NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE DOCTRINE
NZDDP–D
(FOURTH EDITION)
NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE DOCTRINE (NZDDP–D) (FOURTH EDITION)

The New Zealand Defence Force Publication New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDDP–D) is issued for use by the New Zealand Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.

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PREFACE

Scope

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has a unique culture that is underpinned by the shared values of courage, commitment, and comradeship. These cultural values are the tenets from which the NZDF builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, appropriately equipped, and capable of serving the interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand Government. This culture provides the foundation for New Zealand’s unique approach to the conduct of military operations.

In the performance of its military duties, the NZDF has been involved in activities across the full spectrum of operations in all corners of the world. Historically, the majority of New Zealand’s involvement in operations overseas has always been as part of a coalition framework, alongside nations and organisations with interests that compliment our own. These past experiences and the influence of defence partners have helped shape New Zealand’s approach to the conduct of military operations.

Purpose

The NZDF articulates its philosophical approach to the conduct of military operations through military doctrine. New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDDP-D), which sits at the pinnacle of the NZDF’s hierarchy of doctrine publications, is the capstone doctrine publication. It introduces the philosophical concept of military doctrine and its application by the NZDF.

NZDDP-D focuses primarily on the doctrinal components of New Zealand’s military strategy, but it also describes the New Zealand approach to military activity at all levels. New Zealand’s military doctrine is formulated and based on our own national experiences of making strategy and conducting military operations. Whilst authoritative, NZDDP-D conveys broad principles that require judgement in their application, according to situational imperatives. Doctrine is not mandatory dogma to be applied in all circumstances; that is simply not the New Zealand Defence Force’s way of doing business.

Application

This publication is primarily intended for NZDF commanders and staff at all levels.

Structure

NZDDP-D is divided into seven chapters.

• Chapter 1 – New Zealand Policy, Strategy, and Military Doctrine provides an understanding of national security, the main features of New Zealand’s strategic policy that support its security interests, and how the NZDF helps New Zealand to achieve strategic policy objectives. It also discusses the importance of strategy and its different types, as well as the role, utility, and levels of military doctrine. Finally this chapter discusses the instruments of national power.
Introduction

- Chapter 2 – Levels of Military Operations provides an overview of the three levels of military operations — strategic, operational, and tactical — and how these levels overlap. Intertwined with these three levels is the hierarchy of operations. This hierarchy provides a clear understanding of the building blocks of military operations.

- Chapter 3 – The Context of Military Operations provides an understanding of the nature of war and conflict. It further discusses war, types of warfare, the range of security events, and the need to operate using a comprehensive approach in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

- Chapter 4 – New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets identifies and explains the essential elements of NZDF military operations. These essential elements, defined as the NZDF's operational tenets, are fundamental to the conduct of military operations and permeate down through New Zealand military doctrine.

- Chapter 5 – The Characteristics of the Military Instrument identifies that the essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three components of fighting power that may be applied in war and in stability and support operations. These components are: conceptual, moral, and physical. It also describes the six components of capability and the importance of preparedness and reserves in generating military capability.

- Chapter 6 – The Utility of the New Zealand Defence Force explains that whilst the NZDF's warfighting ability provides its raison d'être, it can be employed on a wide variety of activities across the spectrum of military operations. The NZDF will require its combat potential for many of these operations, but some will be more benign, including those mounted to improve living conditions following natural or humanitarian disasters. NZDF assets have a greater utility beyond their threat or use of hard power. International Defence Engagement is how the New Zealand Government employs the NZDF’s personnel, equipment, and activities to achieve influence without the use or threat of force.

Linkages

- NZDDP-00.1 Command and Control (2nd Edition)
- NZDDP-06.1 Rules of Engagement (2nd Edition)
- NZDDP-1.0 Personnel (2nd Edition)
- NZDDP-2.0 Intelligence
- NZDDP-3.0 Campaigns and Operations (2nd Edition)
- NZDDP-4.0 Defence Logistics
- NZDDP-5.0 Joint Planning
- NZDDP-6.0 Communications and Information Systems
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Other works referenced or relied upon in this publication are listed below.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Chapter One: New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine

National security is the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear. New Zealand's national security encompasses the safety of our state and protecting it from external and internal threats. It also requires us to endeavour to preserve the security of New Zealand nationals living overseas.

Defence policy and foreign policy are a partnership aimed at securing New Zealand's physical, economic, social, and cultural wellbeing, and meeting our regional and global responsibilities. The Defence Act defines the role the NZDF plays in pursuing these policy goals. The Act is the legal basis of the NZDF and it describes when, where, why, and how New Zealand's armed forces may be used. New Zealand military strategy draws together defence policy and military strategic doctrine. An alternative way of defining military strategy is as the bridge linking policy and operational objectives.

The principal purpose of military doctrine is to provide the armed forces with guidance for the conduct of operations. New Zealand military doctrine establishes guidelines on how to best employ military power to achieve strategic objectives. Most joint operational-level New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) joint doctrine is adopted from foreign militaries on a case-by-case basis. New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDDP-D) is the highest level of joint doctrine. Although it focuses on the military-strategic level of war, it also addresses the strategic and operational levels.

NZDF personnel possess unique cultural values that identify them as New Zealanders and influence New Zealand military doctrine and its application.

Chapter Two: Levels of Military Operations

There are three levels currently accepted as providing a framework for command and analysis: the strategic level, consisting of the national- and military-strategic, the operational level, and the tactical level.

These three levels of war provide clear building blocks for military operations. The national level covers the political area both domestically and internationally and considers the mobilisation of military and non-military resources to meet the Government's national strategic aim. The NZDF contributes to achieving the Government's strategic objectives by raising, training, and maintaining operationally prepared forces and carrying out government-directed campaigns and operations. Military strategy is the focus of Headquarters NZDF. The operational level is the level where campaigns and major operations are planned, while the tactical level is where these campaigns and operations take place through battles, engagements, and actions.

Operations consist of a number of tactical actions linked to achieve an objective. A series of operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space is a campaign. The levels of military operations overlap and distinctions can sometimes become grey. As there is never a clear line between these levels, it is important that commanders take this into consideration. Sometimes even the strategic and tactical levels overlap. It is important that the risk to effective mission command is managed when such an overlap occurs. The levels of military operations not only apply to war; they can also cover other forms of military operation such as humanitarian aid.

Chapter Three: The Context of Military Operations

In an increasingly complex modern security environment, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) fulfils a vital role by possessing the capability to engage in conflict, manage conflict, and restore peace in an effective, disciplined, and morally legitimate manner.

Conflict takes place on both the physical and moral planes. It is often the moral plane that exerts the greater and often decisive influence on conduct and outcomes. Conflict is characterised by friction, uncertainty, actions
Introduction

and reactions, and violence and destruction. The current global security environment includes all these characteristics ranging from war to peace, but neither exists in its purest form. New Zealand military doctrine is based on the recognition that the NZDF can be involved across this broad range of different security events and operations.

The mix of combat and stability and support operations requires clear definition in order that the role and potential tasks of NZDF personnel committed to an area of conflict, as well as the risks, are fully understood. The NZDF must take a comprehensive approach, which involves responding to crises through coordinating the activities of the military, other government departments, and, if applicable, international organisations and nongovernmental organisations.

When the NZDF uses force it is subject to both national and international law. Its objectives and conduct are subject to democratic parliamentary control, which is exercised on its behalf by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Applying fighting power will be limited to what is necessary to achieve the desired end-state. Maintaining legitimacy is crucial. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic, and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces.

Chapter Four: New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets

The six NZDF operational tenets for the conduct of military operations across the full range of possible security events are a warfighting ethos, the joint effect, the principles of war, the manoeuvrist approach, a command philosophy, and inherent flexibility and pragmatism.

Warfighting Ethos. A warfighting capability and ethos allows the NZDF to more effectively conduct peace support operations, deal with sudden changes in the level of hostilities encountered during operations, and enhance their force protection.

Joint Effect. Effective military operations at the strategic and operational levels require military force elements from all Services to operate in an integrated fashion. The integrated approach allows the value of a joint force to become more than merely the sum of its parts.

Principles of War. The application of the principles of war with judgement and common sense will facilitate success; blatant disregard of them involves increased risk and a proportionate increase in the likelihood of failure.

Manoeuvrist Approach. The manoeuvrist approach is based on using the indirect approach to defeating the adversary. This approach seeks to negate the adversary’s strategy through the intelligent and creative application of effects against the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and centre of gravity.

Command Philosophy. Mission command is a philosophy of command that promotes effective decision making, understanding, and responsibility towards a superior commander’s intent and determination to take plans through to a successful conclusion.

Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism. A flexible and pragmatic attitude encourages imaginative and innovative thinking and is the source of the type of initiative that generates success in military operations.

Chapter Five: The Characteristics of the Military Instrument

The essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three components of fighting power that may be applied in war and in stability and support operations. Fighting power is built upon human capability, which is the collective impact that people have on an enterprise. Human capability underpins the NZDF’s professionalism and its decisive edge. Generating human capability requires a whole-of-force approach. The components of fighting power are: conceptual, moral, and physical.

Conceptual Component. The conceptual component of fighting power consists of the principles of war, doctrine, and conceptual thinking.
Moral Component. The moral component of fighting power is about persuading our people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is morally and ethically sound. The moral component promotes an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim.

Physical Component. The physical component of fighting power is the physical means to fight. It has five elements: personnel, equipment, collective performance, readiness, and sustainability.

The NZDF’s warfighting capabilities are developed during times of extended peace to meet significant defence contingencies. The NZDF will always have limited resources and it does not maintain a large standing military force. NZDF preparedness is based on a capability baseline, which identifies the core individual and collective military skills, capabilities, and proficiencies required by the defence force for military operations.

The components of capability are personnel, research and development, infrastructure, concepts, information management, and equipment and supplies. The Capability Management Framework (CMF) provides the mechanism to priorities the demands of generating capability across the portfolio.

Reserve Forces are an integral component of the NZDF because they provide, across crisis and capability warning times, complementary or supplementary skills as individuals, small groups, and units. The Reserve helps to maintain forces and has a critical role in increasing the NZDF’s ability to sustain a surge for operations.

Chapter Six: The Utility of the New Zealand Defence Force

The NZDF’s warfighting capability makes it suitably structured and readily prepared to assist in a broader range of activities across the full range of security events. Capabilities developed for warfighting can also be applied, in an appropriate form, to a wide range of operations such as peace support operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, and more discrete tasks such as non-combatant evacuation operations.

However New Zealand is involved, the four instruments of policy — the diplomatic, the economic, the psychosocial, and the military — are employed in concert as the circumstances demand. Many operations will require combat potential; however, some will be more benign and involve improving conditions for those subject to natural or humanitarian disasters. International relations can move in either direction from peace to war and the shift can be gradual or rapid. There are various triggers for movement in either direction and no two crises are identical. When a crisis occurs there will be a demanding set of shifting priorities and objectives. Crisis management at the higher levels must accommodate both political and military imperatives. New Zealand has the right to use armed force to protect its sovereign territory, political independence, persons, and property against an armed attack.

The NZDF has the ability to deliver a range of services in support of other government agencies. ‘Multi-agency operations and tasks’ is a term used to describe more formal, pre-planned support to specific government departments and agencies. Multi-agency operations and tasks are becoming an increasingly significant function for the NZDF within New Zealand’s range of security events.

Within the international legal framework, the NZDF contributes significantly in supporting the government’s objectives of influencing the behaviour of any group, nation or state that threatens New Zealand’s interests. One of the key ways the NZDF supports the Government’s objectives of influencing the behaviour of groups or nations is through International Defence Engagement (IDE). The NZDF also contributes through enforcement action, managing confrontation, and humanitarian aid. It also undertakes domestic tasks in support of specific government departments and agencies, as well as unplanned emergency support in times of crisis.

Decisions to use force for national self-defence can only be taken by the New Zealand Government. The government may choose from a wide variety of responses, including the use of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements.
CHAPTER 1:
NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE POLICY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE
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Introduction

1.01 Most nation-states have fundamental and enduring security interests that it seeks to protect and promote. This chapter outlines the main features of New Zealand’s strategic policy that support its security interests, and how the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) contributes to New Zealand achieving its strategic policy objectives.

1.02 This chapter also discusses national security and the purpose of and relationship between policy, strategy, and military doctrine. How military doctrine is used to further New Zealand’s security interests is also explained.

National Security

1.03 National security enables a state’s citizens to go about their daily business confidently, free from fear, and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses the preparedness, protection, and preservation of people, and of property and information, both tangible and intangible.¹

1.04 New Zealand’s national security involves measures taken to keep itself safe from external and internal threats. This includes preserving its physical integrity, its ability to trade freely, govern outside free from outside interference, and maintain control of its borders. External threats may lead to invasion, attack, or blockade. Internal threats include terrorism, subversion, civil disorder, criminality, insurgency, sabotage, and espionage. Internal threats may be externally-sponsored, but are only likely to jeopardise the stability of a state when they receive internal popular support and challenge established authority. Instability caused by financial crisis, climatic events, cyber or other forms of attack on critical national infrastructure, and pandemic disease are other potential threats. National security also extends to New Zealand nationals living overseas. We cannot maintain our own security in isolation. Our national security is both integrated within, and dependent upon, our neighbours’ and partners’ security.

Human Security

1.05 Maintaining authority and stability within democratic states requires meeting the legitimate political, economic, societal, religious, and environmental needs of individuals and groups. These needs are usually termed collectively as human security.

1.06 Increased competition for resources within a globalised world increases the threat to human security. When human security is threatened or lacking, the stability of a state or region can be undermined. Individuals may transfer loyalty to any group that appears or promises to meet their needs. These groups include non-governmental and transnational structures, and organisations that may exist temporarily and/or, in part, virtually. Popular backing for such groups increases the threat to security. Those benefiting from insecurity may seek to perpetuate crises and attempt to undermine any national or international response.

1.07 Providing human security demands an awareness of the needs of individuals as well as states. It requires an understanding of the impact of factors on a society including:

- ideology and politics
- education


² For example, organised criminal gangs, warlords, and insurgent groups.
commercial and economic factors
humanitarian and health issues
freedom of movement and information
aspiration and contentment
attitude to gender equality
racial, ethnic, and religious factors
the military
diplomacy, administration, and governance.

These factors, shaped by history and culture, must be considered in context.

New Zealand’s Security

New Zealand’s security is closely related to our national sovereignty and national interests, and how they are protected and promoted. A fundamental duty of government is to maintain the territorial integrity of New Zealand, the overseas territories for which it has constitutional responsibility, and the security and freedom of New Zealanders. The government also concerns itself with a range of broader interests – political, economic, and social – that contribute to the nation’s strength and prosperity.

Our security is shaped by a complex combination of geostrategic factors, including environmental, resource, social, political, scientific, technological, and military aspects. New Zealand’s diverse population and the million plus New Zealand citizens who live overseas also contribute to our global perspective. Our commitment, with our ally Australia and partners, to strengthening international peace and security enhances our national security.

New Zealand has numerous economic interests overseas and a role to play in maintaining international stability and law. Our stability, prosperity, and well-being depend on international trade and investment. New Zealand imports raw materials from overseas, exports goods by sea, and air, and accesses to global information flows.

We constantly review our security and modify our approach in response to events, emerging priorities, and an informed view of the future. Some factors have enduring significance, but none can be regarded in isolation and all may vary in importance over time. Defence identifies strategic trends to mitigate short-term fluctuations in the geopolitical environment and analyses how such trends may affect the future security environment. These assessments offer a range of potential outcomes, which are subject to chance and contingency, and the possible impact of strategic shocks. Even so, strategic assessments inform policymakers of future possibilities and potential problems, as well as their likely security implications.

Rules Based International Order

As an active member of the United Nations (UN), New Zealand helps to maintain the international world order. To enhance mutual international security and prosperity, New Zealand also seeks to assist with the provision of collective security internationally by collaborating on a broad range of issues and challenges. Our ability to project and employ our Armed Forces is one contribution to this multilateral system.

Alliances and partnerships are fundamental to our approach to defence and security. Collective security is built upon three principles:

- the primacy of diplomacy to resolve disputes
- agreement to act collectively
- trust.

In the context of politics, international security, and cooperation, New Zealand prefers to work with its many friends and allies to maintain the international order. Collective security is an essential pillar of New Zealand’s overall security system. This is promoted through our alliance with Australia, membership of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), close relationships with Canada, Britain, and the United States of America, and membership of major international and regional organisations such as the UN, the Commonwealth, the Pacific Island Forum, and
Chapter 1

The Legal Basis of the New Zealand Defence Force: The Defence Act

Policy

1.19 Policy exists at a number of different levels. National policy is the nation’s response to the generally accepted strategic environment, reflecting the Government’s judgement on what is necessary and possible in pursuance of the national interest. Policy articulates a choice leading to a course of action proposed or adopted by a government. It is a statement of intent or a commitment to act. The national security interests express New Zealand’s national policy for the conduct of external affairs and relations, and national security. Defence policy and foreign policy are subsets of national policy. Defence policy is expressed in the Defence White Paper 2016 which sets out the NZDF’s Principal Roles.

