u>keeping the Naval Board and the New Zealand</u> <u>Commissioner, Singapore informed.</u>

Depending on

4. The Naval Board have undertaken to inform the Department of External Affairs of all visits by New Zealand warships to foreign or Commonwealth countries whether formal, informal, or operational in order that political considerations (if any) may) be taken into consideration, although there is no intention of interfering with the Commander-in- Chief's operational programme.

recognized Indenesian Indonesian Territorial Waters Employment of New Zealand Porces

#### Background

5. On 13 December 1957 the Indonesians claimed as territorial sea all waters within 12 miles of straight base-lines joining the outer points of islands of the republic. This claim has recently been re-affirmed. 1.0 be evenues

Many Governments lodged protests, as the enforcement of the claim would deny the free use of international waterways and air routes. The possible denial of the direct lines of communication to the strategic area of South East Asia was of particular concern to New Zealand. Apart from one or two exceptions the Indonesian claim has not been supported and nations are, generally, still observing the traditional 3 mile limit and retaining the right of innocent passage.

#### Developments

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7. So far the 12 miles claim has not been pressed by the Indonesians and the present state of affairs appear acceptable to both sides.

8. In general the A.N.Z.A.M. nations route warships through the international waterways such as SUNDA and LOMBOX Straits without prior notification to the Indonesian Government as it is considered that the continued prior notifications of these movements could be interpreted as indicating that the A.N.Z.A.M. countries accepted an obligation for such an advice. To avoid provoking the Indonesians, however, it has been agreed that the Indonesians would be notified of ships passing through unusual routes near Indonesia and of unusual exercises or unusual concentrations of ships (more than three). Otherwise, in the case of routine passages etc., no notification would be given to the Indonesians. It is emphasised that the prior advice is merely an act of courteey (and to allay any possible misgivings) and would in no way seek permission for the passage of the ships. The routine passage of ships, either alone or in company, will continue to be made unheralded.

9. This procedure, which was proposed by the Australians and supported by New Zealand, has not yet been formally accepted by the United Kingdom, but it is generally acceptable to all three A.N.Z.A.M. partners.

10. It is United Kingdom and Australian practice, however, to notify their respective Ambassadors in Djakarta of all movements of R.N. and R.A.N. ships in waters close to Indonesian territory in order that the Ambassadors are fully aware of these movements and able to counter possible Indonesian allegations or answer queries. Similarly it has been agreed that the New Zealand Naval Board will notify the Naval Attache to the British Ambassador of any R.N.Z.N. ship passing close to Indonesia on its way to the Far East Station, while C.I.N.C.F.E.S. will notify him of R.N.Z.N. ships returning to New Zealand.

11. The enforcement of the 12 miles limit would strategically affect the United States less than New Zealand and consequently the views of the two countries differ. Depending on the circumstances the United States authorities may or may not give prior warning of the passage of units of the U.S.N. They invariably do so for large concentrations of shipe.

#### New Zealand Policy

12. When passing through the Indonesian islands H.M.N.Z. Ships should follow the passages outlined in "Ocean Passages of the World (1950)". The selected routes should afford minimum entry into recognised Indonesian territorial waters (i.e. the 3 miles limit). To avoid possible misinterpretation, which might be construed as the right of innocent passage through international straits, exercises should not normally be carried out in or close to recognised Indonesian territorial waters.

#### Employment of New Zealand Forces



Byacuation Operations. Because of the strong Nationalistic outlook of the Indonesian Government the scasion may arise when British Commonwealth and other European nationals may have to be evacuated from Indonesia. The R.N. and U.S.N. have coordinated when for this possibility and the N.Z. Government have approved the use of H.M.N.Z. Ships on the same basis as R.N. ships in support of evacuation operations, provided these operations are not opposed by the Indonesian authorities. In granting this approval the Government required that H.M.N.Z. Ships should not, as far as possible, be placed in a position where they might be required to take action which the Indonesians could regard as provocative.

