Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP–D)

(First Edition)

The New Zealand Defence Force Publication Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP–D) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.

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1. The New Zealand Defence Force has a unique culture that is underpinned by shared values of loyalty, integrity, professionalism, and commitment. These cultural values are the tenets from which the New Zealand Defence Force builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, appropriately equipped and capable of serving the interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand Government. This culture provides the foundation for New Zealand’s unique approach to the conduct of military operations.

2. In the performance of its military duties, the New Zealand Defence Force has been involved in activities across the full spectrum of operations, in all corners of the world. These experiences have provided lessons that have influenced the way in which the New Zealand Defence Force conducts operations. Historically, New Zealand’s involvement in operations has always been as part of a coalition framework, alongside nations that share New Zealand’s morals and values. The experiences of the past, and the influence of defence partners have helped shape New Zealand’s approach to the conduct of military operations.


4. Although NZDDP–D is focused primarily on the doctrinal component of New Zealand’s military strategy, it conveys a message about the tone and nature of the New Zealand approach to military activity at all levels. Doctrine is not mandatory dogma to be applied in all circumstances; that is simply not the New Zealand Defence Forces’ way of doing business. New Zealand military doctrine is combination of the distilled experience of our own national experience of making strategy and of mounting and conducting military operations as well as the distillation of other national experiences.
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New Zealand Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of overseas military doctrinal publications, including:


b. **ADDP–D** – *Foundations of Military Doctrine*, dated May 02, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia;

c. **ADDP–D.1** – *Australian Approach to Warfare*, dated Jun 02, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia;

d. **ADDP–D.2** – *Force 2020*, dated Jun 02, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia;

e. **ADDP–D.3** – *Future Warfighting Concept*, dated Dec 02, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra, Australia;

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Part 1

Military Doctrine and
the New Zealand Strategic Context
Executive Summary

- The principal purpose of military doctrine is to provide the armed forces with guidance for the conduct of operations.
- New Zealand military doctrine establishes guidelines on how to best employ military power to achieve strategic objectives.
- New Zealand Defence Force personnel possess unique cultural values that identify them as New Zealanders and influence New Zealand military doctrine and its application.

The Role of Doctrine

1.1 Military doctrine is defined as the ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application’¹. Military doctrine is extracted from the history of skirmishes, battles, campaigns and wars, and more specifically drawn from lessons learned in stalemates, defeats and victories. The principal purpose of military doctrine therefore, is to provide the Armed Forces with guidance for the conduct of operations.

1.2 New Zealand military doctrine provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Military doctrine helps planners and commanders approach stressful, perilous, confusing and unfamiliar situations with clarity of thought based on rigorous analysis, comprehensive knowledge of hard-won lessons from human history and national military experience.² New Zealand military doctrine establishes guidelines on how to best employ military power to achieve strategic objectives.

¹ Joint Warfare Publication (UK) JWP 0–01
² Canadian Force Doctrine (CFD)
1.3 New Zealand military doctrine describes how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) conducts military activities but does not describe why. New Zealand military doctrine development is dynamic and is constantly reviewed for relevance in the context of emerging factors that influence the way New Zealand as a nation intends to use military force. New Zealand military doctrine is about how operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered.

1.4 In addition to informing members of the NZDF about military doctrine, the Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP-D) publication also serves to inform those who have a legitimate interest in the way the NZDF conducts its business. NZDDP-D is also of value to allies and potential coalition partners who will benefit from an understanding of New Zealand’s military doctrine, ethos, cultural values and general approach to strategic and military issues.
Utility of Doctrine

‘Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.’

General George H. Decker, USA

1.5 By describing the nature and the characteristic of current and immediate future military operations, doctrine contributes to the NZDF’s ability to fight and win. It does this by setting a common framework within which to plan, train and conduct military operations. Doctrine guides the preparation for these operations in peacetime and describes the methods for successfully conducting military operations in the New Zealand context. Doctrine also fundamentally shapes the way the NZDF thinks about the use of the military instrument of national power.

1.6 Doctrine builds cohesion through mutual understanding. By guiding the application of military force in operations, doctrine reduces the effects of indecision by guiding responses to unpredictable events. Doctrine allows confidence in decision making, brevity in communications, and acts as an enabler when choosing a course of action. Effective military doctrine prevents confusion and reduces ambiguity in changing and uncertain conditions.

1.7 In preparation for operations, doctrine provides a knowledge base for training assessment of unit performance and provides a basis for further development of innovative conceptual thinking.

Military Doctrine within New Zealand’s Strategic Environment

1.8 New Zealand’s current strategic environment is characterised by a growing number of non-conventional security challenges that have implications for New Zealand’s security interests. Defence forces have traditionally trained for conventional military operations and the NZDF must still do so. The NZDF must also have the flexibility and versatility to contribute to international efforts to counter asymmetric threats, to contain the fall-out from increasing intra-state conflict, to respond to the breakdown of law and order in failing states, and to provide support for efforts to counter transnational criminal activity.

1.9 New Zealand’s geo-strategic position and reliance upon international trade fundamentally influences the way NZDF doctrine is derived and applied. As a result NZDF doctrine focuses upon our need to develop and sustain expeditionary forces.
1.10 New Zealand’s future strategic environment will be different from today’s. The scope and nature of any hostility that New Zealand may face in the immediate future and the rapidity of any changes in New Zealand’s strategic context are uncertain. What is certain, is that credible and effective military forces can not be generated instantly to meet a need at the time it is required. This is especially so in the more demanding roles encountered in hostile environments approaching the warfighting end of the spectrum of military operations.3

1.11 By possessing the ability to conduct warfighting operations, the NZDF can conduct peace support operations and operations other than war more effectively. Without an ability to effectively respond to an increasingly hostile environment approaching warfighting situations, military forces have a diminished capability to conduct operations that require a credible and effective military presence, such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Military forces lacking such credibility are more likely to attract hostile and warlike actions from belligerents as a direct result of their inability to effectively counter such threats.

1.12 Within any operation involving belligerents there is significant risk that operations initially considered benign can rapidly deteriorate into what closely resembles, or is in fact, warfighting at the operational or tactical levels. Similarly, there are very few conflicts in modern warfare where warfighting is strictly confined to well-defined geographic localities. Military forces, other governmental agencies or humanitarian agencies involved in relatively benign activities can, with little or no notice, become involved in warfighting activities between, or directly in conflict with, belligerent parties.

1.13 Forces that are only capable of conducting operations at the lower end of the spectrum are not capable of conducting effective warfighting activities, either on a large or small scale. It is for this reason that NZDF military doctrine reflects preparation for warfighting with the ability to operate effectively in the wider spectrum of military operations.

3 See Chapter 5 for details on the spectrum of operations.
1.14 Military doctrine is therefore required across a range of military operations, from peace operations, through operations other than war, to warfighting. Maintaining a credible and effective military capability across a spectrum provides options for employment of military forces for current and future Governments of New Zealand.

Military Doctrine and NZDF Values

1.15 An acknowledged strength of the NZDF in military operations is the quality of New Zealand military personnel. NZDF personnel possess a unique culture and resultant set of military values that identify them as New Zealanders and influence New Zealand military doctrine and its application. It is therefore appropriate to commence articulation of NZDF military doctrine by identifying the military values which distinguish NZDF personnel from military personnel of other nations.
1.16 The NZDF military values are:

– commitment,
– loyalty,
– integrity, and
– professionalism.

1.17 **Commitment.** NZDF personnel have a high level of commitment to successfully accomplishing military objectives. NZDF personnel take pride in achieving results above and beyond expectations.

‘**Tough, knotty, good-natured, they seem to make a fetish of taking on impossible jobs with cheery unconcern. All through the Solomons they are favourites. An outstanding characteristic is their extreme modesty. In the face of compliments your average New Zealander will probably turn red, hem and haw, splutter and gurgle, and then desperately attempt to steer the conversation into some other channel.**’

**Quote from the 1944 issue of the American magazine ‘Flyer’ regarding New Zealand Air Force personnel**

1.18 **Loyalty.** New Zealanders are fiercely proud of who they are, where they come from and their achievements as a small nation. NZDF personnel possess a strong sense of comradeship regardless of rank, gender, cultural or ethnic background, social status, or religious conviction. NZDF personnel also possess a strong sense of loyalty to friends, allies and like-minded coalition partners. NZDF personnel tend to demonstrate their loyalty through honest and candid discussion and advice.
The Chief of the New Zealand Naval Staff, Commodore Sir Atwell Lake, RN, received tributes to the service of the RNZN in the South Pacific from Admiral W.F. Halsey and his chief of staff, Rear-Admiral R.B. Carney. The latter said: ‘New Zealand’s naval contribution to the South Pacific campaign has invariably been loyal, thorough, whole-hearted and rugged. You lads are grand sailors and have earned the respect and admiration of our people. My association with your outfit leaves a fine taste in my mouth, and they will never have a better friend than me.’

As quoted in ‘New Zealand at War’, by Keith Hancock

1.19 Integrity. In the conduct of peace support operations, New Zealanders take pride in their neutrality and ability to work in an honest and cooperative manner with other groups to achieve a peaceful solution. This stems from an underlying premise that everybody deserves a ‘Fair Go’ until they prove themselves to be unworthy of that consideration. In the conduct of warfighting, New Zealanders take pride in possessing a warrior ethos that extols an intelligent, innovative and aggressive fighter who executes the task without fear or favour, whilst adhering to the rules of war.4

‘In terms of military resources, New Zealand developed the art of promising to do – and indeed doing – much with little. During Confrontation, the RNZAF achieved the impossible with obsolete aircraft. The blend of Maori and Pakeha within the squadron saw the New Zealanders excel in the tracking and patrolling skills essential to jungle warfare. They also excelled at ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the indigenous tribespeople…. These skills were complemented by careful selection, intensive training, and sound leadership.’

From Emergency to Confrontation – The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-1966, by Christopher Pugsley

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4 In the modern setting the rules of war is a term applied that includes the Geneva Convention, the Law of Armed Conflict and the Rules of Engagement for a specific operation.
1.20 **Professionalism.** NZDF personnel pride themselves on possessing a professional approach to the conduct of military operations. NZDF personnel value playing a credible role in the conduct of military operations and generally perform above expectations when that role utilises their unique qualities. The style of professionalism demonstrated by NZDF personnel is representative of the multi-cultural mix of the NZDF. It is a relaxed and friendly professionalism that prefers attaining professional excellence with quiet modesty rather than with fanfare or outspokenness.

> ‘In my youth Japan was defeated. The United States’ Red Arrows were stationed here and they were active and outgoing. Some New Zealand soldiers were also stationed in Yamaguchi City. They were more shy and reserved; well mannered and polite – like Samurai. So I said to myself, ‘New Zealand is a gentleman’s country.’

Kenji Inove at a reception for New Zealand teachers at Yamaguchi City (25 November 1980).
As translated by Mr Yoshida, Japanese Foreign Office

### Conclusion

1.21 The NZDF has a unique culture that is underpinned by shared values of commitment, loyalty, integrity, and professionalism. The resultant military values are the tenets from which the NZDF builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent and appropriately equipped. With this organisational and cultural basis the NZDF becomes capable of serving the interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand Government. The NZDF culture and set of military values provide the foundation for New Zealand’s unique approach to the conduct of military operations.
Executive Summary

- Defence policy and foreign policy are a partnership aimed at securing New Zealand’s physical, economic, social and cultural well being, and meeting our regional and global responsibilities.

- New Zealand military strategy draws together defence policy and military strategic doctrine. An alternative way of defining military strategy is to describe it as the bridge linking policy and operational effect.

The Defence Act

2.1 Under the Defence Act 1990, New Zealand’s armed forces are raised and maintained for:

- the defence of New Zealand and the protection of its interests, whether in New Zealand or elsewhere;

- the contribution under collective security treaties, agreements or arrangements; and

- the contribution of forces to the United Nations (UN) or other organisations or states for operations in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN.

2.2 The Act also allows the armed forces to be made available for the performance of public services and assistance to the civil power in time of emergency, whether in New Zealand or elsewhere.

New Zealand Defence Policy

2.3 National Security Outcomes. The Government of the day establishes the key defence policy objectives for New Zealand. From the key defence policy objectives National Security Outcomes are determined. The NZDF works in conjunction with other Governmental agencies and departments to achieve the following five National Security Outcomes:
– a secure New Zealand including its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure;

– a strong strategic relationship with Australia in support of common interests for a secure and peaceful region;

– a political environment in the South Pacific in which national economies, societies and identities continue to evolve in a climate of good governance and internationally agreed standards of compliance with human rights;

– an expanding role in the regional dialogue of South East and North East Asia and, where appropriate, a role in regional security consistent with New Zealand’s interests and capabilities; and

– a global approach which supports New Zealand’s place in an international community committed to the maintenance of human rights and the collective security responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter, and which strengthens New Zealand’s international economic linkages.

**Figure 2.1: Parliament Buildings**

Defence policy sets out the key defence policy objectives. From the key defence policy objectives National Security Outcomes are defined.
Primary Mission of the NZDF
2.4 The primary mission of the NZDF, is:

- ‘to secure New Zealand against external threat, to protect our sovereign interests, including in the EEZ, and to be able to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest’.

NZDF Operational Outcomes
2.5 The NZDF Operational Outcomes are extracted from the National Security Outcomes and focus on the narrower defence-related aspects of the outcomes. The NZDF Operational Outcomes are:

- A secure New Zealand and its environs.
- A strong relationship with Australia.
- A secure stable environment in the South Pacific.
- A secure and stable Asia-Pacific.
- A stable peaceful international community.
The National Power Model

‘National power is the capability of a nation to influence or coerce other nations, or conversely, to resist the influence or coercion of other nations, in order to achieve its objectives’.

NZDF CSC, 2003

2.6 The contextual framework of the National Power Model provides a useful mechanism to understand the complex and dynamic nature of New Zealand, its interrelationship with other nations and the influence of national power on the employment of the NZDF. The Model does not originate from a single text, but rather is the synthesis of the work of a number of writers on the subject.
2.7 The sources of national power provide the capability to influence or to coerce. There are seven generally agreed sources of national power: geographic, demographic, economic, scientific–technological, organisational, psychosocial and military. These sources are converted into national power using what are commonly referred to as the four instruments of national power: economic, political, psychosocial and military. The application of all or a combination of these instruments enables one nation to influence or coerce another (figure 2.3).