1.20 Defence policy can be both fluid and enduring. It must be capable of rapid review if strategic circumstances change. In response to the more stable and less dynamic features of the strategic environment, it may also take on an enduring quality of its own that will have an influence on strategic thinking, including the development of military strategic doctrine. In short, policy can be described as a directive statement of what is to be achieved.

Strategy

1.21 Conducting international politics involves applying national power to support our national or collective interests within the international system. This involves collaborating and coordinating with allies and partners. While the political outcomes and objectives are articulated in policy, a strategy is a strategic level plan concerned with creating and orchestrating the instruments of power in support of those long-term policy outcomes or objectives.

Military Doctrine

1.22 Military doctrine has an important relationship with both defence policy and strategy. In contrast with the potentially fluid and changeable nature of policy and strategy, military doctrine is informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about the ways in which military forces can be used effectively in support of policy. Doctrine is more enduring and less subject to change than policy, although it is by no means rigid or inflexible.
Military doctrine provides the framework for the conduct of military operations and is therefore an important aspect of the ‘ways’ for any strategy. It is about how current military operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained, and recovered. Therefore, it is neither about the past, nor is it about the medium- to longer-term future – it is about the present and how things are done now.

Defence Policy

Defence policy establishes the ends of military strategy and shapes the structures and capabilities of Defence’s contribution to national security objectives within resource and other constraints. New Zealand’s aims and objectives must be articulated clearly to provide the baseline for making decisions.
1.26 National Security Objectives. The Government of the day determines the national security objectives that shape defence policy. The NZDF, acting in a lead or supporting role, works in conjunction with other government agencies and departments to achieve the security interests.\(^3\)

1.27 New Zealand has seven overarching national security objectives.

- **Preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity:** Protecting the physical security of New Zealand citizens, and exercising control over its territory.
- **Protecting lines of communication:** These are both physical and virtual and allow New Zealand to communicate, trade and engage globally.
- **Strengthening international order to promote security:** Contributing to the international rules-based system, and engaging in targeted interventions offshore to protect New Zealand’s interests.
- **Sustaining economic prosperity:** Maintaining and advancing the economic wellbeing of New Zealand individuals, families, businesses, and communities.
- **Maintaining democratic institutions and national values:** Preventing activities aimed at undermining or overturning government institutions, principles and values that underpin New Zealand society.
- **Ensuring public safety:** Providing for, and mitigating risks to, the safety of citizens and communities.
- **Protecting the natural environment:** Contributing to the preservation and stewardship of New Zealand’s natural and physical environment.

\(^3\) Defence White Paper 2016
Primary Mission of the New Zealand Defence Force

1.28 The primary mission of the Defence Force is to secure New Zealand against external threat, to protect our sovereign interests, including in the Exclusive Economic Zone, and to be able to take action to meet likely contingencies in our strategic area of interest.4

Principal Roles of the New Zealand Defence Force

1.29 The principal roles of the NZDF are derived from the stated national security objectives and focus on the narrower defence-related aspects of those objectives. The NZDF’s principal roles are to:

• defend New Zealand’s sovereign territory
• contribute to national resilience and all of government security objectives
• meet New Zealand’s commitment as an ally of Australia
• support New Zealand’s civilian presence in the Ross Dependency of Antarctica, and participate in all of government efforts to monitor and respond to activity in the Southern Ocean
• contribute to, and where necessary lead, operations in the South Pacific
• make a credible contribution in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region
• protect New Zealand’s wider interests by contributing to international peace and security, and the international rule of law
• contribute to the advancement of New Zealand’s security partnerships
• participate in whole of government efforts to monitor the strategic environment
• be prepared to respond to sudden shifts in the strategic environment.

Strategy

Strategy is to derive from the [policy] aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.

Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke

The National Security Strategy

1.30 In a globalised, competitive world, states will legitimately set out to secure their own interests and achieve influence. New Zealand’s national security strategy coordinates the instruments of national power in pursuit of national policy aims to secure our interests. It is the responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to articulate the government’s political intentions as either a national strategic aim or end-state, supported by strategic objectives. Our national strategy may overlap, complement, or conflict with those of other states within the global diplomatic, economic, military, and informational contexts. Formulating and executing strategy is therefore dynamic and iterative. Furthermore, unexpected events and crises may radically change national strategy, requiring the military to operate outside of previous planning assumptions and Defence policy.

1.31 Cabinet National Security Committee. The Cabinet National Security Committee (NSC) is a formally constituted Cabinet committee. It has oversight of the national intelligence and security sector, including policy and legislative proposals relating to the sector. The NSC coordinates and directs national responses to major crises or circumstances affecting national security (either domestic or international). The NSC has Power to Act without further reference to the full Cabinet when the need for urgent action and/or operational or security considerations require it.

4 NZDF 2015-2018 Statement of Intent
1.32 The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes senior Ministers with relevant portfolio responsibilities: Finance, Defence, Economic Development, Communications, the Attorney-General, intelligence agencies, Foreign Affairs, Police, and Immigration, along with other relevant portfolio Ministers as appropriate. 5

1.33 Defence Security Strategy represents Defence’s overall contribution to national security. The security strategy is owned by the Minister of Defence and its delivery is the joint responsibility of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary of Defence.

1.34 While the National Security Strategy articulates agreed security objectives and the routes by which government departments, together, will deliver them; the Defence Security Strategy adapts those objectives and responsibilities allocated to Defence into outcomes and pertinent outputs necessary to meet the Government’s requirements. This follows on from regular all-of-government processes that inform strategic judgement, where challenges are assessed and lead to the development of an integrated view on mitigating the impact on New Zealand’s domestic and international activities.

1.35 The Armed Forces principal role is to defend New Zealand. While the traditional focus of providing for the defence of New Zealand is a given, the armed forces have a domestic role in national security. The Armed Forces act in support of government’s integrated strategy to build national resilience and contribute to government’s security objectives so that the population is protected from harm and can recover from the impact of disruptive events. The domestic role also includes contributing to the efforts of law enforcement agencies to secure the sovereign and economic borders from illegal, unauthorised and unregulated activities and assistance when disasters affect the wellbeing of the population.

5 For details on the establishment, terms of reference and membership of the NSC see CO (14) 8.

1.36 A significant function of Defence security strategy is to ensure that New Zealand maintains and sustains credible and capable military forces. Defence security strategy directs how Defence will develop over time, based on the anticipated future operating environment and balanced against resource limitations and the need to prioritise military activities. The Defence Security Strategy may change as a result of the five-yearly Defence White Paper cycle or the consequences of a significant shift in the security environment.

1.37 Defence strategy sits above the interests of individual Services. It is about integrating corporate strategy (namely, organising and managing the complete gamut of Defence resources to generate capability) with political/military and military strategy. To be effective, Defence security strategy requires close collaboration across a number of areas of civilian and military expertise.

The Political/Military Strategy

1.38 The Government directs the employment of the Armed Forces on operations. The political/military strategy shapes and directs a range of Defence activities, including operations, but it particularly focusses on influence, conflict prevention, and supporting broader Government interests. Political/military strategy also involves:

- shaping and implementing the various individual strategies which direct our broader activities
- multilateral Defence engagement within the international institutions of which New Zealand is a member, such as the UN
- supporting Defence activities at home and abroad
- providing leadership on thematic issues across counter-proliferation, climate change, energy security, nuclear deterrence, stabilisation, cyber, and space.

Military Strategy

1.39 Military strategy is a subset of Defence strategy. It directs the use of the military instrument where it
has been identified by the Government as part of New Zealand’s response to a specific challenge. Military strategy is a Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF) function. It is owned by the CDF and led on his behalf by Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Engagement (AC SCE).

1.40 The specific aim of the military strategy is to ensure coherent and effective strategic planning when the NZDF is used by the government. Military strategy is inherently joint. It sits above single-Service interests, tying together military capabilities to deliver an effect that meets the short-term requirement, but which is firmly rooted in a clear understanding of the long-term policy ends. The Military strategy has a role to play in developing policy through delivering military advice including, ultimately, the advice delivered by CDF to the Prime Minister. It should respond to the requirements asked of it by politicians and policy-makers, but should also proactively offer options in support of the Government’s ambitions. Importantly, military strategy must always be rooted in Defence strategy and policy. Operational policy staffs are embedded within the military strategy function to ensure that planning and operational delivery take place within the boundaries defined by policy.

The Instruments of National Power

1.41 National policy objectives are achieved through the coherent and effective application of all three instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, and military. The three instruments of power are underpinned by information.

1.42 **Diplomatic Instrument.** The diplomatic instrument of national power enables New Zealand to achieve its — mainly foreign — policy objectives through diplomatic means. Successful diplomacy depends upon the power of persuasion. Persuasion is reinforced by the possibility of coercion, and enhanced by a combination of reputation and integrity, the skilful interplay of the military and economic instruments, and effective communication. It is based on the nation-state system, but has evolved to incorporate other opinion formers, power-brokers, and third parties.

1.43 The diplomatic instrument is constantly in use, including during conflict when the need to influence allies and neutrals, as well as opponents, is as vital as the application of military force. Defence diplomacy aims to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of responsible, competent, and democratically accountable forces. It may also facilitate other NZDF military activity, by setting the conditions for overseas basing, access or over-flight, and cooperation with allies and partners. Diplomacy is enhanced by NZDF staff in embassies, the provision of operational military advice and assistance, the conduct of overseas training, and other influence activities.

1.44 **Economic Instrument.** Overseas investment, international flows of capital and trade, and development assistance provide scope for the exercise of economic influence. Economic power can provide a range of incentives, boycotts, tariffs, and sanctions to influence decisions and affect behaviour. The potential impact of such measures can, however, be diminished by the effects of economic integration and the political sophistication of recipient countries. Their impact is also complicated by the combination of public and private influences, the operation of market forces, and the complex relationships between global and national rates of growth and economic activity.

1.45 Military force sometimes may be required to support the economic instrument, this support may include embargo operations or naval cooperation and guidance for shipping. Alternatively, the reform of host nation military structures in a foreign country may foster positive economic outcomes abroad.

1.46 **Military Instrument.** Military power is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power. Its use ranges from deterrence and coercion through to the deliberate application of force to neutralise a specific threat. It is the principal means of defence.

1.47 The military instrument is most effective when employed in conjunction with the other instruments to achieve national objectives. Its use is ‘not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of
policy by different means. Even so, the military instrument can be decisive. For example, in difficult negotiations with intractable opponents, diplomacy may only be successful if backed up by the prospect of force. Indeed, the unique contribution of the military instrument is to threaten or, where necessary, to apply force to ensure the security of the nation, freedom from foreign oppression, and the promotion of national interests.

Employment of National Power

1.51 The geo-strategic balance of power between nations changes over time, owing to uneven rates of growth and variations in technology, demography, and resources, which confer advantage on one society or another. States also exercise their national power in relation to the way in which their elites and populations perceive their position and status relative to other states within the international community. These factors, as well as a nation’s propensity for security and stability, determine the relative importance afforded to the employment of its instruments of national power.

1.52 Individually, each instrument of power is limited in terms of its discrete influence and impact. In practice, the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments interact or conflict according to circumstance; ideally they act together, unified behind a common purpose or goal. What constitutes an appropriate combination in any given situation depends upon a full understanding of the complexities of the strategic context and the national policy objectives sought. At the same time, an appropriate balance should be drawn between the use of hard and soft power.

1.50 Information. Information underpins all three instruments of national power. It is fundamental to the Government’s approach to crisis management, although the New Zealand position is that information does not form a separate instrument per se. The dissemination of information, in accordance with a cross-government information strategy, enables diplomatic, economic, and military influence to be exerted in an effective and comprehensive way. At the same time, intelligence, and information received across government shapes planning and execution at all levels. Moreover, efficient management of information promotes unity of effort and understanding, and provides the opportunity to influence a range of audiences and activities in a coherent manner.

6 Von Clausewitz letter, 22 December 1827.
7 Some other nations, such as the United States, treat information as a discrete instrument of power.
The Role of Military Doctrine

Doctrine provides a military organisation with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.

General George H. Decker
Chief of Staff United States Army
1960–62

1.58 Military doctrine establishes guidelines on how to best employ the military instrument of national power to achieve strategic objectives. Military doctrine is defined as the ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application’. These principles are extracted from the history of skirmishes, battles, campaigns, and wars, and more specifically, drawn from lessons learned in stalemates, defeats, and victories. The principal purpose of military doctrine, therefore, is to provide the armed forces with guidance for the conduct of operations.

1.59 Military doctrine helps planners and commanders approach stressful, perilous, confusing, and unfamiliar situations with a clarity of thought that is based on rigorous analysis and comprehensive knowledge of hard-won lessons from human history and national military experience.

1.60 New Zealand military doctrine describes how the NZDF conducts military activities, but does not describe why. Doctrinal development is dynamic and is constantly reviewed for relevance in the context of emerging factors that influence the way New Zealand intends to use military force. New Zealand’s military doctrine is about how operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained, and recovered.

1.61 In addition to informing members of the NZDF about military doctrine, this publication also serves to inform those who have a legitimate interest in the way the NZDF conducts its business. NZDDP–D is also of value to allies and potential coalition partners who will benefit from an understanding of New Zealand’s military
Chapter 1

docline, ethos, cultural values, and general approach to strategic and military issues.

Utility of Doctrine

1.62 By describing the nature and characteristics of current and immediate future military operations, doctrine contributes to the NZDF’s ability to fight and win. It does this by setting a common framework within which to plan, train for, and conduct military operations. Doctrine guides preparation for these operations in peacetime and describes the methods for successfully conducting military operations in the New Zealand context. Doctrine also fundamentally shapes the way the NZDF thinks about the use of the military instrument of national power.

1.63 Doctrine builds cohesion through mutual understanding. By guiding the application of military force in operations, doctrine reduces the consequences of indecision by informing responses to unpredictable events. Doctrine allows confidence in decision making, brevity in communications, and acts as an enabler when choosing a course of action. Effective military doctrine prevents confusion and reduces ambiguity in uncertain conditions.

1.64 In preparation for operations, doctrine provides a knowledge base for training assessment of unit performance and provides a basis for further development of innovative conceptual thinking.

Military Doctrine within New Zealand’s Strategic Environment

1.65 New Zealand’s current strategic environment is characterised by a growing number of non-conventional security challenges that have implications for New Zealand’s security interests. Defence forces have traditionally trained for conventional military operations and the NZDF must still do so. The NZDF must also have the flexibility and versatility to continue to contribute to international efforts to counter asymmetric threats. Challenges include containing the fallout from increasing intrastate conflict, responding to the breakdown of law and order in weak, failing, and failed states, and countering transnational criminal activity, including piracy and terrorism.

1.66 New Zealand’s geo-strategic position and reliance upon international trade fundamentally influences the way NZDF doctrine is written and applied. As a result, NZDF doctrine focuses upon our need to develop and sustain expeditionary forces.

1.67 Today, even situations that appear benign have potential to rapidly deteriorate into violence or intense warfighting at the operational or tactical levels. Similarly, modern conflicts tend to have a global dimension and are no longer necessarily defined by geographic localities. Nor do belligerents seek to avoid populated areas. Consequently, military forces, other government agencies, and humanitarian agencies involved in relatively benign activities can quickly become embroiled in warfighting activities between or against belligerent parties.

1.68 Because the NZDF can conduct warfighting operations, it is able to conduct more effective stability and support operations and peace support operations. Without the ability to respond to an increasingly hostile environment approaching warfighting conditions, military forces have a diminished capability to conduct operations that require a credible and effective military presence, such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Military forces lacking such credibility are more likely to attract hostile and warlike actions from belligerents as a direct result of their inability to counter such threats.

1.69 War is the greatest challenge to peace. Therefore the NZDF must train to win in war. In doing so it also trains to conduct operations amongst the populace. This also enables the NZDF to conduct stability and support operations and peace support operations more effectively. Conversely, to forego preparedness for warfighting would undermine the NZDF’s ability to conduct operations requiring a credible military presence. Ultimately, this would endanger both the mission and the service personnel called to perform it.

See Chapter 3 for details on the spectrum of operations.
NZDF military doctrine reflects preparation for warfighting with the ability to operate effectively in the wider spectrum of military operations. It supports the deliberate business of preparing military forces for operations in a dynamic geo-strategic environment. Given New Zealand’s location, NZDF military doctrine focuses on our need to develop and sustain expeditionary forces. Ultimately, the maintenance of a professional and effective military capability — employable throughout the conflict spectrum — provides options for current and future New Zealand Governments to support and defend peace and democracy.

New Zealand Military Doctrine

The development of sound military doctrine is as much to do with challenging conventional wisdom as it is with codifying established practice. Commanders at every level have to rely on their judgement and apply as much of what they have learned as appropriate, departing from the established route when circumstances demand it.