Should the situation deteriorate to such a stage that an evacuation would have to be carried out by force the prior specific approval of the New Zealand Government would be required before New Zealand forces were committed.

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- (b) <u>Singapore Territorial Waters.</u> The Government, although it considered the responsibility primarily that of the United Kingdom, agreed that R.M.N.Z. Ships, or parts of ships' companies, may be used in the same manner as R.N. ships for the protection of Singapore territorial waters. This does not include Internal Security duties.
  - (c) <u>Protection of Shipping.</u> Protection of shipping on the high seas (i.e. outside the 3 miles limit) may be afforded by H.M.N.Z. Ships. The protection given by New Zealand naval units is to be limited to British shipping unless specific approval for other uses is first obtained from the New Zealand Government.

14. Far East General Order 151 is, therefore, applicable to H.M.N.Z. Ships serving under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station.

Maintenance and Repairs on Far East Station

(Ref: N.Z.B.R. 23 Articles 56/22, 56/24)

15. Arrangements have been made with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station for the allocation of 8 working days at extended notice, every three months, for self maintenance during the term of commission of H.M.N.Z.S. PUKAKI on the Far East Station.

16. Under normal circumstances Dockyard assistance will not be required on the Far East Station, except in circumstances outlined in N.Z.B.R. 23, Article 56/22 and 56/24. In essence any call for Dockyard assistance should be limited to urgent and essential defects affecting operational efficiency and approval of such is left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer. Details of such work would eventually be reported as in Article 56/24(2).

17. N.Z.N.B. approval is required before Dockyard assistance is called upon to remedy defects other than urgent and essential as indicated in paragraph 16. Brief details should be forwarded by signal.

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## Access Navy Secretary

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INDONESIAN TERRITORIAL WATERED NZ DEFENCE FORCE

This memorandum is issued for the information and guidance of Commanding Officers of ships making passages in the vicinity of Indonesian waters.

#### Background

2. On 13 December, 1957, the Indonesians claimed as territorial sea all waters within 12 miles of straight baselines joining the outer points of islands of the republic.

3. Many governments lodged protests, as the enforcement of the claim would deny the free use of international waterways and air routes. The possible denial of the direct lines of communication to the strategic area of South East Asia was of particular concern to New Zealand. Apart from one or two exceptions the Indonesian claim has not been supported and nations are, generally, still observing the traditional 3 mile limit and retaining the right of innocent passage.

#### Developments

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4. So far the 12 miles claim has not been pressed by the Indonesians and the present state of affairs appears acceptable to both sides.

5. In general the ANZAM nations route warships through the international waterways such as SUNDA and LOMBOK Straits without prior notification to the Indonesian Government as it is considered that the continued prior notifications of these movements could be interpreted as indicating that the ANZAM countries accepted an obligation for such an advice. To avoid provoking the Indonesians, however, it has been agreed that when unusual concentrations of warships pass either through the international straits or near the Indonesian coast, it would be polite to notify the Indonesians in advance. It is emphasized that this prior advice is merely an act of courtesy (and to allay any possible misgivings) and would be in no way seeking permission for the passage of the ships. The routine passage of ships, either alone or in company, will continue to be made unheralded.

5. The enforcement of the 12 miles limit would strategically affect the United States less than New Zealand and consequently the views of the two countries differ. Depending on the circumstances the United States authorities may or may not give prior warning of the passage of units of the U.S.N. They invariably do so for large concentrations of ships.

#### New Zealand Policy

7. When passing through the Indonesian islands H.M.N.Z. Ships should follow the passages outlined in "Ocean Passages of the World (1950)". The selected routes should afford minimum entry into recognised Indonesian territorial waters (i.e. the 3 miles limit). To avoid possible misinterpretation, which might be construed with the right of innocent passage through international straits, exercises should not normally be carried out

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in or close to recognised Indonesian territorial waters.