2.8 Each source of national power influences and contributes to the instruments of national power to varying degrees. It is seldom that an instrument is applied in isolation. The political instrument, for example, pervades the other three.
Application of the National Power Model

2.9 To use a manufacturing analogy, there are the ‘raw materials’ (sources), a ‘refinery’ (instruments) and a ‘product’ (national power). The model requires ‘management’ of the process to ensure that resources are optimised to achieve the desired goals. ‘Management’ of national power is achieved through national objectives, policies and strategies. The relationship is briefly outlined at figure 2.4. New Zealand’s defence policies are based on New Zealand’s own assessment of the security environment and on what action is considered to be in New Zealand’s best interests.

Figure 2.4: Management of National Power

Military Strategy and the Relationship between Policy and Doctrine

2.10 National policy is the nation’s response to the generally accepted strategic environment, reflecting the Government’s judgement on what is necessary and possible in pursuance of the national interest. The National Security Outcomes express New Zealand’s national policy for the conduct of external affairs and relations, and national security. Defence policy and foreign policy are subsets of national policy. Defence policy is expressed in NZDF Operational Outcomes.
2.11 Defence policy can be both fluid and enduring. It must be capable of rapid review if strategic circumstances change. Nevertheless, in response to the more stable and less dynamic features of the strategic environment, it may also take on an enduring quality of its own that will have an inevitable influence on strategic thinking, including the development of military strategic doctrine.

2.12 Military strategic level doctrine has an important relationship with Defence policy. In contrast with the potentially fluid and changeable nature of policy, military strategic level doctrine is informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about the ways in which military forces can be used effectively in support of policy. Doctrine is more enduring and less subject to change than policy, although it is by no means rigid or inflexible.

2.13 New Zealand military strategy draws together Defence policy and military strategic doctrine. An alternative way of defining military strategy is to describe it as the bridge linking policy and operational effect. As such, it consists of an approach to the delivery of policy within the prevailing strategic circumstances. Military strategy is, therefore, a reflection of both what the NZDF will do and how it will be done. The ends, ways and means approach to military planning discussed in Chapter 6 assists planners in formulating effective military strategy.
Levels of Military Operations

Executive Summary

- There are three levels currently accepted as providing a framework for command and analysis: the strategic level, consisting of the national and military strategic, the operational level and the tactical level.

Levels of Military Operations

3.1 Military pursuits are conducted at different levels involving different people, from the senior political leadership of the country to the soldiers, sailors and airmen at the forefront of military operations. The three levels (depicted in figure 3.1) currently accepted as providing a framework for command and analysis are the strategic level, consisting of the national and military strategic, the operational level and the tactical level.
3.2 **The Strategic Level.** The strategic level of military operations consists of two sub-levels, the national strategic level and the military strategic level:

- **National Strategic Level.** The national strategic level refers to the political dimension of conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and the mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to meet the Government’s strategic objective. It is to do with the full range of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the coordinated use of the four principal instruments of national power: economic, political, psychosocial and military. It is as much concerned with the avoidance of war as with its conduct. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

- **Military Strategic Level.** The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and direction of conflict. This level includes the setting of the military end-state and the broad military approach to its achievement in order to support the national end-state. Military strategy is the military component of national strategy. From the broad national strategic outcomes, a defence policy objective is set for each outcome. In achieving these objectives, the NZDF makes a range of contributions: it raises, trains and maintains operationally prepared forces for use by the Government and it carries out operational missions in accordance with Government direction. Military strategy is the primary focus of the HQNZDF and the Ministry of Defence.

3.3 **Operational Level.** The operational level is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned and commanded. The operational level links military strategy to tactics by establishing operational objectives and end-states, initiating actions and applying resources to ensure the success of the campaign or operation. Operations could involve only NZDF force elements, or be conducted in conjunction with other New Zealand agencies/departments and/or the forces of other countries. In the planning and conduct of campaigns or major operations, ‘Operational Art’ is practiced. Operational art is defined as the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns or major operations. The practice of operational art is the primary focus of the Commander Joint Force New Zealand (COMJFJNZ) and the staff of HQJFJNZ.
3.4 **Tactical Level.** The tactical level is where the execution of the operation or campaign actually takes place. Tactics is the art of disposing maritime, land, air and Special Forces for battle or conflict, and logistics for direct support of those engaged in combat to achieve success in battle. It is what Clausewitz referred to as ‘the theory and use of military forces in combat’. In a joint operation the highest tactical commanders are normally the Component Commanders working directly to the COMJFNZ or a designated Joint Task Force Commander. Operational advice provided to COMJFNZ by the Component Commanders should be an amalgam of judgements across all functional areas of their responsibilities. Below them are the formation and unit commanders, and other subordinate commanders, whose task it is to execute the mission at the tactical level.

### The Significance of the Levels of Military Operations

3.5 **Overlapping Levels of Military Operations.** In practice, the levels of military operations overlap and the distinctions between them will rarely be clear. For example, planning at all levels of operations is very closely linked, interdependent, and often occurs concurrently. Three important issues emerge about the ways in which the three levels of operations interact:

- There is never any clear line drawn between them; they invariably overlap, a factor commanders need to bear in mind, especially when establishing the levels of command in which clear distinctions reflecting divisions of responsibility need to be drawn.

- They were developed with war in mind, although they can also apply to all forms of military operation, from warfighting to the most benign humanitarian aid operations.

- In some operations, for example Peace Support Operations (PSO) and during the management of complex confrontations, action taken at the lowest tactical level may need to be responsive to strategic decision-making, with the tactical outcome having immediate strategic significance (the so-called “strategic corporal” concept). This may lead to political and military leaders at the strategic level wishing to directly influence the lowest tactical level, missing out the intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of command.
3.6 The levels of military operations provide a general framework for the command and control of operations and a useful tool for the analysis of politico-military activity, before, during and after the conduct of military operations. An understanding of them – and of their limitations – is vital to a commander’s grasp of the conduct of military operations. The levels of military operations provide a means of achieving the coherent application of force in different ways at different levels in pursuit of strategic objectives. It is quite possible, for example, to apply force offensively at one level, while being defensive at another, both being entirely consistent with a campaign’s ultimate objective (as shown in the following historical example on Samoa during WW2).

3.7 While the strategic/tactical overlap may be inevitable, given the nature of some operations it does threaten the essential command and control structure and can undermine the principles of mission command. The risk to effective mission command can be managed if such an overlap is anticipated and included as a factor during the planning stages. Informing political and military leaders at the strategic level on the requirements of mission command will aid effective implementation of the NZDF command philosophy (See chapter 6).
Historical Example

Different Objectives at the Strategic and Operational Levels of a Military Operation

New Zealand Expeditionary Force to German Samoa, August 1914

Strategic Threat: The German Pacific Fleet based at Tsingtao (China) threatened to project naval power deep into the South Pacific. Samoa, having the only base south of the equator, was assessed as a critical vulnerability to the German plan.

Strategic Level: Defence – The British Imperial concept was to limit German access into the South Pacific and retain logistic bases for shipping. New Zealand’s assessment concluded that the Germans could readily launch attacks against the New Zealand coast that would in turn necessitate increased resources for coastal security. New Zealand adopted a defensive objective at the strategic level of military operations.

Operational Level: Offence – On request from the Imperial War Department, New Zealand invaded German Samoa. HMS Philomel (at the time loaned to New Zealand as a training Ship) escorted by two Navy cruisers, escorted 1400 troops with the mission of occupying German Samoa. New Zealand adopted an offensive objective at the operational level of military operations.

The strategic assessment of the situation and the decision to commit operational forces to German Samoa was justified with the arrival of German Pacific Fleet vessels one week after New Zealand’s successful occupation. Pre-emptive offensive actions at the operational level denied the Germans a firm base from which to project power from in the South Pacific and threaten New Zealand’s interests. The Samoa example highlights how diverse, yet complimentary objectives can be set at the different levels of military operations.

Chapter 4

Doctrine in the New Zealand Defence Force

Executive Summary

- The NZDF positively encourages judicious and innovative departure from doctrine when it is a considered departure from established doctrine by educated practitioners.

- Most joint operational-level NZDF Doctrine is adopted from the Australian Defence Force. Adoption of Australian joint doctrine publications is on a case by case basis.

- The Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine (NZDDP–D) is the highest level of joint doctrine. It focuses on the military strategic level of war, but contains comment on both the strategic and operational levels.

Introduction

4.1 The development of sound military doctrine is as much to do with challenging received wisdom as it is with codifying established practice. Those in command, at whatever level, have to rely on their judgement and apply as much of what they have learnt as appropriate, departing from the established route when the circumstances demand it.

4.2 The NZDF positively encourages judicious and innovative departure from doctrine when it is a considered departure from established doctrine by educated practitioners. New military doctrine is inherently flexible, allowing commanders to seize the initiative and adopt unorthodox or imaginative courses of action as the opportunities arise.

4.3 Doctrine also embraces the organisational culture of the NZDF. In the NZDF, the culture is undergoing a paradigm shift from three discrete single Services to a jointly focused Defence Force; “three Services, one Force”. The operational focus in the NZDF is towards integrated joint operations with synchronised joint effects. This cultural change realises the collective strength of a joint approach, whilst retaining the strength of the diversity of the three Services.
Doctrine Categories

4.4 Doctrine may be divided into three categories that shape the development and use of the doctrine. The three categories are:

- **Philosophical–level Doctrine.** Philosophical doctrine explains the fundamental principles behind the employment of forces in military operations. Philosophical doctrine also describes the basic tenets under which forces operate. Based on regional and sometimes global politico–military environments, philosophical doctrine describes the conditions that determine the Government’s options for the employment of Force Elements. It also describes possible future environments within which a force may operate.

- **Application–level Doctrine.** Application–level doctrine explains how philosophical principles are applied. This doctrine encompasses guidance at both the individual and collective levels for dealing with differing circumstances in order to achieve mission success. Application–level doctrine contains both extant, proven applications and the newer emergent ideas that are yet to mature.

- **Procedural–level Doctrine.** Procedural doctrine describes the skill–sets that are fundamental to the performance of set tasks by every individual service person. It includes minor tactics, military techniques and procedures in the detail necessary to ensure team effectiveness and interoperability. This level of doctrine is therefore highly prescriptive and not usually open to interpretation. Given the safety implications inherent in many aspects of some procedural doctrine, there is usually only one approved way of applying tactics, techniques and procedures.

**NZDF Doctrine Development**

4.5 **Sources of Doctrine.** There are two categories of doctrine providing guidance to the NZDF; joint doctrine and single Service doctrine.

- **Joint Doctrine.** This publication is the highest level of joint doctrine. It focuses on the military strategic level of war, but contains comment on both the strategic and operational levels. NZDF joint doctrine at the operational level is contained in the hierarchy of adopted Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) and NZDF supplements.

- **Single Service Doctrine.** Some elements of operational and tactical doctrine are, by their nature, exclusively single Service. They remain the responsibility of the single Services, but are consistent with joint doctrine.

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1 ADDP–D–*Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, June 2003, annex A
4.6 The NZDF employs doctrine that is normally developed by likely coalition partners, thereby promoting interoperability. New Zealand doctrine is not normally derived unless:

- Government and/or defence policy dictates,
- there is a philosophical difference on the military operation or task, or
- specialised organisations or equipment drives a requirement.

4.7 **Adopting Doctrine.** The NZDF does not normally develop its own doctrine below the Capstone level. Most joint operational–level NZDF doctrine is adopted from the Australian Defence Force. Adoption of Australian joint doctrine publications is on a case by case basis. Single Service tactical doctrine is adopted at the discretion of the single Service Chiefs with primacy of doctrine being with joint doctrine. Adopted doctrine is normally the application level doctrine for the NZDF.

4.8 **Adapting Doctrine.** The NZDF does develop New Zealand doctrine supplements to support specific New Zealand doctrinal requirements within the overall framework of the Australian ADDP series.

4.9 **Deriving Doctrine.** Deriving doctrine is a complex and resource intensive task, and as such is normally only undertaken when no other suitable doctrine is available. Production of New Zealand doctrine can be undertaken at the strategic, operational or tactical level. However it is normally limited to instances when the fundamental philosophy of the NZDF differs from other nations and needs to be clearly stated for the benefit of NZDF and the New Zealand Government. This publication is an example of a New Zealand derived doctrine publication.

4.10 Much of the tactical doctrine of the NZDF will be promulgated in single Service publications. These publications will be accredited within the NZDF hierarchy of doctrine where they are agreed as representing the NZDF practice in the subject matter. The NZDF may also publish a body of doctrine work outside of either of these series. Such publications would be aimed at an external (ie non–Defence) readership, and normally provide treatment of doctrine issues at a philosophical level.
Part 2

Applying Doctrine to the Conduct of Military Operations
Chapter 5

The Context of Military Operations

Executive Summary

– Conflict on the moral plane exerts the greater and often decisive influence on the conduct and outcome of conflict.

– New Zealand military doctrine is based on the recognition that the NZDF can be involved across the full spectrum of operations.

– The mix of combat and non–combat operations requires clear definition in order that the role and potential tasks of NZDF personnel committed to an area of conflict, as well as the risks, are fully understood.

– Paradoxically, peace is ultimately sustained by, and dependent upon, the willingness of states to use force to preserve it, as well as restore it when lost.

Introduction

5.1 The modern security environment is becoming increasingly complex. This can be largely attributed to the inter–relationships and the degree of harmony existing among or between individuals, groups, societies and states. While individuals may act for reasons of altruism, nations generally act in their own self–interest, including the pursuit of political, economic, ideological, religious and cultural objectives.

5.2 When the self–interests of groups or nations are in harmony, or at least pose no real or perceived threat to each other, there is peace. When they are not, and the actions or policies of one are viewed as threatening the vital interests of another, a state or condition of conflict arises. Conflict between or among nations, unless minimised, resolved or contained, can quickly escalate in nature and in scope.