The NZDF positively encourages the judicious and innovative departure from its military doctrine when it is well considered and implemented by trained professionals. This allows commanders to seize the initiative and adopt unorthodox or imaginative courses of action as opportunities arise.

Doctrine also embraces the NZDF’s organisational culture. This culture is undergoing a paradigm shift from three discrete single Services to a jointly focused Defence Force. The NZDF’s operational focus is towards integrated joint operations with synchronised operational- and tactical-level objectives. This cultural change realises the collective strength of a joint approach, whilst retaining the strength of the diversity of the three Services.

Doctrine Categories

Doctrine may be divided into three categories that shape its development and use. The three categories are:

- **Philosophical-Level Doctrine.** Philosophical doctrine explains the fundamental principles behind the employment of forces in military operations. Philosophical doctrine also describes the basic tenets under which forces operate. Based on regional and sometimes global politico-military environments, philosophical doctrine describes the conditions that determine the Government’s options for the employment of force elements. It also describes possible future environments within which a force may operate.

- **Application-Level Doctrine.** Application level doctrine explains how philosophical principles are applied. This doctrine encompasses guidance at both the individual and collective levels for dealing with differing circumstances in order to achieve mission success. Application-level doctrine contains both extant, proven applications, and newer emergent ideas that are yet to mature.

- **Procedural-Level Doctrine.** Procedural doctrine describes the skill sets that are fundamental to the performance of set tasks by every individual service person. It includes minor tactics, techniques, and procedures in the detail necessary to ensure team effectiveness and interoperability. This level of doctrine is therefore highly prescriptive and not usually open to interpretation. Given the safety implications inherent in many aspects of procedural doctrine, there is usually only one approved way of applying tactics, techniques, and procedures.

New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine Development

- **Categories of Doctrine.** There are two categories of doctrine providing guidance to the NZDF: joint doctrine and single-Service doctrine.

- **Joint Doctrine.** This publication is the highest level of joint doctrine. It focuses on the military strategic level of war, but contains comment on both the strategic and operational levels. NZDF joint doctrine at the operational level is contained in the hierarchy of derived New Zealand Defence Doctrine publications (NZDDPs), adopted foreign doctrine, and New Zealand supplements.
• **Single-Service Doctrine.** Some elements of operational and tactical doctrine are, by their nature, exclusively single Service. They remain the responsibility of the single Services, but are consistent with joint doctrine.

1.76 **Sources of Doctrine.** The NZDF employs doctrine that is developed by likely coalition partners, thereby promoting interoperability. New Zealand doctrine is not normally developed unless:

- government and/or defence policy dictates
- there is a philosophical difference on the military operation or task
- specialised organisations or equipment drive a requirement.

1.77 **Adopting Doctrine.** The NZDF only develops a select amount of joint doctrine. While most of this derived doctrine is at the philosophical and application levels, a small amount of procedural-level doctrine is also developed. However, the majority of joint doctrine used by the NZDF is adopted from overseas militaries. Adoption of foreign joint doctrine publications is on a case-by-case basis. Single-Service tactical doctrine is adopted at the discretion of the Service chiefs, with primacy of doctrine given to joint doctrine.

### The New Zealand Military Culture

1.78 Any New Zealand approach to military operations needs to maximise the qualities of our service personnel. It is the qualities of our personnel that shape the military culture of the wider NZDF. With many of the current conflicts being a competition for the support of the population, i.e. ‘human-centric’, the NZDF is

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**Figure 1-3:** The qualities of our personnel shape the culture of the wider New Zealand military.
well placed to successfully undertake the full range of military operations. The characteristics and attitude of NZDF personnel, regardless of Service, coupled with their ability to establish good relations with the local population, enable them to mitigate many issues that arise during operations. This has brought praise for New Zealand’s efforts from areas as diverse as the Solomon Islands, East Timor, and Afghanistan. The neutrality and ability of NZDF personnel to work in an honest and collaborative manner has greatly improved cooperation.

NZDF personnel are from a mixture of cultures and backgrounds. Therefore, the culture of the NZDF reflects the blending of these cultures and backgrounds. The fundamental attributes that typify this modern NZDF service person are:

- independence
- initiative

The NZDF has a unique culture that is underpinned by shared values of courage, commitment, and comradeship. The resultant military values form the foundation on which the NZDF builds an organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, and appropriately equipped. With this organisational and cultural basis, the NZDF becomes capable of serving the interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand Government. The NZDF culture and set of military values provide the foundation for New Zealand’s unique approach to the conduct of military operations.
CHAPTER 2:
LEVELS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
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Introduction

2.01 War and conflict in general occur at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. This chapter discusses these three levels and how they overlap. Intertwined with these three levels of war is the hierarchy of operations. This hierarchy provides a understanding of the building blocks of military operations, starting from the tactical actions through to national strategy.

Key Terms

National Strategic Level
The national strategic level refers to the political dimension of conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and the mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to meet the Government's national strategic aim.

National Strategic Aim
The national strategic aim is the Government's declared purpose in a situation. It is normally expressed in terms of a future desired outcome.

Strategic Objectives
A strategic objective is a goal to be achieved by one or more of the instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim.

Military Strategic Level
The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and directing conflict. This level includes setting the military end-state and the broad military approach to its achievement, in order to support the national strategic aim.

Levels of Military Operations

2.02 Conflict and war are perceived as actions spanning three broad levels (see figure 2-1): strategic, operational, and tactical. While each level is definitive in broad terms, all levels are interrelated and it is normal for conflict to be planned and prosecuted at all three levels concurrently.

The Strategic Level

2.03 The strategic level of military operations consists of two sub-levels: the national strategic level and the military strategic level.

• National Strategic Level. The national strategic level refers to the political dimension of conflict at the macro level, both domestically and internationally, and the mobilisation of national military and non-military resources to meet the Government's national strategic aim. The national strategic aim describes the Government's declared aspiration or goal. In order to achieve this aim a number of strategic objectives need to be attained. The national strategic level pertains to the full range of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the coordinated use of the three principal instruments of national power; the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments enabled by the effective collection and dissemination of information. This invariably requires contributions from a number of government agencies. The national strategic level is as much concerned with the avoidance of war as with its conduct. National strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

• Military Strategic Level. The military strategic level is responsible for the military aspects of planning and directing conflict. This level includes setting the military end-state and the broad military approach to its achievement, in order to support the national strategic aim. Military strategy is the military component of national strategy. To achieve the stated strategic objectives, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) makes a range of contributions: it raises, trains, and maintains operationally prepared forces for use by the Government, and it carries out campaigns and operations in accordance with government direction. Military strategy is the primary focus of Headquarters NZDF and the Ministry of Defence.
2.04 The operational level is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned and commanded. A campaign consists of a series of linked operations and is conducted to achieve a campaign end-state. This end-state is reached when all the operational or campaign objectives have been attained. The operational level links military strategy to tactics by establishing operational objectives and end-states, initiating actions, and applying resources to ensure the success of the campaign or operation. Operations could involve only NZDF force elements, or be conducted in conjunction with other New Zealand agencies/departments and/or the forces of other countries. In the planning and conduct of campaigns or major operations, ‘operational art’ is practiced. Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration, and conduct of campaigns or major operations.9

9 See NZDDP-3.0 Campaigns and Operations for a further explanation of operational art.

2.06 The tactical level is where battles, engagements, and actions — that is, the execution of the operation or campaign — actually take place. Tactics is the art of disposing maritime, land, air, and Special Forces for battle or conflict, and logistics for direct support of those engaged in combat to achieve success in battle. It is what Carl von Clausewitz referred to as the theory and use of military forces in combat.
such as battles and engagements, conducted by combat forces of one or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.\(^\text{10}\)

2.07 A series of operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space are campaigns. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when contemplated simultaneous or sequential military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources.

\(^{10}\) The sequenced tactical actions can be described as the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.

**Key Terms**

**Campaign**

A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

**Operation**

An operation is a series of military actions or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.
The Significance of the Levels of Military Operations

Overlapping Levels of Military Operations

2.08 In practice, the levels of military operations overlap and the distinctions between them will rarely be clear. For example, planning at all levels of operations is very closely linked, interdependent, and often occurs concurrently. Three important issues emerge about the ways in which the three levels of operations interact.

- There is never any clear line drawn between them as they invariably overlap. Commanders need to consider this factor, especially when establishing the levels of command in which clear distinctions reflecting divisions of responsibility need to be drawn.

- The levels were developed with war in mind, although they can apply to all forms of military operation, from warfighting to the most benign humanitarian aid operations.

- In some operations, for example peace support operations and during the management of complex confrontations, action taken at the lowest tactical level may need to be responsive to strategic decision making, with the tactical outcome having immediate strategic significance (the ‘strategic corporal’ concept). This may lead to political and military leaders at the strategic level wishing to directly influence the lowest tactical level, missing out the intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of command.

2.09 The levels of military operations provide a general framework for the command and control of operations and a useful tool for the analysis of political-military activity before, during, and after the conduct of military operations. An understanding of them — and of their limitations — is vital to a commander grasping the conduct of military operations. The levels of military operations also provide a means of achieving the coherent application of force in different ways at different levels in pursuit of strategic objectives. It is quite possible, for example, to apply force offensively at one level, while being defensive at another, both being entirely consistent with a campaign’s ultimate objective (as shown in the following real-life example on Samoa during World War One).

2.10 While the strategic/tactical overlap may be inevitable, given the nature of some operations it does threaten the essential command and control structure and can undermine the principles of mission command. The risk to effective mission command can be managed if such an overlap is anticipated and included as a factor during the planning stages. Informing political and military leaders at the strategic level on the requirements of mission command will aid effective implementation of the NZDF command philosophy (see Chapter 6).
Real-Life Example

Different Objectives at the Strategic and Operational Levels of a Military Operation: New Zealand Expeditionary Force to German Samoa, August 1914

**Strategic Threat:** The German Pacific Fleet based at Tsingtao (China) threatened to project naval power deep into the South Pacific. Samoa, having the only base south of the equator, was assessed as a critical vulnerability to the German plan.

**Strategic-Level Objective:** Defence—the British imperial concept was to limit German access into the South Pacific and retain logistic bases for shipping. New Zealand’s assessment concluded that the Germans could readily launch attacks against the New Zealand coast that would in turn necessitate increased resources for coastal security. New Zealand adopted a defensive objective at the strategic level of military operations.

**Operational-Level Objective:** Offence—at the request of the Imperial War Department, New Zealand invaded German Samoa. Escorted by two Navy cruisers, HMS Philomel (at the time loaned to New Zealand as a training ship) escorted 1400 troops with the mission of occupying German Samoa. New Zealand adopted an offensive objective at the operational level of military operations.

The strategic assessment of the situation and the decision to commit operational forces to German Samoa was justified with the arrival of German Pacific Fleet vessels one week after New Zealand’s successful occupation. Pre-emptive offensive actions at the operational level denied the Germans a firm base from which to project power into the South Pacific and threaten New Zealand’s interests. The Samoa example highlights how diverse, yet complimentary objectives can be set at the different levels of military operations.

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THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
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Introduction

3.01 The modern security environment is becoming increasingly complex. This can be largely attributed to the interrelationships and the degree of harmony existing among or between individuals, groups, societies, and states. While individuals may act for reasons of altruism, nations generally act in their own self-interest, including the pursuit of political, economic, ideological, religious, and cultural objectives.

3.02 When the self-interests of groups or nations are in harmony, or at least pose no real or perceived threat to each other, there is peace. When they are not, and the actions or policies of one are viewed as threatening the vital interests of another, conflict arises. Conflict, unless minimised, resolved, or contained, can quickly escalate in nature and scope.

3.03 States affected by serious and continuous internal conflict may find themselves on a path to dissolution and potentially civil war. Within this context, conflict may occur between legitimate governments and non-state organisations such as economic, ideological, or religious terrorist groups. These non-state groups traditionally rely upon asymmetric attacks that are normally considered criminal, as opposed to military acts.

3.04 Conflict and war have the potential to increase in intensity and violence, affect third parties, and may involve dehumanising and genocidal undercurrents. For this reason, every effort must be made to reduce the causes of conflict and, where it has broken out, to prevent its spread and escalation. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) fulfils a vital role by possessing the capability to engage in conflict, manage conflict, and restore peace in an effective, disciplined, and morally legitimate manner.

The Structure and Characteristics of Conflict

3.05 While conflict is a condition or state of the security environment, it is also a physical activity involving the application of armed force to impose its will on an opponent. In terms of its structure and characteristics, conflict is indistinguishable from war, the difference between the two lying in war’s distinct political-strategic function and the decisive military victory sought. Because of the intrinsic similarities of conflict and war, the following discussion of conflict applies equally to war.

Physical and Moral Planes of Conflict

3.06 Physical. Conflict exists on both physical and moral planes. Conflict on the physical plane includes weapons, technology, force ratios, ground captured or lost, logistical matters, and economic, personnel, and industrial factors. Of primary importance to the conduct of military operations on this plane are the materiel support requirements for effecting manoeuvre, fire support, and force sustainment.

3.07 Moral. On the moral plane, conflict is a contest and clash between opposing human wills. Its characteristics are psychological in nature and centre on the desire and will of an opponent to fight or resist. Among nations, they include political leadership, popular feeling, unity of purpose, patriotism, ideology, and national character and beliefs. Within a military force, the moral plane of conflict relates to force cohesion and the determination and will of individuals and task forces to achieve their mission. Conflict on the moral plane encompasses combat leadership, moral justification, discipline, training, motivation, perseverance, morale, esprit de corps, and everything else that inspires military personnel and provides them reasons to fight.

3.08 Decisiveness of the Moral Plane. Because it is human-centred, the moral plane exerts the greater and
often decisive influence on the conduct and outcome of conflict. This is where NZDF operations can be enhanced through the quality of its personnel. Hence, the development of cultural values and moral qualities, especially those pertaining to command, leadership, and the military ethos, will always be of paramount importance in the NZDF.

3.09 Characteristics of Conflict. The clash and interaction of opposing human wills, together with the firepower and destructive capabilities of modern weapons, gives conflict its violent dynamic and produces environments and outcomes that are rarely predictable. There are four principal characteristics of conflict.

- **Friction.** Friction is what makes the apparently easy difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible. During conflict, friction can exist on the moral plane in the form of personality clashes among leaders or indecisiveness of commanders; or it may exist on the physical plane in the form of breakdown of vehicles, loss of communications, navigational errors, difficult ground, and bad weather. When such problems are coupled with the interplay and hostile actions of opponents who are at the same time attempting to impose their will, friction abounds and makes the conduct of military operations a difficult and complex undertaking.

- **Uncertainty.** All actions during conflict occur in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Despite revolutionary advances in information processing and data management, knowledge, information and intelligence about an enemy or situation will remain finite and subject to probabilities. The ‘fog of war’ is real and pervasive, generating anxiety and often restricting effective decision making. Uncertainty can be reduced by developing a climate of trust between leaders and subordinates, and by applying military judgement, experience, and intuition to situations. Uncertainty can be reduced by having simple, flexible plans and good standing orders and operating procedures. Ensuring that orders and the intentions of commanders are clearly articulated and understood, and by fostering in subordinates initiative and independence in thought and action also helps to reduce uncertainty.

- **Actions and Reactions.** Conflict manifests a continuous series of actions, reactions, and situational changes as the principles of war (see Chapter 6) are applied. New challenges and difficulties continually arise, along with opportunities for exploitation. The tempo of operations will be dependent on the ability of a force to accelerate or decelerate its activities, including synchronising combat functions, to meet an ever-changing situation.

- **Violence and Destruction.** The waging of conflict is an intrinsically violent and bloody affair producing destruction, terror, suffering, and death for combatants and non-combatants alike. The means and weapons used in modern conflict are extremely lethal and diverse in nature, from the crudest of weapons to weapons of mass destruction. The diversity and lethality of weapons available to potential adversaries poses significant challenges to commanders and leaders at all levels of operations.

Peace

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.

General George Washington, speech to Congress, 1790

Who desires peace, should prepare for war.

Vegetius (Roman historian, 4th Century AD)

3.10 Among and within nations, peace is defined as the absence of violence—direct or indirect, manifested or threatened. While peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts are the desired norms, the reality is that peace is often a temporary condition. In order for peace to be enduring and genuine, it must be based on mutual respect, shared interests, and common values.
In the international arena, peace is often the result of one state manifesting a superior political will that is backed by a prevalence of force and is militarily unchallenged by others. Peace can also result from a balance of power and agreed political spheres of interest. In either case, despite the paradoxical implications, peace is ultimately sustained by, and dependent upon, the willingness of states to use force to preserve it, as well as restore it when lost.

**Conflict**

3.12 The essence of conflict is a violent clash between opposing human wills, each trying to impose its own will on the other. In interstate and even intrastate conflict, the means to impose your nation’s will on an adversary may include diplomatic, economic, and political mechanisms, as well as the application or threat of violence by military force.