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#### Employment of New Zealand Forces

#### 8. (a) Evacuation Operations

Because of the strong Nationalistic outlook of the Indonesian Government the occasion may arise when British Commonwealth and other European nationals may have to be evacuated from Indonesia. The R.N. and U.S.N. have co-ordinated plans for the possibility and the N.Z. Government have approved the use of H.M.N.Z. Ships on the same basis as R.N. and R.A.N. ships in support of evacuation operations, provided these operations are not opposed by the Indonesian authorities. In granting this approval the Government required that H.M.N.Z. Ships should not, as far as possible, be placed in a position where they might be required to take action which the Indonesians could regard as provocative. Should the situation deteriorate to such a stage that an evacuation would have to be carried out by force the prior specific approval of the New Zealand Governby force the prior specific approval of the New Zealand Government would be required before New Zealand forces were committed.

(b) Singapore Territorial Waters

The Government, although it considered the responsi-bility primarily that of the United Kingdom, agreed that H. M. N. Z. Ships, or parts of the ships' companies, may be used in the same manner as R. N. ships for the protection of Singapore territorial waters.

#### (c) Protection of Shipping

Protection of shipping on the high seas (i.e. outside the 3 mile limit) may be afforded by H.M.N.Z. Ships. The protection given by New Zealand maval units is to be limited to British shipping only unless specific approval for other uses is first obtained from the New Zealand Government.

Far East General Order 151 is therefore applicable to H. M. F. Z. Ships serving under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station.

By direction of the Naval Board. DECLASSIFIED 201 Jonnon Mal 31 lorder Veren formel On Reference. Appointment -RELEASED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS 31, 1 (2013 for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE Jorden Our-

(Sed.) D. A. WRAIGHT P Navy Secretary

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ITEM 4 OF MINUTES OF MEETING (COS(58)M.3) OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE HELD 18 FEBRUARY 1958

PASSAGE OF RNZN SHIPS THROUGH SUNDA AND LOMBOK STRAITS (SECRET)

The Committee had before them a memorandum of 14 February 1958 from the Secretary enclosing a memorandum from External Affairs on the subject of notification of intended passage of RNZN ships through the Sunda and Lombok Straits.

The SECOND NAVAL MEMBER (representing Chief of Naval Staff) stated that it was not obligatory for notice to be given to the Indonesian authorities of intended passage through the Straits mentioned. Some Captains gave notice and others did not. He agreed with the Australian view that continuation to give notice would be interpreted by the Indonesians as acceptance of a legal obligation to do so, and he therefore considered we should fall in line with the Australians and drop this practice entirely.

MR McINTOSH stated that External Affairs view was also that we should cease the practice. He would like to draw attention, however, to the possible danger, in the event of Sumatra and the Celebes breaking away, of the identity of our ships being mistaken.

In discussion, THE COMMITTEE -

agreed that New Zealand should drop the practice of notification of intended passage through the Sunda and Lombok Straits.

THE COMMITTEE -

invited Navy Department and the Department of External Affairs to take note of their views as agreed in discussion.

\* JSO 149/1/1



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From:

All Correspondence should be

"THE AIR SECRETARY, AIR DEPARTMENT, WELLINGTON C. 1."

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"ddressed to:

IN REPLY REFER TO

REF. NO.

AND

227/9/4 CAS

AIR DEPARTMENT. WELLINGTON C. 1.

16th September, 1954

TOP SECRET

Dear C.N.S.

I am most grateful to you for your letter dated 15th September, 1954, forwarding me a copy of the terms under which the Royal New Zealand Navy frigates operate under CINCFES. The information will prove most helpful in drafting a reply to the letter to the Prime Minister from the United Kingdom High Commissioner seeking our agreement to the move of No. 14 Squadron from Cyprus to Malta.

enclose, signed receipt. DECLASSIFIED Y VANUARY 2013 60, Deila eference Abrew Brel opointment\_

ours er

TOP SECRET

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Commodore Sir Charles Madden, Bt., Chief of the Naval Staff, WELLINGTON.