5.3 States affected by serious and continuous internal conflict may find themselves on a path to dissolution and potentially civil war. Within this context, conflict may occur between legitimate governments and non–state organisations, such as economical, ideological or religious terrorist groups. These terrorist groups traditionally rely upon asymmetric attacks that are normally considered criminal, as opposed to military acts.
5.4 Conflict and war have the potential to increase in intensity and violence, affect third parties, and may involve dehumanising and genocidal undercurrents. For this reason, every effort must be made to reduce the causes of conflict and, where it has broken out, to prevent its spread and escalation. The NZDF fulfils a vital role by possessing the capability to engage in conflict, manage conflict and restore peace in an effective, disciplined, and morally legitimate manner.

The Structure and Characteristics of Conflict

5.5 While conflict is a condition or state of the security environment, it is also a physical activity involving the application of armed force to impose its will on an opponent. In terms of its structure and characteristics, conflict is indistinguishable from war, the difference between the two lying in war’s distinct political–strategic function and the decisive military victory it seeks to achieve. Because of the intrinsic similarities of conflict and war, the following discussion of conflict applies equally to war.

‘The manner in which a nation elects to wage war is not inextricably related to the actual practice of war but also reflects the moral view of the society, which it represents.’

John Keegan, A History of Warfare

Physical and Moral Planes of Conflict

5.6 Physical. Conflict exists on both physical and moral planes. Conflict on the physical plane includes weapons, technology, force ratios, ground captured or lost, logistical matters and economic, personnel and industrial factors. Of primary importance to the conduct of military operations on this plane are the materiel support requirements for effecting manoeuvre, fire support and force sustainment.

5.7 Moral. On the moral plane, conflict is a contest and clash between opposing human wills. Its characteristics are psychological in nature and centre on the desire and will of an opponent to fight or resist. Among nations, they include political leadership, popular feeling, unity of purpose, patriotism, ideology, and national character and beliefs. Within a military force, the moral plane of conflict relates to force cohesion and the determination and will of individuals and task forces to achieve their mission. Conflict on the moral plane encompasses combat leadership, moral justification, discipline, training, motivation, perseverance, morale, esprit de corps, and everything else that inspires military personnel and provides them reasons to fight.
5.8 **Decisiveness of the Moral Plane.** Because it is human–centred, the moral plane exerts the greater and often decisive influence on the conduct and outcome of conflict. This is where NZDF deficiencies on the physical plane can be compensated. Hence, development of cultural values and moral qualities, especially those pertaining to command and leadership and the military ethos will always be of paramount importance in the NZDF.

![Figure 5.1: The Characteristics of Conflict](image)

The characteristics of conflict are friction, uncertainty, actions and reactions, and violence and destruction.

5.9 **Characteristics of Conflict.** The clash and interaction of opposing human wills, together with the firepower and destructive capabilities of modern weapons, gives conflict its violent dynamic and produces environments and outcomes that are rarely predictable. The principal characteristics of conflict are:
- **Friction.** Friction is what makes the apparently easy difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible¹. During conflict, friction can exist on the moral plane in the form of personality clashes among leaders or indecisiveness of commanders; or it may exist on the physical plane in the form of breakdown of vehicles, loss of communications, navigational errors, difficult ground, and bad weather. When such problems are coupled with the interplay and hostile actions of opponents who are at the same time attempting to impose their will, friction abounds and makes the conduct of military operations such a difficult and complex undertaking.

- **Uncertainty.** All actions during conflict occur in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Despite the revolutionary advances in information processing and data management, knowledge, information and intelligence about an enemy or situation will remain finite and subject to probabilities. The ‘fog of war’ is real and pervasive, generating anxiety and restricting effective decision-making. Uncertainty is reduced by developing a climate of trust between leaders and subordinates; applying military judgement, experience, and intuition to situations; having simple, flexible plans and good standing orders and operating procedures; ensuring that orders and the intentions of commanders are clearly articulated and understood; and by fostering in subordinates initiative and independence in thought and action.

- **Actions and Reactions.** Conflict manifests a continuous series of actions, reactions and situational changes as the principles of war (See Chapter 6) are applied. New challenges and difficulties continually arise, along with opportunities for exploitation. The tempo or pace of operations will be dependent on the ability of a force to accelerate or decelerate its activities, including synchronising combat functions, to meet an ever-changing situation.

- **Violence and Destruction.** The waging of conflict is an intrinsically violent and bloody affair producing destruction, terror, suffering and death for combatants and non-combatants alike. The means and weapons used in modern conflict are extremely lethal and diverse in nature, from the crudest of weapons to weapons of mass destruction. The diversity and lethality of weapons available to potential adversaries poses significant challenges to commanders and leaders at all levels of operations.

¹ Clausewitz “On War”
5.10 In the current global context, neither peace nor war exists in its purest extreme form. There is a wide range of different situations between war and peace that are frequently given labels such as ‘tension’, ‘crisis’, ‘hostilities’, and ‘conflict’ in which the NZDF will be required to conduct military operations.

5.11 The NZDF conducts a variety of military operations within different environmental contexts, termed the spectrum of operations, with peace at one extreme and war at the other (figure 5.2). Between these two extremes are the wide variety of conditions that represent the bulk of the relationships existing between states. The spectrum is best viewed as an indicative illustration of the shifting types of operations that may be conducted during the relationships between nations, non-national agencies and individuals.
Figure 5.2: The Spectrum of Operations

Environmental Operating Context

- **Peace**
  - Increasing Potential for Lethal Engagements
  - Operations in Peace
  - Peaceful Military Engagement
  - Non-combatant Evacuation

- **Conflict**
  - Conflict Prevention
  - Peace Building
  - Peace Making
  - Peace Keeping
  - Peace Enforcement
  - Countering Insurgencies
  - Complex Warfare
  - Conventional Warfare

- **War**
  - Operations Other than War
  - War Operations

Examples of Operations Involving Military

- **Peace**
  - Aid to Civil Authorities
  - Defence Diplomacy

- **Conflict**
  - Combating Terrorism
  - Humanitarian Assistance

Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine
New Zealand Application

5.12 New Zealand military doctrine is based on the recognition that the NZDF can participant in a number of concurrent operations that fall within different parts of the spectrum of operations and recognises that our core business will remain defending New Zealand and its interests. The ‘spectrum of operations’ extends from assisting with emergency relief to matters of national survival. It is underpinned by the concept of ‘likelihood versus consequence’. As a general guide, operations to the left of the spectrum are more likely, but their consequences are relatively less catastrophic when compared to the consequences of operations to the right of the spectrum. The reverse is true for those operations to the right of the spectrum, where although they might be relatively unlikely, the consequences may be catastrophic for New Zealand.

Conflict Escalation

5.13 All countries can be placed somewhere on the spectrum of operations, a few enjoying relative peace, while many others are in a state of conflict, or even at war. Although the condition of peace is fairly easily determined, that of conflict – because it also encompasses threats of violence – is a far more subjective matter. In reality, the boundary between peace and conflict is often blurred and frequently crossed. When peace is threatened, it becomes vulnerable. At that stage, if disputes cannot be resolved peaceably, or policy goals are pursued through a strategy of threat or coercion, conflict often results.

5.14 Once a conflict escalates to a level involving armed force, diplomacy and negotiation become more difficult, and willingness to conciliate lessens. Moreover, one or both parties may consider that they have no alternative but to evolve the conflict to war in order to achieve their objectives.

Combat and Non–Combat Operations

5.15 The requirement to be able to conduct combat and non–combat operations, often simultaneously, is one of the great complications for Defence Forces operating in the spectrum of operations.

5.16 The mix of combat and non–combat operations, which characterise conflict, requires clear definition in order that the role and potential tasks of NZDF personnel committed to an area of conflict, as well as the risks, are fully understood.
5.17 **Combat Operations.** In New Zealand doctrine, combat operations are defined as: “military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.” The actual level of force used during combat operations will be determined by the tactical situation and by the Rules of Engagement.

5.18 **Non–Combat Operations.** Non–combat operations are defined as: “military operations where weapons may be present, but their use or threatened use is for self–protection purposes and not otherwise essential to the accomplishment of the mission.”

**Historical Example**

*Combat and Non–Combat Operations in Yugoslavia and Somalia*

*Figure 5.3: NZDF Personnel in Former Yugoslavia*

In the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia, New Zealand troops not only carried out armed patrols and escorts, confiscated weapons, and separated belligerents — potentially activities that could have developed into combat operations at the tactical level — but also undertook a host of non–combat activities, which were considered essential to these missions. These included distribution of relief supplies, re–building schools and clinics, assisting in the re–establishment of public services, and undertaking a variety of other humanitarian and civil support activities.
5.19 Both combat and non–combat operations characterise an environment of conflict with a potential threat of sudden and violent escalation. New Zealand service personnel are prepared, trained and equipped to respond appropriately in operations across the spectrum, up to and including warfighting.

Military Responses

5.20 The spectrum of operations model will always be open to interpretation with regard to where a specific conflict or security situation features on the spectrum. However, its usefulness lies in being able to identify and associate appropriate military responses for a particular security condition or conflict situation.

5.21 Operations other than war are very broad in scope and, for the NZDF, range from assistance to civil authorities within New Zealand, to peace enforcement operations overseas. Warfighting for the NZDF, on the other hand, is the implementation of national strategy aimed at imposing will on an enemy and achieving national policy objectives through application of decisive military means.

Peace

‘Who desires peace, should prepare for war.’
Vegetius (Roman historian – 4th Century AD)

5.22 Among and within nations, peace is defined as the absence of violence – direct or indirect, manifested or threatened. While peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts are the desired norms, the reality is that peace is often a temporary condition. To be enduring and genuine, it must be based on mutual respect, shared interests and common values.

5.23 In the international arena peace is most often the result of one state manifesting a superior political will which is backed by a preponderance of force and is militarily unchallenged by others. Or it may result from a balance of power and agreed political spheres of interest. In either case, despite the paradoxical implications, peace is ultimately sustained by, and dependent upon, the willingness of states to use force to preserve it, as well as restore it when lost.
Conflict

5.24 The essence of conflict is a violent clash between opposing human wills, each trying to impose its own will on the other. In interstate, and even intrastate conflict, the means to impose will on an adversary may include; diplomatic, economic and political mechanisms, as well as the application or threat of violence by military force.

5.25 In an environment of conflict, military action is but one tool among several which may be used by a state or group to impose their will. The desired goal or policy objective should be obtained, preferably, by non–military means. However, if this is not possible without resorting to force, the conflict has the potential to escalate in intensity and scope.
War

‘All right–thinking people regard war as a dreadful evil and are pacifists at heart. Probably no one is more aware of the horror, brutality and suffering endured during war than a front line infantry soldier. He has first–hand knowledge. He would be the last to wish it upon his sons or daughters, yet in his heart of hearts he knows that there are evils more intolerable even than war. Those New Zealanders who served in World War II find their reward in still possessing a country in which freedom is the birth–right of each new–born child and the young can grow and flourish in an atmosphere untarnished by the spectre of the fear, brutality and inhumanity practised in a totalitarian state.’

A Soldier’s Story – A Mediterranean Odyssey, by Pat Kane

5.26 War is both an escalation and evolution of conflict, and has a clearly defined political character. It is a strategic–level political and military condition involving the application of a nation’s military and other resources against an enemy to achieve a political end. The object purpose of war is the winning or restoration of a peace, which meets the political conditions or end–state set forth by the political leadership.

5.27 War is prosecuted through strategy, it aims at defeating the enemy’s military forces that support and sustain a political structure and a will to fight. When embarking on a policy of war, the political authority consciously decides to achieve the desired end–state by military means.

5.28 From a military perspective warfare is the application of lethal force using a range of combat techniques and military capabilities. Warfare is the domain of nations’ armed forces. The NZDF adds non–combat techniques to this equation, recognising that a combination of combat and non–combat can have a greater effect than simply the blunt use of kinetic energy.
Executive Summary

- **Operational Tenets.** The six NZDF operational tenets for the conduct of military operations across the spectrum of operations are; a warfighting ethos, the effects based approach, the principles of war, the manoeuvrist approach, a command philosophy, and inherent flexibility and pragmatism.

- **Warfighting Ethos.** A warfighting capability and ethos allows the NZDF to more effectively conduct peace support operations, deal with sudden changes in the level of hostilities encountered during operations across the spectrum, and enhance their force protection.

- **Effects Based Approach (EBA).** An effects based approach to the conduct of military operations requires military planners and commanders to think in terms of generating effects to achieve the desired operational end–state that in turn contributes to achieving the desired strategic end–state.

- **Principles of War.** The application of the principles of war with judgement and common sense will facilitate success, blatant disregard of them involves increased risk and a commensurate increase in the likelihood of failure.

- **Manoeuvrist Approach.** The manoeuvrist approach is based on using the indirect approach to defeating the adversary’s will to oppose us. This approach seeks to negate the adversary’s strategy through the intelligent and creative application of effects against the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and centre of gravity.

- **Command Philosophy.** Mission command is a philosophy of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction.

- **Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism.** A flexible and pragmatic attitude encourages imaginative and innovative thinking and is the source of the type of initiative that generates success in military operations.
6.1 All components of the NZDF, in harmony with other instruments of national power, offer a range of ways and means of enhancing operations. Each Service makes their unique contribution to a joint force whilst retaining their individual Service ethos. Maritime, Land and Air Forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in respective single Service doctrine.

6.2 The chapter identifies and explains the essential elements of NZDF military operations. These essential elements, defined as NZDF operational tenets, are fundamental to the conduct of military operations and permeate down through New Zealand military doctrine.

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**The Warfighting Ethos**

6.3 The nature of military doctrine is a product of military imperatives. Those imperatives lead ultimately to the need to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight and win in warfare. The conduct of warfighting in support of national interests is the most important function military forces may have to perform. Every member of the NZDF must be prepared to fight for whatever legitimate cause the New Zealand Government is pursuing through military endeavour. It follows also that doctrine must have at its core a warfighting ethos.