3.13 In an environment of conflict, military action is one tool among several that may be used by a state or group to impose their will. The desired goal or policy objective should be obtained preferably by non-military means. However, if this is not possible without resorting to force, the conflict has the potential to escalate in intensity and scope.

**War**

3.14 War is an instrument of policy, normally stimulated by fear, self-interest, or ideology, and is characterised by organised violence. War is used as a means to assert the will of a state, individual, or group. The potential and conditions for war, at all levels and intensities of armed conflict, exist at all times. They occur within and between all societies and polities and simply reflect the existence of incompatible goals, ambitions, or perceptions among individuals, groups, or states.

3.15 The global security environment can be shaped by a multitude of interactions that can precipitate the threat or actual use of violence. These interactions and influences can be:

- political
- economic
- religious
- societal
- environmental.

3.16 Peace and war cannot always be distinguished absolutely. The resolution of complex contemporary crises may involve a hybrid of conventional warfighting and irregular activity, as well as concurrent stabilisation activity, all in the same theatre. Boundaries between them may be blurred; they may change suddenly and very obviously, or more gradually over time.

3.17 War is used when the other instruments of national power—that is, diplomacy and economics supported by information—are unable or considered inappropriate to achieve national security objectives or protect national interests. Nations may opt to conduct sustained combat operations to achieve strategic aims. These operations are categorised as war and can range from small- to large-scale engagements and be either single- or joint-environment in nature.

3.18 War is a strategic-level political and military condition involving the application of a nation’s military and other resources against an enemy to achieve a political end. The object purpose of war is the winning or restoration of peace, which meets the political conditions or end-state set forth by the political leadership.
3.19 War in the conventional sense is prosecuted through strategy. It aims to defeat the enemy’s military forces that support and sustain a political structure and will to fight. It may also involve attacking the enemy’s other instruments of national power (diplomatic and economic) with military forces. When embarking on a policy of war, the political authority consciously decides to achieve the desired end-state by military means. The basic nature of war is immutable, although warfare evolves constantly.

3.20 New Zealand has consistently advocated that it will not use war as an extension of policy. In fact, New Zealand formally renounced the use of war as an element of state policy when it signed the Pact of Paris in 1928 and again when it signed the Charter of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. New Zealand retains the right to use armed force for individual or collective self-defence and for the purposes of the UN.

War

3.21 Warfare is the conduct of war. It is the ‘how’ of waging war. In a nation-state, warfare is the domain of the nation’s armed forces. Warfare reflects, amongst other things, the culture, society, and political aspirations of belligerents and other interested parties. Warfare is an inherently unpredictable, often chaotic, human activity. Success will often depend upon asserting some form of order or dominance on a situation and overcoming the inherent frictions and consequences of military activity.

3.22 Warfare changes as rapidly as the means to wage war and the societies that wage war do; this is to say, nearly continuously. Understanding the changing nature of warfare provides the context in which wars are fought. Context helps combatants make right choices on such essential matters as force structure, force preparation, the conduct of campaigns and operations, and rules of engagement.

Forms of Warfare

3.24 The NZDF delineates two basic forms of warfare, based on the strategic focal point of each form. These basic forms are:

- traditional warfare
- irregular activity.

Historian John Keegan has offered that war is a universal phenomenon whose form and scope is defined by the society that wages it. The changing form and scope of warfare gives value to delineating the distinction between war and warfare.
3.25 **Traditional Warfare.** Traditional warfare is a form of warfare characterised as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. This form is labelled as traditional because it has been the pre-eminent form of warfare in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The strategic purpose of traditional warfare is the imposition of our will on adversary nation-state(s) and the avoidance of their will being imposed upon us.

3.26 In the traditional warfare model, nation-states fight each other for reasons as varied as their national interests. Military operations in traditional warfare normally focus on an adversary’s armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary’s government. With the increasingly rare exception of formally declared war, traditional warfare typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in all physical domains and the information environment (including cyberspace).

3.27 Typical mechanisms for victory in traditional warfare include the defeat of an adversary’s armed forces, the destruction of an adversary’s war-making capacity, and/or the seizure or retention of territory. Traditional warfare generally assumes that the people indigenous to the operational area are not belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate.

3.28 The traditional warfare model also encompasses non-state and proto-state actors who adopt conventional military capabilities and methods in service of traditional warfare victory mechanisms. The traditional warfare model also embraces the use of asymmetric tactics by conventional forces; for example the use of cyber attacks coordinated with other capabilities. Irregular forces, to include partisan and resistance fighters in opposition to occupying conventional military forces, are included in the traditional warfare formulation. The near-term results of traditional warfare are often evident, with the conflict ending in victory for one side and defeat for the other, or in stalemate.

3.29 **Irregular Activity.** The NZDF does not use the term ‘irregular warfare’ to describe non-traditional ‘warfare’ activities. Rather, the NZDF describes this form of conflict as ‘irregular activity’. While the term is a little cumbersome, it more accurately describes the range of conflicts covered. Irregular activity can be defined as “the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.”

3.30 As such, it comprises criminality, disorder, insurgency, and terrorism. These activities are not mutually exclusive and will often coexist in the same environment, perhaps even alongside the ‘regular’ threat posed by a state’s armed forces. These threats are irregular by necessity—because there is little chance of prevailing physically over conventional military forces, irregular actors are forced to take asymmetric actions that have a strong political or psychological impact. In the struggle for power and control, irregular actors seek to outlast and discredit their opponents in the eyes of the population through a range of information operations and actions that fall outside the boundaries of regular, state-on-state warfare.

3.31 Irregular activities are usually carried out by irregulars (groups or individuals that do not legitimately represent a state). They tend to live amongst, rather than be isolated from, populations, and operate in complex terrain, such as urban areas or jungles. They have an adaptive, polymorphous character that sees them transition with relative ease between different types of irregular activity. They typically operate in ungoverned spaces, yet have an international dimension because of modern communications technology.

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13 Examples of proto state actors are national liberation movements and pirates who control territory and resources and provide a degree of civil administration to the peoples they control.

3.32 It is important to note that regular forces may also operate in an irregular manner, so as to destabilise and defeat irregular actors. In the NZDF, this is primarily the domain of the Special Operations Forces (SOF).

3.33 Irregular activity has emerged as a major and pervasive form of conflict, although it is not historically new. In fact the world is witnessing a tendency towards irregular forms of conflict. These include:

- terrorism
- economic warfare (attacks on key infrastructure systems to sabotage key industries and disrupt normal life)
- cyber attacks (corrupting or disabling key information databases and systems)
- environmental warfare (the deliberate destruction of, or damage to, eco-systems so as to sabotage economic activity, or degrade the environment).

3.34 The operational environment has become increasingly indistinct and increasingly urban. Civilians are more directly or indirectly involved or affected. The distinctions between military and non-military forces, civilians, combatants, and non-combatants have become increasingly blurred.

### Key Terms

#### Traditional Warfare

This is a form of warfare characterized as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. This form is labelled as traditional because it has been the pre-eminent form of warfare in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

#### Irregular Activity

Irregular activity is the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups, or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. It comprises criminality, disorder, insurgency, and terrorism.

### The Evolution of Warfare

3.35 The evolution of warfare will continue to be unpredictable. Its prevalence, scale, and intensity will change along the continuum of conflict from war, through inter- and intra-state conflict, and ultimately to peace. The NZDF will confront a variety of situations and threats, both state and non-state, potentially at the same time and in the same operating area. Moreover, with increasingly complex problems faced by commanders, the relationships between cause and effect are increasingly hard to predict. Therefore, the way commanders frame complex problems is becoming more important. Adversaries, both state and non-state, are adapting fast to military strength and their preferred way of operating. Adversaries in regions with multiple persistent systematic problems, using de-centralised command styles and an ability to exploit the clutter of heavily populated areas, are unlikely to present themselves in sterile operating environments for precision attack. Conflict is less likely to end in clear ‘victory’ and it will be the resilience and institutional agility as much technological mastery that will define the NZDF’s chance of success.

### Contemporary Influences in Warfare

3.36 Modern warfare is continually changing as technological developments transform the ways that operations are conducted. The political environment, whether domestic, regional, or global, in which operations are conducted is also changing continuously over time. Changes in technology affect the capability of military systems and also the general conditions in society under which operations are conducted. These societal conditions include the state of a society’s transport, communications, health, and education systems, and also the role of the mass media.

### The Future of Warfare

3.37 Technological advances and other factors are expected to transform traditional forms of warfare in ways that are almost impossible to predict. Technological developments will continually enhance the
speed, range, stealth, precision, lethality, and flexibility of weapons across the whole range of domains and operations.

The Range of Security Events

3.38 In the current global security environment, neither peace nor war exists in its purest extreme form. There is an intricate and dynamic blend of cooperation, confrontation, and conflict between:

- states
- groups and factions within states
- other state and non-state actors.

3.39 This wide range of different situations between war and peace are frequently labelled as ‘tension’, ‘crisis’, ‘hostilities’, and ‘conflict’ and the NZDF will be required to conduct military campaigns or operations within these environments.

3.40 Figure 3-1 illustrates the broad range of these situations, called security events, where the Government may employ the NZDF. The border of the diagram shows the relationship between the threats posed and the four elements of NZDF preparedness. The diagram further illustrates where those security events are placed against the level of threat, duration, and the preparedness of NZDF forces.

- Events in the upper left quadrant are typically urgent and unconventional events which threaten New Zealand’s sovereignty.
- Events in the upper right quadrant are less urgent and often do not directly threaten New Zealand’s
The Context of Military Operations

New Zealand Defence Doctrine

3.44 The requirement to conduct combat operations and stability and support operations, often simultaneously, is one of the great dilemmas for armed forces. The diverse nature of the security events requires clear definition so the role, risks, and potential tasks of NZDF personnel committed to an area of conflict are fully understood.

3.45 Combat Operations. In New Zealand doctrine, combat operations are defined as ‘military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.’ The actual level of force used during combat operations will be determined by the tactical situation and by the rules of engagement.

3.46 Stability and Support Operations. Stability and support operations impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies. They do, however, pose the greatest risk to collective security.

• The events in the lower left quadrant are typically urgent but less threatening events which require the NZDF to provide aid to the civil powers.

• The lower right quadrant encompasses events that are less urgent to New Zealand, but provide opportunities to contribute to global stability.

New Zealand Application

3.41 New Zealand military doctrine is based on the recognition that the NZDF can participate in a number of concurrent operations ordered by the Government to deal with a number of security events. It further recognises that our core business will remain defending New Zealand and its interests. The range of security events extends from assisting with emergency relief to matters of national survival. It is underpinned by the concept of ‘likelihood versus consequence’. As a general guide, the security events to the left of the diagram are more likely, but their consequences are less catastrophic when compared to the consequences of events to the right of the diagram. The reverse is true for those events to the right of the diagram, where although they might be unlikely, the consequences may be catastrophic for New Zealand.

Conflict Escalation

3.42 Globally some countries are enjoying a relative peace, while other countries are experiencing a state of conflict or even war. The condition of peace is fairly easily determined; however, conflict — because it also encompasses threats of violence — is a more subjective matter. The boundary between peace and conflict is often blurred and frequently crossed. When peace is threatened, it becomes vulnerable. At that stage, if disputes cannot be resolved peacefully, or policy goals are pursued through a strategy of threat or coercion, conflict often results.

3.43 Once a conflict escalates to a level involving armed force, diplomacy, and negotiation become more difficult. Moreover, one or both parties may consider that they have no alternative but to evolve the conflict to war in order to achieve their objectives.
3.47 The current complex operating environment will require forces to alternate with agility between combat operations and stability and support operations without warning, based on rapidly changing tactical situations. At any given moment, some portions of a force may be conducting combat operations, while others may be engaged in stability and support operations. In addition, combat operations always need to be conducted with longer-term stability and support operations in mind. The NZDF must be appropriately trained and equipped to conduct both types of operations concurrently.

A Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Context

3.48 Today’s complex security environment means that operations undertaken by New Zealand’s military forces will generally be in a joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) context. The NZDF will contribute task-organised force elements to a wider coalition. Coalition partners could include other armed forces, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and national and foreign government agencies.

Figure 3-2: Combat operations are military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to mission success.
The Context of Military Operations

New Zealand Defence Doctrine

on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing. This is necessarily predicated by political agreement on the desired outcome. A future desired outcome is likely to involve aspects related to security, governance, and economic development. The complexity or evolving nature of a crisis may preclude the desired outcome being defined. It may only be possible to look ahead months and reframe the problem in order to discover the necessary desired outcome.

3.52 Political agreement on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives. However, complete agreement between different actors may be difficult to achieve and, in that case, developing a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued. Creating the conditions to achieve a desired outcome requires active involvement from each of the instruments of power. It also requires effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, across both New Zealand government agencies and a broad range of multinational institutions, agencies, and organisations. Although the implementation of this comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of operation, and from one crisis to another, a number of guiding principles apply.

- Proactive engagement is necessary between all actors, before and during a crisis.
- Shared understanding, engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education, and a common language, is vitally important.
- Collaborative working, based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate, is valuable—institutional familiarity and information sharing are key.
- Thinking should be focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal and ideally mutually agreed objectives, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of purpose.

Figure 6-3 in Chapter 6 lists these twenty-two government agencies.

Defined as: ‘a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of some other form of influence’.
Key Term

Comprehensive Approach

An approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and de-conflicting the activities of the military, other government departments, and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

3.53 Commitment to a comprehensive approach does not mean that the NZDF forgoes its warfighting ethos or ability to conduct conventional military operations. Although applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and crisis, a comprehensive approach may not be applicable to every scenario in which NZDF force elements are engaged. The degree to which a comprehensive approach is applied will be guided by situational imperatives such as the complexity, duration, and nature of the situation. Nevertheless, the NZDF recognises that in an increasingly complex modern security environment, effective defence solutions are best achieved through the input of relevant government departments/agencies and multinational institutions, agencies and organisations with an interest in a particular crisis.

3.54 Just as the levels of military operations overlap and the distinctions between them blur, similarly levels of government operations can also overlap under a comprehensive approach. The need for careful and considerate planning is crucial, given that the NZDF will likely be involved in operations led by other government departments or agencies — leaving the NZDF in a supporting role only.

Figure 3-3: In crisis management the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent upon a common sense of purpose, resolve, mutual understanding, and collaboration and resourcing.
Cyberspace

3.55 Cyberspace is one of the NZDF's non-environmental domains. It is defined as a global domain consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers and software. Cyberspace is a complex and dynamic domain, interdependent with the electromagnetic spectrum, and is key to all military operations on land, sea, and in the air and in space. It is far more than just the Internet. Cyberspace is pervasive and all-encompassing, incorporating, for example, aircraft flight control systems, medical life-support systems, physical device controllers and national electricity distribution systems. Cyberspace is less geographically constrained than other environments, so, distance and reach must be viewed differently to traditional environments when considering cyberspace operations. The NZDF issued a Cyber Primer in 2017. The Primer can be found here: [http://doctrine/pdf/Cyber_Primer_Online.pdf](http://doctrine/pdf/Cyber_Primer_Online.pdf)

Key Terms

Cyber

That which relates to or involves operating or taking action in and through computer and information technology networks.

Cyberspace

A global domain consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers and software.

3.56 Access to cyberspace is possible via many means, most often through computer terminals, laptops, tablets, and mobile phones. Connectivity may be achieved via wireless connections or physical cables. Cyberspace is dependent upon physical assets – power sources, cables, networks, data-centres, as well as the people who operate and manage them.

3.57 Our ability to operate in cyberspace is vital to our national interest as it ensures our national security, prosperity, and way of life. Defence is increasingly dependent upon cyberspace and it can expect adversaries to exploit this dependence. The New Zealand government assesses the cyber threats to its interests and mitigates these through resilience measures, awareness, and trusted partnerships. Activities in cyberspace are an essential element of our routine business and are fundamental to planning and conducting operations. Keeping our networks and platforms secure is a prerequisite to being able to operate effectively as a military force.

Military Responses

3.58 The range of security events model (Figure 3-1) will always be open to interpretation with regard to where a specific event, conflict, or security situation features. However, its usefulness lies in being able to identify and associate appropriate military responses for a particular security condition or conflict situation.

3.59 Stability and support operations are very broad in scope and, for the NZDF, range from assistance to the civil authorities within New Zealand, to peace enforcement operations overseas. Warfighting for the NZDF, on the other hand, is the implementation of national strategy aimed at imposing will on an enemy and achieving national policy objectives through application of decisive military means.

