Until recently NZ soldier Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Ramsden was the Deputy Chief of Plans at the Headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Kabul, Afghanistan. NATO awarded him their Meritorious Service Medal for his contribution – the first New Zealander to receive such an award. Here Lt Col Ramsden gives his view of a conflict that is out of sight and out of mind for many New Zealanders.
It was a bloody summer. Every day, almost without exception, the flags of the 40-odd International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition nations would fly at half mast outside the headquarters building in Kabul. And every day I would express my condolences to one or another of my colleagues at the death of a service member from their country. And every day at the Plans Branch we would grapple with the complexity of the security problem – of where to next for the mission?
Ours was not the task to develop plans to contend with the immediacy of insurgency. It was to pitch to the future; to give effect to the Afghan government and ISAF’s aim of establishing a secure environment. And in so doing, to try to improve the lives of the Afghan people.
Afghanistan’s is not a conventional war. Simply “whacking and schwacking” insurgents – as my previous ISAF Commander liked to say - has its limitations.
This is a difficult counter-insurgency campaign that will take time to resolve. (The average time for the successful conclusion of counter-insurgency campaigns since WWII has been 16 years).
First we must understand the nature of the problem: in this case the causes of insecurity. They are many and inter-related.
Current insurgent motivation is both ideological and grievance-based due to the failure of successive governments to meet the population’s basic needs and offer sustainable alternatives to violence.
At the heart of the insurgents’ motivation is a strong and independent culture that draws heavily on religious faith. Let down by successive governments and external actors, the responsibility to protect and provide for one’s own is strong.
The presence of ISAF (a term I use here to include all troops involved in the international security mission, including US troops under Operation Enduring Freedom) and a more generic wariness of western values and their perceived dominance, leads Afghans to feel their way of life, values and faith are threatened.
These concerns are stoked by the growing influence of Salafist and Deobandi teaching, a culture that values arms and force as an expression of strength and a means of earning respect.
Motivation in itself, however, is not enough to cause the violence; there has to be an opportunity to mobilise.
The weakness of the Afghan government and of the Afghan National Security Forces, and strong tribal and clan affiliations has led to ‘ungoverned space’, enabling the safe havens to be created. Combined with a prevalence of weapons, these provide a venue for mobilisation, training and preparation.
Against this backdrop fewer troops are not the answer, at least not initially. The reason ISAF has not been as successful as many would have liked is precisely because of limited troops and resources.
More troops, both to fight the counter insurgency campaign (the immediate problem) and to develop the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (part of the longer-term solution) are essential to underwrite an Afghan solution and enable the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops.
While proper resourcing is important, a more focused and collaborative approach is key. Security improvements occur when the population sees growth in governance capacity and tangible development effort. The real question is, how do you achieve this?
While ISAF might acknowledge their part in the solution, other key players are also stepping up to the mark.
The United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan had its mandate reinvigorated and strengthened under UN Resolution 1806 in March 2008. With the appointment of a UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador Kai Eide, the Assistance Mission has a clearly defined leadership role which ISAF fully supports.
The UN’s Special Representative is crucial to the coordination of ISAF-led security operations and wider governance and development efforts with the Afghan government.
With a 50% increase in funding there is no reason, over time, that the UN Assistance Mission should not develop the capacity to effectively exercise their leadership responsibility.
The Bucharest Summit in 2008 showed that among world leaders there is the political will to match the rhetoric and this was backed up with the Paris Donors Conference in June ‘08 – a triumph for multilateralism, where over US$20 billion was pledged to underwrite the Afghan National Development Strategy; the new blueprint to give impact to the Afghan Compact of 2006.
The Afghan National Development Strategy is a five year strategy, prepared after two years of analysis and priority setting, drawing on extensive national and sub-national consultations. It is an Afghan-owned blueprint for progress in all spheres of life, and the Afghan government’s road map for the long desired objective of ‘Afghanization’ and transition towards stability, self-sustaining growth, and human development.
Winning the people over is what will win this war; this means improving the lives of Afghans. This is not solely a military problem.
I worked closely with the Afghan National Security Forces on developing a partnering model. Implicit in the model is that ISAF, over time, will move from a supported to a supporting role; the Afghans will take the lead.
‘Transition’ of Kabul City and increasingly Kabul Province is a small but extremely important step when matters of nationalism, progress and responsibility are concerned.
Just as important in supporting transition is developing the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces; not just the Army, but increasingly the police.
It has to be an Afghan solution to their security problems to give credibility to the Afghan government in the eyes of the people. To maintain the status quo, or draw down troops (including police) prematurely would undermine this solution, and court failure.
The Afghanistan situation is complex; the challenges immense. No single organisation - be it ISAF, the government, or the United Nations Assistance Mission, is capable of achieving its objectives in isolation.
The inability of both the Afghan government and the international community to rapidly deliver progress following the Taliban’s ousting has reinforced the sense of grievance and the need for groups to provide for themselves, increasing the motivation for resistance.
There is a vicious circle, with the lack of security affecting the ability of the government to deliver governance, while the lack of effective governance contributes to the level of insecurity. The social contract between the state and the population is at risk.
A comprehensive and integrated approach is required.
It is not acceptable, as has happened in the past, that ISAF or the Afghan National Security Forces secure an area and three valleys away in an insecure area, a new school is allowed to be burnt to the ground.
More local ownership is required; sustainable progress in transforming conflict can only be made by local people. In this process the military must recognise its own limitations. The challenge is to integrate the security line of operation (ISAF’s), with the governance responsibility (belonging to the Afghan government) and development (United Nations) lines to produce a combined effect.
On ISAF’s side this means genuine engagement, showing ‘operational patience’, understanding the long game, and positioning for it. For the UN Mission it means filling their establishment and giving effect to their mandate responsibilities. For the Afghan government, extending appropriate governance and dealing with corruption.
Afghanistan needs the leadership of the Afghan government, and that of the United Nations, to make a difference.
Problems of insecurity, poverty, and corruption remain daunting.
With a comparatively modest increase in troop numbers and a more focused and synchronised approach, we have a recipe for success.
The plan requires Afghan ownership, but will they step up? The answer is that they are, and given the stakes I expect more so. The desire of the people is certainly evident. I greatly admire Afghans for their fortitude; with a life expectancy of only 47 years, an average age of 23 years, over 30 years of war and having to spend two-thirds of their monthly income on food, they can still smile and believe things will get better.