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1 JWP 0–01
6.4 Warfighting is about the deliberate application of lethal force, usually by two sides against each other but increasingly in more complex patterns. Because of the destructive nature of warfighting, those involved are forced to endure a constant threat to their lives and well being. They will themselves be attempting to create and amplify the same fear in the minds of their adversary.

6.5 The dynamic and destructive nature of warfighting produces massive uncertainty, confusion, chaos and an inevitable abandonment of initial plans for the conduct of the war. With both sides attempting to gain advantage, surprise and shock will be a constant drain on resources, both physical and mental.

6.6 Warfighting is likely to be demanding and frightening for the individuals involved. Fear and uncertainty are likely to be commonplace, even within the minds of those most conditioned to cope with its challenges. The bravest men and women may be frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears that is the measure of their courage. Importantly, by its very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.

Figure 6.2: Managing Risk during Military Operations
Military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk.
6.7 A warfighting ethos provides the NZDF with the vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with most of the circumstances they are likely to confront in situations across the spectrum of operations. It also prepares public opinion for the possibility of casualties in pursuit of a legitimate and justifiable cause, especially when that cause is a matter of choice and not fundamental to New Zealand’s own national strategic interests. In order to continue to succeed in combat conduct effective peace support operations, provide adequate force protection to all military forces involved in an operation, and be able to respond to current and future governments’ requirements across the spectrum of operations, the NZDF must continue to develop and retain a warfighting ethos.

**Effects Based Approach**

‘Start with the end in mind.’

Sun Tzu

6.8 NZDF military operations are planned and conducted with the end–state in mind. The end–state articulates the desired effect sought by planners. The NZDF adopts an EBA to the conduct of military operations at the strategic and operational levels that requires close co–ordination between appropriate instruments of national power working towards the government’s desired strategic end–state. An EBA requires planners and commanders to think in terms of generating effects to achieve the desired operational end–state, that in turn contributes to achieving the desired strategic end–state.

6.9 The NZDF EBA builds on current planning processes that utilise the ends, ways and means approach (paragraph 6.22) and seek to generate the Joint Effect (paragraph 6.18). The NZDF EBA also facilitates ongoing interoperability with potential major coalition partners as they transition to a full Effects Based Operations (EBO) capability.\(^2\) The NZDF EBA is not an EBO capability as defined by the US.

\(^2\) The US leads the way in developing EBO doctrine and capability. Currently the US does not possess an EBO capability as defined by the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and is unlikely to achieve a full capability in the immediate future. The US Department of Defense is adopting specific achievable aspects of EBO into their current doctrine as it becomes validated through experimentation and modelling.
The NZDF does not possess the capability to conduct EBO and is unlikely to possess this capability for the foreseeable future. A full EBO capability as defined by the US is dependent upon developing a range of supporting capabilities that are not yet technologically or institutionally achievable by the US Government or the US Department of Defense (DoD), hence by definition, not even the US possess the capability to conduct full EBO.

6.10 A key element to adopting an EBA is the understanding of the environmental operating context as a collection of interrelated systems. System information that is derived from both intuition and analysis is considered as a network of nodes and links covering the current state of the adversary, friendlies and neutrals. The essential elements of political, economic, psychosocial, military and other systems within the operating environment are captured as nodes and the relationships between these are modelled as links.

6.11 An EBA requires the activities of a range of relevant agencies being harmonised across the operating environment to achieve optimal reinforcing and sequencing of effects, while minimising the probability of undesired outcomes.

6.12 In the New Zealand context of an EBA to the conduct of military operations, effects are the physical, functional or psychological outcomes, events or consequences that result from specific military or non–military actions at the tactical, operational and strategic level.

6.13 **Decisive and Enabling Effects.** Effects are considered in two main categories; decisive and enabling. Decisive effects are designed to attack key weaknesses and strengths, and thereby contribute directly to operational and strategic objectives. Enabling effects are intended to support the achievement of decisive effects. For example, shaping operations or deception could be enabling effects. Other considerations are:

- **Physical and Cognitive.** Suitable actions to realise decisive or enabling effects are directed at target sets which can be considered in two domains: physical (actions against an adversary’s capability) and cognitive (which influence the will of an adversary).

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3 A full EBO capability is reliant upon a fully coordinated and cohesive whole of government approach and a comprehensive Operational Net Assessment (ONA) capability that provides full situational awareness of an adversary’s essential elements of political, economic, social, military and other systems within the operating environment. The ONA capability extends to neutrals and friendlies influencing the operating environment and monitors and assesses the effects generated by actions by all influencing parties.

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**Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine**
Desirable and Undesirable. Decisive and enabling effects, either in the physical or cognitive domain, will have desirable and undesirable consequences. Desirable and undesirable effects can be considered during the planning process or can occur unexpectedly during the execution of an operation.

6.14 Actions. Actions are applied to generate effects in a designated environment or system, e.g. in the adversary’s political, military, economic, legal ethical and moral, physical, technology, social or cultural areas. The effects might be generated from primary and supporting instruments of power such as economic, political, psychosocial and military.

6.15 Effects based actions focus on an adversary’s key nodes contributing to national power by seeking to exploit an understanding of systems, vulnerabilities, links, and capabilities. The concept is to act on selected key nodes and links to increase the probability that effects are created to alter the adversary’s behaviour and capability.

6.16 The three key characteristics of the planning and execution of an EBA to operations as they relate to the ‘system’ are:

- Planning Commences at the End–state. The planning sequence, commences with a vision of the desired end–state which is aligned to the national objective. A determination is made of those effects that could attain that end–state from the beginning state. An appreciation of tasks to be performed is then made, from which a set of actions are then determined to evoke the desired effects.

- Execution Commences from the Beginning State. The execution sequence commences at the beginning state where actions are applied, generating effects that result in influencing or changing the state of the system, leading to a desired end–state.

- Most Systems are Adaptive. That is, on application of an input the system will try to resist or make adjustments to minimise the effect of that input. This can lead to generating not only primary effects, but also secondary and tertiary effects.

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4 The model is a US construct, taken from a development paper by the United States Joint Forces Command, 23 January 2003, ‘Effects Based Operations’.
6.17 **Assessment of Effects.** A key element to successful implementation of an EBA is the means to assess the effects attainment, task accomplishment and resultant system change. The primary purpose of assessment is to provide feedback to the policy-makers and commanders as to the progress towards attaining the end-states. Informed adjustments to the plan can then be made as required.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 6.3: Effects Based Approach**

An EBA to the conduct of military operations requires military planners and commanders to think in terms of generating effects to achieve the desired operational end-state that in turn contributes to achieving the desired strategic end-state.

**Joint Effect**

*‘Just as a rope with three strands is much stronger than a rope with a single strand, so too are joint operations that integrate the individual strengths of the Navy, Army and Air Force to apply the Joint Effect for precise and decisive impact.’*

RADM RA Iain Henderson, CBE, RN
RUSI Journal (June 2000)
6.18 The adoption of an EBA to operations at the strategic and operational levels requires military force elements from all Services to operate in an integrated fashion. The integrated approach allows the value of a joint force to become more than merely the sum of its component parts. When commanders and staff focus upon the desired effect required and employ the appropriate means in the most effective way in order to achieve that effect; that is called generating the 'Joint Effect'.

6.19 Whilst applicable to all levels of military operations, the Joint Effect is predominantly concerned with the harmonisation of force elements at the operational and tactical levels.

6.20 The Joint Effect can only be achieved when all components are working effectively and harmoniously with those from the other Services. All components of the NZDF offer a range of ways and means of enhancing operations. Each Service makes a unique contribution to a joint force whilst retaining their individual Service ethos. Maritime, Land and Air Forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in maritime, land and air power doctrine.

6.21 Operations are not joint simply because forces from different Services and resources from other agencies and organisations operate in the same area. Operations are only truly joint when there is an interdependence between single Service force elements. Effective command and control of joint operations then depends upon commanders and staff understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses (both inherent and situational) of each component of the force, and how they may complement each other. This understanding, applied in the planning and execution of military operations, allows the NZDF force elements to achieve effects out of proportion to the resources applied.

**Ends, Ways and Means**

6.22 The ends, ways and means approach to operational planning supports an EBA to operations where the focus is to target the adversary’s Centre of Gravity (COG) in such a way as to achieve the operational end–state (the objective or desired effect). The achievement of the operational end–state, and the methods used, in turn, supports targeting the strategic centre of gravity in such a way as to achieve the strategic end–state (the strategic desired effect).

6.23 In determining the shape and nature of an operation or campaign utilising an EBA, commanders invariably consider three issues, ends, ways and means.
6.24 **Ends.** The identification of a clear and unambiguous objective or end–state is the core issue in planning terms. This requirement adds weight to the master principle of war, the selection and maintenance of the aim. Unfortunately, a fixed and enduring objective is not always possible, especially at the strategic level at which political considerations are usually at their most influential. This situation reflects the ambiguities that often characterise the uncertainties of the geopolitical environment, especially during conflict. This is when flexibility becomes key to success in campaign planning. If the political objective changes, as it almost always will, that new objective or end–state creates a requirement for a change in the plan.

6.25 **Ways.** Knowing the objective and the forces available, the commander develops the plan to make best use of the seven fundamental defence capabilities that deliver fighting power. In doing so, the principal question is, how do I make it happen? All commanders need to understand how they can use their capabilities as a lever to achieve the objective, what assumptions they must make and how reliable they are. They assess the likelihood of changes being required and constantly consider what they might be in order to remain prepared for that eventuality.

6.26 **Means.** The means at a commander’s disposal will be those forces or capabilities allocated. If additional forces are available they may be requested by a commander if the appreciation process determines that additional forces are necessary. Commanders consider the nature of their force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force.
6.27 Figure 6.5 depicts how military campaigns and lines of operations interact and support strategic campaigns to achieve the strategic end-state. Other lines of operation (utilising other instruments of national power), normally do not sit within the operational commander’s campaign plan, although other governmental agencies may work for, or in conjunction with, the military commander. Both military and non-military lines of operation must be coordinated; this is depicted by the dotted, rather than a solid, line at the bottom of the campaign plan box.

6.28 Explanatory notes that expand on the relationship between the various campaign planning tools to the overall campaign planning and execution context are contained within ADDP–D.4 Joint Warfighting and ADDP 5.01 Joint Planning (Provisional).
6.29 From an understanding of the nature and types of conflict, and humanity’s experience of conflict, it is possible to derive certain basic principles about the conduct of armed conflict. These principles are known as the ‘Principles of War’.

The application of the principles of war with judgement and common sense will facilitate success, blatant disregard of them involves increased risk and a commensurate increase in the likelihood of failure.

6.30 In planning for war and in executing that plan, commanders and their staff at all levels need to consider these principles. The principles of war are not rigid laws but provide guidance on which military action will be based. The principles of war maintain relevance, applicability and relative importance in spite of dramatic changes over time in the methods, techniques and weapons of war.

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5 JWP 0–01 and ADDP–D

6 These principles of war are drawn from the United Kingdom’s military doctrine. The United States of America uses the following principles of war: Objective, Offensive, Security, Surprise, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, and Simplicity.
The application of the principles with judgement and common sense will facilitate success, blatant disregard of them involves increased risk and a commensurate increase in the likelihood of failure.

6.31 **The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.** This principal is listed first because it is the overriding principle of war. In the conduct of war as a whole, and in every operation within it, it is essential to select and clearly define the aim.

- Each phase of the conflict and each separate operation are directed towards this supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim is decided, all efforts are directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for re-appraisal and potentially a new aim.

- In a complex and turbulent political environment, problems frequently arise due to the existence of multiple, conflicting and changing aims. It is not unusual to have different aims at the national strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations due to the varying nature, duration and scope of activities conducted at each level. When different aims are set at different levels of operations, it is essential that a subordinate level aim fully supports and contributes to the attaining of the higher level aim.

- Complexities and uncertainties inherent within modern military operations reinforce the need for a clear articulation of the purpose of any military action. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim. The selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the ‘Master Principle’. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order since their relative importance varies according to the nature of the operation.
6.32 **Maintenance of Morale.** Success on operations often depends more on morale than on materiel advantages. Numbers, armament and physical resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, cohesion, energy, determination, endurance, skill and a warfighting ethos, that spring from a national determination to succeed. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are therefore essential to success in war.

6.33 **Offensive Action.** Offensive action is action by a military force to gain and retain the initiative. Offensive action is essential in most circumstances to the achievement of operational objectives. Offensive action enables commanders and their forces to exploit opportunities, which capitalise on adversary weaknesses, and to seize and hold the initiative. It is the necessary forerunner of success; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken, success is unlikely.

Figure 6.7: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

The principle of war, the selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the ‘Master Principle’. Above, at the tactical level the NZDF force elements conducted boarding operations in the Gulf to enforce the UN’s aim regarding sanctions against Iraq imposed between the first and the second Gulf War.
6.34 **Security.** A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate protection of high value assets, sea denial, and protection of information and communication systems that are vital to the nation or the defence forces. Security does not however, imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success on operations approaching warfighting. On the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive. Security is often closely linked to the achievement of surprise.

6.35 **Surprise.** Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence on combat operations and its psychological effect is immense. Every endeavour is made to surprise an adversary and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the efforts expended can be obtained and, in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success.

Figure 6.8: Offensive Action

Offensive action is essential in most circumstances to the achievement of victory.
Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally, tactically or by exploiting new materiel. The elements of surprise are:

- secrecy,
- concealment,
- deception,
- originality,
- audacity, and
- rapidity.

6.36 The achievement of surprise is further increased through the application of targeted counter-intelligence measures and techniques, including secrecy, counter surveillance, concealment, deception and other measures to destroy, neutralise or deceive an adversary’s intelligence gathering, surveillance and intelligence dissemination capabilities. These latter aspects are now often referred to as information operations or command and control warfare.

‘Everything which the enemy least expects will succeed the best.’