Conflict Resolution

3.60 The transition from combat operations to stabilisation operations (to re-establish security, stability, and prosperity, underpinned by the rule of law) is hugely important. It is likely to be characterised not by the achievement of specific end-states (such as absolute victory), but by incremental conditions-based outcomes (although they may reflect political direction to achieve particular goals according to a rough timetable). The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, will be highly dynamic. Pursuing the gradual transition towards stability, the NZDF is likely to support the activities of other actors in protecting, strengthening, and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law, and the economy.
3.61 The long-term goal should be to resolve the underlying tensions that led to the inception or resurgence of conflict, and to create the conditions for successful longer-term development. The immediate contribution by military forces, however, is likely to be to re-establish and maintain sufficient security for the local populace and civilian agencies to enable the stabilisation process to advance. This will involve preventing or containing violence and protecting people and key institutions. There will then be a need to promote those (largely political) processes which lead to lasting stability, through the development of host nation capacity, rule of law, and a robust civil society. The level of military activity required depends upon the context of the campaign and the ability of the other instruments of power and non-governmental organisations to operate with appropriate protection, despite perceived security risks.

3.64 Crisis management activities should be both legal and purposeful. They would also be recognisably legitimate, acceptable, and appropriate in a broader sense. Campaign authority derives from confidence that appropriate and legitimate measures are employed by those intervening in a crisis. This confidence helps to maintain support from those that shape opinion, share power, and grant consent.

3.65 Creating and maintaining campaign authority depends upon continuously assessing the effects and consequences of the activities undertaken. To influence decisions and opinions, which reinforce campaign authority, an effective information strategy is required. This should be coordinated across all national and international partners in support of the relevant strategic aim and associated objectives.

3.66 Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic, and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces. Legitimacy is the justification for using force and the manner in which it is applied. As such, it has both collective and individual aspects, both of which directly affect the utility of force. Legitimacy is based upon both subjective considerations, such as the values, beliefs, and opinions of a variety of audiences (at home and overseas), as well as demonstrable and objective legality.

3.67 Maintaining legitimacy is crucial. As well as bolstering morale and promoting cohesion, both within a force and between coalition partners, it also confers a mandate for military activity along with constraints on it. Even so, perceptions of legitimacy are unlikely to be universal or unequivocal and may be shaped by many factors, including the media.

3.68 Once military forces have been committed, the perception of the manner in which they conduct themselves is an essential element of overall campaign authority. Maintaining legitimacy depends on a variety of issues, such as a consistently reputable behaviour, moral and ethical considerations, and the prospects of a successful outcome.
Legality

3.69 New Zealand prides itself on being a democratic member of the international community and a good world citizen, so it is imperative that any NZDF operation demonstrably complies with the law. All operations must be conducted within a legal framework based upon international law, national domestic law, and (where not excluded by international law or any agreed modifications) host nation law. There must also be clearly articulated rules of engagement.

3.70 Central to this framework will be a justification for the use of force, such as a UN Security Council Resolution that provides the legal authority for the operation and that will determine the mission and the desired end-state. Alternatively, the operation may be based on New Zealand’s right of individual or collective self-defence under international law.

Ethics and Morality

3.71 Ethical and moral considerations underpin law and the administration of justice. These considerations also determine the validity of operational decision-making and military conduct. Commanders are accountable for their actions and the actions of those under their command. They are duty-bound to ensure that the highest moral and ethical standards are maintained by their subordinates. This can be done by personal example, promoting a robust ethos, and training and education.

3.72 Service personnel will face opponents with different moral, ethical, and legal boundaries and perspectives. Furthermore, even as NZDF personal are confronted with such realities and complexities of modern warfare, they find themselves operating under increasingly intense scrutiny: parliament, domestic law, humanitarian organisations, non-governmental organisations, and the media continuously monitor the moral and ethical impact of our activities.

3.73 The trend towards transparency and greater regulation of the NZDF’s activities reflects the expectations of the society we serve and whose values we reflect. If we are to maintain campaign authority, then we must maintain our culture’s ethical and moral standards. At the same time, we must respect local traditions, customs, and practices, along with paying appropriate attention to the needs of minority or otherwise vulnerable groups, such as women, children and ethnic minorities. Our challenge is to ensure that society’s expectations of greater legal and ethical regulation are balanced against the imperatives of operational effectiveness.

Law and Political Direction

3.74 NZDF personnel must respect and comply with the Law of Armed Conflict. Political direction and the operational and legal provisions for using force are detailed in NZDDP-06.1 Rules of Engagement (2nd Edition). Rules of engagement (ROE) are orders: they are not comprehensive statements of either the law or policy, although they take both into account. The ROE:

- ensure that military personnel activities remain within the law and are consistent with government policy
- define what military personnel can legally do and not do
- reflect the operational context.

3.75 While rules of engagement may limit activity, they do not limit the legal right to act in self-defence, where such activity is both reasonable and necessary.

3.76 Armed conflict must contribute towards setting the conditions for a political end-state. The way in which we conduct armed conflict, and the dynamic nature of context, means that political constraints and freedoms are a constant reality. Political decisions that affect using force include those that:

- place limitations on objectives and targets
- delineate the theatre of operations and manpower limits
- restrict the types of weapons used
- aim to avoid escalation.

CHAPTER 4:
NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE
OPERATIONAL TENETS
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Chapter 4

Introduction

4.01 All components of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), in harmony with other instruments of national power, offer a range of ways and means of enhancing operations. Each Service makes its unique contribution to a joint force whilst retaining its individual Service ethos. Maritime, land and air forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in their respective single-Service doctrine.

4.02 This chapter identifies and explains the essential elements of NZDF military operations. These essential elements, defined as NZDF operational tenets, are fundamental to the conduct of military operations and permeate down through New Zealand military doctrine.

The Warfighting Ethos

4.03 The nature of military doctrine is a product of military imperatives. Those imperatives lead ultimately to the need to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight and win in battle. The conduct of warfighting in support of national interests is the most important function military forces may have to perform. Every member of the NZDF must be prepared to fight for whatever legitimate cause the New Zealand Government is pursuing through military endeavour. It follows also that military doctrine must have at its core a warfighting ethos.

4.04 Warfighting is about the deliberate application of lethal force, usually by two sides against each other, but increasingly in more complex patterns. Because of the destructive nature of warfighting, those involved are forced to endure a constant threat to their lives and well being. They will themselves be attempting to create and amplify the same fear in the minds of their adversary.

Figure 4-1: New Zealand Defence Force operational tenets.
The dynamic and destructive nature of warfighting produces massive uncertainty, confusion, chaos, and an inevitable abandonment of initial plans for the conduct of the war. With both sides attempting to gain advantage, surprise and shock will be a constant drain on resources, both physical and mental.

Warfighting is likely to be demanding and frightening for the individuals involved. Fear and uncertainty are likely to be commonplace, even within the minds of those most conditioned to cope with its challenges. The bravest men and women may be frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears that is the measure of their courage. Importantly, by its very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.

A warfighting ethos provides the NZDF with the vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with most of the circumstances it is likely to confront in operations across the range of security events. It also prepares public opinion for the possibility of casualties in pursuit of a legitimate and justifiable cause, especially when that cause is a matter of choice and not fundamental to New Zealand’s own national strategic interests. In order to continue to succeed in combat, conduct effective peace support operations, provide adequate force protection, and be able to respond to current and future governments’ requirements across the range of security events, the NZDF must continue to develop and retain a warfighting ethos.

The Joint Effect

Effective military operations at the strategic and operational levels require military force elements from all Services to operate in an integrated fashion. The integrated approach allows the value of a joint force to become more than merely the sum of its component parts. When commanders and staff focus upon the desired outcomes or effects required, and employ the appropriate means from two or more Services, it is called generating the ‘joint effect’.

Whilst applicable to all levels of military operations, the joint effect is predominantly concerned with the harmonisation of force elements at the operational and tactical levels.

The joint effect can only be achieved when all components are working effectively and harmoniously with those from the other Services. Each Service makes a unique contribution to a joint force whilst retaining its individual Service ethos. Maritime, land, and air forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in maritime, land, and air power doctrine.

Operations are not joint simply because forces from different Services and resources from other agencies and organisations operate in the same area. Operations are joint when there is cooperation between single-Service force elements and/or other government agencies. Effective command and control of joint operations then depends upon commanders and staff understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses (both inherent and situational) of each military or non-military component of the force, and how they may complement each other. This understanding, applied in the planning and execution of operations, allows NZDF force elements to achieve military objectives out of proportion to the resources applied.

The Principles of War

From an understanding of the nature and types of conflict, and humanity’s experience of conflict, it is possible to derive certain basic principles about the conduct of armed conflict. These principles are known as the ‘principles of war’.

In planning for war and in executing that plan, commanders and their staff at all levels need to consider these principles. The principles of war are not rigid laws but provide guidance for the conduct of military action. The principles of war maintain relevance, applicability, and relative importance in spite of dramatic changes over time in the methods, techniques, and weapons of war. The principles used by the NZDF are listed in Figure 4.2.
must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim is decided, all efforts are directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for re-appreciation and potentially a new aim.

4.16 Each phase of the conflict and each separate campaign or operation are directed towards this supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which

4.16 In a complex and turbulent political environment, problems frequently arise due to the existence of multiple conflicting and changing aims. It is not unusual to have different aims at the national
strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations due to the varying nature, duration, and scope of activities conducted at each level. When different aims are set at different levels of operations, it is essential that a subordinate-level aim fully supports and contributes to the attaining of the higher-level aim.

4.17 Complexities and uncertainties inherent within modern military operations reinforce the need for a clear articulation of the purpose of any military action. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim. The selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the ‘master principle’. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order since their relative importance varies according to the nature of the operation.

4.18 Offensive Action. Offensive action is action by a military force to gain and retain the initiative. Offensive action is essential in most circumstances to the achievement of operational objectives. Offensive action enables commanders and their forces to exploit opportunities which capitalise on adversary weaknesses, and to seize and hold the initiative. It is the necessary forerunner of success. It may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken, success is unlikely.

4.19 Maintenance of Morale. Success on operations often depends more on morale than on materiel advantages. Numbers, armaments, and physical resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, cohesion, energy, determination, endurance, skill, and a warfighting ethos, which spring from a national determination to succeed. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are therefore essential to success in war.
Figure 4-4: Offensive action is action by a military force to gain and maintain the initiative.

4.20 **Security.** A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate protection of high value assets, sea denial, and protection of information and communication systems that are vital to the nation or the defence forces. Security does not, however, imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success on operations approaching warfighting. On the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive. Security is often closely linked to the achievement of surprise.

4.21 **Surprise.** Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence on combat operations and its psychological effect is immense. Every endeavour is made to surprise an adversary and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the efforts expended can be obtained and, in some operations when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally, tactically, or by exploiting new materiel. The elements of surprise are:

- secrecy
- concealment
- deception
- originality
- audacity
- rapidity.

4.22 The achievement of surprise is further increased through the application of targeted counter-
Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter an adversary’s threats. Concentration is more a matter of time than of space—and has more to do with the effects it has, than on the massing of force for its own sake.

4.24 Economy of Effort. Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place. The principle of economy of effort acknowledges the need for a degree of redundancy in wartime to allow for attrition. But it is opposed to a wasteful allocation of resources that does not maximise the contribution of those resources to the achievement or maintenance of the aim. Wasteful allocation of resources increases the cost of a military operation, and carries with it the danger of threatening the achievement of the aim.

intelligence measures and techniques, including secrecy, counter surveillance, concealment, deception, and other measures to destroy, neutralise, or deceive an adversary’s intelligence gathering, surveillance, and intelligence dissemination capabilities. These latter aspects are now often referred to as information operations or command and control warfare.

4.23 Concentration of Force. To achieve success on combat operations, it is often necessary to concentrate superior force, moral and material, to that of the adversary at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing

Everything which the enemy least expects will succeed the best.

King Frederick II of Prussia
Flexibility. Modern operations demand a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. Most importantly, the decision-making process needs to be flexible. This entails good training, organisation, discipline, and staff work. It also calls for high degrees of physical mobility — strategically, operationally, and tactically — so that our forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive places and times.

Cooperation. Cooperation is based on team spirit and entails the coordination of all force elements to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Above all, goodwill and the desire to cooperate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the individual Services and their increasing mutual dependence on the military forces of allies and potential coalition partners has made cooperation between them of vital importance in modern-day military operations. It is frequently also necessary to cooperate closely with other non-governmental agencies, many of which will have aims and objectives quite different from those promulgated in the military plan.

Sustainability. The logistics and administrative arrangements are invariably crucial to success. They should be designed to give the commander maximum freedom of action in carrying out the plan. The logistics and administrative organisation should be kept as simple as possible with commanders having a degree of control over logistics and administration within their sphere of command, corresponding to their responsibilities for the operational plan.

Figure 4-6: Logistics and administrative arrangements are crucial to success.
The Manoeuvrist Approach

4.28 The manoeuvrist approach is based on using an indirect method to defeat the adversary’s will to fight. The indirect method seeks to negate the adversary’s strategy through intelligent and creative application of effects against their critical vulnerabilities, although it also considers them as intelligent and adaptive. Consequently it is necessary for commanders to take measures to protect their own strategy. The manoeuvrist approach is multidimensional and involves capabilities from different arms and Services across the different environments.

4.29 The manoeuvrist approach aims to apply strength against vulnerable critical capabilities that support an adversary’s centre of gravity. The emphasis is on achieving the objective through dislocating and disrupting an adversary by taking the initiative and applying pressure at times and places the adversary least expects. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

Machines don't fight wars, people do, and they use their minds.

Colonel John Boyd, United States Air Force

4.30 Manoeuvrist thinking is applicable to all types of military operation. Such thinking offers the prospect of rapid results or of results disproportionately greater than the resources applied.
A key characteristic of the manoeuvrist approach is NZDF commanders attaining decision superiority by executing better decisions with more agility than the adversary. This allows commanders to ‘get inside an adversary’s decision-making cycle’ (often described as Boyd’s ‘OODA Loop’—see figure 4-7), and thus achieve a superior operational tempo. This involves presenting active or potential adversaries with the need to make good decisions at a faster rate than they are able to, so that increasingly inappropriate action is taken, or none at all, thereby paralysing their ability to react. Clearly, any degradation of the overall command system that can be achieved by physical or non-physical means accelerates the onset of decision paralysis.

**Command Philosophy**

The Command Dilemma

Modern commanders face a dilemma in where they should position themselves: either forward to provide physical leadership and gain detailed awareness of the tactical situation, or further back where they can better command the whole force. The art of effective command requires commanders to crystallise what they need to achieve and where and when the decisive events are likely to occur, and then position themselves to influence them. Where distributed operations prevent commanders from being physically co-located with all of their forces, they should seek to position themselves at a communications focal point from where they can best command their force. Notwithstanding, there is no substitute for a commander’s physical presence at the right time and place to galvanise effort or to make timely decisions based on first-hand understanding of the situation. There are three means through which effective command is exercised:

- sound leadership
- timely and effective decision making
- good control.

Modern communications present commanders with two interconnected challenges. The first is the risk of superior levels of command ‘micro-managing’ operations at lower levels. The second is too heavy a reliance on communications, which has the effect of undermining the longer-term ability of subordinates to take the initiative. Subordinate initiative is fundamental to the manoeuvrist approach. Equally important to the manoeuvrist approach is the need for a range of disparate activities and force elements to be coordinated to achieve effective systemic disruption of the adversary.

The best response to these two opposing but closely related challenges is to strike a degree of balance in command and control. Such a balance allows the initiative to be taken by subordinates, but with superior commanders providing guidance and support when appropriate. Given the immediate impact that some tactical decisions can have on strategic outcomes, achieving the right balance is not always easy. Nevertheless, a balanced command and control approach is a fundamentally important skill for commanders to develop. The key to this is mutual trust and confidence amongst commanders at all levels, so that subordinate commanders are empowered to use their initiative when they are unable to get guidance from their superior.

Commanders at all levels need to develop a plan that will convey to subordinates what the objective is, and how and by what means it is to be achieved. The plan is the commander’s own way of achieving the tasks delegated by the superior and contains details of how these will be achieved given the forces allocated. The plan also provides subordinates with a clear indication of their own roles and the forces they are allocated to achieve them, allowing them in turn to produce their own plan and to determine for themselves how best to achieve the allotted objectives.
Mission Command

4.36 Mission command is a command philosophy that emphasises responsiveness to superior direction, whilst promoting decentralised command in order to enable subordinate freedom, speed of action, and initiative. Fundamentally, mission command addresses the essential balance between direction and delegation, the essence of which is captured in the above description of the command dilemma. Under mission command, the onus is on subordinate commanders to fully understand their superior’s intent and be able to work cohesively and flexibly to support that intent. Mission command reinforces the manoeuvrist approach and the achievement of the desired operational effect in the modern operational environment.

4.37 Mission command requires a style of command that recognises four supporting principles:

- timely and effective decision making
- a thorough understanding of a superior commander’s intentions
- clear responsibilities on the part of the subordinate to fulfil that intent
- the commander’s determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion.

4.38 Elements of Mission Command. To execute effective mission command, commanders at all levels should apply the following elements.