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15th September, 1954

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Dear

. I enclose a copy of the terms under which our frigates are attached to CINCFES.

This is a consolidating document to cover all the specific employments of the frigates that have been raised from time to time by CINCFES and, each of which has been submitted to the Minister of Defence and the Minister of External Affairs for agreement.

CINCEES has been generously treated by Mr Webb in meeting all these possible employments of the frigates, particularly in Item 2 (4) which allows him to use R.N.Z.N. frigates on the Formosa patrol, which is a rather tricky one as Britain and New Zealand recognise different Chinese Governments. It would not surprise me if this clause was revoked, but despite the recent British announcements in the Press about Formosan patrols, the question has not been raised and all is quiet at the monent.

Yours ever

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Colonia 9/1/2013 for HO NZ DEFENCE FORCE

Air Vice Marshal W.H. Merton, C.B., 0. B. E., (RA. F.), Chief of the Air Staff, WELLINGTON. Auth. ······ / ······· / ···

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Office	of the Commander-in-Chief,
	Far East Station,
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28th June, 1954,

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THE CAPTAIN (F), THIRD FRIGATE SQUADRON. THE CAPTAIN (F), FOURTH FRIGATE SQUADRON. (Copy to:~

The Secretary of the Admiralty. (771/FES.753/3/54). The New Zealand Naval Board. The Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station. The Flag Officer, Malayan Area. The Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong. The United Kingdom Services Liaison Mission, Wellington).

ADMINISTRATION OF R.N.Z.N. FRIGATES ON THE FAR EAST STATION.

To achieve a better balance in the size of the two Frigate Squadrons on the Far East Station, it is intended that H.M.N.Z.S. KANIERE shall be administered by Captain (F), Fourth Frigate Squadron on joining the Station.

2. The Captain (F), Third Frigate Squadron is to transfer the following orders and letter to the Captain (F), Fourth Frigate Squadron before 20th August, 1954:-

New Zealand Navy Order No. 94/53 of 9th July, 1953, New Zealand Navy Order No. 220/53 of 15th December, 1953 The Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station's letter No. FES.753/3/54 of 27th March, 1954.

3. This information will be promulgated in a Far East Station Temporary Memorandum to be issued on 1st July, 1954.



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The Royal New Zealand Naval Liaison Officer

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ATTACHMENT OF R.N.Z.N. FRIGATES TO FAR EAST STATION (Ref: NZNB 250020Z January and Admiralty 291506Z January)

The New Zealand Naval Board desires to convey to Admiralty the conditions under which New Zealand frigates allocated for Korean operations are placed at the disposal of Admiralty for use by Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station.

2. These conditions have been approved by the New Zealand Government and it will be noted that several of the conditions listed below have been advised earlier, but it is desired to re-state them in this consolidated paper.

(1) <u>Korean Operations</u>. The New Zealand frigates placed at the disposal of Admiralty and allocated for use by GINCFES on the Far East Station are to continue to serve some time in Korean waters. Korea is to be regarded as the principle area for their operations, and it is envisaged that the period spent in Korean and Japanese waters would be a pproximately two months in four. New Zealand frigates on the Far East Station are to be made available immediately for Korean operations as required should hostilities be resumed.

(2) <u>Defence of Hong Kong</u>. New Zealand frigates on the Far East Station may be regarded as being available for the defence of Hong Kong should they be required there, in accordance with the undertaking given by the New Zealand Government to provide up to three frigates for Hong Kong in the event of an emergency.

(3) <u>Protection of British Ships</u>. New Zealand frigates on the Far East Station are to comply with the policy adopted by R.N. ships in the protection of British merchant shipping against intervention by Chinese Communist or Nationalist warships and aircraft, as laid down in CINCFES message 980P of 25th June, 1952.

(4) Formosa Patrol. New Zealand frigates on the Far East Station may be used as for R.N. ships for the Formosa Straits Patrol.