King Frederick II of Prussia

6.37 Concentration of Force. To achieve success on combat operations, it is often necessary to concentrate superior force, moral and materiel, to that of the adversary at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter an adversary’s threats. Concentration is more a matter of time than of space – and has more to do with the effects it has, than on the massing of force for its own sake.
6.38 Economy of Effort. Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place. The principle of economy of effort acknowledges the need for a degree of redundancy in wartime to allow for attrition. But it is opposed to a wasteful allocation of resources that does not maximise the contribution of those resources to the achievement or maintenance of the aim. Wasteful allocation of resources unnecessarily increases the cost of a military operation, and carries with it the danger, that it may in some cases, threaten the achievement of the aim.

6.39 Flexibility. Modern operations demand a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. Most importantly the decision making process needs to be flexible. This entails good training, organisation, discipline and staff work. It also calls for physical mobility of a high order, strategically, operationally and tactically, so that our forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive places and times.
6.40 **Cooperation.** Is based on team spirit and entails the coordination of all units so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Above all, goodwill and the desire to cooperate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the individual Services and their increasing mutual dependence on the military forces of allies and potential coalition partners has made cooperation between them of vital importance in modern-day military operations. It is frequently also necessary to cooperate closely with other non-governmental agencies, many of which will have aims and objectives quite different from those promulgated in the military plan.

![Figure 6.10: Sustainability](image)

The logistics and administrative organisation should be kept as simple as possible with Component Commanders having a degree of control over logistics and administration within their sphere of command, corresponding to their responsibilities for the operational plan.

6.41 **Sustainability.** The logistics and administrative arrangements are invariably crucial to success. They should be designed to give the commander maximum freedom of action in carrying out the plan. The logistics and administrative organisation should be kept as simple as possible with Component Commanders having a degree of control over logistics and administration within their sphere of command, corresponding to their responsibilities for the operational plan.
The Manoeuvrist Approach

6.42 The manoeuvrist approach is based on using an indirect method to defeating the adversary’s will to oppose us. The indirect method seeks to negate the adversary’s strategy through intelligent and creative application of effects against their critical vulnerabilities, although it also considers them as intelligent and adaptive. Consequently we need to take measures to protect our own strategy. The manoeuvrist approach is multi-dimensional and involves capabilities from different arms and Services across the different environments.

6.43 The manoeuvrist approach aims to apply strength against vulnerabilities to critical capabilities that support an adversary’s centre of gravity. The emphasis is on achieving the objective through dislocation and disruption of an adversary by taking the initiative and applying constant pressure at times and places the adversary least expects. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

‘Machines don’t fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.’

Colonel John Boyd

6.44 Manoeuvrist thinking is applicable to all types of military operation. Such thinking offers the prospect of rapid results or of results disproportionately greater than the resources applied.
6.45 A key characteristic of the manoeuvrist approach is NZDF commanders attaining decision superiority by making better decisions faster than an adversary. This allows commanders to ‘get inside an adversary’s decision making cycle’ (often described as Boyd’s ‘OODA Loop’ – See figure 6.12), and thus achieving a superior operational tempo. This involves presenting active or potential adversaries with the need to make good decisions at a faster rate than they are able to, so that increasingly inappropriate action is taken, or none at all, thereby paralysing their capability to react. Clearly, any degradation of the overall command system that can be achieved by physical or non-physical means hastens the onset of decision paralysis.

Command Philosophy

The Command Dilemma

6.46 Effective command relies on commanders engaging personally at the right place and tempo, with the deployed force elements. Remote command, that is command by remote control, cannot achieve this requirement. There are two means through which effective command is exercised:

– the promulgation of sound doctrine, and
– the maintenance of effective communications.
6.47 Modern communications present commanders with two interconnected challenges. The first is the risk of superior levels of command ‘micro-managing’ operations at lower levels. The second is too heavy a reliance on communications, which has the effect of undermining the longer-term ability of subordinates to take the initiative. Subordinate initiative is fundamental to the manoeuvrist approach. Equally important to the manoeuvrist approach, is the need for a range of disparate activities and force elements to be coordinated, to achieve effective systemic disruption of the adversary.

6.48 The best response to these two opposing but closely related challenges is to strike a degree of balance in command and control. Such a balance allows the initiative to be taken by subordinates but with superior commanders providing guidance and support when appropriate. Given the immediate impact that some tactical decisions can have on strategic outcomes, achieving the right balance is not always easy. Nevertheless, a balanced command and control approach is a fundamentally important skill for commanders to develop. The key to this is mutual trust and confidence
amongst commanders at all levels, so that subordinate commanders are empowered to use their initiative when they are unable to get guidance from their superior.

6.49 Commanders at all levels will always develop a plan that will convey to subordinates what the objective is, how it is to be achieved, and by what means. The plan is the commander’s own way of achieving the tasks delegated by the superior and contains details of how these will be achieved given the forces allocated. The plan also provides subordinates with a clear indication of their own roles and the forces they are allocated to achieve them, allowing them in turn to produce their own plan and to determine for themselves how best to achieve the allotted objectives.

**Mission Command**

6.50 A philosophy of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom, and speed of action and initiative, but is responsive to superior direction, is termed mission command. Mission command reinforces the manoeuvrist approach and the achievement of the desired operational effect in the modern operational environment.

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**Figure 6.13: Principles of Mission Command**

- **Unity of Effort**
- **Decentralisation**
- **Trust**
- **Mutual Understanding**
- **Timely and Effective Decision Making**
6.51 Mission command requires a style of command that recognises five supporting principles:

- Unity of Effort.
- Decentralisation.
- Trust.
- Mutual Understanding.
- Timely and Effective Decision Making.

6.52 **Mission Command Enablers.** To execute effective mission command, commanders at all levels should apply the following enablers:

- A commander ensures that subordinates understand the commander’s intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context.

- Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is necessary.

- Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

- A commander uses a minimum of control so as not to limit unnecessarily his subordinate’s freedom of action.

- Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions.

6.53 The NZDF approach to mission command stresses five key concepts that are utilised in the application of mission command:

- **Mission command requires practice during training for military operations in general, not for any particular operation.** In order to practice mission command, sufficient training needs to occur in a benign environment, in which honest mistakes are accepted and one in which unorthodox solutions are not rejected. A deeper understanding of what constitutes “intent” should be the subject of continual development. Without the unifying purpose of intent, mission command cannot function.

- **Mission command does not necessarily apply to all situations and to all people.** Mission command may not resonate amongst all our coalition partners. In a multinational environment, mission command has to be applied with particular care. Whilst over–direction will often cause offence, too little direction may cause little effect. Mission command
has the status of a “general rule”, however it should not preclude a very necessary element of active control. Commanders have a right to be satisfied that subordinates not only understand their intentions but are also acting on them. This cannot always be achieved by remote direction. Orders groups, back-briefs before mission execution and face-to-face communication during the conduct of operations not only develops trust and mutual understanding of the plan, but also strengthens collective and individual confidence, purpose and resolve to fight and win.

- **Mission command should apply wherever possible to peacetime military affairs.** This would appear to be entirely in accordance with delegating many peacetime functions to the lowest appropriate level. However, increasingly tight legislative and regulatory requirements, and resource constraints, actually work against the concept of mission command. These constraints tend to breed conservatism, possibly creating a tendency towards hesitation in a wider operational environment.

- **Mission command must remain dynamic and agile.** Mission command should be applied flexibly, reflecting the concept that the doctrine itself is not immutable. A commander’s style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of subordinate commanders. In exceptional circumstances, there will be fleeting opportunities for action where commanders may have to skip echelon and reach down at least one level of command. Historical evidence provides many examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel and Patton all intervened at the decisive point and brought about startling tactical successes.

- **Mission command must be bolstered by information technology.** Commanders should not be expected to conduct mission command effectively if they are saturated by unnecessary information, whatever the source. Conversely, without the detail, staff cannot provide effective advice to the commander. Care must be taken to guard against trying to inform everyone about everything all the time.

**Summary**

6.54 A key strength of mission command is that it encourages a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom, and speed of action, and initiative. The philosophy of mission command fits hand-in-glove with the NZDF organisational culture, NZDF cultural values and the NZDF approach to the conduct of joint operations.
6.55 Perhaps not surprisingly, the final theme is the duality of inherent flexibility and pragmatism. Manoeuvrist operations require a conditioned and resilient attitude of mind developed through experience in training and, if possible, in practice. Manoeuvrist operations also require considerable thought and imagination in both planning and execution.

6.56 Commanders must be conditioned to think constantly of new ways of approaching an objective. Imaginative and innovative thinking is the true source of the type of initiative that generates success in military operations. To allow for such thinking, New Zealand doctrine adopts a flexible and pragmatic approach in two ways.

- First, it is constantly reviewed and reconsidered and, if found wanting, is changed to reflect the developing military environment.

- Second, and in many ways more important, it allows for deviation. Dogma – the resort of the idle and unimaginative mind – is anathema. Doctrine is promulgated for guidance only, not for slavish adherence. An intelligent and talented commander faced with unique circumstances will always be better placed than the writer of doctrine to assess the most appropriate way of achieving his objective.

6.57 The recognition of the requirement for commanders to possess a flexible and pragmatic attitude eschews the formulaic and prescriptive in favour of the unpredictable and surprising. The combination of flexibility and pragmatism is absolutely necessary for the successful conduct of modern military operations across the spectrum. It is reflected in New Zealand doctrine by the simple expedient of avoiding obligatory prescriptive rules while encouraging a distinctive way of thinking about military operations.
6.58 When combined with the NZDF cultural values, the six operational tenets represent the New Zealand approach to military operations across the spectrum of operations throughout the world. The operational tenets are not mutually exclusive of each other, rather they overlap and rely upon each other to form an approach to military success (Figure 6.14).

6.59 Retention of a warfighting ethos is central to cultivating and maintaining the means that facilitate success in military activities across the spectrum of operations. Pursuing an EBA to operations in joint, integrated and multinational operations are the means by which New Zealand’s full range of defence capabilities and attributes may be brought to bear by a commander to achieve the desired operational and strategic outcomes.

6.60 In delivering the operational effect, NZDF elements are guided by the principles of war. The manoeuvrist approach is reliant upon a philosophy of command that allows commanders at all level as much scope as possible in determining how to achieve the desired end–state. The flexible and pragmatic application of the principles of war is a fundamental element of the manoeuvrist approach.

Figure 6.14: Summarising NZDF Operational Tenets
Part 3

Warfighting
Chapter 7

Components of Fighting Power

Executive Summary

– The essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three components of Fighting Power that may be applied in war and in operations other than war: conceptual, moral and physical.

– Conceptual Component. The conceptual component of fighting power consists of the principles of war, doctrine and conceptual thinking.

– Moral Component. The moral component of fighting power is about persuading our people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is morally and ethically sound; these promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim.

– Physical Component. The physical component of fighting power is the physical means to fight. It has five elements: personnel, equipment, collective performance, readiness and sustainability.

Introduction

7.1 Warfighting defines armed forces’ ability to fight and achieve success in operations. The essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three components of Fighting Power that may be applied in war and in operations other than war: conceptual, moral and physical.
The Conceptual Component

7.2 The conceptual component provides the thought processes needed to develop the ability to fight. It comprises both lessons from the past and thinking about how the NZDF can best operate today and in the future. The conceptual component of fighting power consists of the Principles of War, doctrine and conceptual thinking. It is the combination of the principles and doctrine, applied with imagination and initiative by their commanders, that provides the intellectual force driving the NZDF's fighting ability in current operations.

The Principles of War

7.3 The Principles of War were discussed in Chapter 6. Their origins can be traced back to Sun Tsu, they were inherent in Clausewitz’s writing and they achieved their current form immediately after the Second World War. There is a degree of consistency throughout previous iterations of the principles and, in their collective form they remain applicable to this day. The Principles of War are the foundation upon which NZDF doctrine is based.
Doctrine

7.4 NZDF military doctrine primarily utilises the Australian Defence Force doctrine and specifically those publications focused on joint and combined operations. The New Zealand Government is committed to a policy of Closer Defence Relations (CDR) with Australia. One aspect of this relationship is interoperability through a similar doctrinal approach. At the operational level, the NZDF has aligned itself with the ADDP Series.

7.5 NZDF policy recognises that the deployed Force Elements will be required to undertake operations as part of a coalition force. Historically this has been under the command of an Australian, British, or American coalition partner. Standardisation agreements and cooperation fora are important references in the development of New Zealand military doctrine to ensure interoperability, commonality and standardisation between these prospective coalition partners. Accordingly, Australian, British, American, and Canadian operational–level doctrine provides a critical input into the NZDF’s military doctrine.

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1 The principal standardisation agreements that the NZDF participates in are:

- **Air Force** – Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee (ASCC);
- **Army** – American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) Armies’ Standardisation Program;
- **Navy** – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States agreement (AUSCANNZUKUS) Naval Command Control and Communications Board;
- **Defence Research and Development** – The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP);
- **Command and Control** – Australia/New Zealand Command and Control Interoperability Board;
- **Logistics** – Australia/ New Zealand Operational Logistics Working Party;
- **Communications** – Australia/New Zealand Communications Forum; and
- **Military Communications and Electronics** – Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB).
Conceptual Thinking

7.6 There is a further essential element to the conceptual component that assists with the development of warfighting into the future. It is concerned with innovation and ideas for developing future capabilities, and better ways of operating in a continually fluctuating strategic environment. The development of concepts for future operations is vital for both force and doctrine development. Without conceptual thinking and the complementary equipment, the NZDF could not maintain a warfighting capability. In thinking about the future of warfare and the forces necessary to cope with its challenges, the NZDF uses a capability–based approach. There are seven fundamental NZDF capabilities required to deliver warfighting:

- A robust and responsive means of Command (the authority for the direction, coordination and control of military forces).
- A process to Inform the command (the acquisition, collation, processing, management and distribution of information).
- A means to Prepare forces for employment (all the activities needed to define, resource and deliver fighting power for operational employment, within readiness criteria laid down in policy). Service Chiefs contribute to this capability by fulfilling the raise and train functions of their raise, train, maintain responsibilities.
- Measures and resources to Project and recover in a timely manner, a force that is appropriately packaged for the objective it is pursuing.
- The means to Protect and preserve NZDF force elements, principally on operations (involves countering wider threats including, natural, human and technological).
- The ability to Sustain the force (the maintenance of the necessary level of fighting power required to achieve objectives). Service Chiefs contribute to this capability by fulfilling the inherent sustain function of their raise, train, maintain responsibilities.
- All of which are necessary in order to discharge the prime function, namely to Operate by conducting military actions, primarily in combat (including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvre).