- A commander ensures that subordinates understand the commander’s intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational, and tactical context.
- Subordinates are told what objective(s) they are to achieve and the reason why this is necessary.
- Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
- A commander uses a minimum of control so as not to limit unnecessarily his subordinates’ freedom of action.
- Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions.

4.39 The NZDF approach to mission command stresses six key concepts that are used in the application of mission command.

- Learn through Practice. Mission command requires practice during training for military operations in general, not just for a particular operation. Where practicable, all aspects of professional military life should utilise the mission command philosophy of $Q + P = L$. 
are responsible for the life and safety of the members of the armed forces under their command. Omission to take adequate steps to protect them is a fundamental failure of command and will expose the commander to legal liability. Recognising and working within constraints, including those imposed by the law, is also a vital aspect of mission command. Warfighting involves risk-taking. Therefore mission command should be used during peacetime, with appropriate risk management measures, to develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative, and daring that can be easily translated into a warfighting environment while at the same time ensuring that the moral, legal, and prudential requirements to ensure force protection are not neglected.

- **Remain Flexible and Adaptable.** Mission command must remain dynamic and agile. It should be applied flexibly, reflecting the understanding that doctrine itself is not immutable, and should be adapted for a particular campaign, operation, or situation. A commander's style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of subordinate commanders. The characteristics of persuasion, compulsion, loyalty, and leadership by example combine to create an individual command style, but the relative proportion of each must be tempered to suit the situation. In exceptional circumstances, there will be fleeting opportunities where commanders may have to skip an echelon and reach down at least one level of command. Historical evidence provides many examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel, and Patton all intervened at a decisive point and brought about startling tactical successes. Endorsement of such action by a commander should not be seen as an encouragement of micromanagement; it is a technique that should be applied sparingly, based on higher strategic knowledge, to turn the tide in a wavering operation or to seize the initiative where none was previously seen to exist.

- **Delegation.** The NZDF’s mission command philosophy is realised in the commander’s confidence in delegating responsibility to subordinates, and the professional discharge of those responsibilities of command by subordinates. This is of particular importance in response to...
fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct of operations, and contingencies where no specific direction has been given to the subordinate.

- **Information Management.** Recent advances in information systems can boost the effectiveness of mission command through expanded and more efficient networking. However, too much information can prove counter-productive, and care must be taken to guard against trying to collect all possible information to inform everyone about everything all the time. Conversely, without enough detail, staff cannot provide effective advice to the commander. The answer is in achieving an appropriate balance and ensuring that sufficient useable information is collected and passed to the appropriate personnel.

**Summary**

4.40 A key strength of mission command is that it encourages a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom, speed of action, and initiative. The philosophy of mission command fits hand-in-glove with the NZDF’s organisational culture, cultural values, and approach to the conduct of joint operations.

**Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism**

4.41 Perhaps not surprisingly, the final theme is the duality of inherent flexibility and pragmatism. Manoeuvrist operations require a conditioned and resilient attitude of mind developed through experience in training and, if possible, in practice. Manoeuvrist operations also require considerable thought and imagination in both planning and execution.

4.42 Commanders must be conditioned to think constantly of new ways of approaching an objective. Imaginative and innovative thinking is ultimately what generates success in military operations. To allow for such thinking, New Zealand doctrine adopts a flexible and pragmatic approach in two ways.

- It is constantly reviewed and reconsidered and, if found wanting, is changed to reflect the developing military environment.

- More importantly, it allows for deviation. Dogma — the resort of the idle and unimaginative mind — is not recommended.

4.43 Doctrine is promulgated for guidance only, not for slavish adherence. An intelligent and talented commander faced with unique circumstances will always be better placed than the writer of doctrine to assess the most appropriate way of achieving his objective.

*Nine tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books; but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals.*

T.E. Lawrence

4.44 The recognition of the requirement for commanders to possess a flexible and pragmatic attitude eschews the formulaic and prescriptive in favour of the unpredictable and surprising. The combination of flexibility and pragmatism is absolutely necessary to successfully conduct modern military operations across the spectrum. It is reflected in New Zealand doctrine by the simple expedient of avoiding obligatory prescriptive rules while encouraging a distinctive way of thinking about military operations.

**Summarising New Zealand’s Approach to the Conduct of Military Operations**

4.45 When combined with the NZDF culture and values, the six operational tenets represent the New Zealand approach to military operations across the range of security events. The operational tenets are not mutually exclusive of each other; rather, they overlap and rely upon each other to form an approach to military success (see figure 4-9).

4.46 Retention of a warfighting ethos is central to cultivating and maintaining the means that facilitate success in military activities across the range of security events. Contributing effective military force elements to joint, integrated, and multinational operations is the means by which New Zealand’s full range of defence...
employ a manoeuvrist approach. For this approach to be effective, the NZDF is reliant upon a philosophy of command that allows commanders at all levels sufficient scope for determining how to achieve the desired end-state. Additionally, the flexible and pragmatic application of the principles of war is fundamental to the manoeuvrist approach.

4.47 In delivering the joint effect, NZDF elements are guided by the principles of war, the advantages conferred by joint operations, and the imperative to

Figure 4-9: Summarising the New Zealand Defence Force’s operational tenets.
CHAPTER 5:
THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT
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Introduction to Fighting Power

5.01 Warfighting defines armed forces’ ability to fight and achieve success in operations. The essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three components of fighting power that may be applied in both combat and stability and support operations. These components are:

- conceptual (the thought process)
- moral (the ability to get people to fight)
- physical. (the means to fight)

5.02 The interrelationship between each component is shown in Figure 5-1.

5.03 Conflict is competitive and adversarial. Belligerents seek to diminish or undermine the fighting power of their opponents while safeguarding their own. Achieving relative superiority is critical in successful military operations.

Human Capability

5.04 Fighting power is built upon human capability. Human capability is the collective impact that people have on an enterprise. Human capability underpins the New Zealand Defence Force’s (NZDF) professionalism, and comprises the valuable skills, knowledge, and experience possessed by our people, including those contractors and partners with whom we operate; it provides the decisive edge. Generating human capability requires a whole-of-force approach, in which the right mix of people from regular and reserve forces, the civilians employees, and contractors are made capable and motivated.

Figure 5-1: The components of fighting power.
Human Factors

5.05 Fighting power may be enhanced by applying scientific expertise relating to the social, psychological, and behavioural aspects of human behaviour. Understanding group dynamics and people's motivations supports assessments of likely behaviour in complex situations.

Context

5.06 Fighting power must be considered in context.

- **The Character of the Situation.** Fighting power must be applied in a way that best suits the prevailing situation and conditions. This also includes being aware of political, resource or legal constraints.

- **The Environment.** Environmental factors will affect the range of options available to commanders and shape military activities. The topography, climate, and distribution of the urban, agricultural and industrial landscapes each present threats and opportunities. Societal aspects and the cultural environment will also have an impact on how we apply fighting power and not always in ways that could be immediately obvious. NZDF personnel must be mentally and physically conditioned to operate in the environments they fight in. A force optimised to fight in one scenario may be ill-equipped to operate elsewhere.

- **The Opponent.** Protecting New Zealand's interests may require using force against a wide array of potential opponents, both state and non-state. In some instances, the opponent may have outright numerical superiority. In others, they may negate our greater mass by using asymmetric tactics or by operating in difficult environments, such as large cities. In either case, success will depend on the quality of our fighting power and the skill with which we apply it. Yet even in those situations where the NZDF might have either a numerical or qualitative superiority, high morale and strong resolve may allow an opponent to absorb considerable losses.

- **Allies, Partners and other Agencies.** Interoperability is necessary to employ military capability across a multinational force, while role specialisation and burden sharing may promote efficiency. Cooperation and collaboration between the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments, as part of an integrated approach, will also need us to interact and coordinate with other agencies. This may further shape the utility of certain aspects of our fighting power, not least interpreting doctrine to accommodate non-military actors and their cultures, practices, and procedures. However, role specialisation may also leave a nation's forces incapable of undertaking certain operations independently. Interoperability may be expensive to achieve and sustain and may also require us to operate to a common standard.

- **Culture and History.** Understanding the cultural and historical features of a situation, and incorporating that into planning and training, will give us key insights into how we can best apply fighting power.

5.07 The likelihood of success on operations is shaped by:

- coherently applying fighting power against an opponent
- the uncertainties induced by unpredictable or unpredicted events
- the interplay of chance
- the vagaries of human nature.

5.08 When assessing the situation, the NZDF's commanders must understand the context in which they are applying fighting power. Informed decisions can then be made which will shape the situation. Commanders should aim to apply their strengths against an opponent's vulnerabilities (while protecting their own comparative weakness).

The Conceptual Component

5.09 The conceptual component provides the thought processes needed to develop the ability to
fight. It comprises both lessons from the past and thinking about how the NZDF can best operate today and in the future. The conceptual component of fighting power consists of the principles of war, doctrine, and conceptual thinking. It is the combination of the principles of war and doctrine, applied with imagination and initiative by commanders, that provides the intellectual force driving the NZDF's fighting ability in current operations.

The Principles of War

5.10 The principles of war were discussed in Chapter 4. Their origins can be traced back to Sun Tzu, were inherent in Carl von Clausewitz’s writing, and achieved their current form immediately after the Second World War. There is a degree of consistency throughout previous iterations of the principles and, in their collective form, they remain applicable to this day. The principles of war are the foundation upon which NZDF doctrine is based.

Doctrine

5.11 NZDF joint military doctrine uses the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and other suitable foreign doctrine, specifically those publications focused on joint and combined operations. The New Zealand Government is committed to a policy of Closer Defence Relations with Australia. One aspect of this relationship is interoperability through a similar doctrinal approach. At the operational level, the NZDF tends to use ADF and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrinal publications. The NZDF tends to use ADF and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrinal publications for most of its application and procedural level doctrine but develops its own philosophical level doctrine.

5.12 NZDF policy recognises that deployed force elements will be required to undertake operations as part of a multinational force. Historically, this has been under the command of an Australian, British, or American coalition partner. Standardisation agreements and cooperation fora are important references in the development of New Zealand military doctrine to ensure interoperability, commonality, and standardisation with these prospective coalition partners. Accordingly, Australian, British, American, and Canadian operational-level doctrine provide a critical input into the NZDF's military doctrine.

Conceptual Thinking

5.13 There is a further essential element to the conceptual component that assists with the development of warfighting into the future. It is concerned with innovation and ideas for developing future capabilities and better ways of operating in a continually fluctuating strategic environment. The development of concepts for future operations is vital for both force and doctrine development. Without conceptual thinking and the complementary equipment, the NZDF could not maintain a warfighting capability. In thinking about the future of warfare and the forces necessary to cope with its challenges, the NZDF uses a capability-based approach.

5.14 The NZDF recognises that there are seven fundamental capabilities required to deliver warfighting (see Figure 5-2).

- A robust and responsive means of **command**—the authority for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
- A process to **inform** the command—namely the acquisition, collation, processing, management, and distribution of information.

---

19 The principal standardisation agreements that the NZDF participates in are: Air Force – Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC); Army – American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Interoperability Program; Navy – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States agreement (AUSCANNZUKUS) Naval Command Control and Communications Board; Defence Research and Development – The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP); Command and Control – Australia/New Zealand Command and Control Interoperability Board; Logistics – Australia/New Zealand Operational Logistics Working Party; Communications – Australia/New Zealand Communications Forum; and Military Communications and Electronics – Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB). Other joint multinational interoperability forums in which the NZDF participates are: the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC); the Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG).
These fundamental defence capabilities are interrelated and supporting; none can be considered in isolation, and all are required in varying measure to meet the requirements of government policy. A representation of this multidimensional interrelationship is shown in Figure 5-2.

The Moral Component

Battles are won in the hearts of men.

Field Marshal Montgomery

Ultimately it is people that realise warfighting ability. New Zealand has a highly skilled volunteer defence force with a history of excellence. The strengths and expert skills of the Defence Force require time, effort, and resources in order to be developed, maintained, and exploited to the nation’s advantage. The moral component of fighting power is about creating and sustaining our people’s will to fight and win. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is morally and ethically sound. These promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim.
5.17 There are many things that contribute to the moral component of fighting power: training, confidence in equipment, fair and firm discipline, self-respect, and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. With all of those in place, there is clear potential for military success. To draw it out, however, requires motivation, leadership, and management.

Motivation

5.18 Motivation implies a determination for getting things done. It derives from a personal commitment to an idea, a sense of purpose, and a feeling of belonging. In many people, there is an instinctive desire to do what is right and good.

5.19 One means of generating motivation, therefore, is to ensure that NZDF personnel believe in what they are doing. A sense of purpose is achieved when that belief is linked to the individual's involvement in its pursuit. Involvement is a stronger source of motivation for most people when they feel themselves to be a part of a team, all members of which provide the others with support.

5.20 In military units, given the challenges inherent in warfighting, the need is to go beyond mere team building. Military units need to develop genuine comradeship that will endure despite the trauma that violence, injury, and death can bring. It is pride in belonging, best described by the term 'esprit de corps' in relation to unit identity, but which at a higher level includes a belief in patriotic duty.

5.21 Being highly motivated in peacetime is one thing. To retain that motivation in the face of battle requires a strong commitment to one's comrades, one's unit, one's country, and to the cause for which one is fighting.

Leadership

5.22 Leadership is the principal element in the maintenance of morale. Without good leadership, morale will undoubtedly crumble in the face of adversity. All leaders must accept their responsibility for maintaining morale and the fighting spirit of those under their command.

5.23 Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to get subordinates to do what is required of them and to engender within them the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility.

5.24 Born leaders are rare, but leadership potential can be developed by training, experience, study of the methods of great leaders in the past, and knowledge of military doctrine. Through these, individuals develop their own style of leadership and no two people will necessarily lead in exactly the same way.

5.25 Leadership starts with self-discipline. It is a continuous process throughout training and daily life. Leaders promote this amongst their subordinates by decisive action, precept and example, advice, encouragement and admonishment, and by giving their subordinates every opportunity of contributing to operational and tactical success. It is a truism that operational success provides the quickest and most effective boost to morale for those at war, but outstanding leadership will sustain high morale when all other factors are against it. For more detailed information on leadership within the NZDF please refer to NZDDP-00.6 Leadership.

Management

5.26 Management is no substitute for leadership but is a vital element of the moral component nevertheless. Management is about making the best use of resources. It is an attribute of command that can't be overlooked because it is fundamental to efficiency and relates to two principles of war: economy of effort and sustainability. In this sense, especially in relation to logistics, it also has a bearing on the physical component of fighting power.

5.27 Management is regarded as an element of the moral component, because without good management of resources and the provision of sufficient administrative
support, the maintenance of morale and the motivation of the force would be rendered considerably more difficult. The measure of good management is the ability to achieve the right balance — neither overabundance nor a shortage of resources, either of which would undermine the concentration of effort on the main objective.

The Physical Component

5.28 The physical component of fighting power is the physical means to fight. It has five elements: personnel, equipment, integrated performance, readiness, and sustainability. The effective combination of these five elements is essential in order for the NZDF to be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve the tasks assigned by the New Zealand Government.

Personnel

5.29 The servicemen and servicewomen that comprise the NZDF, both regular and reserve, are highly trained and skilled volunteers. They go through a rigorous selection and initial training process that gives them an essential grounding for the further professional development and collective training necessary to turn them into effective combatants. NZDF personnel are highly regarded internationally. Nevertheless, their skills need to be nurtured, developed, and retained. No matter how successful they might have been in the past, their effectiveness can easily be undermined by changing economic, social, and political factors and by significant shifts in the values of society as a whole.

Equipment

5.30 NZDF force elements can expect to deploy on operations with their existing inventory of equipment. A fundamental part of maintaining warfighting capability is the ability to field the most effective equipment/systems. The NZDF procurement approach is to utilise military off-the-shelf (MOTS) when required, with the ability to determine when commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) is appropriate. The aim of this procurement philosophy is to ensure correct investment in the appropriate military technology necessary to maintain comparable position and interoperability with our partners and to defeat potential adversaries, whilst maintaining a sufficient breadth of capabilities.

5.31 Ideally those in defence-related industries should have a clear understanding of the New Zealand approach to military operations in order that they can better anticipate the NZDF’s equipment needs.

Integrated Performance

5.32 An integrated performance is the end result of individual and collective training across the NZDF. This can only be achieved through an understanding of common doctrine, combined with collective training and exercising to rehearse and sharpen the ability to apply it. Commanders devise ways of ensuring that the forces under their command are as prepared as possible for the ultimate demands of warfighting. There can be no compromise on this, since the ability to deploy fully prepared for combat is at the core of warfighting.

Readiness

5.33 The ability to deploy combines the physical process of transit into an area of operations with the readiness to do so in as short a time as possible. By their nature, crises occur unexpectedly. Timelines are quite likely to be short. Government policy, through the NZDF Output Plan, lays down readiness criteria for the force elements of the NZDF, in which priorities are listed and forces allocated differing response times. The readiness details are themselves part of policy and not doctrine, but a commander’s responsibility to meet them is a doctrinal imperative.