(5) <u>Malayan Patrols</u>. New Zealand frigates on the Far East Station are at the disposal of CINCFES for use if required in Malayan waters to prever infiltration by Communist agents or armed bands by sea.

(6) <u>Other Operations Involving Force</u>. While serving under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, New Zealand frigates shall no be used for the conduct of any operations which may require the use of force until the whole circumstances have been laid before the New Zealand Government and its consent received; in cases of emergency, however, where time does not permit of the sanction of the New Zealand Government being obtained beforehand the frigates may be used for operations designed solely for the protection of British lives and property without reference to any higher authority. If possible, however, the sanction of the New Zealand Government shall always be obtained beforehand and in cases where this is not practicable full information as to the action taken shall be furnished to the fard Zealand Government scenes rly as possible afterwards. ARCHIVES

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for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

Navy Secretary

## DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO STRAIT PASSAGES

## THROUGH THE FORMOSA (OR TAIWAN) STRAITS

6 March 1954 to 28<sup>th</sup> June 1955

Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Far Bast Station, Singapore.

28th June, 1955.

FES.537/2/558.C.

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#### FORIOSA STRATTS PATROL

General Instructions for the FORMOSA SERAITS Fatrol together with 'P' Message No. 980 giving the instructions for the conduct of H.M. Ships in protection of British merchant ships against intervention by Chinese Communist or Nationalist warships are attached.

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2. The Patrol is at present in abeyance but H.M. Ships on passage between Hong Kong and Japan are routed through the Formosa Straits and may be ordered to pass through the relevant patrol positions without breaking their passage. Paragraph 2 of Far East Fleet Programme MCV 55/3 refers.

3. The Patrol may be temporarily ro-instituted should a recrudescence of insidents realer it necessary.

Connodore Chief of Staff

Distribution:

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for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

Ceptain C.M. Hudson, R.A.N. Connander E.P. Reade, D.S.C., R.N.

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	Office	of the Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong.
	DECLASSIFIED	1st June, 1955.
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MORANDUM	Reference Appointment	for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE
	FORMOSA STRAIT PATROI (Short Title F.S.	, ORDERS

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The activities of Nationalists against shipping in the Fornosa Straits may make it necessary to have an intermittent patrol in the area. The aim of this patrol is to protect British Shipping in accordance with Message 980 P of 25th June, 1952 and other shipping in so far as it is covered by this message.

2. The Patrol is to be in the general area of a line joining position AA (Lat  $25^{\circ}$  00'H Long  $120^{\circ}$  00'E) and BB (Lat  $26^{\circ}$  45'H Long  $121^{\circ}$  00'E), bounded on the West by Chinese Nationalist or Communist territorial waters.

3. Ships on passage between Hong Kong and Japan may be ordered to patrol in this area for periods up to 48 hours.

4. Ships from the NORTH ordered to carry out the patrol are to inform the Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong of their ETA at BB and their percentage of fuel remaining on arrival at BB.

- 5. The following instructions are issued to ships on patrol :-
- (a) They are to be guided by message 980 P (Appendix II), both as regards British and NEUTRAL merchant ships.
- (b) Should a U.S. Warship or aircraft enquire of a ship on patrol what she is doing, the reply should be to the effect that she is acting under the orders of the Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Hong.
- (c) Ships are to patrol so as to keep, as far as possible, near the known position of any British merchant ship. (See paragraph 6.)
- (d) Hornally, economical speed should not be exceeded. In destroyers, steam for full speed should be kept at one hours notice; in frigates, at inmediate notice.
- (e) Ships are to report to the Comodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong :-
  - (i) Their position, course, speed and intentions at 0800 and 2000 local time daily.
  - (ii) Their percentage of fuel remaining at 0800 local time daily.
- (f) In addition to Hong Kong Cormand net, W/T and D/F watch are to be kept on 500 Mcs.

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REFER to

In the absence of other orders, ships are to take their own Typhoon avoiding action, leaving the area as necessary. Special weather forecasts of the Formosa Straits will, if necessary, be sent, and if in doubt about the likely movements of a typhoon, ships should seek advice from Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong.