7.7 These fundamental defence capabilities are inter–related and supporting; none can be considered in isolation, and all are required in varying measure to meet the requirements of Government policy. A representation of this multi–dimensional interrelationship is shown in figure 7.2.
The Moral Component

‘Battles are won in the hearts of men.’

Field Marshal Montgomery

7.8 Ultimately it is people that realise warfighting ability. New Zealand has a highly skilled and volunteer Defence Force with a history of excellence in performance. Their world–recognised strengths require time, effort and resources if they are to be developed, maintained and exploited to the nation’s advantage. The moral component of fighting power is about persuading our people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is morally and ethically sound; these promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim.

7.9 There are many things that contribute to the moral component of fighting power: training, confidence in equipment, fair and firm discipline, self–respect and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. With all of those in place there is clear potential for military success. To draw it out, however, requires motivation, leadership and management.
Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine

Motivation

7.10 Motivation implies a determination for getting things done. It derives from a personal commitment to an idea, a sense of purpose, and a feeling of belonging. In many people, there is an instinctive desire to do what is right and good.

7.11 One means of generating motivation therefore, is to ensure that NZDF personnel believe in what they are doing. A sense of purpose is achieved when that belief is linked to the individual’s involvement in its pursuit. Involvement is a stronger source of motivation for most people when they feel themselves to be a part of a team, all members of which provide the others with support.

7.12 In military units, given the challenges inherent in war–fighting, the need is to go beyond mere team building. Military units need to develop genuine comradeship that will endure even as the violence and fear of war, death and injury begin to bite deep into an individual’s consciousness. It is pride in belonging, best described by the term ‘esprit de corps’ in relation to unit identity, but which at a higher level, includes a belief in patriotic duty.
7.13 Being highly motivated in peacetime is one thing; to retain that motivation in the face of battle requires a profoundly deep commitment to one’s comrades, one’s unit, one’s country and to the cause for which one is fighting.

**Leadership**

7.14 Leadership at all levels is the principal element in the maintenance of morale. Without good leadership, morale will undoubtedly crumble in the face of adversity. All leaders must accept their responsibility for maintaining morale and the fighting spirit of those under their command.

7.15 Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to get subordinates to do what is required of them and to engender within them the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility.

7.16 Born leaders are rare, but leadership potential can be developed by training, experience, study of the methods of great leaders in the past, and knowledge of military doctrine. Through these, individuals develop their own style of leadership and no two people will necessarily lead in exactly the same way.

7.17 Leadership starts with self-discipline. It is a continuous process throughout training and daily life. Leaders promote this amongst their subordinates by decisive action, precept and example, advice, encouragement and admonishment, and by giving subordinates every opportunity of contributing to operational and tactical success. It is a truism that operational success provides the quickest and most effective boost to morale for those at war, but outstanding leadership will sustain high morale when all other factors are against it.

**Management**

7.18 Management is no substitute for leadership but is a vital element of the moral component nevertheless. Management is about making the best use of resources. It is an attribute of command that cannot be overlooked because it is fundamental to efficiency and relates to two principles of war, economy of effort and sustainability. In those senses, especially in relation to logistics, it also has a bearing on the physical component of fighting power.

7.19 Management is regarded as an element of the moral component, however, because without good management of resources and the provision of sufficient administrative support, the maintenance of morale and the motivation of the force would be rendered considerably more difficult. The measure of good management is the ability to achieve the right balance – neither over-abundance nor a shortage of resources, either of which would undermine the concentration of effort on the main objective.
The Physical Component

7.20 The physical component of fighting power is the physical means to fight. It has five elements: personnel, equipment, collective performance, readiness and sustainability. The effective combination of these five elements are essential in order for the NZDF to be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve the tasks assigned by the New Zealand Government.

Personnel

7.21 The servicemen and servicewomen that comprise the NZDF, both regular and reserve, are highly trained and skilled volunteers. They go through a rigorous selection and initial training process that gives them an essential grounding for the further professional development and collective training necessary to turn them into effective combatants. NZDF personnel are highly regarded internationally. Nevertheless, their skills need to be nurtured, developed and retained. No matter how successful they might have been in the past, their effectiveness can so easily be undermined by changing economic, social and political factors and by significant shifts in the values of society as a whole.

Equipment

7.22 Elements of the NZDF deploy on operations with the existing inventory of equipment. A fundamental part of maintaining warfighting ability is the procurement of the best and most effective equipment that can be afforded. The aim of this procurement philosophy is to achieve a technological advantage over potential adversaries, either in isolation or in conjunction with coalition partners.

7.23 Ideally those in defence related industries should have a clear understanding of the New Zealand approach to military operations in order that they can better anticipate the NZDF’s equipment needs.
Integrated Performance

7.24 An integrated performance is the end result of individual and collective training across the NZDF, achieved only through an understanding of common doctrine, combined with collective training and exercising to rehearse and sharpen the ability to apply it. Commanders devise ways of ensuring that the forces under their command are as prepared as possible for the ultimate demands of warfighting. There can be no compromise on this, for the ability to deploy fully prepared for combat is at the core of warfighting.

Readiness

7.25 The ability to deploy combines the physical process of transit into an area of operations with the readiness to do so in as short a time as possible. By their nature, crises occur unexpectedly in equally unexpected places. Timelines are more likely than not going to be short. Government policy, through the NZDF Output Plan, lays down readiness criteria for the Force Elements of the NZDF, in which priorities are listed and forces allocated differing response times. The readiness details are themselves a part of policy and not doctrine, but a commander’s responsibility to meet them is a doctrinal imperative.

Sustainability

7.26 Sustaining military forces in war is as vital a function as their ability to deliver firepower. As soon as an operation starts, events will generate further demands on the force. It cannot be assumed that a campaign plan will survive the first encounter with the enemy. This is why the ability to sustain is so important a part of fighting power.
Chapter 8

The Broader Utility of Fighting Power

Executive Summary

- In whatever capacity that New Zealand is involved, the three instruments of policy are employed – the diplomatic, the economic and the military – in concert as the circumstances demand.

- In possessing a warfighting capability the NZDF is more effectively structured and prepared to assist in a broader range of activities across the spectrum of operations.

- Multi-agency operations and tasks are terms used to describe more formal, pre-planned support to specific Government departments and agencies. Multi-agency operations and tasks are becoming an increasingly significant function for the NZDF within New Zealand’s spectrum of operations.

Introduction

8.1 While it is the ability to engage in warfighting activities that provides the NZDF with its raison d’être, the NZDF can be employed on a wide variety of activities across the spectrum of military operations. For many of these operations the NZDF will require its combat potential but some will be more benign, including those mounted to ameliorate the living conditions of those subject to natural or humanitarian disaster.

8.2 In a moral and physical sense, warfighting places the greatest demands on military forces, but is also the capability for which armed forces are trained and equipped. Consequently this publication focuses on warfighting, as the capabilities developed for warfighting can also be applied, in an appropriate form, to a wide range of operations such as Peace Support Operations (PSO), humanitarian and disaster relief, and more discrete tasks such as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

8.3 The NZDF may be required to undertake some emergency aid tasks and reconstruction to help restore basic facilities for a suffering population, as well as assisting with some policing roles to create a secure and stable environment. The purpose of military forces’ activity is to create the conditions that allow other agencies to continue progress towards restoring normality without the need for a military presence.
8.4 Creating long term dependency upon NZDF force elements by the local population is almost always counterproductive to the strategic objective. Every effort has to be made to encourage civilian agencies to take over the various tasks as soon as possible. In order to achieve their part of the mission, the NZDF may have to use varying levels of force. The end-state of military withdrawal must always be borne in mind, and there are a number of considerations, which are important in achieving it.

Identifying Crisis and Stability

8.5 The spectrum of operations discussed in Chapter 5 implies an increasing amount of disagreement, tension and conflict as international relations move from peace towards war. Movement can take place in either direction and may be gradual or rapid. There may also be volatility, with movement first one way and then the other.

8.6 In contrast, a relationship may remain in the same position for extended periods, in which case there is a measure of stability. Stability is a relative construct however, and might be a cause for concern if it is achieved at a position on the spectrum too close to war for comfort. That said, two neighbouring states might have a fundamental disagreement but their relationship may remain stable, and they may even be allies in other respects.

8.7 Crisis comes when stability is lost and there is a perceptible movement along the spectrum towards war (movement the other way also represents instability, but of a more benign nature). In working to prevent conflict, attempts are made to move relations along the spectrum towards peace.

8.8 The trigger for movement in the direction of war can take many forms. No two crises are identical and each needs to be dealt with in a unique manner in terms of the substance of any negotiations and arrangements put in place to restore stability. In some cases it may be easier to achieve stability by institutionalising disagreement and putting in place a framework for reducing its effects rather than wasting valuable effort trying to resolve the irresolvable.

8.9 Military containment is a positive role for defence forces, the aim of which is to achieve stability in terms of security, which will allow other political, diplomatic, or economic efforts to move the disputing parties towards a lasting peaceful settlement.

1 JWP 0.01, pp. 6–1,6–2
New Zealand’s Involvement

8.10 The spectrum can be used to describe New Zealand’s relationships with other nations. It also applies however, to relationships between other nations when New Zealand is merely an observer or possibly an independent participant in the process of conflict prevention and resolution. Importantly, such situations can be truly international (involving two or more nations) or they can be to do with internal conflicts and civil wars that also pose a threat to wider international stability.

8.11 The New Zealand Government determines the manner in which New Zealand addresses its international relations and becomes involved in crisis resolution and the restoration of stability. If a decision is made to employ the NZDF, it will most likely result in operations conducted with those other nations in multinational alliance or coalition arrangements, with relationships of increasing complexity.

8.12 In whatever capacity that New Zealand is involved, the four instruments of national power are employed – the political, the economic, the psychosocial and the military – in concert as the circumstances demand. The military instrument is but one of the means at the Government’s disposal. There are many ways of categorising the vast range of military operations dealing with crisis management and the maintenance of stability.

Conflict Prevention

8.13 Prevention of conflict is a vital element in the maintenance of international stability and security. The primary means of conflict prevention are diplomatic, including in circumstances in which diplomatic efforts are backed up by the implicit threat to engage military force.

8.14 As a potential crisis begins to take form, yet more concerted efforts involving the full range of diplomatic, economic and military instruments may need to be brought into play. This activity will inevitably involve several departments of Government, and Prime Minister’s Office involvement will be essential to ensure that New Zealand strategic decision–making and activities are coherent and properly orchestrated.

8.15 Defence diplomacy activities (such as military visits, exchanges of military information, and the provision of military education and training) are intended to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of democratically accountable defence forces.

\(^2\) JWP 0.01, pp. 6–2,6–3
Enforcement Action

8.16 Enforcement action is closest to war, in the sense that the nature of the task will usually result in a recognised mandate to employ warfighting techniques to achieve the aim. Such operations are not driven by the need for impartiality because the mandate will typically be aimed at coercing a particular named nation or nations to adopt an explicit course of action.

8.17 The aim of enforcement action is likely to be to coerce the various parties to engage in negotiations towards a peace agreement, to deter them from taking particular actions, or something similarly prescriptive. This was certainly the case in relation to the deployment of the NZDF to Somalia in 1992 and the intervention in Timor Leste in 1999.

Managing Confrontation

8.18 Even with an agreement in place, defence forces may still be needed to contain residual conflict between protagonists while other political, diplomatic or economic actions are taken to conclude a lasting settlement of the dispute. The over-riding consideration in conducting peace support operations in circumstances requiring military containment, is that the military instrument is but one component of the total effort required to achieving a lasting peace.

8.19 Other elements that contribute to a lasting peace include the host people and their government, civil administrators, international organisations (including the UN and its specialist agencies), non-governmental organisations, and commercial companies supporting operations and looking to assist with reconstruction projects. While all such organisations are vital, it is the military forces deployed into the affected area that provide the ultimate power base; it is their ability to escalate and to employ force that ensures a stable security environment within which the others can operate.

8.20 Force must be used as part of an overall approach to confrontation management. The use of warfighting techniques may be essential to ensure security or compliance, but the aim will never be destruction or the application of lethal force for its own sake. When force is used it is vital to regard it as a tool to be used in support of broader confrontation management and its application will need to be coordinated with other elements of confrontation management in progress at the same time.

8.21 In the early stages, and while stabilising the security situation, defence forces may be the only organised group present. They need to be prepared to initiate comprehensive campaign planning to include each element as it arrives.

3ibid, pp. 6–3, 6–4
Impartiality

8.22 Normally, once a peace agreement has been reached, there will be a mandate from an international authority giving the parameters of the operation. At this stage, there is strategic level consent for the presence of a military force. It acts impartially in order to maintain and promote that consent. Impartiality is judged in relation to the mandate. Action is taken against parties in respect of their lack of compliance with the mandate, the conditions of which will be imposed without bias.

Consent

8.23 While there is strategic level consent (in the form of a recognised mandate for example) for defence forces to be present, there may well be variance in the degree of consent at lower levels, and in different locations. Military actions will need to be robust at times, but the need to promote consent is always borne in mind.

Restraint in the Use of Force

8.24 An unduly heavy–handed approach with excessive use of force is unlikely to aid in the promotion of consent. While it may be necessary at times to use an increased level of force in order to enforce compliance with the mandate, the minimum necessary force is used, consistent with the objective and the mandate. Warfighting capabilities will be an essential tool in many situations, with the ability to deploy lethal force in a deliberate and focused manner serving as a support to confrontation management.

8.25 The longer–term view must always be borne in mind when dealing with immediate crises and the use of force must never be regarded as having a destructive result as its aim or objective. An appropriate interpretation of the meanings of coercion and deterrence is required, in which lethal force is used to assist in the management of confrontation rather than the destruction of the enemy’s warfighting ability or will to fight.