Sustainability

5.34 Sustaining military forces in war is as vital a function as their ability to deliver firepower. As soon as an operation starts, events will generate further demands on the force. It cannot be assumed that a campaign plan will survive the first encounter with the enemy. This is why the ability to sustain is so important a part of fighting power.
The resources available to the NZDF will always be limited, whether the task is preparing for conflict or fulfilling peacetime commitments. The NZDF utilises the Capability Management Framework (CMF) to provide the mechanism to prioritise the competing demands of generating capability across the portfolio. Balance is required because decisions to invest in one area will generally result in fewer resources for the other.

Components of Capability

5.36 Military capability is “the ability to achieve a desired operational objective in a selected environment and to sustain that level of effort for a designated period”. It is the combined effect that systems of inputs have in helping to achieve a particular operational consequence. Military capability goes beyond just

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**Key Term**

**Fighting Power**

Fighting power consists of three interlinked components: the conceptual, the moral, and the physical.

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**Generating Warfighting Capability**

5.35 The NZDF does not maintain a large standing military force. In a period of extended peace, the NZDF emphasises the important long-term task of developing and investing in military capabilities to meet significant probable defence contingencies.

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![Figure 5-3: Components of capability.](image-url)
equipment. Rather, it includes all necessary components that, together, enable a military force to successfully achieve an operational objective or task. In the NZDF, the elements by which the military capability of a force is measured are preparedness and the components described by the acronym PRICIE (see Figure 5-3).

### Key Term

**Military Capability**

Military capability is the ability to achieve a desired operational objective in a selected environment, and to sustain that effort for a designated period.

#### 5.37 Personnel

Operational capability is delivered through people who are the sole component of capability with the intrinsic ability to generate value. All other components remain inert potential, which must ultimately be leveraged by people. Paradoxically, people are the most problematic element of capability to acquire, manage, change, and cease employing. Therefore, there is a need to identify:

- the number of personnel required to deliver, sustain, support, command, and control the capability, together with provision of associated administrative support
- the capability organisation structure
- the skills and competency profiles required to achieve the above
- the recruiting implications
- the training/retraining requirements
- timely identification and management of personnel risk.

#### 5.38 Research and Development

Research and development (R&D) is the ‘engine for change’ in the continual modernisation of the NZDF. The NZDF must be a smart buyer and user of technology to ensure that it maximises the effectiveness of its limited assets, and keeps them interoperable with other nations’ forces. It is important the NZDF remain abreast of future technology trends and how they will impact upon future capabilities required. One avenue for this is through access to international collaboration such as The Technical Cooperation Programme (TTCP). Therefore, the NZDF’s R&D programme requires scientific and technical support for the identification, assessment, acquisition, use, and maintenance of, and improvements to, both current and future capabilities. The Defence Technology Agency (DTA) is the prime provider of R&D support to the NZDF.

#### 5.39 Infrastructure and Organisations

- **Infrastructure.** Infrastructure includes buildings, structures, property, plant equipment, and areas for training and other purposes—exercise areas and firing ranges, for example. Facilities include civil engineering and utility works necessary to support capabilities, both at the home station and at a deployed location. These may be owned directly or leased.

- **Organisations.** Every NZDF unit needs to ensure that it has the optimum number of personnel positions, the appropriate balance of competency and skill sets, the correct structure to accomplish its tasks, and adequate command and control arrangements. This approach provides the underpinning structure for the NZDF. At the Service level, consideration must be given to developing flexible functional groupings that can meet contingency personnel rotation requirements and continual force-improvement requirements.

#### 5.40 Concepts, Doctrine, and Collective Training

- **Concepts.** Concepts are the way in which we believe the NZDF will operate in the medium- to long-term future. They have been developed in response to either changes in the strategic or security environment or emerging technology. While they must still be tested, they act as a potential guide to future capabilities.

- **Doctrine.** As discussed in earlier chapters, doctrine provides the fundamental principles guiding the operations of military forces, or elements thereof, in support of national objectives.

- **Collective Training.** Collective training applies laterally across combined, joint, and single-Service
elements, and vertically down to unit levels. To enhance performance, organisational elements must undertake a comprehensive and ongoing collective training regime validated against the detailed preparedness requirements derived from government guidance.

5.41 Information Technology. On the modern battlefield, effective information technology, the management of information and subsequent information superiority cannot be achieved without properly deployed and managed communications and information systems. Communications and information systems (CIS) are an essential part of military operations that provide commanders at all levels with the means to exercise command and control and disseminate vital information. They contribute to an increased situational awareness, which in turn leads to better and quicker decision making (decision superiority). Information management includes the systems — system architecture, hardware, and software — required to support the NZDF’s operational and non-operational activities.

5.42 Equipment, Logistics, and Resources.

- **Equipment.** Equipment includes all major platforms and weapon systems including, but not limited to: ships, armoured vehicles, aircraft, missile systems, major electronic systems, and the myriad sub-items required to operate and support these platforms and systems.

- **Logistics.** Logistics include the supply, services, and administrative support required to uphold both deployed and non-deployed operational activities and non-operational activities. These range from fuel

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Figure 5-4: Reserve Forces are an integral component of the New Zealand Defence Force.
and ammunition to the highly complex parts needed for modern equipment.

- **Resources.** Resources include the financial and non-financial assets the NZDF requires to meet operational and output commitments to the New Zealand Government.

**Preparedness**

5.43 The operational level of capability (OLOC) is the level that NZDF military forces need to have reached in order to carry out their military tasks effectively. For a military element to be at its OLOC means that it has the requisite preparedness state, specifically, the force element is ready, combat viable, deployable, and sustainable.

5.44 However, to hold military forces at OLOC on a routine basis is expensive and demanding on equipment readiness and personnel availability. Therefore, the likely time that a military element will have before it must be deployed and start operations is determined and is known as the response time. Within the response time, the military element to be deployed must raise its level of capability to OLOC, thus saving the expense and demands of routinely keeping it at that level.

5.45 With the response time known, it is possible to derive the level of capability that a military element must be held at on a routine basis, and this is known as the Peacetime States of Readiness. It is this level of capability that the NZDF is funded to maintain during the financial year in order to provide the Government with options for the commitment of military forces.

5.46 Therefore, NZDF preparedness is based on a capability baseline that determines the Peacetime States of Readiness the NZDF needs to meet its commitments. Analysis of the strategic environment informs NZDF decisions about the manner in which resources are distributed to meet peacetime readiness requirements.

**Reserve Forces**

5.47 Reserve Forces are an integral component of the NZDF because they provide — across crisis and capability warning times — complementary or supplementary skills as individuals, small groups, and units to sustain and surge. The Reserve helps to sustain deployed forces by providing round-out, reinforcement, and rotation elements. This will vary from individuals, such as reservists held at high levels of readiness, through to small groups, sub-units, and units. The Reserve has a critical role to play in increasing the NZDF’s ability to sustain a surge for operations.
CHAPTER 6:

THE UTILITY OF THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE
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Introduction

6.01 While it is the ability to engage in warfighting activities that provides the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) with its raison d'être, the NZDF can be employed on a variety of activities across the spectrum of military operations. For many of these operations the NZDF will require its combat potential, but some will be more benign, including those mounted to improve the living conditions of those subject to natural or humanitarian disaster.

6.02 In a moral and physical sense, warfighting places the greatest demands on military forces, but is also the capability for which armed forces are trained and equipped. Consequently, this publication focuses on warfighting, as the capabilities developed for warfighting can also be applied, in an appropriate form, to a wide range of operations such as peace support operations, humanitarian and disaster relief, and more discrete tasks such as non-combatant evacuation operations.

6.03 The NZDF may be required to undertake some emergency aid tasks and reconstruction to help restore basic facilities for a suffering population, as well as assisting with some policing roles to create a secure and stable environment. The purpose of military force activity is to create conditions that allow other agencies to continue towards restoring normality without the need for a military presence.

6.04 Creating long-term dependency upon NZDF force elements by the local population is counterproductive to the strategic objective. Every effort has to be made to encourage civilian agencies to take over the various tasks as soon as possible. In order to achieve its part of the mission, the NZDF may have to use varying levels of force. The end-state of military withdrawal must always be borne in mind, and there are a number of considerations that are important in achieving it.

Identifying Crisis and Stability

6.05 The scope of security events discussed in Chapter 3 implies an increasing amount of disagreement and conflict as international relations move from peace towards war. Movement can take place in either direction and can be gradual or rapid. There can also be unpredictability, with movement first one way and then the other.

6.06 In contrast, a relationship may remain in the same position for extended periods; in that case there is a measure of stability. Stability is a relative construct, however, and might be a cause for concern if it is achieved at a position too close to war for comfort. That said, two neighbouring states might have a fundamental disagreement but their relationship may remain stable, and they may even be allies in other respects.

6.07 Crisis comes when stability is lost and there is a perceptible movement along the spectrum towards war (movement the other way also represents instability, but of a more benign nature). In working to prevent conflict, attempts are made to move relations along the spectrum towards peace.

6.08 The trigger for movement in the direction of war can take many forms. No two crises are identical. Each crisis needs to be dealt with in a unique manner with regards to the type of negotiations and arrangements set up to restore stability. In some cases it may be easier to achieve stability by institutionalising disagreement and establishing a framework for reducing its effects, rather than wasting valuable effort trying to resolve the irresolvable.

6.09 Military containment is a positive role for defence forces, the aim of which is to achieve stability in terms of security, which will allow other political, diplomatic, or economic efforts to move the disputing parties towards a lasting peaceful settlement.

The Essentials of Crisis Management

6.10 As a potential crisis begins to take form, more concerted efforts involving the full range of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments may need to be introduced. This activity will inevitably involve several government departments, coordinated through the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) to ensure that New Zealand strategic decision making and activities are coherent and properly orchestrated.

6.11 During a crisis, there will be a demanding set of shifting priorities and objectives, and any crisis management organisation must be designed to meet various essential criteria. The 'master' principle of war, selection and maintenance of the aim, is of crucial importance in this context, and the source of a fundamental dilemma. The military desire is for a clearly stated and hard objective as the basis for mission planning. However, the essential fluidity of crises renders the identification of clear, firm, and enduring aims almost impossible from a political point of view.

6.12 As soon as any military operation commences, the crisis agenda inevitably changes and political aims and objectives develop afresh. This is particularly the case in peace support operations and during fast moving crises. In contrast, during longer term operations established to maintain stability, military aims will tend to be clearer and better understood.

6.13 National Security System. Crisis management at the higher levels needs to accommodate both political and military imperatives. New Zealand’s arrangements for dealing with national security issues are generally referred to as the National Security System. These arrangements evolved from the longstanding Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) system. A structured approach to national security through the National Security System does not override the statutory powers and responsibilities of Ministers or departments. Responsibility for actions and policies remains with the Chief Executive of an agency, statutory officers, and the relevant Minister.

6.14 National security considerations are done via the National Security System to ensure more effective coordination and that agencies work together on complex problems in order to achieve better outcomes.

6.15 The National Security System operates at three levels.

- The Cabinet National Security Committee is comprised of Ministers and led by the Prime Minister, who also holds the portfolio of National Security and Intelligence;
- Chief Executives of the various structures which comprise the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC). These are led by the Chief Executive of DPMC, the lead official for the whole National Security System (also termed the “Chair of ODESC”);
- Senior officials and other officials (Committees, Working Groups and Watch Groups), who work together in formal structures and less formally in pursuit of shared national security objectives.

6.16 The National Security System comprises:

- Cabinet National Security Committee
- Boards and Working Groups.

6.17 Cabinet National Security Committee. The Cabinet National Security Committee (NSC) is a formally constituted Cabinet committee. It has oversight of the national intelligence and security sector, including policy and legislative proposals relating to the sector. The NSC coordinates and directs national responses to major crises or circumstances affecting national security (either domestic or international). The NSC has the Power to Act, without further reference to the full Cabinet, where the need for urgent action and/or operational or security considerations require it. The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes senior Ministers with relevant portfolio responsibilities: Finance, Defence, Economic Development, Communications, the Attorney-General, intelligence agencies, Foreign Affairs, Police, and Immigration, along with other relevant portfolio Ministers as appropriate.

6.18 Boards and Working Groups. A number of Boards and multi-agency committees, working groups, and watch groups support the NSC. Committees tend to be long standing; working groups are issue specific; watch groups are formed in response to potential, emerging, or actual events.
Chapter 6

6.19 The National Security System is designed to facilitate a comprehensive approach in a national crisis and in circumstances affecting New Zealand’s security. The intent is to monitor emerging threats, risks, and vulnerabilities, and implement measures to control possible problems and manage potential consequences. The National Security System is activated in the event of a major crisis or security event affecting New Zealand or its critical interests abroad.

6.20 NZDF involvement in the National Security System process is normally limited to events affecting national security within New Zealand’s borders, such as counter-terrorist operations. In almost all other national security situations, following ODESC deliberations, the NZDF provides advice and receives direction directly from the NSC. Within this context, the NZDF is responsible for formulation of advice to the Government, and at its direction, implementation of a crisis management strategy.

6.21 For more detailed information on the National Security System please see the National Security System Handbook.

New Zealand’s Involvement

6.22 The scope of security events model (Figure 3-1) can be used to describe New Zealand’s relationships with other nations. It also applies, however, to relationships between other nations when New Zealand is merely an observer or possibly an independent participant in the process of conflict prevention and resolution. Importantly, such situations can be truly international (involving two or more nations) or they can involve internal conflicts and civil wars that also pose a threat to wider international stability.

6.23 The New Zealand Government determines the manner in which New Zealand addresses its international relations and becomes involved in crisis resolution and the restoration of stability. If a decision is made to employ the NZDF, it will most likely result in operations conducted with those other nations in multinational alliance or coalition arrangements, with relationships of increasing complexity. In whatever capacity New Zealand is involved, the three instruments of national power — the diplomatic, the economic, and the military all supported by information — are employed in concert as the circumstances demand. The military instrument is but one of the means at the Government’s disposal.

6.24 The NZDF’s commitment to a comprehensive approach enables it to participate more effectively in situations that require the NZDF to work alongside the other instruments of national power. In particular, the collaborative processes, shared understanding, and concerted action emphasised under a comprehensive approach are essential enablers in crisis prevention and resolution. Commitment to a comprehensive approach thus helps the NZDF understand how it may best support, and be supported by, other instruments of national power in achieving New Zealand Government objectives.

Employing Armed Force

6.25 New Zealand’s response to global instability and conflict is to apply the most appropriate instrument of national power to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source. This approach recognises the potential need for overseas military operations and that security is often a prerequisite for political and economic progress. To that end the NZDF maintains the ability to respond to a range of intervention scenarios to:

- assist in the prevention of violent conflict
- enable mediation
- stabilise situations in, or emerging from, violent conflicts
- support recovery and reconstruction.

6.26 Annex A outlines when armed force may be used.
Applying Force

6.27 Within an internationally-agreed legal framework, force may be used as part of a strategy to defend New Zealand's legitimate interests. Force may be required to:

- counter an imminent threat
- diminish our opponents' capacity to act
- influence situations by degrading an opponent's will and capability to act and ability to make timely and effective decisions.

6.28 In applying force, threats may be countered by disrupting, defeating, or destroying an opponent. In summary:

- disruption degrades specific parts of an opponent's capability, both moral and physical, thereby limiting their freedom of action
- defeat (a broader effect than simply disruption) diminishes an opponent's will, cohesion and overall capacity to the extent that they are no longer able to maintain a tangible threat or prevent friendly forces from achieving their objectives
- destruction is the ultimate level of applied force, where it is considered necessary to eliminate a potential threat.

Understanding the Operational Context

6.29 Effective military engagement depends on an accurate, detailed and informed understanding of the operational context. The operational context is defined by:

- physical factors
- the relationships between internal and external actors
- the prevailing cultural nuances and characteristics.

Conflict Prevention

Influence

6.30 By integrating the national instruments of power (diplomatic, economic and military – all underpinned by information) the government seeks to influence, through a range of activities, to prevent conflict, protect its legitimate interests and shape a stable world. New Zealand, which is a trading nation, resides and trades in an increasingly globalised, competitive context. Therefore, maintaining New Zealand’s security and prosperity is a negotiated and contested process. Threats will appear when they are least expected, often without warning and it is almost impossible to accurately predict the future. New Zealand has been in a long period where there has been no major threat to our security, freedom, or prosperity. The potential for a major state threat or existential threat remains in what will always be a highly competitive and contested global environment. However, in this competitive environment, we must ensure that we are prepared to react to inevitable change. This is executed through diplomatic and economic activity, including membership of international organisations (for example, the UN) and, if justified, our sovereign legal right to use force.

6.31 Within the international legal framework, the NZDF contributes significantly in supporting the government’s objectives of influencing the behaviour of any group, nation or state that threatens New Zealand’s interests. One of the key ways the NZDF supports the Government’s objectives of influencing the behaviour of groups or nations is through International Defence Engagement (IDE).