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#### FORMOSA STRAIT PATROL ORDERS (Short Title F.S.P.)

(Page 2 of the Carnodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong's Manorandwa H.W. No.17/21/5 dated 1st June, 1955.)

(h) When meeting a strange vessel they should first attempt to exchange identifies by the use of plain language. At the same time they must be ready to enswer a challenge made by any form of identification and authorisation that are effective for Allied use in the Far East theatre.

6. A signal will be issued daily at about 1600 local time stating the Inown movements of any British morehant ships in the area for the next 24 hours using code letters and numbers contained in Appendix III.

7. Reports of proceedings for Formose Straits Patrols are to be forwarded in triplicate to the Commodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong (Copies to:-The Flag Officer, Second-in-Commond, Far East Station and Captains (D) or (F).

8. Appendix I lists previous incidents.

9. Attention is invited to the list of Islands off the Chinese mainland hold by Chinese Mationalists, contained in current Far East Station Secret Manoranda.

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#### Distribution:

The Connender-in-Chief, Far East Station. (10) The Flag Officer, Second-in-Cormand, Far East Station. (4) The Flag Officer, Malayan Area. (1) The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Hure. (2) The Cormanding Officer, H.M. Ships HENCASTIE, HENFOUNDIAND, COSSACK, CONCORD, COCKADE, CHEVIOT, CONSORT, COMUS, CARDIGAN BAY, ST. BRIDES BAY, CRAIE, MODESTE, OFOSSUM. (2 each.) New Zeeland Frigates.

Enclosure:

Appendix - Message 980P of 25th June, 1952.

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Appendix II to the Connodore-in-Charge, Hong Kong's H.L. No.17/21/5 of 1st June, 1955.

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FROM :	C.II C., F.E.S.	DECLASSIFIED
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The following nessage brings up to date the instructions for the conduct of H.M. Ships in protection of British merchant ships against intervention by Chinese Communist or Hationalist warships and aircraft. H.M. Ships are to help any neutral vessel to save life but are to be careful that such action does not constitute intervention in the conduct of the Chinese Nationalists or Communists.

2. Commonwealth ships should be guided by their own governments in this matter.

3. The following rules are accepted by H.M. Government as applying to jurisdiction which may be exercised over British merchant ships by Chinese Communist or Nationalist warships or circraft :-

- (a) Jurisdiction may be exercised over merchant ships by Nationalists or Communists in their respective territorial waters. Ships may be turned back, searched or arrested.
- (b) Merchant ships may not be interfered with or controlled outside territorial waters, even though they have been arrested inside territorial waters.
- (c) Morchant ships may not be attached either inside or outside territorial waters. (See paragraph 9.)
- (d) Territorial waters are to be taken as limited by a line drawn strictly three miles from the low water mark of mainland and islands.

4. Available H.M. Ships are to give full protection up to the limits of territorial waters (o.g. in the MANGINE SOUTH CHANNEL up to ELUTOAN SPIT EUCY but not westward of it.).

5. When dealing with incidents arising out of interforence with British morehant ships H.M. Ships are to be guided by paragraphs 6 to 11 below.

6. British merchant ships held under arrest outside territorial waters are to be released, whether they were originally arrested inside or outside territorial waters.

7. H.M. Ships are normally to keep outside territorial waters (see paragraph 3 (d)) and they are not to enter confined waters dominated by Communists or Nationalists. They may enter other territorial waters as follows :-

- (a) To protect a British merchant ship which has actually been attacked by gunfire or aircraft.
- (b) On humanitarian grounds.

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8. If a British morehant ship is stopped in territorial waters and told to go back she disobeys at hor own risk. If she is then fired on and H.M. Ships have intervoned as in paragraph 9 (b) below, the merchant ship must be told to camply with Chinese instructions while in territorial waters.

