June 2009, Lyndsay Fletcher in Afghanistan
(WN09-0040-52)
By Lyndsay Fletcher BEM (civilian), S9 Finance Officer
Opportunities for civilians to serve in an Operational environment are few, particularly for someone like me with 2000 weeks service to the RNZN in and out of uniform.
I’m attached to the NZ Provincial Reconstruction Team (NZ PRT) in the Bamyan province, a province that has seen constant conflict since Alexander the Great passed through the region in 334-327 BC until the removal of the Taliban in 2001. Unfortunately in 1996 the Taliban regime established itself and occupied Bamyan.
There was much killing and destruction, and by 1999 the Taliban controlled 95% of the country. However, rather than offering security to the local people, the Taliban’s regimes were particularly harsh, especially towards women: women were excluded from education, employment and public office (even home schooling girls was illegal).
Following the September 11 attacks in New York in 2001, the Taliban regime was identified as providing a safe haven for international terrorist groups, however, before being overthrown in late 2001 their final act was to destroy the two great Buddha’s approximately 1km from where the PRT is based.
Our objective here is essentially to help the Afghan Government enhance security, improve governance and deliver reconstruction and development, ensuring this is delivered by best practice; and then to transfer the subsequent PRT planning, coordination and responsibilities to the Bamyan Provincial Government.
Six weeks into theatre, as an NZDF civilian I find myself asking a ‘Value Question’ - what value is the current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the NZDF delivering to the Afghanistan government on behalf of NZ? How do we measure success or failure? Are we being effective? What are the possible alternatives - if any?
The measure of success
The PRT concept was always intended to be temporary, with the desired end state being recovery back to NZ in the knowledge that the Afghan’s have ownership and the capability for maintaining security, providing governance and development, thus ensuring a sustainable economy and stability to the region.
How effective has the NZ PRT been? When analysing what has been achieved from the arrival of the first NZ PRT, the majority of the early projects appear to have been Bamyan-town focused. Today, our patrols operate in the wider province, facilitating development/aid projects and local government support to the external boundaries of all seven Bamyan districts.
Within Bamyan centre, a new town has been constructed adjacent to the PRT, and the Forward Operating Bases have experienced similar expansion. Some within ISAF now consider the NZ PRT as a role model for the other 25 PRT’s. Unfortunately, achieving success across all PRTs is challenging because different nations follow different models (there is no ‘one size fits all’); there has not always been transparency across the PRTs or with local government; development budgets vary considerably by region; sometimes PRTs implement their own agenda, rather than aligning with Afghan national priorities; and although many PRTs have been effective at ‘doing’ they have not always built this capacity into Afghan institutions.
Participating nations are starting to ask the same question – when can we transition/handover to Afghan agencies? When will it be time to transfer responsibility for security over to the Afghan national police and army, which would enable our coalition partners to downsize? The upcoming NATO conference will explore this question of transition. Personally, I think that achieving an acceptable end state for withdrawal could be up to four years away. To leave any earlier would simply provide opportunities for the Taliban to re-establish. I’m sure the NZ Government will consider this when reviewing options for the expiry of the current mandate in 2010.
ISAF has now established criteria for measuring coalition PRT success, and they are now mapping and reviewing all PRTs for a common approach. One and three year plans have been developed for implementation within our US Task Group Warrior. These plans dovetail into the recently established (2008) Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The Afghan government has also formed an agency to harmonise the efforts of all 26 PRTs and ensure best practise. The aim of the ‘Independent Directorate for Local Governance’ (IDLG) is to ensure that PRT’s are more effective, by enhancing information sharing and aligning with Afghan government goals.
However, I have formed some impressions already about this from my contacts with the local Afghan people. I’d say that local people are protective and territorial, and many are resistant to change. They are inclined to defend their position within hierarchical community structures, and in my opinion there remains considerable corruption and back watching with often little loyalty to what ISAF is trying to achieve. Hence success will not be easy (I now understand the difference between the Area of Operations (AO) Battle space and what civilians refer to as the Humanitarian Space (HS)).
Our Senior National Officer (SNO), Group Captain Greg Elliot, RNZAF, is leading from the front, insisting that NZAID principles and the excellent foundations and momentum established by previous NZ PRT rotations are continued and enhanced. His guidelines for development are as follows:
• Ownership must be local; solutions jointly agreed with a view on building local capacity, following nationally-set priorities.
• Promote Afghan leadership, with the PRT leading from behind.
• Harmonisation; I call this removal of duplication (where have I heard that before?), thus ensuring our aid or project(s) contribution does not clash with the efforts of other international aid donors.
• Think long term and sustainable development with subsequent evaluation and analysis to value the outcomes
• Ensure measurable results through well co-ordinated projects.
• Manage for results; careful selection and sensitive management, balancing local needs and priorities.
• Carefully manage expectations; under promise and over deliver.
• Have an exit strategy. This entails a good faith commitment to the host country, to ensure aid programmes are not abruptly changed or terminated.
So how are we doing? To enable any organisation to excel, its strategic direction must be solid. This PRT has introduced a robust Development Plan that includes Terms of Reference for Sector Working Group representatives to ensure we meet both mission and local expectations.
Embedded within the PRT is an American military contingent which has access to funding from the US Commanders Emergency Response Programme (CERP), as originally founded in Iraq. The combined NZ/US development team is referred to as the PRT 5 Shop. Together, they are responsible for timely project delivery, quality and cost while adhering to and maintaining national guidelines. The S5/CERP personnel are heavily involved in major road infrastructure, health and education programmes and through the PRT 5 shop and have jointly facilitated the successful delivery of over 600 projects since NZ commenced PRT assistance in 2003. Of course, completing a project is one aspect, but they must also consider through-life maintenance, staff and operating costs.
Predicted joint programmed expenditure in the Bamyan region this year through the 5 Shop is estimated in excess of $US26 million. This includes aid contributions by NZ AID. Additionally, the Italian Government has promised a contribution of 104 million Euros to rehabilitate 136km of road from Kabul to Bamyan.
NZ Public Perception
Afghanistan is a difficult country to understand, with the majority of news articles being from foreign correspondents focused on military or Taliban activities. One solution may be to embed a New Zealand journalist to report on the difference the NZDF has made (and continues to make) in Bamyan.
To answer my value question, I think we are exceeding our goals and expectations. Many of the measures of this PRT and those before us are intangible. However, we are in a continuous improvement mode, and our direction is clear and concise - there currently is no alternative.
The conclusion I draw from the above is simple: the challenges in Afghanistan remain huge (as does the international effort required to overcome them), while the foundations are being built for a secure future for its people.
The Presidential and Provincial Council elections scheduled for this August (the second since the fall of the Taliban), will be managed for the first time by the local Afghan authorities with ISAF and international support, provide an excellent opportunity for the local population to exercise their democratic rights in a relatively safe environment.
Finally, although this is a 7 day a week operation, I think regularly of the family at home, Fleet Engineering Centre work colleagues, and the various organisations of which I am a member, and I wonder how my dog watch activities are managing without me, - or have I been replaced as the Drum Major of the RNZN Pipes and Drums, or Treasurer of the RNZN Alpine & Ski Club - a role I’ve had since 2000?
My personal measure of success: as a civilian have I been accepted in theatre alongside my military peers? I guess time will tell. I’m sure I will be judged not so much on what I achieve in my Finance role but by the wider contribution I make as a team member.
Felan khoda hafez (goodbye for now) from PRT Fire Officer, CP watch keeper, Private Sector PRT representative and occasional PRT S9!