International Defence Engagement

6.32 Defence assets have greater utility beyond their threat or use of hard power. IDE is how New Zealand employs the NZDF’s personnel, equipment, and activities to achieve influence without the use or threat of force. Although IDE may reduce the chances of a conflict occurring, historical precedent illustrates that any kind of engagement or public commitment may draw New Zealand Defence Doctrine
6.33 Many of New Zealand’s closest defence relationships have been forged by operating alongside other countries: as far afield as Afghanistan or nearer to home in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. The Defence Force and Ministry of Defence, alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other agencies, also work in other ways to advance New Zealand’s international security relationships. The nature and extent of these relationships vary, but many are characterised by a mix of engagement activities, which include:

- annual dialogues between senior defence officials
- exchanges of defence personnel
- joint military exercises
- high level visits
- information sharing.

6.34 **Enduring Objectives.** There are a number of enduring objectives for undertaking IDE. These objectives are:

- shaping the strategic environment to meet New Zealand’s interests
- enhancing New Zealand’s reputation and profile as a valued and responsible international partner
- contributing to regional and global peace, security, and stability in order to support an international environment, which promotes New Zealand’s prosperity.

6.35 **Principles.** There are also a number of principles that guide planners in developing an IDE strategy. These principles are:

- assist in achieving New Zealand’s strategic objectives
- identify and meet the common interests of partner nations and New Zealand
- based on partnership
- importance of “people to people” relationships as a cornerstone to all engagement
- aligned to Defence’s approach and resources, both internally, and within the broader NZ security sector.

6.36 **Characteristics.** IDE planning is not separate from operational planning. The approach to Defence Engagement planning has the following key characteristics.

- It is based on a long-term view of both the New Zealand Government’s and Defence’s objectives in a region or country and has no end-state.
- It is deliberate and not conducted solely in response to events, but rather takes a view of our interests set against the current situation and potential future development.
- Activity involves foreign partners, who can choose which activities they participate in and with whom they conduct them.
- It requires a cooperative, rather than competitive, approach based on mutual interests.
- It does not employ all the levers of military power (most notably fires) and it does not involve physical coercion or the use of lethal force.\(^{20}\)
- It must be part of a comprehensive approach.

6.37 **Partner Expectations.** Another key factor in any IDE planning is the willingness and ability of partners to undertake activities. Therefore, any initiatives included in a strategy or plan need to take into account the capability and expectations of the level and type of engagement likely from the partner country.

6.38 **Planning.** IDE planning is complicated by activities creating multiple effects. Therefore, it has to recognise, lever, and influence activities intended to protect or respond. IDE is often delivered by actors for whom IDE is not their primary task. Where resources are limited, the NZDF has to prioritise in order to optimise how the range of outcomes is delivered.

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\(^{20}\) Except in the case of self-defence.
6.39 **A Comprehensive Approach.** A comprehensive approach requires clear national objectives, strong political leadership, and collaboration across departments to ensure that the New Zealand’s national power is coherently applied. IDE supports many cross-government strategies, which planners and practitioners should take into account. Such a comprehensive approach optimises Defence’s contribution.

6.40 **Delivering Engagement – Ways and Means.** IDE activities are built upon developing and maintaining a network of contacts and relationships through all available channels. Understanding the broader benefits of sometimes seemingly unrelated activity also provides foundations for IDE. Proactive investment is required. Commanders should champion those with the cultural capability, empathy, emotional intelligence, and flair for engagement activity with the same vigour they champion their warfighters.

6.41 IDE is delivered through a range of activities: security cooperation, enterprise cooperation, and Defence diplomacy. Figure 6-1 details the tools used in these activities.

6.42 For more information of Defence’s IDE Strategy please refer to the *International Defence Engagement Strategy*.

### Enforcement Action

6.43 Enforcement action is closest to war, in the sense that the nature of the task will usually result in a recognised mandate to employ warfighting techniques to achieve the aim. Such operations are not driven by the need for impartiality, because the mandate will typically be aimed at coercing a particular nation or nations to adopt an explicit course of action.

6.44 The aim of enforcement action is likely to be to impel the various parties to engage in negotiations towards a peace agreement, to deter them from taking particular actions, or something similarly prescriptive. This was certainly the case in relation to the deployment of a Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) frigate to the Persian Gulf to assist in the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

### Managing Confrontation

6.45 Even with an agreement in place, defence forces may still be needed to contain residual conflict.
between protagonists while other political, diplomatic, or economic actions are taken to conclude a lasting settlement of the dispute. The overriding consideration in conducting peace support or stability and support operations in circumstances requiring military containment, is that the military instrument is but one component of the total effort required to achieving a lasting peace.

While all such organisations are vital, the military forces deployed into the affected area provide the ultimate power base. It is their ability to force de-escalation and encourage or enforce compliance that ensures a stable security environment within which the others can operate.

Force must be used as part of an overall approach to confrontation management. The use of warfighting techniques may be essential to ensure security or compliance, but the aim will never be destruction or the application of lethal force for its own sake. When force is used, it is vital to regard it as a tool to be used in support of broader confrontation management. The application of force will need to

Other elements that contribute to a lasting peace include:

- the people of the host nation and their government
- civil administrators
- international organisations (including the UN and its specialist agencies)
- non-governmental organisations
- commercial companies supporting operations and/or looking to assist with reconstruction projects.
be coordinated with other elements of confrontation management in progress at the same time.

6.49 In the early stages, and while stabilising the security situation, defence forces may be the only organised group present. They need to be prepared to initiate integrated campaign planning to include each element as it arrives.22

Impartiality

6.50 Armed forces are expected to conduct themselves within the parameters of the mandate underpinning and authorising an operation. This effectively creates the strategic justification for the presence of a military force. Such military forces are expected to act impartially and lawfully in the conduct of operations to promote and enforce the mandate.

Consent

6.51 While there is generally a strategic-level mandate for the conduct of operations and the presence of armed forces, there may well be variance in the degree of consent to that mandate at lower levels and in different locations. Military actions can be necessarily robust at times, but the strategic outcomes associated with the mandate should always be borne in mind.

Restraint in the Use of Force

6.52 Excessive use of force is unlikely to aid in the promotion of the strategic goals and be consistent with the mandate. The mandate may justify, or in fact require, the use of appropriate force to achieve the objective.

6.53 The strategic consequences of the use of force are a relevant and important consideration where such force is employed by armed forces. A clear understanding of the consequences of appropriate levels of force for coercion and deterrence is essential.

A Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan (TICP) must incorporate cross-government objectives and activities and non-military representatives will be critical in developing it.

Humanitarian Operations

6.54 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations. There will be occasions when it will be appropriate to deploy military assets to assist in a foreign emergency or disaster relief operation, either on a national basis or as part of an international effort. In such operations, the NZDF will be deployed for a specific task in an entirely benign posture (except for essential force protection) and in support of the coordinating humanitarian agency. Examples of this include the support to Indonesia in the aftermath of the devastating 2004 Asian tsunami and the support to Samoa after the 2010 tsunami.

6.55 Humanitarian Assistance. The provision of humanitarian aid is principally a function of humanitarian and development agencies. There may be circumstances, especially during conflict, when these agencies are unable to deliver such aid without support from the military. Humanitarian assistance differs from that undertaken in disaster relief operations, in that:

- the provision of humanitarian aid is not the primary mission of the military commander
- the force has not been deployed in support of a humanitarian agency, but for the purpose of military operations
- the military will hand over full responsibility for the humanitarian task to civilian agencies at the earliest possible opportunity.

Domestic Tasks

6.56 The NZDF has the capacity to deliver a range of services in support of other government departments, the community, and foreign and defence policy objectives (see Figure 6-3). This support may be provided by a combination of deployable force elements and non-deployable support or training units. These operations are generally divided into government support operations and community support operations.
The term ‘domestic tasks’ is used to describe both the formal, pre-planned support to specific government departments and agencies, and the unplanned emergency support in times of crisis. Domestic tasks are becoming an increasingly significant function for the NZDF within New Zealand’s range of security events. Undertaking domestic tasks is a joint activity and typically involves operations concerned with the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone/maritime environment and New Zealand territory, including border patrol.

Figure 6-3: Agencies supported by the New Zealand Defence Force.
National Self-defence: Protecting New Zealand’s Security

6.58 New Zealand has the right to use armed force to protect its sovereign territory, political independence, persons, and property against an armed attack. This right extends to those areas that New Zealand has a statutory responsibility to defend (such as The Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue). Protecting New Zealand includes having the capacity to deter and defeat military threats or incursions. Protection encompasses the integrity of New Zealand, its territorial waters, and airspace. This also includes the NZDF supporting other government departments (termed military aid to civil authorities in matters of security and law enforcement). Military aid to civil authorities may also involve provision of limited manpower to assist local authorities during unforeseen contingencies or more significant resources to assist the civil power in countering, for example, terrorism.

6.59 Decisions to use force for national self-defence can only be taken by the New Zealand Government. The government may choose from a wide variety of responses, including the use of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements.

6.60 If a direct military threat to New Zealand’s mainland occurs, appropriate forces (either national or with allies and partners) would be provided to confront the specific threat and to deter further aggression.

Use of Force Authorised by the United Nations

6.61 The United Nations (UN) Security Council may authorise the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in response to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggression. Resolutions passed by the Security Council bind all member states including New Zealand. Member states may be called upon to contribute armed forces to give effect to such resolutions, either as part of a UN force or as part of a coalition/combined force. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) procedures set out in NZDDR06.1 Rules of Engagement (2nd Edition) apply to all such uses of force.

6.62 Force used in accordance with a UN Security Council mandate may include the conduct of armed combat operations against a designated enemy. In such circumstances, neither force elements nor individual members of the NZDF are acting in self-defence, but rather use force to accomplish the mission that has been assigned to them.

6.63 UN operations authorised under Chapter VI or Chapter VIII of the UN Charter will not authorise the use of force. ROE in these circumstances will be predicated upon force element self-defence and individual self-defence.

Treaty Obligations

6.64 Membership of a Treaty, such as the Canberra Pact or the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), may involve political obligations that may include assisting an ally, even if New Zealand’s security is not directly threatened.
Collective Security (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Where a group of sovereign states form a general system of organisation designed to deal with peace as an indivisible entity, and therefore a threat to the peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire group of states, which must agree in advance both to react to such a threat and how to react against it.

Combat Operations (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Military operations where the use or threatened use of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.

Combined Operation (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Command (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The authority that a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of his rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

Common Security (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Where two or more sovereign states form a system of international organisation designed to preserve peace by reducing international tension, assisting transparency, and providing a forum where common security issues can be aired and discussed openly.

Comprehensive Approach (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

An approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and de-conflicting the activities of the military, other
government departments, and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.

Conflict

See Armed Conflict.

Conflict Prevention (NATO AAP–6 (2015))

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and—when necessary—military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. See also: Peace Support Operations.

Control (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

Cyber (NZDF Cyber Primer)

That which relates to or involves operating or taking action in and through computer and information technology networks.

Cyberspace (NZDF Cyber Primer)

A global domain consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers and software.

Deterrence (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.

Doctrine (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.

End-State (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The set of desired conditions that will achieve the strategic objectives.

Fighting Power (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Fighting power is the result of the integration of three interdependent components:

- the conceptual component provides the knowledge to fight
- the moral component provides the will to fight
- the physical component provides the means to fight.

Force Element (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The force elements of the NZDF are the units which directly contribute to the delivery of the NZDF outputs, and which may form part of an operational force, e.g., a frigate, an Orion detachment, or a Light Task Group. Force elements will be capable of undertaking a limited independent task, or contributing to a Service, joint or combined operation.

Insurgency (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Intelligence (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity.

Interoperability (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide the services to, and accept services from, other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
Irregular Activity (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Irregular activity is the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups, or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. It comprises criminality, disorder, insurgency, and terrorism.

Joint (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc. in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Joint Effect (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The integrated approach that allows the value of a joint force to become more than merely the sum of its components.

Logistics (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel
- movement, evacuation and hospitalisation of personnel
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services.

Manoeuvre (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy.
2. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Manoeuvrist Approach (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose that creates a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. The manoeuvrist approach focuses commanders at every level on exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy strength, and protecting friendly vulnerabilities.

Military Capability (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Military capability is the ability to achieve a desired operational objective in a selected environment, and to sustain that level of effort for a designated period.

Military Doctrine

See Doctrine.

Military Strategy (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

That component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.

Mission (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.
2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task.

Mission Command (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about the intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.

Mobilisation (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

1. The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources.
2. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organising personnel, supplies, and materiel for active military service.

**Mobility (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

A quality or capability of military forces that permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission.

**National Security (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

The ability to preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders.

**National Strategic Aim (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

The Government’s declared purpose in a situation. It is normally expressed in terms of a future desired outcome.

**Operation (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission.

2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

**Operational Art (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

Operational art is the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, sequencing, and direction of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates strategic into operational and ultimately tactical actions.

**Operational Command (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

The authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy elements, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational control, tactical command, and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

**Operational Control (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy elements concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those elements. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the elements concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

**Operational Level of War (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

The operational level of war is concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level that military strategy is implemented by assigning missions, tasks, and resources to tactical operations.

**Peacebuilding (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and—when necessary—military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations.

See also: Peace Support Operations.

**Peace Enforcement (NZ Supp to AAP-6)**

A peace support operation conducted to maintain a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. Military forces must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially.

See also: Peace Support Operations.
Peacekeeping (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence.

See also: Peace Support Operations.

Peacemaking (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
A peace support operation conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

See also: Peace Support Operations.

Peace Support Operations (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
A generic term describing operations that impartially make use of diplomatic, civil, and military means to restore or maintain peace. They are operations carried out under an appropriate mandate. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Reserve Forces (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
Personnel, units or formations earmarked for future use on mobilisation or against an operational requirement, or withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement.

Security (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
1. Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, annoyance or surprise.

2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.

3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that deters unauthorised persons from attempting to gain access to official matters affecting national security.

Stability and Support Operations (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
Operations that impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies.

Staff (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
The body of military professionals who support a commander in his or her estimation of a situation, and in formulating and executing subsequent plans, orders, and activities.

Strategic Level of Conflict (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
The strategic level of conflict is that level of war that is concerned with the art and science of employing national power.

Strategic Objective (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim.

Strike (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
An attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.

Surveillance (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

Tactical Level of Conflict (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
The tactical level of conflict is concerned with the planning and conduct of battle and is characterised by the application of concentrated force and offensive action to gain objectives.

Tempo (NZ Supp to AAP-6)
The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations.
Terrorism (AAP-6 (2015))

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Theatre (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

A designated geographic area for which an operational-level joint or combined commander is appointed and in which a campaign or series of major operations is conducted. A theatre may contain one or more joint force areas of operation.

Unit (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

1. Any military element whose structure is prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of organisation and equipment; specifically, part of an organisation.

2. An organisation title of a subdivision of a group in a task force.

3. A standard or basic quantity into which an item of supply is divided, issued or used. In this meaning, also called ‘unit of issue’.

War (Concise Oxford Dictionary)

Armed hostilities between nations or states.

Warfare (NZ Supp to AAP-6)

Warfare is the application of lethal force using a range of combat techniques and military capabilities.
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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Interoperability Program</td>
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<td>AC SCE</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Strategic Commitments and Engagement</td>
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<td>ADMM+</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+</td>
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<td>ADDP</td>
<td>Australian Defence Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>Australian Defence Force Publication</td>
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<td>AJODWG</td>
<td>NATO Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group</td>
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<td>ASIC</td>
<td>Air and Space Interoperability Council</td>
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<td>AUSCANNZUKUS</td>
<td>Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States Agreement Naval Command, Control and Communications Board</td>
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<td>British Defence Doctrine</td>
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<td>Combined Communications Electronics Board</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Force</td>
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<td>CIS Systems</td>
<td>Communication and Information</td>
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<td>CMF</td>
<td>Capability Management Framework</td>
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<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial Off-The-Shelf</td>
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<td>DESC</td>
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<td>DPMC Cabinet</td>
<td>Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
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<td>DLOC</td>
<td>Directed Level of Capability</td>
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<td>Defence Technology Agency</td>
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<td>DWP16</td>
<td>Defence White Paper 2016</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defence Arrangement</td>
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<td>HADR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
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<td>Headquarters’ New Zealand Defence Force</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JDP</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>JIM</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Multinational</td>
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<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>Multinational Interoperability Council</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
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<td>ODESC</td>
<td>Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OLOC</td>
<td>Operational Level of Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>OODA</td>
<td>Observe, Orient, Decide, Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRICIE</td>
<td>Personnel; Research and Development; Infrastructure and Organisations, Concepts, Doctrine, and Collective Training; Information Management; Equipment, Supplies and Services, and Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCJWC</td>
<td>Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference</td>
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<td>RNZN</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Navy</td>
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<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>TICP</td>
<td>Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>The Technical Cooperation Program</td>
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