- 9. Opening fire :-
- (a) H.H. Ships may open five if fired at first or if a British morchant ship is fired at.
- (b) In the particular circumstances of a British merchant ship being fired at because she disobeys orders while in territorial waters, H.M. Ships should take all possible steps to cause Chinese to cease fire. If after warning fire continues, H.M. Ships may open fire (see paragraph 8 above).
- (c) H.M. Ships may fire at circraft in self defence or when British merchant ships are being or have been attacked provided there is no doubt that the circraft being engaged is the attacker.
- (d) Paragraph 7 above should ensure that ships do not come under fire of shore batteries. If, however, this happens, H.M. Ships are not to reply to the fire unless essential to save life, and should, if their task permits, move out of range.

10. H.M. Ships may board merchant vessels at their discretion to investigate or regain control of an arrested ship. If boarding party is resisted by force, force may be used in reply.

11. Should it be necessary for one of H.M. Ships to intervene to release or protect a merchant ship in accordance with these instructions she is to act vigorously to gain the initiative giving firm instructions to merchant ships or Chinese warships, and, if possible, putting the latter in the position of having to fire first if British orders are to be resisted.

12. If asked for advice or permission to anter Chinese ports, Carranding Officers are to state that it is not the Havy's duty to give such advice or permission. All the Havy may do is to give the facts of the situation, for example, that the entrance is patrolled. Merchant ships must make their own estimates of risks.

13. 680 '2' of 18th April, 1951, is cancelled.

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# for HQ NZ DEFENCE FORCE

D.T.G. 25 04032 JUNE 1952.

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NAVY SECRETARY

The Minister of External Affairs.

Referred. Further to previous memoranda. J.L. Mo. 29.4.54

ATTACHMENT OF R.N.Z.N. F FAR EAST STATION FRIGATES TO

You have asked me to lot you have my views on a submission, dated 11 March and made by the Navy Secretary to the Minister of Defence, relating to the proposed operational conditions under which New Zealand frigates allocated for Korean duties should be attached to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station.

The particular point now raised for consideration concerns the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, for authority to use the New Zealand frigates for patrols in the Formosa Strait under the same conditions as applyed to the Royal Navy ships. As the Navy Secretary points out, the patrols in the Formosa Straits are designed to protect British merchant ships trading on the China coasts from attacks by Chinese Communist and Nationalist ships carrying non-strategic goods to and between ports on the Chinese mainland, providing a licence has been obtained for each voyage. So far as the question of trade with Communist China is concerned, there is no difference between New Zealand and United Kingdom there is no difference between New Zealand and United Kingdom Both countries comply with the embargo on the supply policy. of strategic materials but permit the export to China of nonstrategic goods.

In my view the only possible objection that could arise to the employment of New Zealand vessels for patrols in the Formosa Straits would stem from the fact that, whereas the United Kingdom recognizes Communist China, New Zealand con-tinues to recognize the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

The Nationalists have attempted to close ports on the China coast opposite Formosa but, as the Navy Secretary states, this "blockade" has not been effective. The United Kingdom this "blockade" has not been effective. The United Kingdom Government (and also the United States Government) have adopted the attitude that the actions taken by the Nationalist Government of China have no validity at international law since an <u>effective</u> blockade has not been <u>declared</u> and <u>maintained</u>. The Nationalist Government, indeed, does not seem to regard the port closure as an attempt to establish a blockade, since this would have involved recognition that the Chinese Communist Government possessed the level status of belignment. legal status of belligerency.

The United Kingdom Government have, on a number of occasions, REFER issued instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, which, while conceding that the Nationalists (and also the Communists) ARCHIMAYE the right to control British merchantmen in Chinese terri-torial waters, authorize vessels of the Royal Navy to prevent

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any interference with British merchantmen by Chinese Nationalists or Communists on the high seas. These instructions expressly preclude the rights attaching to blockade and the right of visit and search. It appears certain that the United Kingdom recognition of Communist China does not amount to a recognition of belligerency entitling the Nationalist Chinese to maintain a blockade (if effective) and to visit and search neutral merchantmen. The United Kingdom position in regard to the "Nationalist blockade" is therefore substantially the same now as it was before the United Kingdom recognized Communist China.

