Each year the Chief of Defence Force gathers together a group of around 100 people from across the Defence Force to participate in a two-day seminar. This year participants were put to work exploring six topics relevant to successfully implementing the Defence White Paper.
The Total Defence Workforce (TDWF)
The overarching objective of personnel management is to ensure the Defence Force has the right number of people, with the right skills, held at the appropriate state of readiness to meet the Government’s policy objectives. The seminar was asked to consider the implications of a Total Defence Workforce approach to personnel and for career planning pathways. Seminar participants concluded that a greater degree of mobility among military and civilian roles was required. Some of the implications of this included:
- The need to establish competencies of professional military mastery, commercial and public sector acumen;
- The need to professionalise ‘management’;
- The need for better civilian career management; and
- The critical nature that training and education will take on.
Projection and Sustainment
The seminar was asked to consider how with 30 days notice we could deploy and sustain 800 troops in an operation – supported by 200 Air and Naval personnel – for up to three years. The seminar concluded:
- Projection: The need to secure a point of entry into theatre was stressed. It is likely this would be an airport and the point of entry would need to be secured by up to a company-sized group.
- Sustainment: While the Defence Force has a Commander Logistics, the seminar believed there was a need to establish a Consolidated Force Sustainment Group to support the logistics bridge from New Zealand to the area of operations.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance are vital tools in protecting New Zealand’s sovereignty. The seminar concluded there were four effects that could be applied to the ISR problem:
- Deter: focused on an information campaign aimed at stopping illegal activity before it occurred by convincing adversaries that there would be real and swift consequences. It was a “global effect” – achieved outside our EEZ.
- Detect: was also an activity with implications beyond our EEZ. It related to surveillance and reconnaissance before our EEZ was breached.
- Interdict: covered the range of options for enforcing New Zealand’s jurisdiction; and
- Defeat: consisted of kinetic and non-kinetic activities that could stop adversaries conducting illegal activities in our EEZ.
The Naval Combat Force
In contributing to peace and security in the South Pacific, the Defence Force should, together with Australia, be able to meet all reasonably foreseeable contingencies. The seminar was asked to consider possible contingencies in the Pacific and the implications for the Naval Combat Force. The seminar concluded that there was an overall requirement to think in terms of systems, rather than platforms. Considerations included:
- The need for multi-role, general purpose, multiple utility ships with longer range relevant to the South Pacific;
- Australia’s expectations and the possibility of joint procurement;
- The need for ‘commercial off-the-shelf’ solutions but with military utility (and robustness and survivability); and
- Maintaining our war-fighting ethos.
A Credible Ground Force
Deployable ground forces suitably equipped and in sufficient numbers, including supporting elements such as engineers and medics, are also required in meeting foreseeable contingencies in the South Pacific. The seminar was asked to consider what would constitute a “credible ground force”. Discussion focused on:
- Determinants for force structure not being limited to the Pacific – discretionary tasks further afield also need to be considered;
- Ground forces will need to be able to undertake a range of land tasks, as well as be self-sufficient;
- Self-sufficiency includes being able to support other nations’ forces, in particular, any attached Pacific Island contingents.
- Credibility was driven from the land elements that formed the force, but also the support from the Navy and Air Force.
Command and Control of an independent Combined Joint Task Force
The seminar was asked to consider those times when New Zealand might wish to operate independently of our partners and what would be the command and control ramifications. Discussion focused on:
- The need for a permanent core of command staff that are trained in establishing a deployable Joint Interagency Taskforce Headquarters;
- For longer deployments it must be supported by staff that have been pre-identified and specifically trained for the task;
- Equipment needed to be acquired for the purpose; and
- It must have trained as a team, including field exercises.