Humanitarian Aid

8.26 Humanitarian / Disaster Relief Operations. There will be occasions when it will be appropriate to deploy military assets to assist in a foreign emergency or disaster relief operation, either on a national basis or as part of an international effort. In such operations, the NZDF will be deployed for a specific task in an entirely benign posture (except for essential force protection) and in support of the coordinating humanitarian agency. An example of this was support to Papua New Guinea in 1999 following a devastating tsunami initiated by an earthquake.
Humanitarian Assistance. The provision of humanitarian aid is principally a function of humanitarian and development agencies. There may be circumstances, especially during conflict, when these agencies are unable to deliver such aid without support from the military. Humanitarian Assistance, differs from that undertaken in Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations, in that;

- the provision of humanitarian aid is not the primary mission of the military commander,
- the force has not been deployed in support of a humanitarian agency but for the purpose of military operations, and
- the military will hand over full responsibility for the humanitarian task to civilian agencies at the earliest possible opportunity.

The Essentials of Crisis Management

8.28 During a crisis, there will be a demanding set of shifting priorities and objectives and any crisis management organisation must be designed to meet various essential criteria. The ‘master’ principle of war, selection and maintenance of the aim is of crucial importance in this context, and the source of a fundamental dilemma. The military desire is for a clearly stated and hard objective as the basis for mission planning. However, the essential fluidity of crises renders the identification of clear, firm and enduring aims almost impossible from a political point of view.

8.29 As soon as any military operation commences, the crisis agenda inevitably changes and political aims and objectives develop afresh. This is particularly the case in peace support operations and during fast moving crises. In contrast, during longer–term operations established to maintain stability, the military aims will tend to be clearer and better understood.

8.30 Crisis management at the higher levels needs to accommodate both political and military imperatives. The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) fulfils a critical role in this process. The Committee exercises oversight in respect of matters of intelligence, security and crisis management and it is tasked to ensure that timely, relevant and useful advice is provided by affected Government Agencies, to Ministers of the New Zealand Government (eg the Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Coordination).

8.31 The framework in place is designed to facilitate a whole–of–government approach in a national crisis and circumstances that affect security, monitoring emerging threats, risks and vulnerabilities, and putting measures in place both to control possible problems and to manage potential consequences. The ODESC is activated in the event of a major crisis or security event affecting New Zealand, or its critical interests abroad.
8.32 NZDF involvement in the ODESC process is normally limited to events affecting national security within New Zealand’s borders, such as Counter-Terrorist operations. In almost all other national security situations, following ODESC deliberations, the NZDF provides advice and receives direction directly from the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Within this context the NZDF is responsible for formulation of advice to the Government, and at their direction, implementation of a crisis management strategy.

### Multi-Agency Operations

8.33 The NZDF has the capacity to deliver a range of services in support of other Government departments, the community, foreign and defence policy objectives. This support may be provided by a combination of deployable force elements and non-deployable support or training Units. These operations are generally divided into Government support operations and community support operations.

8.34 The term Multi-agency operations and tasks is used to describe more formal, pre-planned support to specific Government departments and agencies and is becoming an increasingly significant function for the NZDF within New Zealand’s spectrum of operations.
Chapter 9
Generating Warfighting Capacity

Executive Summary

- The components of capability are, personnel, research and development, infrastructure, concepts, information, management and equipment.

- NZDF preparedness is based on a capability baseline. This capability baseline identifies the core individual and collective military skills, capabilities and proficiencies required by the defence forces for military operations.

- Reserve forces are an integral component of the NZDF because they provide, across crisis and capability warning times, complementary or supplementary skills as individuals, small groups and units to sustain and surge.

Introduction

9.1 The resources available to the NZDF will always be limited, whether the task is preparing for conflict or fulfilling peacetime commitments. The NZDF Defence Planning System (DPS) utilises the Capability Management Framework to provide the mechanism to balance the competing demands of generating capability for near-term tasks from a capability baseline (preparedness) and developing future capability (modernisation). Balance is required because decisions to invest in one area will generally result in fewer resources for the other.
9.2 **Personnel.** Operational capability is delivered through people who are the sole component of capability with the intrinsic ability to generate value. All other components—infrastructure, equipment, concepts, etc. remain inert potential, which must ultimately be leveraged by people. Paradoxically, people are the most problematic element of capability to acquire, manage, change, and dispose of. Therefore, there is a need to identify:

- the number of personnel required to deliver, sustain, support, command and control the capability together with provision of associated administration support,
- the capability organisation structure,
- the skills and competency profiles required to achieve the above,
- the recruiting implications,
- the training/retraining requirements, and
- timely identification and management of personnel risk.
9.3 **Research and Development.** Research and Development [R&D] is the ‘engine for change’ in the continual modernisation of the NZDF. The NZDF must be a smart buyer and user of technology to ensure that it maximises the effectiveness of its limited assets, and keeps them interoperable with other nation’s forces. It is important the NZDF remain abreast of future technology trends and how they will impact upon future capabilities required. One avenue for this is through access to international collaborative fora such as The Technical Cooperation Programme [TTCP]. Therefore, the NZDF’s R&D programme requires scientific and technical support for the identification, assessment, acquisition, use, maintenance and improvements to both current and future capabilities. The Defence Technology Agency [DTA] is the prime provider of R&D support to the NZDF.

9.4 **Infrastructure and Organisations.**

- **Infrastructure.** Infrastructure includes buildings, structures, property, plant equipment, and areas for training and other purposes – exercise areas and firing ranges for example. Facilities include civil engineering and utility works necessary to support capabilities, both at the home station and at a deployed location and may be owned directly or may be leased.

- **Organisations.** Every NZDF unit needs to ensure that it has the optimum number of personnel positions, the appropriate balance of competency and skill sets, the correct structure to accomplish its tasks and adequate command and control arrangements. This approach provides the underpinning structure for the NZDF. At the Service level, consideration must be given to developing flexible functional groupings that can meet contingency personnel rotation requirements and continual force–improvement requirements.

9.5 **Concepts, Doctrine and Collective Training.**

- **Concepts.** Concepts are the way in which we believe the NZDF will fight in the medium to long term future. They have been developed in response to either changes in the strategic or security environment or focused upon emerging technology. While they must still be tested, they still act as a potential guide to future capabilities.

- **Doctrine.** As discussed in earlier chapters, doctrine provides the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their application in support of national objectives.

- **Collective Training.** Collective training applies laterally across combined, joint, and single Service elements and vertically down to unit levels. To enhance performance, organisational elements must undertake a comprehensive and ongoing collective training regime validated against the detailed preparedness requirements derived from government guidance.
9.6 **Information Technology.** On the modern battlefield, effective information management and subsequent information superiority cannot be achieved without properly deployed and managed communications and information systems (CIS). CIS are an essential part of military operations that provide commanders at all levels with the means to exercise command and control (C2) and disseminate vital information. They contribute to an increased situational awareness, which in turn leads to better and quicker decision-making (decision superiority). Information technology includes the systems [system architecture, hardware and software] required to support NZDF’s operational and non-operational activities.

9.7 **Equipment, Supplies and Services, and Resources:**
- **Equipment.** Equipment includes all major platforms and weapon systems including but not limited to ships, armoured vehicles, aircraft, missile systems, major electronic systems and the myriad sub-items required to operate and support those platforms and systems.
- **Supplies and Services.** Supplies and services include the logistical and administrative support required to uphold both deployed and non-deployed operational activities and non-operational activities.
- **Resources.** Resources includes the financial and non-financial assets the NZDF requires to meet operational and output commitments to the NZ Government.

9.8 **Preparedness**

NZDF preparedness is based on a capability baseline that determines the Directed Level of Capability (DLOC) the NZDF needs to meet its commitment to New Zealand’s military strategy. Analysis of the strategic environment informs NZDF decisions about the manner in which resources are distributed to meet DLOC requirements.

9.9 When deciding the manner in which resources are allocated the NZDF considers assessments of the warning period likely to precede a particular operational commitment and the time required to develop new capabilities. The following warning periods are used to assist planners prepare NZDF elements for operations:

- **Crisis Warning.** Crisis warning is defined as the limited warning time likely in a crisis and is measured in days or months. The NZDF elements required for current or short-notice operations are predominantly full-time, supported by some specialist part-time elements that are both maintained at high levels of preparedness.
– **Capability Warning.** Capability warning is measured in years and is defined as the warning time expected of a major capability development within the Asia–Pacific region that might threaten New Zealand. The NZDF elements that can be generated or developed to operationally competent levels within these warning times for conflict are predominantly held in integrated and part–time units. These force elements are maintained at lower preparedness levels.

### Reserve Forces

9.10 Reserve forces are an integral component of the NZDF because they provide, across crisis and capability warning times, complementary or supplementary skills as individuals, small groups and units to sustain and surge. The Reserve helps to sustain deployed forces by providing round–out, reinforcement and rotation elements. This will vary from individuals, such as reservists held at high levels of readiness, through to small groups, sub–units and units. The Reserve has a critical role in increasing the NZDF’s ability to surge for operations.
Part 4

Future Doctrine Developments and Capability Concepts
Chapter 10

Future NZDF Capability Concepts

Executive Summary

- The concepts expressed in this chapter provide a long-term focus for the development of operational capabilities and future doctrine development, but are not current NZDF doctrine.

Introduction

10.1 The intent of this chapter is to define future NZDF capability concepts. By its title and scope these concepts are not current doctrine. The concepts expressed in this chapter provide a long-term focus for the development of NZDF operational capabilities and future doctrine development. As such the concepts provide a framework for NZDF capability development proposals but are subject to further discussion, consensus and iterative development before being considered approved NZDF doctrine.

10.2 The concepts expressed in this chapter are broad-spectrum enough to allow for changing security or operational circumstances, however they are explicit enough to focus and discipline efforts to inform decision-making. They are broad enough to avoid foreclosing on different strategies and ways for meeting capability needs that have been properly explored and tested; and yet are specific enough to make sure those capability choices are grounded in defence policy principles.

Strategic Capability Concepts

10.3 The future NZDF could be called upon to perform a range of military operations and missions. To perform these missions in the longer-term future, a particular type of defence force will be needed – one with exacting strategic capabilities. It will not be the NZDF of today. It is likely that most of our major specialist military equipment will still be in the inventory, however the capabilities of which they are a part will be different in precision, power, accuracy, range, speed, and other performance aspects. New and novel equipments, doctrine, organisations, training and technologies will complement and change the operational performance of the NZDF.
Four strategic capability concepts have been identified for the NZDF. These concepts set out an NZDF capable of achieving defence policy results in the longer-term future. They present an ideal, and a benchmark with which to aim. The four strategic capability concepts are the:

- Knowledge Edge Force,
- Tailored Joint Force,
- Multi-Mission Force, and
- Network Force.
10.5 The effectiveness advantage lies in human capital of organisations, whether they are businesses or military forces. This human capital is the combined knowledge, skills, innovativeness, culture, values and ability of the NZDF’s people. Whilst New Zealand as a nation seeks to “ride the knowledge wave”, the NZDF as a small military force, must develop a “knowledge edge” and build and sustain the knowledge advantage of NZDF personnel. The right knowledge, to the right people at the right time, is a crucial force multiplier and can mean the difference between success and failure. It means fewer mistakes and it means the NZDF are able to maximise the gains using the minimum resources.
10.6 To achieve the “Knowledge Edge”, the future NZDF will require flexible organisations and structures. This flexibility will allow teams of experts from different parts of the organisation to come together easily for each task, and then be reconfigured for the next task. NZDF structures will need to be adaptive to changing circumstances with all barriers that slow change and impede knowledge sharing removed.

10.7 The future NZDF will require information systems that get “the right knowledge to the right people at the right time”, regardless of whether that information is required by decision–makers in Wellington, or tactical commanders on operations thousands of miles from New Zealand.

10.8 The leaders of the future NZDF at all levels will be professionally competent and potent examples of our ethical values. They are the key to building an organisational culture of innovation, knowledge sharing and knowledge growth that underpins operational effectiveness and adaptability. The Knowledge Edge Force will have a flexible education programme to provide tailored learning opportunities for leaders. At all levels, the knowledge edge will be pursued through realistic, testing military training and exercising. Training programmes will be shaped to incorporate new lessons as soon as they are learned. Experimentation and simulation will be the norm following the lesson that it is better to sweat in peace than bleed in war.

10.9 The Knowledge Edge Force will have a fully documented joint doctrine at the strategic and operational levels that draws upon effective practices from New Zealand’s strategic partners. Environmental doctrines for land, maritime and air operations will be coordinated with each other. The Knowledge Edge Force will have the systems, processes, analytical tools, and qualified staffs to develop new and improved military capabilities, and opportunities will be encouraged for incorporating innovation into those systems.
10.10 The future NZDF will be a “tailored” joint force. This does not mean one unified military service. It will contain three single Services with their specialist competencies in the maritime, land and air components of military operations, particularly at the tactical level. It does mean that particularly at the operational and strategic levels, the future NZDF will be overwhelmingly joint in its organisation, work practices, staffing arrangements, responsibilities, and management systems.

10.11 The Tailored Joint Force will be shaped to contribute joint effects in peace enforcement and combat missions that are approved by Government. These will include both precision lethal and non-lethal effects that can be tailored to meet the requirements of international law, and local rules of engagement, and protect NZDF personnel, people, and property that they are made responsible for.
10.12 The Tailored Joint Force will also be shaped to contribute joint effects, in all nature of peace support missions. The force will be tailored to apply minimum levels of force and non-lethal effects to achieve national and coalition objectives. The Tailored Joint Force will also be able to carry out missions to sustain peace, and support security outcomes in New Zealand’s area of strategic national interest.

10.13 The Tailored Joint Force will hold fully mission-capable units and their supporting components at degrees of readiness that are matched to achieving New Zealand’s defence policy objectives in responding to any particular security crisis. The Tailored Joint Force will contain the ability to deploy joint operational headquarters to support national operations, and will have the ability for continuous, accurate, data and voice communications between deployed forces and strategic levels of the NZDF, other relevant agencies, and the Government.