New Zealand vessels in the Far East have already been authorized to comply with the United Kingdom instructions. In the past, however, New Zealand vessels have, of course, only visited the Formosa Straits area during the voyage to and from Korean waters. The present request from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station, seeks authority to use New Zealand frigates for regular patrols in the Formosa Straits.

In my opinion, the instructions referred to above, if complied with by New Zealand vessels, would be consistent with our own relations with Nationalist China. I conclude, therefore, that we should not raise any difficulties in regard to the suggestion that New Zealand frigates should be employed on regular patrols in the Formosa Straits area provided the United Kingdom instructions remain substantially the same as previously. If these instructions are observed, we should not find ourselves in a position vis-a-vis the Chinese Nationalists which would cause us undue embarrassment.


I recommend accordingly that you should advise the Minister of Defence that you agree with the submission made to him by the Navy Secretary on 11 March.

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Foss SHANAHAN. by Secretary of External Affairs

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(Copy to: The Secretary of External Affairs, WELLINGTON).

ATTACHMENT OF R.N.Z.N. FRIGATES TO FAR EAST STATION.

On the 22nd February, 1954 I submitted to you the proposed operational conditions under which New Zealand Frigates allocated for Korean duties should be attached to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station has now asked for authority to use the N.Z. Frigates for patrols in the Formosa Strait under the same conditions by which Royal Navy ships operate, and it is desired to seek Government approval for this course.

3. Formosa Strait patrols are designed to protect British merchant ships trading on the China coasts from attacks by Chinese Communist and Nationalist ships and aircraft.

4. It is the policy of the United Kingdom Government that British merchant ships are permitted to carry non-strategic goods to and between ports on the Chinese mainland provided a licence is obtained for each voyage. The R.N. gives protection to these ships. The instructions regarding the protection of these British ships on the high seas and under some conditions, in territorial waters were promulgated in April, -1951, and with your authority N.Z. Ships in the Far East were ordered to comply with these instructions (para. 3 (3) of N.A. 06/1/31 of 22nd Feb., 1954 refers).

5. While hostilities continued in Korea R.N. ships were not able to afford regular protection to British merchant vessels on the Chinese coast and a considerable number of incidents involving British ships occurred in the Formosa Straits off the Chinese mainland ports. In a few cases cargoes were conflicated and in one case the Master of a British ship was killed. The majority of incidents were initiated by Chinese Nationalist guerillas, and at the same time Chinese Nationalist warships have attempted some sort of blockade in the area opposite Formosa in an endeavour to close the mainland ports to all, including British shipping. At no time, however, was the blockade effective.

6. Since the Korean truce a Formosa Straits patrol by R.N. ships has been instituted and the number of incidents has been reduced, no cargoes having been seized or ships successfully detained.

7. These patrols which are fully in accordance with international law have become a regular commitment for R.N. frigate squadrons, and if the N.Z. frigates are to be successfully integrated into a R.N. squadron it is most desirable that they operate as for R.N. ships in these and other matters.

8. The principle of R.N.Z.N. ships conforming with R.N. policy in the protection of British vessels has already been established and the present request to use N.Z. ships for the Formosa patrol in no way extends this principle but only means that they will be assisting in giving regular protection rather than spasmodic protection as previously while travelling in Chinese waters en route to or from Korea.

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9. It is recommended that the existing approval for R.N.Z.N. ships on the Far East Station to conform with R.N. policy for the protection of British merchant vessels be re-affirmed and that specific authority be given for R.N.Z.N. ships to be associated with R.N. ships in Formosa Strait patrols.

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10. This authority will then be included in the general statement on operational conditions for N.Z. frigates on the Far East Station already submitted for your endorsement.

Navy Secretary.

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