10.14 The Tailored Joint Force will include a logistic support home and deployable base. This base will be tailored to meet the needs of training and operational force commanders. It will harness each generation of information technologies to achieve efficient, standardised management of all aspects of the logistics supply chain.
10.15 The future NZDF will be a Multi-Mission Force. It will have the adaptive capacity to carry out national assistance missions in support of other agencies that are the first responders to emergencies and crises. Civilian communities will be protected through the NZDF providing specialist services such as disposal of improvised explosive, chemical or other destructive devices.

10.16 Independently or with strategic partners and other agencies, the future NZDF will be capable of carrying out military missions that anticipate and discourage threats to New Zealand’s interests. Many of these missions will involve forceful and peaceful options for preventing, or demonstrating an ability to prevent, transnational threats to New Zealand’s security. These threats could include threats to New Zealand’s bio–security, and information infrastructure as well as to the physical and territorial resources and borders.

10.17 The future NZDF will be capable of helping others to restore lost peace and security, where enemies are actively searching for peaceful means to resolve their conflict. These missions (including ceasefire monitoring, supervising the disarmament of combatants, providing a stabilising presence,
assisting communities rebuild infrastructure, providing basic humanitarian services) will need to be carried out in unstable conditions, where conflict may re-erupt without warning.

10.18 On such operations, the force will have flexible self-protection that can be extended to non-combatants in emergencies or periods of increased levels of hostilities. It will have highly sophisticated non-intrusive information gathering capabilities to support its neutrality and monitoring tasks. It will be equipped with a range of non-lethal force options to defuse crises with minimal casualties.

10.19 The future NZDF will be capable of contributing to international efforts to deal with breakdowns of peace and security. In New Zealand, this will include responding rapidly, and with precision force, to terrorist incidents, and preparing to respond to novel uses of violence by terrorists. Independently, or as part of a multinational force, the future NZDF will be capable of protecting and removing from harm’s way, New Zealanders (and other nationals), at risk in situations of crisis and instability in New Zealand’s area of strategic interest.

10.20 The future NZDF will be capable of contributing to a range of military tasks in international peace support operations and combat missions established under an appropriate mandate. Such tasks include for example, combat, combat support and combat service support tasks to defeat opponents, separate opposing forces, protect humanitarian relief supplies and distribution networks, search and seize illegal weapons, and enforce sanctions with land and maritime blockades. Such missions will most likely be carried out in conditions ranging from widespread instability through sporadic conflict to spikes of combat activity. The force capable of operating in this setting will be equipped with a flexible range of lethal and non-lethal force options with extended standoff range and self-protection.

10.21 The Multi-Mission Force will have a high degree of versatility and adaptability in its doctrine, structures, leadership and training methods, so that force packages can be readily configured and reconfigured to serve a variety of missions.

The Network Force

10.22 The NZDF of the future will be a Network Force. Many countries have tried to maintain military forces that can independently perform all aspects of a military mission. It is unlikely that New Zealand will ever have the financial capacity to resource such a military force, rather it will seek to resource a force that has the ability to fully integrate with and complement other forces and agencies, this is the concept behind a Network Force.
10.23 There are likely to be few if any missions or tasks that the NZDF of the future will undertake where it will not be working at some level with other partners – be those partners other national agencies in New Zealand, or other military forces in a multinational force, or with other UN or non–governmental agencies and groups. To be effective in its tasks – which may well to be to ensure that others can be successful in theirs – the future NZDF will be capable of flexible and versatile networking.

10.24 The Network Force will have an ability to connect internally, with other forces and agencies without any glitches. It will include features on each system and force structure that will allow any force package contributed by New Zealand to contribute seamlessly to, and be supported by, broader agency or coalition networks. This means designing capabilities that can be identified easily by others in a network, in terms of what they can do and what they can contribute, and the support and complementary capabilities they will require from a network. This networking ability underpins the effectiveness of a future NZDF with a multi–mission capacity.
The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are source documents.

The source documents used are:

- ADDP–D – *Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*
- ADFP 04.1.1 (101) – Australian Defence Force Publication – *Glossary*
- BMD – *British Military Doctrine*
- DP2001 – *Canadian Defence Force*
- US NDP 1 – *United States Naval Doctrine Publication 1*
- MS – *Australian Defence Force Military Strategy Glossary of Terms*
- New Zealand Defence Force 2003/2004 Output Plan

**Administration** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

1. The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management.
2. Internal management of units.

**Armed Conflict** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

Conflict between States in which at least one party has resorted to the use of armed force to achieve its aims. It may also embrace conflict between a State and organised, disciplined and uniformed groups within the State, such as organised resistance movements.

**Assigned Forces** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

Forces in being which have been placed under the operational command or operational control of a commander.

**Asymmetric Warfare** (BMD)

1. The actions undertaken by state or non–state parties to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths and capitalise on perceived weaknesses by exploiting dissimilarities, (including values, strategies, organisation and capabilities) with a view to achieving a disproportionate effect gaining the instigator an advantage, either not attainable through conventional means or more cost effectively.
2. Actions achieving disproportionate effect by by–passing military strengths.
Attrition (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel.

Attrition Warfare (US NDP 1)

The application of overwhelming combat power that reduces the effectiveness of an enemy’s ability to fight through his loss of personnel and materiel.

Battlespace (US NDP 1)

All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of influence and area of interest.

Campaign (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential operations designed to achieve an operational commander’s objective, normally within a given time or space.

Capstone Doctrine (APPD–D)

The single, foundational doctrine publication that sits at the apex of the doctrine hierarchy, and from which all other doctrine is derived.

Centre of Gravity (ADDP–D.4)

That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may consist of a number of key elements.

Coalition Operation (MS)

Military operations conducted in conjunction with, or in support of, the military forces of one or more other nations, which may include formal alliance partners.

Coercion (BMD)

The use of force, or the threat of force to persuade an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour, against his wishes.

Collateral Damage (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

Incidental damage to persons, objects or locations arising out of combat action against a legitimate military objective.
**Collective Defence** (ADDP–D)

Where two or more sovereign states form a system of international organisation directed against threats to a specified area from an outside source, and intended as a system of self–defence, not as a system to keep the peace anywhere it happens to be threatened.

**Collective Security** (ADDP–D)

Where a group of sovereign states form a general system of organisation designed to deal with peace as an indivisible entity, and therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire group of states, which must agree in advance both to react to such a threat and how to react against it.

**Combat Operations** (BMD)

Military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.

**Combat Power** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.

**Combat Service Support** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The support supplied to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.

**Combined Operation** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

**Command** (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The authority that a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of their rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

**Common Security** (ADDP–D)

Where two or more sovereign states form a system of international organisation designed to preserve peace by reducing international tension, assisting transparency and providing a forum where common security issues can be aired and discussed openly.
Conflict
See Armed Conflict.

Conflict Prevention (NATO AAP–6 (2003)) See also: Peace Support Operations.
A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and – when necessary – military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. (NATO AAP–6 (2003)) See also: Peace Support Operation.

Control (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Decisive Effects (Draft BMD)
Effects that attack key strengths and weaknesses and thereby contribute directly to operational and strategic objectives.

Deterrence (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))
The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.

Dislocation (ADDP–D.4)
Dislocation involves action to render the enemy’s strength irrelevant by not allowing it to be employed at the critical time or place. In effect, dislocation separates the enemy’s centre of gravity from the key capabilities that support or protect it.

Disruption (ADDP–D.4)
Disruption is a direct attack that neutralises or selectively destroys key elements of the enemy’s capabilities. The aim of disruption is to reduce the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight by neutralising or destroying parts of his force in a manner that prevents the force from acting as a coordinated whole.

Doctrine (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))
Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.
Effects (Draft BMD)
Effects are the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that result from specific military or non-military actions at the tactical, operational and strategic level.

Effects Based Approach (Draft BMD)
An approach to the conduct of military operations designed to influence the will of an adversary, own forces or neutrals through the coordinated application of military capability, in order to achieve the desired strategic objectives. In the NZDF context the effects based approach builds upon the ends, ways and means approach to operational planning and expands the integrated approach inherent within the Joint Effect to include other agencies and elements of national power that may be either directly or indirectly involved in the operation.

Effects Based Operations (ADDP–D.4)
The application of military and other capabilities to realise specific and desired outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post–conflict situations.

Enabling Effects (Draft BMD)
Effects that support the achievement of decisive effects.

End–state (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))
The set of desired conditions that will achieve the strategic objectives.

Force Element (NZDF Output Plan 03/04)
Units which directly contribute to the delivery of the NZDF outputs, and which may form part of an Operational Force, eg a frigate, an Orion detachment, an infantry battalion. Force elements will be capable of undertaking limited independent tasks, or contributing to a Service, Joint or combined force.

Fighting Power (ADDP–D.4)
Fighting power is the result of the integration of three interdependent components:
a. the conceptual component provides the knowledge to fight,
b. the moral component provides the will to fight, and
c. the physical component provides the means to fight.

General War (BMD)
A conflict between major powers in which their large and vital interests, perhaps even survival are at stake.
Insurgency (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Intelligence (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

Interoperability (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

Joint (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Joint Effect

The integrated approach that allows the value of a joint force to become more than merely the sum of its components.

Keystone Doctrine (ADDP–D)

The principal doctrine publication in each doctrine series. Keystone publications support the capstone doctrine, and provide a framework for all subordinate doctrine publications in that series.

Logistics (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel;

b. movement, evacuation and hospitalisation of personnel;

c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and

d. acquisition or furnishing of services.
Manoeuvre (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
2. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Manoeuvre Warfare (US NDP 1)

A philosophy that seeks to collapse the enemy’s cohesion and effectiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation, with which he cannot cope.

Manoeuvrist Approach (BMD)

The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose that creates a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. The manoeuvrist approach focuses commanders at every level on exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strength and protecting friendly vulnerabilities.

Military Doctrine

See Doctrine.

Military Strategy (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

Mission (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task.

Mission Command (ADDP–D.4)

Mission command is a philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of his intentions, the result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated, however subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result. The term ‘directive control’ is synonymous but is being replaced by mission command. Mission command is the internationally, more widely accepted term. (Glossary of Tactical Terms, 1998)
Mobilisation (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

1. The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources.
2. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organising personnel, supplies and materiel for active military service.

Mobility (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

A quality or capability of military forces that permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

National Security (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.

Non–Combat Operations (BMD)

Military operations where weapons may be present, but their use or threatened use is for self–protection purposes and not otherwise essential to the accomplishment of the mission.

Operational Art (ADDP–D.4)

Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions. It requires a commander to:

a. identify the military conditions or end–state that constitute the strategic objective;

b. decide the operational objectives that must be achieved to reach the desired end state;

c. order a sequence of actions that lead to fulfilment of the operational objectives; and

d. apply the military resources allocated to sustain the desired sequence of actions. (ADDP 3.0)

Offensive Operations (MS)

Military operations conducted for the purpose of seizing or retaining the initiative.
Operational Authority (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

1. The authority granted to a commander to use the operational capability of a unit to undertake his mission. This authority is granted without qualification and is described as either operational command or operational control (q.v.).

2. In naval usage, a flag officer or senior officer exercising operational control over one or more ships.

Operational Command (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

Operational Control (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

Operational Level of Conflict (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

The operational level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks and resources to tactical operations.

Operation (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

Peace Building (NZDF 2003)

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and – when necessary – military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations. (NATO AAP–6 (2003)) See also: Peace Support Operations.
Peace Enforcement (NZDF 2003)
A peace support operation conducted to maintain a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. Military Forces must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially. (Adapted from 2002 NATO Terminology Conference) See also: Peace Support Operations.

Peace Keeping (NZDF 2003)
A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self–defence. (AAP–6 (2003)) See also: Peace Support Operations.

Peace Making (NZDF 2003)
A peace support operation conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets. (NATO AAP–6(2003)) See also: Peace Support Operations.

Peace Support Operations (NZDF 2003)
A generic term describing operations that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means to restore or maintain peace. They are operations carried out under an appropriate mandate. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Regional Conflict (BMD)
A conflict where the fighting is contained within a particular geographic area. Its political and economic effects however, may reverberate further afield and there may be involvement from beyond the region, such as the supply of military equipment, advisers and/or volunteers by third parties.

Reserve Forces (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))
Personnel, units or formations earmarked for future use on mobilisation or against an operational requirement, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement.

Security (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))
1. Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, annoyance or surprise.
2. A condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition which deters unauthorised persons from attempting to gain access to official matter affecting national security.

**Spectrum of Operations (BMD)**

The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war.

**Staff (ADDP–D)**

The body of military professionals who support a commander in his or her estimation of a situation, and in formulating and executing subsequent plans, orders and activities.

**Strategic Level of Conflict (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))**

The strategic level of conflict is that level of war which is concerned with the art and science of employing national power.

**Strike (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))**

An attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective.

**Surveillance (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))**

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means.

**Tactical Level of Conflict (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))**

The tactical level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of battle and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

**Tempo (BMD)**

The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations.

**Terrorism (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))**

The use or threatened use of violence for political ends, or any use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.
Theatre (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

A designated geographic area for which an operational level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operation.

Unit (ADFP 04.1.1 (101))

Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organisation and equipment, specifically part of an organisation.

Warfare (UK JDP 01)

Warfare is the application of lethal force using a range of combat techniques and military capabilities.

Warfighting (Adapted from ADDP–D.4 and BMD to include ‘lethal’)

Government directed use of lethal military force to pursue specific national objectives.
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardisation Program</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>ADFP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force Publication</td>
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<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Air Standardisation Coordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUSCANNZUKUS</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States agreement Naval Command, Control and Communications Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDD</td>
<td>British Defence Doctrine</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>British Military Doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCEB</td>
<td>Combined Communications Electronics Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Force</td>
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<td>COMJFNZ</td>
<td>Commander Joint Forces New Zealand</td>
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<td>COSC</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff Committee</td>
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<td>DLOC</td>
<td>Directed Level of Capability</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Canadian Defence Publication</td>
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<td>EBA</td>
<td>Effects Based Approach</td>
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<td>EBO</td>
<td>Effects Based Operations</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Employment Context</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategic Objective</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
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<td>ODESC</td>
<td>Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination</td>
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<td>OLOC</td>
<td>Operational Level of Capability</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>The Technical Cooperation Program</td>
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